JUDGMENT The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a raiyat under the state in respect of the disputed lands. On 6th January, 1954 the petitioner's husband Sri Baidya Nath Banerjee executed a Registered Deed in gavour of the petitioner. It is alleged that the said deed was a confirmatory document and not a document of transfer. Upon the publication of the notification under section 4 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 the intermediary interests of the aforesaid landlords vested in the State. It is stated that in the finally published Revisional Record of Rights, the petitioner was recorded as a raiyat in respect of the said lands directly under the state. Sri Baidya Nath Banerjee submitted return in Form B exercising his choice to retain his khas lands in terms of section 6 of the Act. The Revenue Officer, Suri, started big raiyat Case No. 9 of 1968 under section 6 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 and after holding an enquiry by his Order No. 10 dated 27 July, 1959 accepted the said returns of Baidya Nath Banerjee and directed that Khanda Khatians be opened. In consequence thereafter, it is alleged Sri Baidya Nath Banerjee rendered to the State a large number of plots of lands. It is stated that the Assistant Settlement Officer and charge Officer, Birbhum, Suri to whom powers of the State Government under section 5A of the Act had been delegated purported to start an enquiry under section 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 in respect of the seven deeds executed and registered on 6th January, 1954. The said Officer recorded that he was of the opinion that there was prima faice reasons for believing that the alleged transfers may not be bonafide. The enquiry was started under section 5A of the Act and a case under section 5A of the Act was registered as Case No. 190 of 1960-61. The Assistant Settlement Officer duly served notices of the said case on all interested parties and proceeded to hold an enquiry under section 5A of the Act. The enquiry was started under section 5A of the Act and a case under section 5A of the Act was registered as Case No. 190 of 1960-61. The Assistant Settlement Officer duly served notices of the said case on all interested parties and proceeded to hold an enquiry under section 5A of the Act. The petitioner and other parties filed written objections, adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their cases that the transfers in question were made in the year 1351 B.S. i.e. long before 5th of May, 1953 and as such the transfers did not come within the mischief of section 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. From the judgment in Case No. 190 of 1961 it appears that the parties did not prefer an appeal. It is contended that the judgment passed in the case became final. It appears that the Revenue Officer, B. Camp, Suri, thereafter issued a notice u/s 57 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act upon the Baidya Nath Banerjee. Against the notice under section 57 calling upon Sri Baidya Nath Banerjee to submit a statement of land of which possession will be given up in consequent whereupon, Baidya Nath Banerjee moved this court and obtained the rule and ad interim order being C.R. No. 1917 (W) of 1967. On 14th November, 1967 the Assistant Settlement Officer, Suri, issued a notice on the petitioner after recording that he was of the opinion that there was, prima facie reasons for believing that the said transfer may not be bona fide. The Assistant Settlement Officer ordered that an enquiry will be held by him under section 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and seven cases were started by him under section 5A of the Act being Case Nos. 1 to 7 of 1967 being served with the notice, Sri Baidya Nath Banerjee filed a preliminary objection before the Revenue Officer that once under section 5A of the Act proceeding has been started and concluded and finding has been made in favour of the petitioner the said proceeding cannot be reopened by starting a second enquiry. That preliminary objection was however rejected. Thereupon the petitioner's Advocate applied for further time to move the Higher Court which was however rejected whereupon the petitioner's Advocate withdrew from the case and order was made ex parte. That preliminary objection was however rejected. Thereupon the petitioner's Advocate applied for further time to move the Higher Court which was however rejected whereupon the petitioner's Advocate withdrew from the case and order was made ex parte. Against the order of rejection of the preliminary objection, the petitioner moved the appeal court and the appeal however was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Revenue Officer for rehearing of the matter but the preliminary point on which the petitioner urged was held against the petitioner. Being aggrieved, the petitioner moved this court and obtained the present rule. 2. The respondent has filed the affidavit. In the affidavit the respondent, inter alia, stated that Baidya Nath Banerjee, husband of the petitioner, transferred about 135.87 acres of khas land to his near relations, namely wife, sons, daughters, son's wife etc. By several deeds of gifts executed on 6th January, 1954 all the registered deeds except the one made in favour of his son's wife, were stated to be confirmatory deeds of alleged oral gift made in 1944 by Sm. Mriganayana Devi, the mother of the said Baidy Nath Banerjee. By virtue of the confirmatory deeds, the alleged transferees, including the petitioner, purported to get the names recorded in the finally published records of rights. In November, 1961 the Revenue Officer, namely A.S.O. and charge officer, Birbhum, Suri initiated a proceeding under section 