JUDGMENT Madan Mohan Prasad, J. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of quashing an order passed by the Managing Committee of a school where the petitioner was a teacher, purporting to be one accepting his resignation from the post. 2. The case of the petitioner, briefly stated, is as follows. He was appointed first a social Education Instructor in the S.K. M.M. School (hereinafter referred to as 'the school'). Later the Managing committee of the school appointed him temporarily for three months as an Assistant Teacher in the said school pending the filling up of the post on a permanent basis. He joined the post on the 1st of April 1965. In June, 1965 an advertisement was made for the post of a permanent Assistant Teacher and on the 10th of July, 1965 he was appointed to this post on probation for one year. The approval for this appointment from the sub-divisional education officer was also received. During the continuance of his service the petitioner was granted increments in pay on two occasions and provident fund account and a service book also started. The petitioner, however, incurred the displeasure of one Satya Narain Yadav who was a great favourite of the Secretary. The aforesaid Satya Narain Yadav always insulted him. The petitioner made several complaints to the secretary and the Principal against his behaviour but they paid no heed to it. In disgust therefore, he submitted a letter of resignation on the 6th of March, 1967 (Annexure 5). He, however, having been advised by the Principal and others, changed his mind and withdrew his resignation subsequently by another letter dated the 15th of March, 1967 Annexure 5. The managing committee then started an enquiry and the petitioner was asked to substantiate his charges against Satya Narain Yadav. He worked in the school till the 19th of May, 1967 when the school closed for summer vacation. To his utter surprise, he received a letter dated the 20th May, 1967 at his village home the next day, discharging him from service. The petitioner approached the Secretary and requested him to withdraw the order. He did not do so. The petitioner then filed an appeal before the President of the Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter called 'the Board') on the 6th of June, 1967. The petitioner approached the Secretary and requested him to withdraw the order. He did not do so. The petitioner then filed an appeal before the President of the Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter called 'the Board') on the 6th of June, 1967. After hearing the petitioner the Board allowed the appeal by an order dated the 26th of December, 1969. Still the petitioner was not allowed to re-join his post. The Board, therefore, dissolved the Managing Committee and constituted an Ad Hoc Committee by an order dated the 25th of June, 1971. As against the order of the Board dated the 26th December, 1969 allowing the appeal of the petitioner, the Secretary of the school got a writ petition filed in this court through one of the guardian. It was, however, dismissed on the 27th of January, 1970. Again the Secretary along with others filed, another writ petition for quashing the said order dated the 26th December, 1969 as also the next order dated the 25th of June, 1971 dissolving the Managing Committee and appointing an ad-hoc one. The said writ application was allowed and the order dissolving the managing committee was quashed by this court on the 28th April, 1972. The further case of the petitioner is that although he was working in the school until the 19th of May, 1967, there was no whisper for holding of the .Managing Committee. The said meeting was held illegally without any proper notice. It is said that the notice was issued on the 13th of May, 1967 and the meeting was to be held on the 19th of May, 1967 and the notice was not, therefore, issued in accordance with law. Further that there were only four members present in the meeting held on the 19th of May, 1967 and it was illegally adjourned to the next date when one more member attended and there was thus no proper quorum at the meeting. 3. Further that there were only four members present in the meeting held on the 19th of May, 1967 and it was illegally adjourned to the next date when one more member attended and there was thus no proper quorum at the meeting. 3. The petitioner, therefore, claims firstly that he was appointed on a permanent basis and he could not be discharged except on the grounds mentioned in rule 15 of the rules relating to Appointment and Service condition of Teachers in Non-Government High Schools (published in the Government notification No. II/R4.01/55-F. 5172, dated the 7th September, 1955) (hereinafter called the Service Condition Rules'), secondly that the resignation having been withdrawn it was not open to the Managing Committee to accept it, thirdly that the notice of the meeting being improper and there being no quorom the resolution of the Managing Committee is incumpetent. Accordingly he prays for a writ quashing the resolution of the Managing committee contained in Annexure 9 and the letter intimating the same contained in Annexure 8 and for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Managing Committee to allow the petitioner to work, in the school as an Assistant Teacher. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Secretary of the school, respondent No.2. It has been pointed out therein that the petitioner had not been appointed by the Managing Committee as a social Education Inspector but in fact he had been appointed by the Government and deputed to the school as such. It is further said that the petitioner was 'subsequently appointed as an Assistant Teacher only on a purely temporary basis and was never confirmed in the said post, that it was false to say that any service book or provident fund account had been opened in this respect or that he had been granted any increment. It is said that no letter withdrawing the resignation was ever sent to the Managing Committee or the Principal of the school and a copy produced is a fabricated document, that there was no enquiry started against Satyanarain Yadav, that it was false to say that this respondent had got the writ application filed through the guardian, that the meeting of the Managing Committee was held in accordance with law and that the petitioner was not discharged from service but only his letter of resignation has been accepted. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged firstly that the letter (Annexure 5) was not a letter of resignation at all but merely a letter of protest, secondly that even if it were a letter of resignation, this having been withdrawn there was no resignation which the Managing Committee could accept and thirdly that the meeting of the Managing Committee being illegal for absence of notice and want of quorum the resolution passed by it has no effect. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has, however, contended firstly that the petitioner being an employee of the school is not entitled to the issuance of any writ directing his employer to continue him in service; secondly that the question as to whether he had resigned or not, cannot be raised now on the principle of res judicata, it having been held by this Court earlier that he had resigned; thirdly that it is not competent to the petitioner to question the validity of the meeting; and lastly that in any case the order passed by the Managing Committee relates to the internal administration of the school and does not call for any judicial interference. 7. I will first take up the aforesaid two contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of the letter of resignation. I must state at the outset that there is no substance in either of the two contentions. It is said that the letter, Annexure 5, was not a letter of resignation at all but merely a letter of protest. The contents there of are as follows :- "Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the behaviour of clerk Mr. Satyanarayan Yadav, I tender my resignation. He always behaves badly with me. I am thankful to you". The basis for this argument is that he has mentioned the reason for his resignation. In my view, the reason which prompted him to resign is not the criterion for determining the nature of the letter. It is obvious that the resignation is unconditional and it cannot be treated to be anything other than that. The next argument is on the basis of the assumption that the petitioner had withdrawn the resignation. This is a disputed fact. The respondents have denied that any such letter was ever sent. It is obvious that the resignation is unconditional and it cannot be treated to be anything other than that. The next argument is on the basis of the assumption that the petitioner had withdrawn the resignation. This is a disputed fact. The respondents have denied that any such letter was ever sent. The petitioner has not produced any evidence in support of his statement that such a letter of withdrawal had been sent. The fact that a letter of resignation had been sent having been admitted and there being no proof of the fact that it had been withdrawn there is no option to this court but to proceed on the assumption that it had not been so withdrawn. Accordingly it must be held that there was a letter of resignation and the Managing Committee had the right to accept the same. These two points, therefore, fail. 8. The only argument which remains to be considered is that the resolution of the Managing Committee was ultra vires in the absence of proper notice and quorum at the meeting which passed the resolution. The contention is based on the following facts alleged. Firstly, that the notice was issued on the 13th of May, 1967 for the meeting to be held on the 19th of May, 1967 and, therefore, there was not sufficient notice in accordance with rule 22 of the Bihar High Schools (Constitution, Powers and Functions of Managing Committee) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter called 'the Rules') which provides not less than ten clear days, notice. Secondly that, only four members were present at the meeting held on the 19th of May 1967 and they could not constitute a quorum in view of rule 26 of the Rules, the total number of members of the Managing Committee being ten and the said rule having provided for a quorum of one-half of the number of the members. It is said, therefore, that the adjourned meeting held on the 20th May, 1967 was also illegal and the resolutions accepting his resignation having been passed at the meeting on the 20th May was a nullity. Rules 22 and 26 are as follows: "22. It is said, therefore, that the adjourned meeting held on the 20th May, 1967 was also illegal and the resolutions accepting his resignation having been passed at the meeting on the 20th May was a nullity. Rules 22 and 26 are as follows: "22. Every notice, calling a meeting of the committee shall state the date, time and place at which such a meeting is to be held and shall, except in case of an emergent meeting, be sent through a messenger or by post under postal certificate to every member of the Committee not less than ten clear days before the day appointed for the meeting. In the case of an emergent meeting, the notice shall be served on every member at least twentyfour hours before the time appointed for the meeting". "26 The quorum in any meeting of the Committee shall be one half of number of the members entitled to participate and vote at such meeting". The facts aforesaid, have not been seriously disputed. The question, however, remains whether it is open to the petitioner to contend on the basis of these rules that his dismissal has been wrongful and whether on the ground the Managing Committee should be directed to reinstate him. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended firstly that it is not open to the petitioner to question the validity of the resolution for the reasons that the rules are meant for the guidance of the Managing Committee and they do not form a part of the contract between the Committee and the petitioner to whom the law of master and servant must be applied; secondly because the petitioner being a servant his service depended upon the pleasure of the master and the only remedy open to him is to file a suit for damages for breach of Contract and not a writ petition asking for a declaration that the dismissal is wrongful and for an order for reinstatement, and thirdly that the principle of res judicata debars the petitioner from raising these points. 10. 10. With regard to the first contention learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision in the case of Municipal Board, Shahjahanpur V. Sardar Suka Singh, A.I.R. 1937 All 264, wherein the suit had been filed by an employee of the Municipal Board against the termination of his service on the ground that the resolution with respect thereto was illegal and ultra vires on account of improper notice and absence of notice to some of the Municipal commissioners in violation of the provisions of the Municipal Act. The learned Judge held that the irregularity did not afford any ground for maintaining the action and relied on a decision of the Privy council in the case of Shenton v. Smiths, 1895 A.C. 229. In the latter case the plaintiff had been dismissed by the Government of Western Australia, and he complained that the action was illegal and ultra vires because the Government had failed to observe the regulations prescribed fen it by the colonial office in the matter of dismissal of its servants. The plea was rejected by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee and it was held that they were merely directions given by the Crown to the Government of Crown colonies for general guidance and that they did not constitute a contract between the Crown and its servants. 11. In the present case rules 22 and 26 aforesaid are contained in chapter V. of the Rules under the heading "General provisions applicable to all Managing Committees". There is nothing in this chapter which shows that they have the effect of imposing upon the Managing Committee any obligations towards the servants of the school nor do they show that any right is created by virtue of the rules contained in this chapter in any servant of the school with regard to the manner in which meeting of the Managing Committee are to be held. The result is that these rules cannot be held to alter in any manner the contract between the school and its servants. The rules govern the constitution, powers and functions of the Managing committee. The result is that these rules cannot be held to alter in any manner the contract between the school and its servants. The rules govern the constitution, powers and functions of the Managing committee. It will appear that Chapter I deals with the short title and commencement, Chapter II with the definition, Chapters III and IV with the constitution of Managing Committee respectively of schools other than proprietary schools, Chapter V, as stated earlier, with the general provisions applicable to Managing Committees, Chapter VI with powers and functions- of the Managing Committee, Chapter VII with the authorities of the Committee and their powers and functions and Chapter VIII with miscellaneous and transitory provisions. There is nothing in these rules which mentions the rights of the servants of the schools or the obligations of the Managing Committee towards them. The only relevant rule which has some relation to the matter in issue is rule 31. Clause 12 of sub-rule (2) of rule 31 contains in particular, apart from the general powers given by sub-rule (1), the power for making arrangement for teaching of different subjects and to hold school examinations therein. Clause 13 gives the power to create teaching, administrative and other posts and to make appointments thereto. Clause 14 also empowers the managing committee to appoint teaching and other staff in vacancies in the existing post, to grant extension of service and to impose, penalties on such members of the staff in accordance with the rules. Clause 15 gives the power to exercise administrative and disciplinary control on the members of the teaching staff and other staff of the school subject to the rules prescribed in that regard. These rules thus donot form a part of the contract between the petitioner and the school, nor do they modify it. It is therefore, not open to the petitioner to object to the want of notice or absence of quorum at the meeting held on the 19th May, 1967. 12. Assuming, however, that the dismissal of the petitioner was wrongful being in violation of the aforesaid rules, it is not open to him to agitate this point in the present proceeding for the purpose of getting the relief prayed for. 12. Assuming, however, that the dismissal of the petitioner was wrongful being in violation of the aforesaid rules, it is not open to him to agitate this point in the present proceeding for the purpose of getting the relief prayed for. If the ordinary law of master and servant applies between the petitioner and the respondent-committee, as it does, it is not open to the petitioner, even though the dismissal be wrongful to claim the relief prayed for. The ordinary law of master and servant is that the tenure of a servant is governed by the contract between the master and the servant. This contract, however, is subservient to any limitation imposed or modifications made by any statute or statutory rules. If there are such statutory provisions the servant can take advantage of them. In other cases if the service is governed by a contract the only remedy of the servant is to sue for damages for breach of contract. The service of a servant may be terminated wrongfully, yet he has no right to say that his service shall not be deemed to have been terminated and he must be deemed to have continued. The general law of master and servant applies except in certain cases, viz. (a) cases of public servants falling under Articles 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, (b) cases falling under the industrial law and (c) cases where acts of statutory bodiesa re in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. In the present case it is not alleged nor can it be alleged that the petitioner comes under the first two categories. That brings me to the question whether the case of the petitioner is covered by the third exception. 13. In this connection learned counsel has drawn attention to rule 15 of the Service condition rules which is as follows; "A teacher shall not be discharged or dismissed save and except on grounds of proved inefficiency, conduct involving moral turpitude or gross negligence of duty or behaviour likely to prove subversive of discipline, or any other good or sufficient reasons which may make his retention on the school staff no longer desirable. In the last case, the prior approval of the Department is necessary". A feeble attempt has been made to show that the petitioner had been discharged or dismissed on account of charges levelled against him. In the last case, the prior approval of the Department is necessary". A feeble attempt has been made to show that the petitioner had been discharged or dismissed on account of charges levelled against him. There is absolutely no basis for this contention. Reference may, however, be made to rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules which is as follows : "The termination of service of a person – (i) during the period of probation, (ii) during the period in which he holds a temporary appointment, (iii) on retrenchment of a post, will not amount to discharge or dismissal. In such casses, however, the teacher or Headmaster shall be apprised of the grounds on which it is proposed to terminate his services and his reply considered by the Managing Committee before orders are passed." In the present case the petitioner was merely a temporary teacher on probation. His services could, therefore, at best be said to have been dispensed with under rule 14 and all that it required was, to apprise him of the ground on which his service was terminated. In. the instant case obviously the ground for termination was that he had resigned and his resignation was accepted. In fact before the resolution of the Committee was passed he had been asked to elucidate certain points, namely, the allegation made by him in the letter of resignation against Satyanarayan Yadav, the clerk, and a leaflet published against him and the petitioner had been heard in the matter. There is thus no violation of any mandatory statutory obligation. 14. The point under discussion was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Executive Committee of U. P. State Ware-housing Corpn. Lucknow Vs. Chandra Kiran Tiyagi, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1244. The plaintiff of that case had been dismissed and had instituted a suit for a declaration that the order dismissing him was null and void and that he was entitled to be reinstated. He had alleged that there had been no proper enquiry in disregard of clause 16 of the Regulations called the Uttar Pradesh State Ware-housing Corporation Regulations, 1961 and that the requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution had not been complied with. It was held that the enquiry was vitiated on account of non-compliance with the provisions of regulation no. 16 aforesaid. It was held that the enquiry was vitiated on account of non-compliance with the provisions of regulation no. 16 aforesaid. It was, however, held that the violation of regulation 16 could only result in the order of. dismissal being wrongful and in consequence making the master liable for damages, but it could not provide a ground for asking for being treated as still in service, the dismissal being wrongful. Their Lordships held that an order made would be contrary to the terms and conditions of relationship between the corporation and its