JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - A learned Single Judge has referred the following question to a larger Bench:- "Whether Section 171 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1951), as amended by U. P. Act XVI of 1953, preferring a brother as an heir to a daughter's son, would take effect from 1-7-1952 or prospectively." 2. The following is the pedigree of the family of the parties :- 3. Smt. Dhanau the plaintiff appellant filed a suit for an injunction and in the alternative for possession. The suit related to two holdings. The plots mentioned in List A annexed to the plaint were Sir and Khudkasht while the plots mentioned in the List B to the plaint constituted a tenancy holding. The plaintiff alleged that Sri Ram Singh and Girdhari Singh were cosharers in the two holdings. Shri Ram Singh died prior to the date of vesting. On his death the plaintiff succeeded to his interest under the personal law in regard to the sir and khudkasht plots. In respect of the tenancy holding, on death of Sri Ram Singh, the other cosharer Girdhari Singh coopted Smt. Dhanau as co-tenant with the consent of the zamindar. Girdhari Singh died on June 6, 1953 leaving no one as an heir under the Zamindari Abolition Act. So under Section 175 of that Act the plaintiff Smt. Dhanau as a co-sharer acquired Girdhari Singh's interest by survivorship. In this way she became the sole tenure-holder of both the holdings. It was alleged that Jagarnath Singh defendant No. 1 had on March 29, 1957 transferred the plots of Lists A and B to defendants second set without having any title or interest in them. Since the defendants name had been mutated the plaintiff apprehended dispossession. 4. The suit was contested by Jagarnath Singh. He admitted the pedigree set out in the plaint. He also admitted that the plots mentioned in List A were the joint sir and Khudkasht of Shri Ram Singh and Girdhari Singh and that plots of list B constituted a tenancy holding. It was alleged that the plaintiff had transferred her interest in plots of list A to one Suraj Singh. He also admitted that the plots mentioned in List A were the joint sir and Khudkasht of Shri Ram Singh and Girdhari Singh and that plots of list B constituted a tenancy holding. It was alleged that the plaintiff had transferred her interest in plots of list A to one Suraj Singh. The allegation that Girdhari Singh had co-opted the plaintiff as a cotenant was denied and it was alleged that by, virtue of the amending Act No. XVI of 1953 a sister's son became an heir to a sirdar and so on death of Girdhari Singh. Jagarnath Singh defendant No. 1 succeeded to his interest. 5. The trial court held that the amending Act No. XVI of 1953 was constitutionally valid and the defendant Jagarnath Singh was the rightful heir to the interest of Girdhari Singh. The plaintiff Smt. Dhanau in fact had sold her interest in the bhumidhari , holding. She had no right to sue. The allegation that Girdhari Singh had co-opted the plaintiff as a co-sharer in the tenancy of the holding was not proved. On the death of Shri Ram Singh his interest in it passed on to Girdhari Singh by survivorship because the former had left no heir. Girdhari Singh was the sole heir of the plots in the tenancy holding; and his interest was inherited by the defendant Jagarnath Singh. On these findings the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff went up in appeal but failed. Aggrieved she came up to this Court in second appeal. She challenged the finding that the amending Act No. XVI 1953 was constitutionally valid. A learned Single Judge finding a conflict of opinion in this Court, referred the question mentioned above to a larger Bench. 6. It will be seen that the dispute is whether a sister's son could validly be an heir. The question relerned to us in so far as it raises the controversy whether the amending Act No. XVI of 1953 preferring a brother as an heir to a daughter's son is valid is wrongly framed. The question should be:- "Whether Section 171 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1951), as amended by U. P. Act XVI of 1953, adding a sister's son as an heir would take effect from 1-7-1952 or prospectively? A sister's son is an heir under Hindu Law. The question should be:- "Whether Section 171 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1951), as amended by U. P. Act XVI of 1953, adding a sister's son as an heir would take effect from 1-7-1952 or prospectively? A sister's son is an heir under Hindu Law. A sister's son has always been an heir under all the tenancy laws prevailing in this State from time to time. The Zamindari Abolition Act came into force on July 1, 1952. In the table oi succession laid down in it by Section 171 a sister's son was not an heir. Sec. 39 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. (Amendment) Act XVI of 1953 which came into force on June 19, 1953 introduced the sister's son as an heir in Sec. 171. Sec. 1, Sub-sec. (2) of the amending Act XVI of 1953 stated:- "1 (2). It shall be deemed to have come into force from the first day oi July, 1952 except Secs. 37, 38 and 60 which shall come into force at once. " With the exception of Secs. 37, 38 and 60 of the amending Act all other sections thereof were directed to come into force from July 1, 1952, that is to say, they were expressly given retrospective effect. The addition of a sister's son as an heir by Section 39 of the amending Act XVI of 1953 directed to take effect from July 1, 1952. 