5A of the Act fitter notice to the alleged transferor and the transferees. By order dated 1st August, 1961 the said officer concerned accepted the contention of the alleged transferor and held that the transfer was made in 1944 and the deeds dated 6th January, 1954 are nothing but confirmatory deeds and therefore the transfer was effected in 1351 B.S. and not during the prohibited period, that is 5.5.1953 and the date of vesting thereafter 1967 the Assistant Settlement Officer, Mr. H.K. Sinha, started a proceeding under section 5A of the Act against the transferor and the transferee and in the earlier order under section 5A there was no declaration as to whether the transfer is bona fide or mala fide. H.K. Sinha, started a proceeding under section 5A of the Act against the transferor and the transferee and in the earlier order under section 5A there was no declaration as to whether the transfer is bona fide or mala fide. The Assistant Settlement Officer by order dated 24th October, 1967 held that the order dated 1st August, 1961 was merely an opinion and not an order under section 5A of the Act and that it was made without considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the case as also without notice to the Collector. Birbhum who was the necessary party to a proceeding under section 5A and without giving him any opportunity of being heard. In the aforesaid proceeding under section 5A, the alleged transferees, inspite of notices being served, did not appear at the hearing. All the cases were heard analogously and covered by the same judgment. By order dated 28th November, 1967 the Assistant Settlement Officer held that all the transfers dated 6th January, 1954 was hit by section 5A of the Act and hence the transfers are cancelled. Against the said order dated 28th November, 11967, both the transferor and transferees preferred 12 appeals. The appeals were heard by the special Judge, Birbhum, who by order dated 31st July, 1968 directed the case to be remanded back for further hearing, inasmuch as, according to the learned judge, the parties were not given proper opportunity of being heard. The learned Judge, however, overruled the contention of the appellants that fresh proceedings under section 5A would be barred by the principles of res judicata. Against the said appellate order, the petitioner moved this court and obtained the present rule. The respondent denied further that the second proceeding under section 5A is not maintainable. On these pleadings the parties came into trial. 3. The only point argued by Mr. P.N. Mitter on behalf of the petitioner is that once an order under section 5A of the Act has been made and once it hag been held that the transfer in question does not come within the mischief of section 5A of the Act, the Revenue Officer concerned who is delegatee of the State Government, cannot re-open, reconsider or review the order already passed under section 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. 4. Elaborating the point, Mr. 4. Elaborating the point, Mr. Mitter contended that the power of enquiry under section 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act is given to the State Government. Under section 5A(4) of the Act this power can be delegated by the State Government to an officer of the State Government. Therefore when the delegatee of the State Government holds the enquiry, in law, this is an enquiry by the State Government. In support of this point, Mr. Mitter relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in the case of (1) Roop Chand v. State of Punjab and Another reported in AIR 1963 SC 1503 . 5. Mr. Roy Chowdhury on behalf of the respondent, however, contended that the power is an executive power and if that if so, the State Government has a power to reconsider, review or 'rethinking', on the matter. Even when the State Government once exercises the same power by delegation of the power to his officer, the State Government has not been divested of the power under section 5A of the Act. It is argued by Mr. Roy Choudhury that the power being an executive power and so by means of that power attached to it, the State Government or his delegatee can reopen the matter. 6. Section 5A of the Estates Acquisition Act is in the following terms :- "5A. Restriction on certain transfers. (1) The State Government may after the date of vesting enquire into any case of transfer of any land by an intermediary made between the 5th day of May, 1953 and the date of vesting if in its opinion there was prima facie reasons for believing that such transfer was not bona fide. (2) If after such enquiry the State Government finds that such transfer was not bona fide, it shall make an order to that effect and thereupon the transfer shall stand cancelled as from the date on which it was made of purported to have been made; Provided that, subject to such cancellation, nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to affect any rights which the transferor or the transferee may otherwise have against each other. (3) If after such enquiry the State Government finds that the transfer was bona fide, it shall made an order to that effect and thereupon the following consequences shall ensure, namely- (i) the land shall, without prejudice to any rights which the transferor or the transferee may have against each other, be deemed to be the land of the transferee for the purpose of this Act; (ii) if any such land or any part thereof is retained by transferee under the provisions of this chapter, such land or such part thereof may be taken into accounts in calculating the land which may be retained by the transferor under this chapter as if such land or such part thereof had never been transferred and were retained by the transferor or chosen by him