JUDGMENT K.B.N. Singh, J 1. This revision petition is directed against an order dated the 10th December, 1971 of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Gopalganj, drawing a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') and attaching the land in dispute excluding the dwelling house standing thereon, under section 145 (4) of the Code. It is mainly the question of legality of the order of attachment in the proceeding which is under challenge in this revision application and the case has been referred to a Division Bench to consider the correctness of the decision in 1970 P.L.J.R. 677. 2. On the application dated the 12th October, 1971, filed by opposite party no.1 about apprehension of a breach of the peace in respect of 1 katha 1 dhur of land, being the south-eastern portion of survey plot no.2440 of khata no. 407, situated in village Barkagaon, Police station Mirganj, district Saran. On the 14th October, 1971, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Gopalganj, drew up a proceeding under section 144 of the Code and restrained both the parties from going over the land in dispute. After the parties filed their show cause, the parties were heard and the impugned order was passed. 3. The case of the petitioners who were the second party no. 1 to 3 in the proceeding was that plot nos. 1225 and 2440 having a total area of 16 kathas 18 dhurs admittedly belonged to Kokil Tawaif. On the 25th March, 1941, she sold plot no. 1225 to her sister's son, Reyasat Mian, along with other lands and in 1351 fasli, she orally gifted her remaining lands including plot no. 2440 to Reyasat Mian. On the 16th March 1954, Reyasat Mian sold 1 katha I dhur of plot no. 2440 towards south and 15 dhurs of plot no. 1225 from south to S.K.G. Mill Ltd., by a registered sale deed. By two sale deeds dated the 10th December 1968 and the 16th. January, 1971, the Mills sold the entire purchased lands to Shri Nath Bhagat Opposite party no. 2 who was second party no. 4 in the proceeding. Shri Nath Bhagat sold all his purchased land in plot no. 2440 i.e. 1 katha 1 dhur and 5 dhurs out of plot no. January, 1971, the Mills sold the entire purchased lands to Shri Nath Bhagat Opposite party no. 2 who was second party no. 4 in the proceeding. Shri Nath Bhagat sold all his purchased land in plot no. 2440 i.e. 1 katha 1 dhur and 5 dhurs out of plot no. 1225 in favour of these petitioners by five registered sale deeds dated the 30th March, 1971 and put them in possession thereof and remained in possession of only 10 dhurs out of plot no. 1225. The case of the second party further is that Kokil Tawaif neither married nor had any daughter and Bibi Khatoon, from whom the first party claims to have purchased the land, is an imposter. First party Akbar Mian (opposite party no. 1) is the son of Reyasat Mian is stopped from challenging the title or possession of the second party. They denied that the first party have constructed any structure on the disputed land. It was also asserted that earlier also there was a proceeding under section 144 of the Code in respect of this very disputed land which was decided in favour of the petitioners-second party by an older dated the 8th October, 1971. 4. The case of the first party is that the residential house of Kokil Tawaif stood on plot no. 1226/2440 measuring 11 kathas 17 dhurs which stood recorded in her name and she had got another plot bearing no. 1225 having an area of 4 kathas 11 dhurs. It is also admitted by the first party that Kokil Tawaif sold plot no. 1225 to Reyasat Mian on the 25th March, 1941 who came in possession thereof. But it is asserted that Kokil Tawaif later married and had a daughter Bibi Khatoon who inherited the rest of her properties after her death. The first party claims to have purchased plot no. 1226/2440 from Bibi Khatoon by a registered sale deed dated the 25th March, 1971, and claims to have been in possession thereof since then and put four palanies thereon and let them out to four shop keepers on monthly rent. It is the case of the first party that the earlier proceeding under section 144 of the Code was wrongly , decided and being emboldened by that order .the second party are ready to commit breach of the peace by removing the aforesaid shops from the disputed land. 5. It is the case of the first party that the earlier proceeding under section 144 of the Code was wrongly , decided and being emboldened by that order .the second party are ready to commit breach of the peace by removing the aforesaid shops from the disputed land. 5. Before coming to the main question, it will be convenient to dispose of the submission of Mr. Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha, learned Counsel for the petitioners that the earlier proceeding under section 144 of the Code having been decided in favour of his client on the 8th October, 1971, the learned Magistrate acted illegally in initiating a fresh proceeding under section 144 of the Code only four days thereafter on the petition filed by the opposite party and later converting the same into a proceeding under section 145 of the Code. There is no substance in the submission of I the learned, Counsel. The first party made a specific allegation of fresh apprehension of a breach of the peace at the hands of the second party as a result of the earlier order and no illegality has been committed by the Magistrate if after being satisfied about serious apprehension of a breach of the peace, he drew up a proceeding under section 144 of the Code, nor he committed any illegality in converting the said proceeding under section 145 of the Code after being fully satisfied on perusal of the show cause, the documents filed by the parties and after hearing the parties that there was a bona fide dispute with regard to possession of land and there was apprehension of a breach of the peace on that account. An Application by a party also could be the basis of the Magistrate's satisfaction for initiating a proceeding under section 144 or 145 of the Code is beyond dispute Vide R.H. Bhutani v. Miss M.J. Desai, AIR 968 S.C. 1444. 6. As to the main question which falls for consideration in this case, Mr. Sinha has urged that the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate has assigned no reason for ordering attachment of the land in dispute. 