Judgment :- 1. The appellant, who is the accused in Sessions Case No. 41 of 1972 of the Sessions Court, Palghat, has been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code for causing the death of one Akkamma by hitting her on her bead with M.O.1, a big granite stone, some time after 9.30 p.m. on 19-4-1972 and before the sunrise on 20-4-1972. He was also convicted and sentenced to ten years rigorous imprisonment under S.392 I.P.C. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. The appellant aged about 25 years is a resident of Sreekrishnapuram village. Deceased Akkamma, aged 33, also belonged to that village. They are members of Harijan community who eked out their existence working as labourers. pw.1 is the elder sister of Akkamma and pw. 4 is the son of pw. 1. Akkamma lived with pw.1 in the same house, but pw. I had no control over her. Akkamma led a licentious life taking to drinking and prostitution. Often she was found lying in an unconscious condition due to excessive drinking. Whenever persons found fault with her regarding her conduct, she used to abuse them and so on such occasions they used to leave her alone. However, she had some jewels which she wore habitually on her person M.O.9 gold chain, M.O.11 pair of ear studs, M.O.12 ring and M.O.13 silver waist band were those few jewels which she had on her person when she came. out of the house of pw.1 after taking meals in the afternoon of 19-4-1972. 3. On the next day morning the deal body of Akkamma was found lying with bead injuries near a fence on the northern side of one Poozhikalem paddy land almost naked, M.O.1 granite blood-stained stone lying by her side. On receiving information, pws. 1, 2, 4 and 5 cams running to the spot when they found Akkamma lying dead at the spot in the condition described above. Ali her jewels were found missing from her body. On seeing the ghastly sight, pw.1 went to the Cherpalacherry police station, which is 12 K.m- east of the place of occurrence, and lodged Ext. P1 first information statement at 11.00 am. with pw. 15 Sub Inspector. On registering a crime pw. 16 Inspector lookup investigation forthwith. 4. pw. Ali her jewels were found missing from her body. On seeing the ghastly sight, pw.1 went to the Cherpalacherry police station, which is 12 K.m- east of the place of occurrence, and lodged Ext. P1 first information statement at 11.00 am. with pw. 15 Sub Inspector. On registering a crime pw. 16 Inspector lookup investigation forthwith. 4. pw. 16 arrived at the scene at 1.00 p m. when he held inquest over the dead body. During the inquest he questioned Pws.l, 4 and others. On questioning them, it was revealed that deceased Akkamma had taken bath along with pw. 2 at a water-stream in the evening of 19-4-1972 when M.Os. 9,11,12 and 13 jewels were seen worn by Akkamma on her person. Thereafter pws. 2,4 and S met the appellant at about 9.30 p.m. on the same day in the company of another person at the place of occurrence. pws. 2,4 and 5 were then going to attend a drama and they passed along the pathway which was within about 45 feet from the place where they saw the appellant and another person who was lying down. On seeing them the appellant came near them and asked them for snuff. While so they asked the appellent who was the other person lying there. The appellant told them that Akkamma was lying there drunk in an unconscious condition- pws.2, 4 and 5 knowing her conduct, however, did not care to go near that person and ascertain who it was. Thereafter pws. 2, 4 and 5 went away to their destination. 5. On 20-4-1972, the day after the incident, the appellant pledged M. 0.9 gold chain for Rs. 55/- in the branch of the Canara Bank at Sreekrishnapuram, of which pw. 8 was the Manager, and pw. 10 the gold appraiser, on execution of Ext. P4 agreement and Ext. P5 pronote. Until 30 41972, the appellant was not available for arrest as he was not in the village. On that day be was arrested by pw. 15 at Cherpalacherry which is another village. On search of his body Ext. P6 token was recovered together with Rs. 4/- in cash. That he pledged M. 0.9 in the Canara Bank was traced through Ext. On that day be was arrested by pw. 15 at Cherpalacherry which is another village. On search of his body Ext. P6 token was recovered together with Rs. 4/- in cash. That he pledged M. 0.9 in the Canara Bank was traced through Ext. P6 token which showed the loan number, the amount for which M. 0.9 was pledged, the name of the person, as well as the bank at which it was pledged, including the date. The appellant gave a false name at the bank, though he himself affixed his thumb impression in Exts. P4 and P5. 6. After arrest, the appellant made a confession to pw. 16 on the basis of which the appellant took pw. 16 to his residential compound wherefrom the appellant unearthed M.Os.10 to 13, the rest of the jewels from the foot of a cashewnut tree in the presence of pws. 6 and 7. pw. 6, a clerk of the Canara Bank, and pw. 7, a tea-shop keeper in the neighbourhood, figured as attestors to Ext. P3 mahazar under which M. Os. 10 to 13 were seized by pw.16. On chemical examination human blood was detected on M. 0.1 stone and M. 0.8 blood-stained earth which was collected from the place of occurrence (vide Ext. P18 Chemical Analyst's certificate). pw. 11, Assistant Surgeon, conducted autopsy on the dead body, and issued Ext. P9 post-mortem certificate which revealed that as a result of serious skull fracture the brain had been injured. One of the lobes of the ear was also found cut. The head injury was described as sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. 