as land to be retained by him. (4) The State Government may delegate all or any of its powers under this section to such officers in its service as it may deem fit. (5) The procedure to be followed in such enquiry shall such as may be prescribed : Provided that- (i) No order shall be passed in an enquiry held under this section except after giving the transferor and the transferee an opportunity of being heard; (ii) in conducting such enquiry the State Government any officer to whom any powers have been delegated under sub-section (4), shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purposes of taking evidence, administering oaths, enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of sections 480, 481 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898). (6) An appeal against any order passed by the State Government under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) or passed under any of those sub-sections as read with sub-section (4) by an officer to whom powers have been delegated under sub-section (4), if preferred within sixty days of such order, or within sixty days from the date of appointment of the Special Judge, whichever is later shall lie to a Special Judge being a person who is or has been District Judge or an Additional District Judge appointed by the State Government for the purpose of this section and such Special Judge shall dispose of the appeal according to the prescribed procedure. (7) In this section- (i) a transfer shall be held to be not bona fide if it was made principally or partially with the object of increasing the amount of land which a person may retain under this chapter or principally or partially with the object of increasing the amount of compensation payable under Chapter III or Chapter IV : (ii) a transfer in favour of one or more of the following relatives of the transferor, that is to say, a wife, a husband, a child, a grandchild, a parent, a grandparent, a brother, a sister, a brother's son, a sister's son, a daughter's husband, a son's wife, a wife's brother or sister, or a brother's wife, made between the 5th day of May, 1953 and the date of vesting shall be presumed to be not bona fide until the contrary is proved : Provided that no such presumption shall be made in respect of transfer of land by an intermediary if the aggregate area of such land owned by the intermediary at any time between the 5th day of May, 1953 and the date of transfer did not exceed twenty acres in extent in the case of non-agricultural land and twenty five acres in extent in the case of agricultural land ; (iii) 'transfer' means a transfer by sale, mortgage, lease, exchange, or gift; (iv) 'transferor' and 'transferee' include the successors-in-interest of a "transferor or transferee". 7. Under section 5A the State Government has a power to initiate the proceeding between the period 5th May, 1953 and the date of vesting in respect of a transfer if the State Government is of the opinion there are prima facie reasons for believing that such transfer was not bona fide and after holding the enquiry if the State Government finds that such transfer was not bona fide, it shall make an order to that effect and thereupon the transfer between the prohibited period shall stand cancelled from the date on which it was made or purported to have been made. Such cancellation however will not effect any rights which the transferor or the transferee may otherwise have against each other. Such cancellation however will not effect any rights which the transferor or the transferee may otherwise have against each other. Under sub-section 5A(3)(i) of section 5A it has been provided that the land shall, without prejudice to any rights which the transferor or the transferee may have against each other, be deemed to be the land of the transferee for the purpose of this Act, that section 5A(3)(ii) the land transferred shall be take into account in calculating the land which may be retained by the transferor if any land or part thereof had never been transferred by the transferor if such land or any part has been retained by transferor. The State Government has a power to delegate all or any of its powers to such officer in its service as it may deem fit under section 5A(4) of the Act. Section 5A(5) prescribes the procedure and section 5A(6) provides for appeal against the order made under sub-section (2) or (3). Section 5A(7) provides that the transfer shall be held to be not bona fide, if it was made principally or partially with the object of increasing the amount of land which a person may retain under the chapter or principally or partially with the object of increasing the amount of compensation payable. It further provides that a transfer in favour of one or more of the following relatives of the transferor, namely, a wife, a husband, a child, a grand-child, a grandparent, a brother, a sister, a brother's son, a sister's son, a daughter's husband, a son's wife, a wife's brother or sister, or a brother's wife made between the prohibited period shall be presumed to be not bona fide until the contrary is proved 'Transfer' in the Act means a transfer by sale, mortgage, lease, exchange or gift and the 'transferor' and 'transferee' include the successors in interest of a transferor or a transferee. Section 5A(6) provides for an appeal to the Special Judge. Rules in respect of the proceeding under section 5A is to be found prescribed in Rules 3A of the Estates Requisition Rules. Rule 3 was inserted by notification dated 30th November, 1954. On the date of notification in 1954 the Rule 3A of the Estates Acquisition Rules reads as follows :- "3A. Rules in respect of the proceeding under section 5A is to be found prescribed in Rules 3A of the Estates Requisition Rules. Rule 3 was