employees but would not be in breach of any statutory obligation. Their Lordships further held :- "From a review of the English decisions, referred to above, the position emerges as follows; The law relating to master and servant is clear. A contract for personal service will not be enforced by an order for specific performance nor will it be open for a servant to refuse to accept the, repudiation of a contract of service by his master and say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employees is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. This is the normal rule and that was applied, in Barbar's case, 1953-1 All ER. 322 and Francis' case, 1962-3 All ER. 633. But when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provisions of the statute while terminating the services of such an employee, the latter' will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the order is null and void and that he continues to be in service, as it will not then be a mere case of a master terminating the services of a servant. This was the position in Vin's case 1956-3 All ER 939." Thereafter their Lordships have discussed the earlier decisions of the Court in the cases of Dr. S.B. Dutta Vs. University of Delhi, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1050 and S.R. Tiwari V. District Board, Agra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680, and then held as follows :- "From the two decisions of this court, referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. S.B. Dutta Vs. University of Delhi, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1050 and S.R. Tiwari V. District Board, Agra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680, and then held as follows :- "From the two decisions of this court, referred to above, the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well recognised exceptions to this rule and they are: To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (I) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311(2). Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute". In that case it was held that the case of the respondents before their Lordships did not come under either the first or the second category. On the question whether it came under the third, it was held as follows :- "Having due regard to the principles discussed above, we are of opinion that the High Court ,was not justified in granting the declaration that the order dated March 10, 1964 dismissing the respondent from service is null and void and that he is entitled to be reinstated in service with full pay and other emoluments. As pointed out by us, the regulations are made under the power reserved to the Corporation under section 5+ of the Act. No doubt they lay down the terms and conditions of relationship between the Corporation and its employees. An. order made in breach of the regulations would be contrary to such terms and conditions, but would not be in breach of any statutory obligations, as was the position which this court had to deal with in the Life Insurance Corporation case, 1964-5 SCR 523.(A.I.R. 1964 SC 847). In the instant case, a breach has been committed by the appellant of regulation 16 (3) when passing the said order of dismissal, in as much as the procedure indicated therein has not been followed. The act does not guarantee any statutory status to the respondent nor does it impose any obligation on the appellant in such matters. In the instant case, a breach has been committed by the appellant of regulation 16 (3) when passing the said order of dismissal, in as much as the procedure indicated therein has not been followed. The act does not guarantee any statutory status to the respondent nor does it impose any obligation on the appellant in such matters. As to whether the rules framed under section 52 deal with "any such matter, does not arise for consideration in this case as the respondent has not placed any raliance on the rules and he has rested his case only on regulation 16 (3). It is not in dispute that, in this case, the authority who can pass an. order of dismissal has passed the same. Under those circumstances, a violation of regulation 16 (3,), as alleged and establish in this case, can only result in the order of dismissal being held to be wrongful and, in consequence, making the appellant liable for damages. But the said order cannot be held to be one which has not terminated the service, albeit wrongfully or which entitles the respondent to ignore it and ask for being treated as still in service. We are not concerned with the question of damages, because no such claim has been made by the respondent in these proceedings". In the case of Indian Airlines Corporation V. Sukhdeo Rai, A.R. 1971 S.C. 1828 also the question was considered and it was held that the employment of the respondent in that case was not to an office or status and there being no restrictions or obligations in the Act (Act 27 of 1953) or the Rules, subject to which only the power to terminate the respondent's employment could be exercised, he was not entitled to a declaration that the termination of his employment was null and void. Their Lordships held:- "It is well settled principle that when there is a purported termination of a contract of service, a declaration, that the contract of service still subsisted, would not be made in the absence of special circumstances because of the principle that courts do not ordinarily grant specific performance of service. This is so, even in cases where the authority appointing an employee was acting in exercise of statutory authority. This is so, even in cases where the authority appointing an employee was acting in exercise of statutory authority. The relationship between the person appointed and the employer would in such cases be contractual, i.e. as between a master and servant, and the termination of that relationship would not entitle the servant to a declaration that his employment had not been validly determined. (See. A. Francis v. Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur (1962) 3 All ER. 633, and Barber v. Manchester Regional Hospital Board, (1958) 1 All ER.322)". In this case reference has been made to the case of Vidyodaya University v. Silva, 1964-3 All E. R. 865. In that case a teacher had been appointed by the University. His service had been brought to an end by a resolution of the University Council. Under section 18 (a) of the relevant Act the Council had the power to dismiss an officer or a teacher On grounds of incapacity or conduct which in the opinion of not less than two-thirds of the members of the council rendered him unfit to be an officer or a teacher of the, university. The service of the teacher was admittedly terminated without hearing him. The Privy council held that the mere circumstance that the university was established by the statute and was regulated by statutory enactments contained in the Act did not mean that the contracts of employment made with teachers though subject to section 18 (e)were other than ordinary contracts of master and servant and, therefore, the procedure of being heard invoked by the respondent was not available to him and no writ could be issued against the university. 15. In the case of S.R. Tewari (Supra) the Supreme Court noted with approval the decision of Jagdish Sahai J. of the High Court of Allahabad in Ram Babu Rathaur v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, A.I.R. 1961 All 502 holding that though the Corporation was a statutory body the relations between it and its employees were governed by contract and were of master and servant and not subject to any statutory obligations although the Corporation had framed under its powers under the Act regulation containing conditions of service in the Corporations. A similar view has recently been taken by the High Court of Calcutta in Life Insurance Corporation V.N. Banerji, 1971 (1) L.L.J. 1. A similar view has recently been taken by the High Court of Calcutta in Life Insurance Corporation V.N. Banerji, 1971 (1) L.L.J. 1. In the case of Ram Babu Rathaur (supra) the petitioner was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation. Consequent on his dismissal from service on charges of misconduct and misappropriation he had filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order of his dismissal and also for issue of a mandamus directing the Corporation to treat him as in service and ray him all the arrears of salary and other amounts due. The order of dismissal was alleged to be wrongful being in disregard to the staff regulations and also because the petitioner had not been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges. The petition was held not to be maintainable .on the ground firstly that the petitioner had an alternative remedy for filing a suit for damages for wrongful dismissal, secondly that the relationship between the petitioner and the Corporation being entirely that of a 'master and servant the general law of master and servant applied to his case and in the absence of any statutory provision or contract, curtailing or modifying the power of the Corporation to dismiss its employees at pleasure, the petitioner could not claim the right aforesaid. The learned Judge further held that even a writ of certiorari alone could not be issued declaring the dismissal to be wrongful because the practical effect of such a writ would be of doing indirectly what could not be done directly by issuing a writ of mandamus. It was held that a writ of mandamus could not be issued because it would be in violation of section 21 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, according to which a contract of employment cannot be specifically enforced. It was held further that it mere disregard of the staff regulation would not be actionable and the remedy of the petitioner was by way of departmental appeals and representation and not by any action in a court of law. Reliance was placed on the cases of Vankatrao v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 31 and R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 27. Reliance was placed on the cases of Vankatrao v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 31 and R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 27. In Venkatrao's case their Lordships were considering section 96(B) of the Government of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder and their Lordships held that a disregard of the rules aforesaid even though framed under section 96(B) of the Government of India Act could not be actionable and the right of the Crown to treat the services at its pleasure was not affected by those rules. It was held that the rules would ordinarily be observed but if not observed it did not confer a right in the dismissed servant which could be enforced in a court of law. A similar view was taken in the case of S. Framji v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1960 Bom 14, where it was held upon the basis of the two Privy Council decisions aforesaid that the disregard of a rule even though it be statutory did not confer on a Government servant a right of action and the right of a Government to treat the services of an employee at pleasure remained unaffected by the rules framed. 