6. As to the main question which falls for consideration in this case, Mr. Sinha has urged that the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate has assigned no reason for ordering attachment of the land in dispute. He also urged that the third proviso to section 145 (4) of the Code lays down that an order of attachment can only be passed, if the Magistrate considers it a case of emergency and it must be so stated in the order of attachment, otherwise the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment. The relevant proviso to section 145 (4) reads thus: "Provided also that, if the Magistrate considers the case one of emergency, he may at any time attach the subject of dispute, pending his decision under this section." It is true that the impugned order of the learned Magistrate has not mentioned that he considered it a case of emergency and therefore, the order of attachment was made. No reason for attachment has been given. The aforesaid proviso dealing with the attachment does not lay down that the reason for attachment should be recorded in the order itself. It may be pointed out that in section 145 (1) of the Code, it is specifically laid down that a Magistrate should state "the ground of his being so satisfied" while drawing up a proceeding under section 145 of the Code that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed concerning any land or later etc., while in the proviso in question it is not so laid down that for an order of attachment a Magistrate should record his reasons for being so satisfied that the case is one of emergency for ordering the attachment of the disputed land. The requirement of recording of reasons for an order under one sub-section of section 145 and not in the other is not without significance. To import the idea of recording of reasons on the general principles that every judicial order should be backed by reasons, in such a situation will be adding to the provisions of the Statute where it has not been so provided by the legislation in its wisdom. The general .principles that every judicial order should be backed by reasons is also not of universal application. The general .principles that every judicial order should be backed by reasons is also not of universal application. Absence of reasons for an order where Statue does not so requires does not make the order per se bad and illegal. It is true that the order of attachment should be made, if the Magistrate considers the case as one of 'emergency' but the question whether the case is one of emergency or not is a question to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each particular cases on the materials that are available before the Magistrate at the time of passing an order of attachment. An order of attachment will not necessarily be good simply because it has been mentioned in the order that the Magistrate considered it to be a case of emergency. It will again depend on the facts of each case. In a case, which is not of emergency, if an order of attachment is passed, it will be open to a party to satisfy the Magistrate that no emergency, in fact, existed for an order of attachment. This Court also in exercise of its revisional Jurisdiction is not precluded from going into the question whether in fact the case is one of emergency for an order of attachment. It is, therefore, apparent that an order of attachment cannot be said to be illegal simply because the word 'emergency' has not been mentioned in the order of attachment the proceeding under section 145 of the Code itself being of emergency nature as observed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case reported in A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1444. Therefore, the propriety of an order of attachment has to be judged on the materials that are before the Magistrate while passing an order of attachment, and mere absence from the order that he considered the case as one of 'emergency' should not be the sale ground for setting aside an order of attachment as illegal. The purpose behind an order of attachment is to keep effective control over the subject matter of dispute, where immediate measures are necessary to prevent the contesting parties from creating breach of the peace in their attempt to obtain actual possession of the disputed properties during the pendency of the proceeding, for which the responsibility lies with the Magistrate. 7. The purpose behind an order of attachment is to keep effective control over the subject matter of dispute, where immediate measures are necessary to prevent the contesting parties from creating breach of the peace in their attempt to obtain actual possession of the disputed properties during the pendency of the proceeding, for which the responsibility lies with the Magistrate. 7. Learned Counsel has submitted that if two conditions required for initiation of a proceeding under section 145 of the Code, namely, (i) that there is a dispute between the parties concerning land etc. as laid down in the Section and (ii) that such a dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace, are considered to be sufficient ground for attachment of the property in dispute, then there will be an order of attachment in every case. The primary purpose behind a proceeding under section 145 of the Code is to avert an apprehension of a breach of the peace regarding land etc., and the idea is to decide the question of possession without going into complicated question of title of the parties within a period of two months from the date of appearance of the parties as contemplated by section 145(4) of the Code. The speedy disposal of such proceedings within a period of two months, as desired by the Legislature, has remained a pious wish, be it for the delaying tactics of the parties, or the Executive Magistrates who try such cases being not in a position to devote their full time to such cases. The initiation of a proceeding under section 145 of the Code by itself does not ensure that there will be no apprehension of a breach of the peace at the hands of the parties, as it does not amount to any restraint order against them. Therefore, if the facts on the basis of which a proceeding under section 145 of the Code is drawn, also discloses, that there is immediate or 'imminent danger of clash between the parties in an effort to measure their strength to take possession of the disputed land endangering public peace, then that will be a case of emergency or pressing necessity for an order of attachment though emerging from same set of facts on the basis of which a proceeding under section 145 of the Code has been initiated. What case will be considered as one of emergency, as held earlier, is a question to be decided on the facts of each particular case and wide discretion has been allowed to the Magistrates in this regard for which no hard and fast rule has been laid down. Therefore, it will not be correct to say that the two conditions required for initiating a proceeding under section 145 of the Code are precisely the reasons for attachment of the property in dispute, nor it will be correct to say that an order of attachment will follow in such situation in almost every case, as suggested by the learned Counsel. 8. The three decisions of this Court, relied upon by Mr. Sinha in support of his submission now remain to be considered. 9. In the case of Rambachan Singh vs. Ramsajan Singh, 1970 PLJR 677, Verma, J. noticing that the requirement of recording reasons for an order under sub-section (1) of section 145 or sub-section (3) of Section 117 is not to be found under the third proviso to sub• section (4) of Section 145 of the Code, has held as follows: "Every legal order, whether there are directions in the Jaw to give reasons or not, must be backed by reasons. That is the general principle of Jaw. In that view of the matter, I think, the impugned order suffers from this infirmity. He has not written in the order as to why he was satisfied." and set aside the order. 10. As already held, the general principle of law that every judicial order should be backed by reason is also not of universal application, and looked at from that point of view, the legal position, with great respect to the learned Judge. has been too widely laid down in that decision, in so far as it lays down that the order has to be set aside merely on that score. I respectfully differ from that view. The Magistrate should do well to record reasons for his order, but that by itself would be no ground for setting aside the order. If the materials before the Magistrate justify immediate measure for prevention of breach of peace, and an order of attachment has been passed without assigning reason or mentioning that the case is one of emergency, the order could not be set aside on that score. If the materials before the Magistrate justify immediate measure for prevention of breach of peace, and an order of attachment has been passed without assigning reason or mentioning that the case is one of emergency, the order could not be set aside on that score. The two unreported single Judge decisions of this Court relied upon by the learned Counsel, one in the case of Sankar Thakur vs. Ramkailash Thakur and another Cr. Rev. No. 1856/71 D. 7.2.1973 and the other in the case of Jagat Kishore Pd. Narain Singh vs. Chandrawati Singh and others have simply followed the aforesaid decision reported in 1970 P.L.J.R. 677, the former expressly referring to it while the latter without mentioning it. The two decisions, one in the case of Atma Singh vs. Rarnam Singh A.I.R. 1926 Lahore 205 and the other in the case of Ahshan Saji vs. Sona Mir A.I.R. 1958 Jammu and Kashmir 17 relied upon by Verma J. do not support the view taken by him in the decision of 1970 P. L.J. R. 677. All that the Lahore decision lays down is that where a breach of peace is imminent, the Magistrate should attach the, disputed property. There can be no doubt about this proposition of law. The Lahore decision does not lay down that if no reason is given, the order will be per se bad. The full Bench decision of Jammu and Kashmir High Court accepted the reference made by the Sessions Judge and set aside an order of attachment on two grounds, firstly that the Magistrate had not drawn up a preliminary Older in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 145 and secondly that the order of attachment was' improper on the ground that no prayer for attachment was made by the party on whose application the proceeding was drawn up. The only material relied upon in that case in support of the order of attachment, the statement of a witness in the case, was considered to be not disclosing any emergency for attachment. The following observations from that decision may usefully be quoted. The only material relied upon in that case in support of the order of attachment, the statement of a witness in the case, was considered to be not disclosing any emergency for attachment. The following observations from that decision may usefully be quoted. "But whatever this witness may have said, there was no request made by the non-applicant for the attachment of the tree and the Magistrate, even if he wanted to use his powers under second proviso to sub section (4) of Section 145, should have recorded his finding that the case was one of emergency, and that the circumstances of the case were such that it was not possible for him to direct issuing of notice to the other side before making that order." 11. In the instant cases, after a proceeding under section 144 was drawn up and the parties were restrained from going to the land they filed show cause and thereafter, the proceeding was converted into one under section 145 of the Code and the land was attached. The assertion in the show cause, made on behalf of the first party, at whose instance the proceeding was drawn up, was that the second party, emboldened by an earlier order in a proceeding under section 144 of the Code, were out to commit breach of the peace by removal of the aforesaid four shops from the disputed land and that the second party were influential and powerful persons and the first party had no resources to resist them. If in such a situation an order of attachment has been made, in my considered opinion, it should not be set aside merely on account of omission from the order that the Magistrate considered the case as one of emergency. 12. In the result, there is no merit in this application and it is, accordingly, rejected. I agree. Application dismissed.