inserted by notification dated 30th November, 1954. On the date of notification in 1954 the Rule 3A of the Estates Acquisition Rules reads as follows :- "3A. Procedure for enquiry under section 5A(1): The Procedure for enquiry under sub-section (1) of the section 5A shall be as follows:- (1) Where, in the opinion of the State Government of any officer in its service to whom its powers under sub-section (1) of section 5A may be delegated, there are prima facie reasons for believing that transfer of any land made by an intermediary between the 5th day of May, 1953 and sthe date of vesting is not bona fide, the State Government on such officer may record a formal order to that effect. (2) Thereafter the State Government or such officer shall cause to be served an the transferor and the transferee of such land and also on the bargadar, where such land is under the cultivation of a bargadar and such other party as may be found to be interested in or affected by the transferor a copy of such order and a notice requiring them to produce necessary documents and other evidence for proving whether or not the transfer of such land was bona fide and shall specify in such notice a date time and place for the production of such documents and other evidence and the hearing of the case. (3) Upon hearing the transferor, the transferee, the bargadar and other party referred to in sub-rule (2) as appear at the hearing of the case and considering such documents as may be produced and the evidence, if any, which may be adduced and after making such enquiry if any, as the State Government or such officer, thinks fit the State Government or such officer as the case may be, shall make and appropriate order. If, however, the transferor, the transferee, the bargadar or other party referred to in sub-rule (2) does not appear on the date and at the time and placed fixed in the notice under sub-rule (2) for the production of the documents and evidence and for hearing of the case on any subsequent date to which the hearing may be adjourned the State Government or such officer, as the case may be, shall be entitled to proceed to hear the case and to make such order ex parte against the non-appearing transferor, transferee, the bargadar or other party." 8. On 24th December, 1959 Rule 3A(2) was amended and after the words. "Such other party as may be found to be interested in," the words "or affected by", were inserted by the same amendment. It appears that after the word "evidence" the words "for proving whether or not" were inserted. In 1964, Rule 3A(3) was substituted. Rule 3B provides for the procedure for disposal of appeal under section 5A(6) of the Act. Rule 3B is in the following terms :- "3B. Procedure for disposal of appeals under section 5A (6)- The procedure for disposal of appeal under sub-section (2) of section 11 as laid down in Rule 9 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to the procedure for disposal of appeals under sub-section (6) of section 5A." 9. Rule 9 also provides for the procedure for disposal of appeals under section 11 (2) which is as follows :- "Rule 9. Procedure for disposal of appeals under section 11(2): The procedure of disposal of appeals under sub-section (2) of section 11 shall be as follows :- (a) a petition setting forth therein the grounds of appeal, which shall be signed by the appellant or his pleader, shall be presented to the Special Judge, such petition shall be accompanied by a copy of the order appealed against. (b) The appellant shall not, except by leave of the Special Judge, urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal; but the Special Judge in deciding the appeal, shall not be confined to the grounds of objections set forth in the appeal or taken by leave of the Judge. (b) The appellant shall not, except by leave of the Special Judge, urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal; but the Special Judge in deciding the appeal, shall not be confined to the grounds of objections set forth in the appeal or taken by leave of the Judge. (c) Where the petition is defective, the Special Judge may return the same for the purpose of being amended within a time to be fixed by him or such petition may be amended then and there. (d) The Special Judge may stay further proceedings in respect of recovery of fines under the order of the collector until the disposal of the appeal on sufficient grounds being shown. (e) The Special Judge shall fix a date for the hearing of the appeal within six weeks of the presentation of the petition and shall cause notice thereof to be served on the Collector within ten days from the date of presentation of the petition. The appeal shall be disposed of as soon as possible." 10. Now coming to the point raised by Mr. Mitter, it is not disputed in this case that the power has been delegated to the officer concerned. It is also not disputed that the officer concerned passed the order in 1961. In Case No. 190 of 1961 the Revenue Officer concerned held that the transfer does not come within the mischief of section 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. The subsequent proceeding 1967 was initiated by another Revenue Officer on the basis of the delegated power. 11. In my opinion, Mr. Mitter's contention that the second enquiry is incompetent, must be accepted to be correct. In the decision reported in 1966 (1) Calcutta it has been held by this Court in C.R. No. 4658 of 1960 as follows : "No doubt it can be said without hesitation that successive enquiries under section 5A of the Act between the same transferor and transferee and the same transferee regarding same plot of land under the same transfer cannot be resorted to. That will not only be a source of endless harassement but will also lead to endless confusion by the possibility of divergent decision and orders of the Government. That will not only be a source of endless harassement but will also lead to endless confusion by the possibility of divergent decision and orders of the Government. Therefore, within the limits of the order under section 5A and within the limits of condition of (a) the same parties (b) the same transfer and (c) the same land there exist the possibility and scope for the application of the general principles of resjudicata." 