7. The statement of the appellant in both the lower courts was one of complete denial of his complicity to the crime. 8. There was no direct eye-witness account as evidence to prove the appellant's participation in the murder of Akkamma. But there were clinching circumstances against him to establish that he was both the murderer of Akkamma and robber of her jewels. There was no difficulty in holding that M. Os. 9. 11, 12 and 13 were the jewels which were usually worn by Akkamma. pws. 1, 2,4 and 5 were positive in their evidence that those jewels belonged to Akkamma and that they were seen worn by her on the date of the incident. pw. There was no difficulty in holding that M. Os. 9. 11, 12 and 13 were the jewels which were usually worn by Akkamma. pws. 1, 2,4 and 5 were positive in their evidence that those jewels belonged to Akkamma and that they were seen worn by her on the date of the incident. pw. 2 saw her last in the evening when they took bath at a stream. On the next day M. 0.9 was pledged by the appellant in the Canara Bank. Exts. P4 to P7 records of the Bank, coupled with the evidence of pws. 8 and 10, established that the appellant pledged M. 0.9 for Rs. 55/- at the Bank giving a false name. The appellant himself admitted that he affixed bis thumb impression in Exts. P4 and P5. The evidence of pw. 12, Finger Print Expert, together with Exts. P11 to P14, his report and photographic enlargements of the thumb impressions, established beyond dispute that the appellant was the executant of Exts. P4 and P5. It was therefore proved against the appellant that he pledged M, 0.9 chain with the Bank after he removed it from the person of Akkamma on the previous night. The recovery of M. Os. 10 to 13 under Ext. P3 mahazar attested by pws. 6 and 7 was another circumstance to show that the appellant, and the appellant alone, removed the identical jewels from the person of Akkamma. 9. The evidence established that the dead body of Akkamma was found with serious bead injuries lying at the place of occurrence without her jewels on her body on the early hours of 20-4-1972 and that all those identical jewels were found in the possession of the appellant on the same day. Then the real question for consideration is whether the evidence established that the appellant murdered and robbed of Akkamma. It has to be said that the evidence against the appellant in this case was circumstantial. Before the evidence is dealt with, it is necessary to consider how far resent possession of property of a deceased person, in circumstances clearly indicating that he had been murdered and robbed, would suggest that not only the possessor of the property was a thief or a receiver of stolen property, but also that it indicated that he was guilty of a more aggravated crime of murder which had connection with the theft. 10. 10. In the earliest of cases reported, Emperor v. Neamatulla (17 Cal. W.N. 1077), Sir Lawrence Jenkins examined this question and stated as follows: "the possession of stolen goods recently after the loss of them, may be indicative not merely of the offeree of larceny, or of receiving with guilty knowledge, but of any other more aggravated crime which has been connected with theft. This particular fact of presumption commonly forms also a material element of evidence incases of murder; which special application of it has often been emphatically recognised." The Madras High Court in Queen Empress v. Sami (ILR.13 Madras 426) observed as follows: "Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any explanation, the presumption arises that any one who took part in the robbery also took part in the murder. In cases in which murder and robbery have been shown to form parts of one transaction, it has been held that recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property while it would be presumptive evidence against a prisoner on the charge of robbery would similarly be evidence against him of the charge of murder. All the facts which tell against the appellant, especially bis conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt, point equally to the conclusion that he was guilty as well as of the murder as of the robbery." Again in Emperor v. Chintamani Sahu (AIR. 1930 Cal. 379), more or less the same opinion was expressed. It was stated: "the possession of stolen goods recently after the loss of them may be indicative not merely of the offence of larceny or of receiving with guilty knowledge but of any other more aggravated crime which has been connected with the theft; this particular fast of presumption forms also a material element of evidence in the case of murder." A similar view has been expressed in almost all the cases decided on this question by the various High Courts in India. In this regard, another Madras decision supporting the same view can be cited. (See In re Guli Venketaswamy AIR. 1950 Mad. 309). The Nagpur High Court took a similar view in Ram-prashad Makundram Rajput v. The Crown (AIR. 1949 Nag. 277). 11. In State v. Shankar Prasad (AIR.1952 All. In this regard, another Madras decision supporting the same view can be cited. (See In re Guli Venketaswamy AIR. 1950 Mad. 309). The Nagpur High Court took a similar view in Ram-prashad Makundram Rajput v. The Crown (AIR. 1949 Nag. 277). 