16. In the case of Kedar Nath Lal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 1972 BLJR 960 a similar question came up for consideration. The petitioner was an Assistant in the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Company. At the time of his confirmation in service the company had accepted his date of birth on the basis of horoscope and some affidavits. Thereafter the company was taken over by the Life Insurance Corporation. The Corporation later after verification changed the date of birth to one which was in accordance with the University certificate. Prayer was made for quashing the order aforesaid on the grounds that it was in violation of the principles of natural justice and section, 11 (1) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act and violative of Articles 14 and 16. It was held that there was no violation of any principle of natural justice or of section 11(1) of the Act. The question thus was whether petitioner was entitled to any relief in the writ proceeding on the assumption that the order was arbitrary and illegal and wrongfully terminated the contract of service. It was held that there was no violation of any principle of natural justice or of section 11(1) of the Act. The question thus was whether petitioner was entitled to any relief in the writ proceeding on the assumption that the order was arbitrary and illegal and wrongfully terminated the contract of service. Reliance was placed by the learned Judges on the cases of Ram Babu Rathaur (Supra) S.R. Tewari (Supra), Executive Committee of the U.P. State Warehousing Corporation (Supra) and Indian Airlines Corporation (Supra) and it was held that although the Corporation was an authority amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the court, no writ could be issued to quash the impugned order as it would have the effect of bringing into existence the contract of service already determined by the employer albeit it may have been wrongful. 17. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. it is well settled and clearly established (1) that ordinarily courts would not enforce a contract of employments in view of section 21(b) of the Specific Relief Act (2) that a dismissed servant unless he holds a stautory status or office is governed by the ordinary law of master and servant (3) that a declaration that such a dismissed servant continues to be in service his dismissal being wrongful cannot be made except in cases where such servants fall within the category of persons to whom Industrial Law applies or where there has been a breach of statutory obligations imposed upon the employer and (4) that all rules framed under any statute do not have the status of statutory rules and do not create statutory rights in dismissed servants or statutory obligations on the employer. Judged in the light of these principles, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case that the ordinary law of master and servant does not apply or that he comes within any of the categories aforesaid which would entitle him to get a declaration in the present case. His only remedy, therefore, is by way of a suit for damages on account of wrongful dismissal, if at all. 18. In the present case the petitioner has not filed any, such suit and this alternative remedy is certainly open to him which he has not exhausted. His only remedy, therefore, is by way of a suit for damages on account of wrongful dismissal, if at all. 18. In the present case the petitioner has not filed any, such suit and this alternative remedy is certainly open to him which he has not exhausted. There is no good reason thus why the petitioner should be allowed to agitate this point in the present writ proceeding the alternative remedy having not been exhausted. That is another ground which weighs against the petitioner. 19. Apart from these considerations in the present case the petitioner had tendered his resignation which had been accepted. The termination of service was, therefore, on the asking of the petitioner and in fact it was not a termination of service on any of the grounds mentioned either in rule 14 or rule 15 of he Service Condition Rules mentioned above. The aforesaid rules envisage cases where the termination of service is at the instance of the employer. It is obvious that if it is during the period of probation or during the period he holds a temporary appointment, such termination may be on the grounds that the employee is not found suitable or his work is not satisfactory or some such other reasons. Such termination may be also on the retrenchment of a post. It is for this reason that the rule requires that the teacher shall be apprised of the grounds on which it is proposed to terminate his service. In such cases the grounds emanate from the employer. The employee has, therefore, to be informed of them and to be heard as against them. To my mind, rule 14 does not purport to cover cases where the termination of service is a result of a resignation tendered by the employee and the same having been accepted. It is well known that in case of temporary appointments it is open to the employer to terminate the service after giving notice. It is equally open to the employee to resign from the post, after giving notice. In the present case the petitioner gave such a notice and resigned. This could not be except under the right of an employee arising out of a contract with his employer. It bring the case thus out of the ambit of rule 14. 