12. Mr. Sen Gupta however contended that the principles or res judicata has no application. Mr. Sen Gupta is also right in his contention as has been held by the said judgment of this court decided on 28th August, 1963. In the said case it has also been held that the principles of analogous to the resjudicata are applicable. 13. Mr. Mitter again contended that under section 5A of the West 'Bengal Estates Acquisition Ace it is the State Government and the State Government alone is the authority to make an order. Under section 5A(4) of the Act, the State Government may delegate all or any of its powers under this section to such officers in its service as it may deem fit. In the present case, it is admitted that this power has been delegated to the Revenue Officer concerned. Therefore, Mr. Mitter contended that the order made by the delegatee is in fact the order of the State Government. In support of his contention, Mr. Mitter referred to the case (1) Roop Chand v. State of Punjab and Another reported in AIR 1963 SC 1503 . Mr. Sengupta however contended that the power exercised under section 5A (4) of the Act is one by the delegtee and is quasi judicial power and unless the State Government is also made a party therein, the power cannot be binding on the State Government. In my opinion Mr. Sengupta is not right in his contention. The power under section 5A is a power given to the State Government. Under section 5A(4) of the Act, this power can be delegated to any officer of the State Government. The power exercised by the delegatee is in fact the power exercised by the delegator. As soon as the delegatee assumed the power under section 5A it is deemed to be a power being exercised by the State Government. Under section 5A(4) of the Act, this power can be delegated to any officer of the State Government. The power exercised by the delegatee is in fact the power exercised by the delegator. As soon as the delegatee assumed the power under section 5A it is deemed to be a power being exercised by the State Government. It is clear that the delegatee may exercise the power under the section, that is, under section 5A of the Act. Assuming for a moment that the power under section 5A of the Act has not been delegated under section 5A(4) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and the State Government exercised the power under section 5A, even then the State Government should be made a party in this proceeding. In my opinion, this is wholly unnecessary even if there is any doubt, in my opinion, this doubt has been set at naught by the Supreme Court pronouncement in the case reported in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab and Another (Supra). In that case the Supreme Court was considering the provision of sections 41 and 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (consolidation and prevention of Fragmentation) Act (Pun 50 1948). The provisions of the said Act being sections 41 and 42 are as follows :- "41 The State Government may for the administration of this Act appoint such persons as it thinks fit and may by notification delegate any of its powers or functions under this Act to any of its officers either by name of designation. 42. The State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer under this Act call for and examine the records of any case pending before or disposal of by such officer and may pass such order in reference there to as it thinks fit." 14. The question then arises whether, the order, made under section 21(4) deciding the appeal, by officer who is delegated to hear the appeal is the order of the officer or of the Government? In paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has stated as follows :- "11. The question then arises whether, the order, made under section 21(4) deciding the appeal, by officer who is delegated to hear the appeal is the order of the officer or of the Government? In paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has stated as follows :- "11. The question then arises, to entertain and delegates its power, for example, to entertain and decide an appeal under section 21(4), to an officer and the officer pursuant to such delegation bears the appeal and makes an order, is the order of the officer or of the Government? We think it must be the order of the Government. The order is made under a statutory power. It is the statute which creates that power. The power can, therefore, be exercised only in terms of the statute and not otherwise. In this case the power is created by section 21(4). That section gives a power to the Government. It would follow that an order made in exercise of that power will be the order of the Government for no one else has the right under the statute to exercise the power. No doubt that Act enables the Government to delegate its powers but such a power when delegated remains the power of the Government for the Government can only delegate the power given to it by the statute and cannot create an independent power in the officer. When the delegate exercises the power, of does so far the Government. It is of interest to observe here that Wills, J. said in the case of (2) Hith v. Clarke, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 391 that 'the word delegate means little