11. In State v. Shankar Prasad (AIR.1952 All. 776), a number of cases on this question have been considered, some of which established that a presumption could be drawn as to the guilt of the accused from circumstances of possession of stolen articles soon after murder. On a consideration of those cases it can be stated that each of those decisions was given on the evidence and circumstances established in that particular case and that no general proposition of law can be deduced from them. 12. This Court in Ravunni Nair v. State of Kerala (1957 KLT. 255) laid down the following proposition on the question at issue: "Recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property, while it would be presumptive evidence against the prisoner of robbery would similarly be evidence against him on the charge of murder. The chain sold by the accused to pws.11 and 12 belonged to the deceased. In the absence of any acceptable explanation from him as to how he came by it, in the circumstances of the case the Court would be perfectly justified is holding that he was not only the thief of the article, but also the murderer of the owner thereof, who was wearing the same when she was last seen alive." 13. This Court, again is Kuttappan v. State of Kerala (1960 KLT. 829) reiterated the same view as follows: "It is well-settled that in cases where robbery and murder are so connected as to form parts of the same transaction the recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property will not only be presumptive evidence against the accused on the charge of robbery but also on the charge of murder." 14. The "Supreme Court had to consider this question in a series of cases. But the first of these cases, Tulsiran Renu v. The Stale (AIR. 1954 SC. The "Supreme Court had to consider this question in a series of cases. But the first of these cases, Tulsiran Renu v. The Stale (AIR. 1954 SC. 1) while approving the presumption that the ornaments worn by the deceased when found in the possession of the accused on the very same day on which the alleged murder was committed the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to hold the accused responsible for the murder of the deceased, if he gave no explanation as to how he came to be in possession of the same, cautioned as to the time factor. It pointed out that if the ornaments are found in the possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted. But if several months expire in the interval, the presumption may not be permitted to be drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case. 15. The next Supreme Court case was one reported in Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR. 1954 SC. 704) where the usual presumption was taken. The time factor was against the accused in that case. The appellant there had disappeared from his house even before 7-30 a.m. and when he was brought back under arrest, he produced the articles which were earlier found with the deceased. The Supreme Court held that he would have got possession of the articles before he left the house wherein the murder took place. The inquest over the dead body in that case was held early after dawn. The Supreme Court pointed out the distinction between the case before it and another decision in Criminal Appeal No. 99 of 1952 of the Supreme Court, which was later reported in Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan (AIR. 1956 SC. 54). 16. In the latter case, the dead bodies of two persons were found lying in a temple on 1-1-1948. One of the accused persons in that case was arrested only on 13-1-1948 and the other on 18-1-1948. One of the articles which were the subject-matter of dispute was produced on 13-1-1948 and the other on 19-1-1948. 1956 SC. 54). 16. In the latter case, the dead bodies of two persons were found lying in a temple on 1-1-1948. One of the accused persons in that case was arrested only on 13-1-1948 and the other on 18-1-1948. One of the articles which were the subject-matter of dispute was produced on 13-1-1948 and the other on 19-1-1948. This decision was sought to be distinguished in the former case, firstly hat the inquest was held late in the day, in which case the articles in question could have changed hands, so much so the accused could not be held to be in immediate possession of those articles soon after the death of the person. However, this decision made it clear that as regards the presumption to be made, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from a certain circumstance. It has laid down the proposition in the following words; "Where the only evidence against an accused person is the recovery of stolen properly and although the circumstances may indicate that the theft and the murder must have been committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw the inference that the person in possession of the stolen property was the murderer. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof." 17. It would follow from the above decisions that the mere fact that the accused produced shortly after the murder, ornaments which were on the murdered woman is not enough to justify as inference that the accused must have committed the murder. It is necessary that there should exist some other evidence or circumstance to connect the accused to a crime of murder. 18. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sunderlal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR. 1954 SC 28) laid down the proposition that in a case where the ornaments were established to be the ornaments worn by the deceased and the accused was not in a position to give any satisfactory explanation as to how he came to be in possession of the same on the very same day on which the alleged murder was committed, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to come to the conclusion that the accused was responsible for the murder of the deceased. In that case apart from the recovery, the only other circumstance existed was the presence of the accused and the deceased together at about 2.00 p.m. on 25-7-1971. Soon after the alleged murder, the accused was found to be in possession of the articles worn by the deceased. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that those ornaments were those worn by the deceased and the accused was not in a position to give any satisfactory explanation as to how he came to be in possession of the same on the very same day on which the alleged murder was committed. According to the Supreme Court, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to hold the accused responsible for the murder of the deceased. 19. As indicated, it can be laid down that mere possession by an accused of articles, which were on the person or custody of a murdered man, without any explanation cannot lead to an inference that he took part in the murder or was a party to it. It is not safe to lay down a hard and fast rule as to the inference to be drawn from a certain circumstance where the only evidence against the accused is unexplained possession of property belonging to a murdered person. It is not safe to infer that the person is the murderer. The only inference that can be drawn in such circumstances is that he is either the thief or the receiver of stolen property. 20. In the light of these conclusions arrived at from the various decisions, it is necessary to examine the evidence in the case in hand to ascertain whether the appellant is guilty of murder under S.302 IPC, and robbery under S.392 IPC. The fact that the appellant was seen In the company of Akkama admits of no dispute. There was the evidence of pws. 2,4 and 5 that they met the appellant and another person in the paddy land at about 9.30 p. m. on 19-4-1972. The other person was found to be lying by his side. On seeing pws. 2, 4 and 5 the appellant approached them and told them on being questioned that Akkamma was drunk and lying unconscious then. However, none of those witnesses cared to go and verify what Akkamma was doing there. But their conduct on that account was not abnormal. The other person was found to be lying by his side. On seeing pws. 2, 4 and 5 the appellant approached them and told them on being questioned that Akkamma was drunk and lying unconscious then. However, none of those witnesses cared to go and verify what Akkamma was doing there. But their conduct on that account was not abnormal. They knew that she used to lie down unconscious after a heavy drink and that as usual if anyone disturbed her then, she was likely to abuse them. So they did not care for any verification. The evidence was that the appellant was not in his village after he pledged M. 0.9 with the Canara Bank on the same day on which the dead body was seen in the paddy field. Just after dawn, the dead body of Akkamma was found lying in the same place where pws. 2, 4 and 5 saw if on the previous night. pws. 2, 4 and 5 themselves witnessed the dead body. The ornaments, M. Os. 9,11,12 and 13 were not seen on the dead body. Except M.O.1, bloodstained stone lying by her side, there were no other materials there. She was lying almost naked with injuries on her head. pw.11, Assistant Surgeon, who conducted the autopsy, stated that the injuries could be caused by bitting with a stone like M. 0.1. On chemical examination human blood was detected on M. 0.1 (vide Ext. P18). The medical evidence was also conclusive that the death of Akkamma would have taken place sometime after 9.30 on the night of 19-4-1972. 21. The presence of the appellant along with Akkamma at about 9.30 p.m. was an important circumstance to connect him to the murder, firstly on the basis of the presumption, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation as to how he came to be in possession of the ornaments of Akkamma, that be was both the robber of ornaments as well as her murderer. His explanation that be pledged bis sister's jewels could not be accepted. In that case there was no need for him to conceal part of the jewels in his bouse compound and pledge another part in the Bank. If the jewels were of his sister, there was no necessity for giving a false name to the Bank and pledge M.O.9 in the name of one Raman when bis real name is Palan. In that case there was no need for him to conceal part of the jewels in his bouse compound and pledge another part in the Bank. If the jewels were of his sister, there was no necessity for giving a false name to the Bank and pledge M.O.9 in the name of one Raman when bis real name is Palan. He had no case that he committed theft of his sister's jewels. The guilty conscience of the appellant pervaded his conduct throughout beginning from the time pws. 2, 4 and 5 met him first in the company of Akkamma at 9.30 p. m. until he was arrested on 30-4-1972 in another village. Recovery of M.0s.11,12 and 13 was made out of his own residential compound in the presence of pws. 6 and 7 who were two independent witnesses. The appellant was not seen in his