ORDER S. Malik, J. - This is a Defendants' second appeal against the judgment dt. 27-2-1965 of the 1st Addl. Civil Judge, Nainital, allowing the Plaintiffs' appeal and decreeing the Plaintiffs' suit for a declaration that the land in suit was a legal extension made by the Plaintiffs in accordance with the provisions of the Kumaun Nayabad and Waste Lands Act, 1948 (Act No. XXXII of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The suit was filed by Prem Singh for a declaration that the land described in the plaint and shown in red in the Amin's map is a genuine extension of the Plaintiffs in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Prem Singh died during the pendency of the suit and his five sons, daughter and widow continued the suit thereafter. In Kumaun a cultivator is allowed to extend his cultivated land by including land which has not yet been brought under the plough and lying contiguous to his agricultural land provided the land included is within the traditional boundary as defined in the Act. According to the Plaintiffs, the father of Defendant-Appellants Nos. 1 to 7 wrongly reported against the said extension legally made by Prem Singh and on the said report the Asstt. Collector held the extention in question to have been illegal and directed Prem Singh to vacate the same. Prem Singh admittedly went up in appeal against the order passed by the Asstt. Collector and his appeal was dismissed. Thereafter Prem Singh filed a Second Appeal before the Commr. and the same also was dismissed and thereafter the suit in question was filed. The State of UP was also made a party through the Dy. Commr. Almora but it appears that the State of UP is no longer interested in this case and therefore, has not challenged the judgment passed by the lower appellate court and has been impleaded as a proforma Respondent in this Court. 3. The contesting Defendants-Appellants pleaded that the revenue courts rightly held the extension to be illegal. 4. The questions which arise in this case are whether the extension in question is contiguous to the agricultural plots of the Plaintiffs-Respondents and within the traditional boundary of the village to which the Plaintiffs belong. It may be mentioned that the Plaintiffs are residents of village Dhanyari, while the Defendant-Appellants are residents of village Hatela. 4. The questions which arise in this case are whether the extension in question is contiguous to the agricultural plots of the Plaintiffs-Respondents and within the traditional boundary of the village to which the Plaintiffs belong. It may be mentioned that the Plaintiffs are residents of village Dhanyari, while the Defendant-Appellants are residents of village Hatela. By concurrent findings of fact the courts below have held that the extension in question is situate in village Dhanyari and contiguous to the agricultural plot of the Plaintiffs. 5. The only other question of fact relevant for the purposes of this case is the course of rivulet Gadhera. According to the Act an extension cannot be made across a natural boundary including a rivulet or a ravine. According to the Defendants, the Plaintiffs changed the course of rivulet Gadhera and thereby made the land in suit contiguous to their cultivated plots which otherwise lay across Gadhera. The trial court after considering the evidence on the record came to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs, in fact, had changed the course of Gadhera and thus were able to extend their cultivation. The lower appellate court, however, after considering the evidence on the record held that it had not been proved that the course of Gadhera was changed by the Plaintiffs and therefore, decreed the Plaintiffs' suit for the declaration. This finding of the lower appellate court is a finding of fact. Nothing could be brought to my notice due to which it could be said that the said findings of fact suffers from any procedural defect or from misreading of evidence. 6. The only other question raised was the question of jurisdiction. It was argued on behalf of the Appellants that in view of Section 14 read with Ch. III, Sections 16 and 23 of the Act, it is apparent that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. I see no force in this contention. Section 14 lays down: Subject to the provisions contained in Ch. III, all proceedings under this Act and the rules made thereunder shall be heard and decided by revenue courts and no court, other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such proceeding. 7. In this connection, it would be useful to examine the scheme of the Act. Sections 4 and 5 of Ch. III, all proceedings under this Act and the rules made thereunder shall be heard and decided by revenue courts and no court, other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such proceeding. 7. In this connection, it would be useful to examine the scheme of the Act. Sections 4 and 5 of Ch. II give a statutory right under certain circumstances to a cultivator to make an extension by bringing under the plough virgin land. For this statutory right no permission of the Dy. Commr. is needed but for the restrictions imposed in provisos (i) and (ii) of Section 5 and the other sections in Ch. II. Therefore Ch. II gave Prem Singh a statutory right to extend his cultivation subject to the legal bar mentioned in Sections 5, 6 and 7. 8. Prem Singh purported to exercise this right and the party aggrieved had to seek its relief Under Ch. III in the Civil Court. Section 14 of the Act, therefore, does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as Prem Singh's right of extension was a right of a civil nature and covered by S 9 of the CPC which lays down: The Courts shall....have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation : A suit in which the right to property...is contested is a suit of a civil nature.... Nothing could be brought to my notice from which it may appear that the Act and the Rules provide for a suit for a declaration as was claimed by the Plaintiffs in the instant case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the suit giving rise to this appeal is a proceeding under the Act. Moreover, the provisions of S 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, have nowhere in this Act been barred either expressly or impliedly. Section 16 of the Act also lays down: The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908...in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall apply to all suits and proceedings under this Act or the rules made thereunder. As has been pointed out, the Act in question does not provide either directly or indirectly for a suit for a declaration as filed by the Plaintiffs-Respondents. As has been pointed out, the Act in question does not provide either directly or indirectly for a suit for a declaration as filed by the Plaintiffs-Respondents. Under the circumstances, I find that the suit was rightly instituted in the Civil Court. 9. In view of the reasons discussed, I see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs.