JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The appellant company made defaults in making payments of the contribution due under the Employees' Provident Fund Act. For the defaults committed in respect of the period February 1963 to February, 1966 the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner assessed damages at Rs. 25,141.35. He served a notice of demand upon the appellant company requiring it to pay the amount within the stated period of time. Aggrieved, on June 28, 1968 the appellant company filed a detailed representation before the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. On 12th July, 1968 the appellant company made a detailed representation before the State Government against the assessment of damages. On 19th August. 1968 the State Government passed an order rejecting the representation of the appellant company. Thereupon the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner served the notice dated 18th September, 1968 requiring the appellant company to pay the aforesaid sum within 10 days of the receipt of the notice failing which the entire amount of damages was to be recovered from the appellant company as arrears of Land Revenue. Thereupon, the appellant company instituted a writ petition in this Court. 2. The petition was supported by the plea that Sec. 14-B of the Employees Provident Fund Act which authorises the State Government to assess and realise damages for delay or default in making contributions was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was also argued that the impugned notices of demand were invalid because they were issued in violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned Single Judge was not impressed by these submissions. He dismissed the writ petition; hence the present appeal. 3. In support of the appeal three points were stressed : - 1. Sec. 14-B of the Act was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution a it conferred unguided discretion; 2. That the principles of natural justice were violated in this case; and 3. That the order of the State Government was bad because it did not disclose any reasons for rejecting the representation of the appellant company. 4. In Messrs Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, C.M.W. No. 189 of 1968. D/d. 11.4.1969 one of us upheld the validity of Sec. 14-B. It was held: "Sec. 14-B empowers the appropriate Government to levy and recover damages for committing default in making the deposit. 4. In Messrs Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, C.M.W. No. 189 of 1968. D/d. 11.4.1969 one of us upheld the validity of Sec. 14-B. It was held: "Sec. 14-B empowers the appropriate Government to levy and recover damages for committing default in making the deposit. The Government had been given a discretion to recover such damages not exceeding 25% of the amount of the arrears as it may think fit to impose. It was urged that Sec. 14-B vests in the Government at very wide range of discretion. The Government may vary the levy of damages from 1 to 25% in different cases. The provision does not lay down any standard or policy for the guidance of the State Government. It confers all uncanalised and uncontrolled power on the Government. The obvious intention behind Sec. 14-B was to safeguard the interests of the employees in the matter of loss of interest on the employers contribution by the delay in making the deposits. Government, therefore, would levy compensatory damages. That would reasonably be fixed at 6%. But the Government has a discretion of levying damages upto 25%. Sec. 14-B provides for statutory damages for the breach of statutory duty to deposit the amounts within the prescribed period. The object sought to be served by this provision is not merely to afford restitution in integrum, i.e., to recompense the employee, but also to punish the defaulter in an exemplary manner for his wilful wrong. Sec. 14-B is, in my opinion, a provision for exemplary, retributory, penal or punitive damages. In Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. B. N. Rayal, 1960-61 31, F.J.R. 1 the Bombay High Court took the view that Sec. 14-B provides for punitive damages because the intention was to enable the Government to impose such damages that the employer would not find it profitable to make defaults in the payment. Similarly, in R. Fernandes v. The State of Mysore, (1969) 18 F. and L.R. p. 63, the Mysore High Court expressed the view that Sec. 14-B provides for recovery of damages in the nature of punishment or penalty. In the case of R. Fernandes Mysore High Court further observed that the section contains a clear direction that the damages that could be recovered are those which the apropriate Government might think fit to impose. In the case of R. Fernandes Mysore High Court further observed that the section contains a clear direction that the damages that could be recovered are those which the apropriate Government might think fit to impose. The phrase, "as it may think fit to impose" is susceptible of no other construction than that there should be an estimation of amount of damages in each case which presents itself and that estimation should rest itself upon all relevant facts and circumstances. For this, the Court relied upon the decision of the Patna High Court in R. B. H.T. M. Jute Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, I.L.R. 37 Patna 47. In my opinion, it is really not necessary to decide whether Sec. 14-B confers a quasi-judicial or a purely administrative function on the appropriate Government. In either case, the power will have to be exercised consistently with the principles of natural justice. In the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 S.C. 1269 Shah, J. observed : "The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequence. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed; it need not be shown to be super added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implieit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case." Under Sec. 14-B, the State Government has to make an order assessing the damages after objectively taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. That would require an enquiry in consenance with the principles of natural justice. That would require an enquiry in consenance with the principles of natural justice. Sec. 14-B involves the imposition of a penalty which has the effect of depriving the employer of his property in the shape of money. It, therefore, involves serious civil consequences. A duty to follow the principles of natural justice is implicit in the provision. So interpreted, Sec. 14-B cannot be characterised as conferring on arbitrary or an unguided power on the appropriate Government. The measure of damages to be imposed in a given case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The provision, therefore, lays down a policy as well as a standard for the guidance of the executive. For that reason, it cannot be held to import the vios of discrimination so as to violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court decision in F. N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, 1957 S.C. 1151 (1158), is very much in point there. Sec. 167, item 8, of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 was held not to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. In that section the customs authorities were given a discretion to decide the penalty to be imposed upto a maximum of Rs. 1,000/-. The Supreme Court upheld that the discretion could be exercised within the limits fixed by the Statute. So this is not a case of uncontrolled or unreasonable discretion. It was also held that the imposition of fine was really a quasi-judicial act and the test of quantum of it was the gravity of the offence ana the object of the Act. Applying these principles it could not be said that the conferment of power by Sec. 14-B was unguided and arbitrary. For the petitioner Mr. Gupta placed reliance upon the observations of K. Subba Rao, C.J. in Messrs. Devi Das Gopal Krishnan, etc. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 S.C. 1895 . In paragraph 23, his Lordship expressed the opinion that a large statutory discretion placing a wide gap between the minimum and the maximum rates and thus enabling the Government to impose an arbitrary rate may not be sustainable. Devi Das Gopal Krishnan, etc. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 S.C. 1895 . In paragraph 23, his Lordship expressed the opinion that a large statutory discretion placing a wide gap between the minimum and the maximum rates and thus enabling the Government to impose an arbitrary rate may not be sustainable. In that case, Sec. 5(1) of the East Punjab Central Sales Tax Act, 1948 which authorised the Government to fix the rate of Sales Tax exceeding 2 paise in a rupee was held to be valid on the ground that the discretion to fix the rate between 1 pice and 2 pice in a rupee is so insignificant that it is not possible to hold that it exceeds the permissible limits. The observations relied upon by the petitioners, were in the nature of an obiter. Moreover, in that case the Court was concerned with a purely administrative power which was not to be exercised after examining and considering the facts and circumstances of each case. The principles applicable to such a power would not apply to Sec. 14-B involved in the present case wherein the power can be exercised after considering the merits of each case. In the latter class of cases, conferment of discretion is neither arbitrary nor unguided. Moreover, the value of these observations in Devi Das's case has been neutralised to some extent by the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1968 S.C. 1232 . In that case Section 150 (i) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act which I provides that the maximum rate of taxi which was to be levied was to be specified and sanctioned by the Central Government, was held to be valid. There the statute did not itself provide for a maximum, yet it was held to be valid. It was held that that section was not a piece of excessive delegation beyond the constitutionally permissible limits not was it discriminatory." 5. We are in agreement with this view. 6. In regard to the second point we are satisfied that this is not a fit case for interference. It was held that that section was not a piece of excessive delegation beyond the constitutionally permissible limits not was it discriminatory." 5. We are in agreement with this view. 6. In regard to the second point we are satisfied that this is not a fit case for interference. On March 18, 1963 the State Government issued a notification authorising the Regional Provident Fund Commissioners to assess and realise damages under Sec. 14-B of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952 so far as possible in accordance with the scales given in it. On October, 15, 1966, the State Government partially cancelled the aforesaid notification and directed the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, that in future when damages are proposed to be levied appropriate recommendations should be made to the State Government for sanction in all cases. This shows that the power to assess or realise damages was not delegated to the Commissioner. The Commissioner's powers were in the nature of a fact finding authority. It was for the State Government to sanction the amount of damages in each case. 7. In the present case the Commissioner assessed the proposed damages and informed the appellant company of his proposals. Thereupon the appellant company made a detailed representation before him as also before the State Government. The State Government considered the representation and after an oral hearing it was unable to accept the same. 8. The principles of natural justice only require that the aggrieved person should have an opportunity of having his say in the matter. This was amply complied with in the present case. Since the Commissioner is not the authority which passes a final order it was not necessary at all that an opportunity must have been given to the appellant company before the Commissioner made his recommendations. 9. The third point is also without merit. In Star Construction and Transport Company v. State of Mysore and another, 42 F.J.R. 308. The Mysore High Court held that the order under Sec. 14-B must be a speaking order containing the reasons in support of the order, though it need not be elaborate like m order of Court. The order must disclose that there has been an application of the mind of the Government to the matters in controversy and the contentions raised by the employer. The order must disclose that there has been an application of the mind of the Government to the matters in controversy and the contentions raised by the employer. A perusal of Annexure `C' filed along with the counter-affidavit of Sri Ram Dayal Sharma, which is a copy of the reasons recorded by the State Government, clearly shows that the State Government applied its mind to the various points raised by the appellant company at the oral hearing given to it by the State Government. It is, therefore, clear that the State Government did apply to its mind and recorded detailed reasons for rejecting the representation of the appellant company. 10. It is true, that the State Government did not communicate a copy of the reasons to the appellant company along with the communication intimating the rejection of its representation. It was no doubt necessary, and it is hoped that in future while communicating the information regarding rejection or otherwise of the representation, the reasons will also be communicated. Unless the reasons are communicated they do not serve any purpose because it is settled that a party who has made a representation should know the reasons for rejection of his representation. Recording the reasons and keeping them on the file of the Government is an exercise in futility. Nonetheless, we are satisfied that this is not a fit case for interference because a copy of the reasons having been annexed to the counter-affidavit, its contents came to the knowledge of the appellant company. It was open to the appellant company to have suitably amended the writ petition if it thought that there was any error on the face of the recorded reasons upon which relief can be claimed. In the absence of any such ground of attack the plea that the order is not a speaking one becomes a technical one. 11. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.