more then an agent'. An agent of course exercise no powers of his own but only the powers of his principle. Therefore, an order passed by an officer on delegation to him under section 41 (1) of the power of the Government under section 21(4), is for the purposes of the Act, an order of the Government. If it were not so and it were to be held that the order had been made by the officer himself and was not an order of the Government and of course it had to be one or the other-then we would have an order made by a person on whom the Act did not confer any power to make it. That would be an impossible situation. There can be no order except as authorised by the Act. What is true of section 21 (4) would be true of all other provisions in the Act conferring powers on the Government which can be delegated to an officer under section 41(1). If we are wrong in the view that we have taken, then in the case of an order made by an officer as delegate of the Government's power section 21(4) we would have an appeal entertained and decided by one who had power himself under the Act to do either. Finally, none of these things could be done. 12. Again, if an order passed by an order passed by an officer to whom a power had been delegated by the Government under section 41(1) was an order passed by the Officer, then an order made by an, officer to whom power under section 42 had been delegated would also be an order by an officer within the meaning of section 42. That order would then be liable to be interfered with by the Government under section 42 and if such interference is again not by the Government itself but by another officer as its delegate, then in that way the process of interference might be repeated for ever. Obviously an interpretation leading to such a result cannot be correct. It is of some interest to point out here that in the present case the order under section 43, that is the impugned order, had not been made by the Government itself but by the Director, Consolidation of holdings, to whom the Government's power under that section had been delegated. 13. It was however, said by the learned Advocate-General that this absurd result would not follow because power under section 42 can be exercised only once in respect of the same order. We will assume that power can be exercised in respect of the same order only once. But even so it seems to us that if the order by a delegate officer is an order within section 42, then the power under that section can be exercised repeatedly. This will appeal clearly if we take an illustration, suppose delegate officer A makes an order under section 21(4). This order can be interfered with by the Government under section 42. This will appeal clearly if we take an illustration, suppose delegate officer A makes an order under section 21(4). This order can be interfered with by the Government under section 42. Now suppose the Government delegates its power under section 42 to officer B and Officer B then makes an order under section 42 as delegate of Government. That would be an order made by a delegate Officer and capable of being interfered with under section 42. This exercise of power would be in respect of an order of officer B and therefore, no power under section 42 had been exercised, namely the order by Officer A. Now assume that this time delegate Officer C exercises Government's power under section 42. Again the order made by him would be interfered with the order under section 42. Repeated exercise of power would be in respect of successive orders and never in respect of the same order. In this way finality in the matter can never be reached. We must reject an interpretation which prevents finality being reached. On the interpretation that we have suggested the matter would be finally decided, the power under section 42 cannot be exercised more than once in respect of the same matter." 15. Therefore from the principles laid down by the Supreme Court as above, it is clear, that the order passed under section 5A of the Act by an officer who is delegates of the power is an order made by the State Government itself. In the said judgment also it has been made clear that once a power is exercised under section 21(4) of the Punjab Act it cannot be exercised more than once is respect of the same matter. 16. Mr. Sen Gupta followed by Mr. Roy Chowdhury and Mr. P. Roy, contended that in 1973 Cal 148 the Special Bench has also held that the power under section 5A of the Act is an executive power and as such there is no limitation attached to it and the State Government can reopen it. In my opinion, the Special Bench has held that the power under section 5A of the Act is an executive power but the facts remain that the executive power will be exercised in a quasi judicial way and in accordance to the procedure provided in the statute by the state Government. In my opinion, the Special Bench has held that the power under section 5A of the Act is an executive power but the facts remain that the executive power will be exercised in a quasi judicial way and in accordance to the procedure provided in the statute by the state Government. They will have to give the notice of hearing and they have all powers of Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence, administering others, enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents etc. as it is provided in section 5A(ii) of the Act. It has been provided that under section 5A(6), this power exercised by the State Government under section 5A is appealable to the District Judge under section 5A(6) of the Act. In this circumstances therefore, it cannot be said that there is no finally within the limits of section 5A of the at all. In my opinion, once the power has been exercised under section 5A of the Act