village after M. 0.9 was pledged at the Bank on the day on which the dead body was seen in the paddy field. pw.15, Sub-Inspector, who arrested him stated that the whereabouts of the appellant were not heard after the alleged crime, in spite of his enquiry until he was arrested. The appellant bad no explanation to offer regarding his movements upto bis arrest. He admitted that his arrest was on 30-4-1972. These circumstances are sufficient to bring home the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt on both the counts. The lower court was justified in finding in the circumstances of the case that he was both the murderer and robber of the jewels of Akkamma. The convictions under S.302 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code were therefore correct. There is no ground to interfere with the sentences. 22. In the result, in confirming the convictions and sentences, the appeal is dismissed. Narayana Pillai, J. 1A. Illustration (a) to S.114 of the Evidence Act says that when a person is found in possession of stolen articles soon after the theft be may be presumed to be the thief or receiver of the stolen goods. But that presumption can be drawn only if he cannot account for their possession. In a criminal trial an accused can afford to remain silent because it is for the prosecution to prove bis guilt beyond reasonable doubt. But that presumption can be drawn only if he cannot account for their possession. In a criminal trial an accused can afford to remain silent because it is for the prosecution to prove bis guilt beyond reasonable doubt. S.342-A of the Criminal Procedure Code which enables an accused to be a competent witness specifically provides that his failure to give evidence should not be made the subject of any comment by the Court and should not give rise to any presumption against him. If during examination under S.342 of the Crl. P. C. the court questions him about his possession of stolen articles soon after the theft and be remains silent no presumption can ipso facto arise from the silence and the silence cannot be allowed to become a substitute for proof. But that does not mean that his silence in such a case cannot be taken into account along with the other circumstances appearing in the case. 2A. Assuming that the accused has an obligation to account for his possession of the stolen articles in order that a presumption may not be drawn against him, even then the drawing of the presumption under S.114 of the Evidence Act is only in the option of the Court. It is not one the Court is bound to draw because it is an instance of only "may presume" and S.4 of the Evidence Act shows that the Court can call for proof of the fact that may be presumed. Thus the presumption can be drawn only if the accused does not account for his possession and even if he does not account for his possession the court can insist on independent proof by the prosecution of the accused being the thief or receiver of stolen goods. These statutory safeguards are signals of caution in drawing the presumption which has its own inherent weakness. 3A. The situation becomes more complicated when graver offences like murder and robbery have been shown to form parts of one and the same transaction. Illustration (a) to S.114 of the Evidence Act as it stands speaks only of the accused being presumed to be the thief or receiver of stolen goods but having regard to "the common course of natural events" mentioned in S.114 of the Evidence Act cannot a presumption be drawn against the accused in respect of both the charges of robbery and murder. Here again if the accused does not account for his possession of the stolen goods and remains silent it can be used only as a circumstance against him and because, in all cases of circumstantial evidence, the completed chain of evidence has to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused, possible theories in favour of the accused have to be eliminated before the charges of robbery and murder are found against him. It may be that another person committed the murder and left the scene leaving articles on the dead body and the accused who happened to come to the scene later took them from the dead body. It may also be that the person who committed the murder and robbery entrusted the articles to, or was himself robbed of them by, the accused. After eliminating possible theories in favour of the accused the circumstance that he was found in possession of the stolen articles has to be considered along with the other circumstances brought out in evidence and if it appears to be reasonably beyond doubt, be can be found to be guilty of both robbery and murder. If in his statement under S.342 or deposition under S.342-A of the Crl. P. C. be gives an explanation and that is proved to be false or if he keeps silent when questioned under S.342 of the Cr. P C. the same can also be taken into account as additional links in the chain of circumstantial evidence. 