20. It is equally open to the employee to resign from the post, after giving notice. In the present case the petitioner gave such a notice and resigned. This could not be except under the right of an employee arising out of a contract with his employer. It bring the case thus out of the ambit of rule 14. 20. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention to one of the clauses in the form of agreement which has to be executed by the teacher as contained in Appendix IX in the Education Code, 1967 edition, Part 11. The relevant clause thereof is as follows : "(vii) That this agreement may be terminated at any time by the teacher after serving on the school authority three calendar, months notice of intention to terminate the same or by paying three months salary in lieu of such notice. If the said teacher fails to comply with the provision of this clause he shall be debarred by the District Education officer from getting employment in any other recognised school in the State of Bihar by causing a notification to be issued to this effect". It is said, that in the present case the resignation letter does not give three months' notice. This argument is of no avail. It ignores the fact that the school authorities have made no complaint of the matter. This requirement of the rule is obviously for the protection of the school authorities and of they have not raised the point of such notice and made a complaint of it, it is not for the teacher to do so. The resignation cannot be held to be invalid on that ground. 21. The last ground taken by learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner is estopped by the principle of res judicate from agitating the very same points in this proceeding which he had raised earlier and which were decided against him. Reference has been made to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bishwanath Khetan and ors. V. President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, 1973. Reference has been made to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bishwanath Khetan and ors. V. President, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, 1973. B.B.C.J. 110, disposed of on the 29th April, 1972 in the previous writ proceeding (C.W.J.C. No. 1044 of 1971) arising out of the application by the Secretary of the Managing committee for quashing the order of the Board dissolving the committee and appointing an Ad. Hoc committee to which the petitioner was a party. Therein it was held that the termination of petitioner's service could at best be one under rule 14 of the Service Condition Rules aforesaid and not under rule 15. It was further held that the termination of service of this petitioner, could not be said to be against the terms of the contract of his service, that the ordinary law of master and servant applied to the facts of the case, that even according to the requirements of rule 4 the petitioner had been heard in the matter and there was no illegality and even if there was any, illegality he could have pursued any other remedy open to him, rather than appealed to the President of the Board there being no appeal provided as against orders under rule 14. The points aforesaid were thus settled against him and the petitioner cannot re-agitate the same points. The principle of res judicata applies to the present case. If an authority were needed for the proposition that the aforesaid principle applies to writ proceedings it will be found in the case of Daryao and others V. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457 and Amalmagated Coalfields Ltd, and another V. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara and others, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1013. In the case of Daryao and others (Supra) their Lordships held that on general considerations of public policy there is no reason why the rule of res judicata should be treated as inadmissible or irrelevant in dealing with petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. It was also held that the judgment of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will also operate as a bar to the raising of the same matter in the Supreme Court under Article 32 provided the petition has been considered and decided by the High Court on its merits. It was also held that the judgment of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will also operate as a bar to the raising of the same matter in the Supreme Court under Article 32 provided the petition has been considered and decided by the High Court on its merits. In the case of Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. and another (supra) their Lordships held that the general principle of res judicata applies to writ petition filed under Article 32 or under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reference was made in this connect ion to the case of Daryao (supra). In this view of the matter also the application of the petitioner cannot be granted. 22. Having considered the case in all its aspects I find that the present application cannot succeed. In the result, it is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case I think it proper that the petitioner should pay a cost of Rs. 100/- to the contesting respondents. Application dismissed.