this cannot be reopened under the same provision by a subsequent proceeding. If that power is conceded then with the change of officer or delegatees, there will be divergent opinions and divergent orders passed by different delegatees under section 5A of the Act in respect of the same matter. Mr. Roy Choudhury however, contended that the order passed in the proceeding under section 5A is in 1961 and was to the effect that section 5A does not apply and the subsequent proceeding under the same section is maintainable. In my opinion, that cannot be correct. The order made in 1961 was under section 5A where it was held that the transfer was beyond the scope of section 5A of the Act. In my opinion, in order to initiate a proceeding under section 5A, the delegatee officer must have a prima facie opinion and if it is found after hearing the transferee or transferor that section 5A has no application that will be a finding on the jurisdictional fact under section 5A. That finding would be as much binding on the parties as well as any other delegatee officers as finding of fact regarding the bona fied of a transfer. It has been held by Mr. That finding would be as much binding on the parties as well as any other delegatee officers as finding of fact regarding the bona fied of a transfer. It has been held by Mr. Justice A.K. Sen in (3) v. AIR 1971 Cal 400 at page 401 that "it would be also necessary for a competent authority which is adjudicating the proceeding under section 5A of the Act to adjudicate and decide whether the transfer comes within the mischief of the section itself" and His Lordship further held that "even if assume for a moment that such conclusion was reached erroneously still in my view the decision is binding on the authorities." I agree respectfully with the view taken by Mr. Justice A.K. Sen. Once the power, in respect of the same plot and in respect of the same parties has been exercised, it cannot be reagitated or reopened by different officers. 17. Mr. Roy Chowdhury argued that no notice of enquiry was given to the State. It has not been provided in section 5A of the Act that notice is to be given by the State Government because the State Government itself exercised the power under section 5A through its delegates but when the appeal is to a different body that it to the District Judge, the rules provided for notice to the collector, it has been argued by the State Government that there is a power of review inherent in the delegated officer. It has been stated that the officer concerned has all powers of a civil court. It must be stated that the officer under section 5A of the Act has a limited power as provided in section 5A (ii) of the Act. They have a power of civil court for the purpose of taking evidence, administering oath, enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and shall be deemed to be within the meaning of section 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The provision under section 5A of the Act does not provide for inherent power of the Civil Court or for the power of review. A power of review is a creature of a statute and unless such power is given, no power of review can be read into it. The provision under section 5A of the Act does not provide for inherent power of the Civil Court or for the power of review. A power of review is a creature of a statute and unless such power is given, no power of review can be read into it. There is no doubt that the statute does not provide for a power of review of order passed under section 5A of the Act. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case (4) Patel Chunibhai Dajibha etc. v. Narayan Rao Khanderao Jambekar and Another reported in AIR 1965 SC 1457 in paragraph 23 as follows :- "23. The order of the Mahalkari under section 29 was passed on December 25, 1957 and was appealable under section 74. By section 79 (torn) the appeal could be filed within 60 days from the date of the order. No appeal was filed within the period provided for by (torn). The Collector could at any time thereafter exercise his revisional powers under section 76 either suo muto, i.e. of his own motion (torn) on a reference made by the Divisional Officer or the State Government, in the exercise of his revisional powers, the collector could call for the record of the proceedings of the Mahalkari and pass such order as he deemed fit. There were two limitations on this power of revision. Firstly the records could not be called for after the expiry of one year from the date of the order. Secondly, the order could not be modified, annulled, or reversed unless opportunity had been given to the interested parties to appear and he heard. In the instant case, there was no reference by any authority. The collector could still exercise his revisional powers, but he seldom exercises such powers unless some irregularity or illegality is brought to his notice by the aggrieved party, Though section 76A, unlike section 76, does not provide for an application for revision by the aggrieved party, the appellant property drew the attention of the Collector to his grievances and asked him to exercise his revisional powers under section 76A. Having perused the application for revision filed by tae appellant, the Collector decided to exercise his suo motu powers and called for the record on August 14, 1958 within one year of the order the Mahalkari. Having perused the application for revision filed by tae appellant, the Collector decided to exercise his suo motu powers and called for the record on August 14, 1958 within one year of the order the Mahalkari. But before the record, the collector passed orders on October 3, October 4 and October 17, 1958 rejecting the applications for revision. By these orders the Collector decided that