4A. Mr. N. Govindan Nair, counsel who argued the case for the accused spared no pains to place before us all aspects of the matter. The decisions of the Supreme Court cited by him were:- Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR. 1954 SC. 1, Sanwat Khan and another v. State of Rajasthan 1956 Crl. Q. 150, Sunderlal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR. 1954 SC. 28, Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR. 1954 SC. 704, Wasim Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1956 SCA. 549, Shivappa and others v. The State of Mysore AIR 1971 SC. 196 and Ayodhya Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1972) II SCWR. 446. In Tulsiran Kanu v. The State AIR. 1954 SC. 28, Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR. 1954 SC. 704, Wasim Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1956 SCA. 549, Shivappa and others v. The State of Mysore AIR 1971 SC. 196 and Ayodhya Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1972) II SCWR. 446. In Tulsiran Kanu v. The State AIR. 1954 SC.1 it was held that as the ornaments belonging to the deceased were recovered only about five months after the occurrence presumption could not be drawn that it was the person who was found to be in possession of them who had committed the murder. In Sanwat Khan and another v. State of Rajasthan 1956 Crl. Q. 150 the only circumstance appearing in evidence against the accused who were convicted for murder of two persons was possession of certain articles which were in the possession of the deceased before the occurrence. The conviction was altered from S.302 to S.380 of the IPC. It was held there that where the only evidence against the accused was the recovery of stolen property although that circumstance may indicate that the theft and murder were committed at the same time it was not safe to draw the inference that the person in possession of the stolen property was the murderer. It was stated that it could easily be envisaged that the accused after seeing the deceased murdered, removed the articles or received them from the person who committed the murder, that the maximum that could be said against the accused was that they received the articles knowing them to be stolen or that they themselves stole them and that in the absence of other evidence it was not possible to hold that they were guilty of murder as well. In Sunderlal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR. 1954 SC. 28, Ram Bharnsey v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR. 1954 SC. 704 and Wasim Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1956 SCA. 549 the circumstance that after the occurrence the accused was found in possession of articles which were with the deceased at the time of occurrence was relied upon along with other circumstances to conclude that it was the accused who had committed the murder. In Sunderlal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR. 1954 SC. 549 the circumstance that after the occurrence the accused was found in possession of articles which were with the deceased at the time of occurrence was relied upon along with other circumstances to conclude that it was the accused who had committed the murder. In Sunderlal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR. 1954 SC. 28 the accused and the deceased were seen together a few hours before the occurrence and on the date of occurrence itself after the murder the accused went to a person and offered to sell the stolen articles to him. In Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR. 1954 SC. 704 blood stains were found on the jewels stolen by the accused, the accused was seen a short time after the occurrence getting down the roof of the house where the murder took place and as the relationship between the accused and the deceased was not cordial there was a motive for the crime. In Wasim Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1956 SCA. 549 when the deceased was last seen alive he was the in company of the accused and the accused bad no explanation for possession of a bloodstained knife. In Shivappa and others v. The State of Mysore AIR 1971 SC. 196 the charge and conviction were only for dacoity and in Ayodhya Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1972) II SCWR. 446 house breaking and theft. No murder was committed in the transactions. In Shivappa and others v. The State of Mysore AIR. 1971 SC. 196 the conviction for dacoity was upheld holding that along with possession of stolen property if there was other evidence, however small, to connect the accused with the crime, the finding of the stolen property with him was a circumstance which connected him further with the crime and that there was then do question of presumption. In Ayodhya Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1972) II SCWR. 446 where the convictions for house breaking and theft were upheld besides recovery of stolen articles there was the circumstance that in their anxiety to conceal the stolen articles the accused buried them in a graveyard. 4. In Ayodhya Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1972) II SCWR. 446 where the convictions for house breaking and theft were upheld besides recovery of stolen articles there was the circumstance that in their anxiety to conceal the stolen articles the accused buried them in a graveyard. 4. In the present case besides the circumstance that soon after the occurrence the appellant was found in possession of ornaments which were on the body of the deceased a short time before the occurrence, there were also the circumstances that just before the occurrence he was seen with the deceased under circumstances which could rule out his innocence and that he was absconding until he was arrested. From these circumstances the conclusion is inescapable that he is guilty of the offences for which he has been convicted. I agree in confirming the convictions and sentences and dismissing his appeal.