JUDGMENT This is an application in revision by the decree-holder and is directed from the order of the lower appellate court dismissing his miscellaneous first appeal filed under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called the Code) and upholding the order of the execution court. Because of the bar of section 102 of the Code this Civil-revision has been filed. 2. The petitioner obtained a decree in small cause Court Suit 14/14 of 1966 in the court of the 1st subordinate Judge, Chapra. The decree was transferred for execution on the regular civil side of the court. Execution Case 20 of 1968 was filed in the court of 1st Munsif, Chapra. In the execution case the judgment-debtor opposite party filed an application under section 47 of the Code, which was registered and numbered as Miscellaneous Case 65 of 1968. The application was also under section 15 of the Bihar Money-Lenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 (hereinafter called the Act) and section 16 of the Bihar Privileged Persons Home stead Tenancy Act; 1947. The opposite party claimed exemption, alleging that he was an agriculturist possessed of only 19 kathas 10 dhurs of land, with the usufruct of which he maintains himself and as the land held by him was less than one acre, the same could not be attached and sold in execution of a decree. The petitioner filed a rejoinder contending that the application was barred by the principles of constructive res judicata and the opposite party was possessed of more land than one acre. The land under attachment was not fit to be released. 3. The learned Munsif, namely, the execution court took oral and documentary evidence, allowed the miscellaneous case and released the land under section 15 of the Act, holding that the opposite party was possessed of only 19l kathas of culturable land which was his main source of livelihood. 4. The decree-holder filed a miscellaneous first appeal which has been dismissed by the learned additional subordinate Judge. Three points were urged before him, namely, (i) That the provisions of the Act do not apply to a casual money-lender or to those who are not professional money-lenders and the execution of this decree being not by a professional money-lender, no relief under section 15 could be given to the judgment-debtor. (ii) That the objection was hit by the principles of constructive res judicata. (ii) That the objection was hit by the principles of constructive res judicata. (iii) That the lands which had been given to Most Kulanjana could be made available in computing the area of one acre to be in possession of the opposite party. All the three points have been decided against the petitioner by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, and hence he has come up in revision. 5. Since no order for sale was made in the execution case, the point of the objection being barred on the principles of constructive resjudicata, could not be substantiated. We need not go into the question whether land given to Most. Kulanjana in lieu of maintenance could be counted in computing the area possessed by the judgment-debtor as, in our opinion, the provisions of section 15 of the Act are not applicable to the present execution. Since the application of the opposite party filed under section 16 of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act has not been examined and tried in accordance with law by the execution court, the case will have to go back to that court for a trial of that petition. 6. The term 'money-lender' has been defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Act. The word 'loan' is defined in clause (f). On a consideration of these definitions, there have been several decisions by this Court to say that section 4 of the Act is not a bar to a suit by a person who is not a professional money-lender. In Dwarkadas Marwari V. Kalipada Dey it was pointed out at page 148 that- "The principle to be applied to a case of this description has been laid down by this Bench in Saraswati Devi V. Janklal Thakur (Second Appeal No. 1182 of 1954 decided on the 12th Dec., (1958),. It was pointed out in that case that a man does not become a money-lender by reason of occasional loans to relations, friends or acquaintances, nor does he become a money-lender merely because on one or several isolated occasions he may lend money to strangers. It was pointed out in that case that a man does not become a money-lender by reason of occasional loans to relations, friends or acquaintances, nor does he become a money-lender merely because on one or several isolated occasions he may lend money to strangers. It was also pointed out in that case that the business of money lending imports a notion of system, repetition and continuity, and that was the proper legal test to be applied for the purpose of finding out whether the plaintiff was a professional money-lender and whether the suit was barred by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act. In another decision of a Division Bench of this Court, Sana Kashinath Chaudhuri V. Pattito Sabuto (24 P. L. T. 11) it was observed that there must be more than occasional and disconnected loans if there was to be a finding that the plaintiff was a professional money-lender and the bar of Sec. 4 of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act operates”. The point seems to be well settled now that section 4 of the Act cannot bar a suit for realisation of money paid by a person who had not advanced it as a professional money-lender. Of course, a debate and dispute arose between some decisions of this Court as to on whom the initial onus to plead and prove that the plaintiff is a professional money-lender or not a professional money-lender, lay. Different views were taken by some learned Judges of this Court sitting singly and the view taken in Babu Ram Japo Chaudhary V. Babu Pathak was approved by a Bench of this Court in Lakhi Narayan Sao. V. Smt. Bhagwati Kuer. But on this question, the Full Bench in the case of Smt. Fulla Devi V. Mangru Maharaj and others overruled the said view of the Bench. The Full Bench, however, did not differ from the well settled view of this Court that section 4 of the Act cannot apply if the suit is not by a professional money-lender. But on this question, the Full Bench in the case of Smt. Fulla Devi V. Mangru Maharaj and others overruled the said view of the Bench. The Full Bench, however, did not differ from the well settled view of this Court that section 4 of the Act cannot apply if the suit is not by a professional money-lender. The expression used in section 4 is- "No Court shall entertain a suit by a money-lender for the recovery of a loan advanced by him." Section 15 of the Act provides for exemption of portion of the holding from attachment or sale in execution of a decree where the decree is passed "for the payment by an agricultural debtor of the amount due on any loan advanced to him by a money-lender". Relief under Section 15 cannot be granted if the decree is not for the payment of the amount due on a loan advanced by a money-lender. The meaning which has been assigned to a similar phrase in the former section, it is plain, must be attributed to the words used in section 15. In that view of the matter, it is manifest that the exemption must relate to a decree passed on the basis of a loan advanced by a professional money-lender to an agricultural debtor. If the decree was not obtained by professional money-lender relief under section 15 cannot be given to a judgment-debtor. 7. In this case we have examined the plaint, the written statement and the judgment passed in the small cause court suit. In paragraph 4 of the plaint the petitioner pleaded that he was not a professional money-lender and the advance to the opposite party was a casual one. This fact was not denied in the written statement. No issue, therefore, was framed in that regard. On the facts of this case, therefore, it is plain that the present execution is not of a decree for payment of an amount due on account of loan advanced by a professional money lender. Both the courts below have committed an error of law in that regard and the error is one of jurisdiction vide the decision of the Privy Council in Joy Chand Lal babu Vs. Kamalaksha Chaudhry. 8. On behalf of the opposite party, his application under section 16 of the Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act was pressed before us. Both the courts below have committed an error of law in that regard and the error is one of jurisdiction vide the decision of the Privy Council in Joy Chand Lal babu Vs. Kamalaksha Chaudhry. 8. On behalf of the opposite party, his application under section 16 of the Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act was pressed before us. But, it appears, no sufficient evidence was adduced in that connection in the execution court nor any of the courts below has expressed its opinion in that regard. Justice, therefore, demands a remand of this case to the execution court for a fresh trial of that petition. 9. In the result, this civil revision application is allowed; the judgments and orders of the courts below are set aside. The case is remitted back to the execution court for a fresh disposal of the application filed by the judgment debtor under section 16 of the Bihar Privileged Persons Homestead Tenancy Act in accordance with law, in the light of this judgment and after giving fresh opportunity to both the parties to adduce further evidence in relation to that petition. There will be no order as to cost. Application allowed.