there was no ground for interference with the Mahalkari's order. The Collector observed that the appellant had not paid rent for three consecutive years, and the tenancy had been duly terminated by the requisite notice and the findings of the Mahalkari on these points had not been challenged by a regular appeal. The collector thus upheld and confirmed (torn) Mahalkari's order. He did not specifically deal with the (torn) as to the non-maintainability of the application for eviction (torn) view of the amended section 32 as the point was not taken either (torn) before him or before the Mahalkari. All these orders were (torn) by the Collector in the exercise of his suo motu power of revision. These orders as also the previous order calling for the record could be passed by the Collector only in the exercise of his revisional power under section 76A. As he refused to modify, annual or reverse the order of the Mahalkari, he could pass these orders without issuing notice to the respondent No. 2. These orders passed by the Collector in the exercise of his revisional powers were quasi-judicial, and were final. The Act does not empower the Collector to review an order passed by him under section 76A. In the absence of any power or review, the Collector could not subsequently reconsider his previous decisions and hold that there were grounds for annulling or reversing the Mahalkari's order. The subsequent order dated February 17, 1959 reopening the matter was illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction. The High Court ought to have quashed the order of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 on this ground." 18. It is clear that the Supreme Court held that a quasi judicial power under section 76A cannot be reviewed in absence of any power of review, and as such the Collector cannot subsequently reconsider his previous decision. The High Court ought to have quashed the order of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 on this ground." 18. It is clear that the Supreme Court held that a quasi judicial power under section 76A cannot be reviewed in absence of any power of review, and as such the Collector cannot subsequently reconsider his previous decision. In my opinion, the principle applies in all forces in the facts of the present case as has also been held by the Supreme Court in the case (5) The Sub-Divisional Officer v. Raja Srinivasa Prasad Singh reported in AIR 1966 SC 1164 . Mr. Roy Choudhury contended that unless the State Government is made a party, the decision is not binding on the State Government and relied upon the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 12 which is as follows :- "12. Here the question is not one of reopening the Compensation Roll or the objection case for purposes of making a correction or for review. The question there is that one of the necessary parties to the objection cases were neither joined nor noticed to appear. The most important party, besides the objector, claiming enhancement of the compensation was the State which has to pay the enhanced compensation. That party had to be joined to the proceedings under section 343 and a notice or intimation of the date of the hearing had to be sent as laid down in section 343. Section 343 prescribes not only the manner of serving of notices but lays down that the State Government must be joined. Every Court and tribunal is entitled to reopen a proceeding which has proceeded ex parte, not because a party has failed to appear but because a notice has not been sent to a necessary party. A decision reached behind the back of a necessary party to whom notice must be sent is not binding upon such a party and the Court may in such a case reopen the proceeding to give the party a chance to state its case." 19. In may opinion, the Supreme Court judgment is clearly distinguishable. The Supreme Court was considering the U.P. Jamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (1950). Section 343 of the Act clearly provides that the State Government must be a party in a proceeding under Chapters 3 to 5 which deals with the assessment of compensation. In may opinion, the Supreme Court judgment is clearly distinguishable. The Supreme Court was considering the U.P. Jamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (1950). Section 343 of the Act clearly provides that the State Government must be a party in a proceeding under Chapters 3 to 5 which deals with the assessment of compensation. The provision of the Act provides further for serving of a notice on the State Government and as such it is incumbent upon the Compensation Officer to sent a notice to the State Government which was not done and in the facts of this case the Supreme Court held that the Court has a power to reopen the proceeding to give the party a chance to state its case. In this case, however, it is the State Government which under section 5A of the Act has a power to declare a particular transfer as cancelled. Therefore the question of notice being given to the State Government does not arise and in fact has not been provided in section 5A(2) or (3) of the Act. In the circumstances, therefore, in my opinion, this judgment does not support the respondent's contention and on the other hand supports Mr. Mitter's contention. 20. In my opinion, therefore, the orders complained of cannot be sustained and must be held to be without jurisdiction. The notice under section 5A and the Appellate Order thereon must therefore stand quashed. The order is therefore made absolute but without costs. (Mentioned) In the last line of the judgment after the word 'The' and before the word 'is', let the word 'Rule' be inserted. If any certified copy has been issued, the same may be corrected accordingly. The 18th December, 1973.