7. For the appellant it was urged that when Girdhari Singh died on June 6, 1953 the amending Act XVI of 1953 had not come into operation. At the moment of the death of Girdhari Singh there was in law no one who could succeed as an heir. So Girdhari Singh's interest went to the plaintiff by survivorship. Once Girdhari Singh's interest vested in the plaintiff a law which operated to divest her of her rights in property would be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 19 (1) (f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. The amending Act XVI of 1953 in so far as it gave retrospective effect to Section 39 was unconstitutional. 8. On the finding of fact that Girdhari Singh did not co-opt the plaintiff as a co-tenant, Girdhari Singh's interest could not in law vest in the plaintiff by survivorship. 19 (1) (f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. The amending Act XVI of 1953 in so far as it gave retrospective effect to Section 39 was unconstitutional. 8. On the finding of fact that Girdhari Singh did not co-opt the plaintiff as a co-tenant, Girdhari Singh's interest could not in law vest in the plaintiff by survivorship. The constitutional question sought to be raised on her behalf does not really arise, but since a specific question has been referred to this Bench we proceed to consider it. When a statutory enactment expressly gives retrospective operation to its provisions it does so by creating a fiction. In State of Bombay v. Pandurang, AIR 1953 S.C. 244 , Mahajan, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, held : - "When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion." He quoted with approval the following observations of Lord Squith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1952) A.C. 109: - "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative, state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it ................... The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs." 9. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 S.C. 352 Venkatarama Aiyar, J., after quoting with approval the above mentioned observations of Lord Asquith held : - "It is a rule of interpretation well settled that in construing the scope of a legal fiction it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those lads on which alone the fiction can operate." 10. The amending Act XVI of 1953 directs that a sister's son will be deemed to be an heir under Section 171 of the Zamindari Abolition Act with effect from July 1, 1952, the date on which the principal Act came into operation. We have already noticed that a sister's son was always an heir under the Revenue laws of the State. He was for some reason left out from the principal Act and this mistake was sought to be recitified by Amending Act XVI of 1953 retrospectively. The intention of the Legislature was clearly expressed that a sister's son would be an heir from the beginning of the commencement of the Zamindari Abolition Act. This being the legislative intent court must not let its imagination to boggle when it comes to the corollaries of the fictional state of affairs. It must assume all these facts on which alone a fiction can operate. The fiction created by the amending Act XVI of 1953 can operate only when it is assumed that a sister's son was an heir in cases where the succession opened after July 1, 1952. If this is assumed, then the position would be that the sister's son was an heir entitled to succeed when Girdhari Singh died on June 6, 1953. The necessary consequence which equally well has to be assumed is that there being an heir, no one could succeed by survivorship under Section 175 because on its terms Section 175 operates only when there is no heir at all. 11. So giving full effect to the legal fiction the resultant position is that succession by survivorship never took place. There is no question of divesting any rights in property which had become vested by survivorship. No question of an infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f) or Art. 31 would arise. 12. Art. 31(1) permits deprivation of property by authority of law. Art. 31(2) requires payment on compensation; but before Art. 31(2) can operate it must be established that the deprivation has been because of acquisition by the State or in favour of any Corporation owned by the State. Sec. 39 of the amending Act XVI of 1953 does not seek to acquire any one's right in favour of the State or a State Corporation. Sec. 39 of the amending Act XVI of 1953 does not seek to acquire any one's right in favour of the State or a State Corporation. Even according to the plaintiff the effect is that the rights of the plaintiff are taken away and vested in the defendant. To such a state of affairs Art. 31(2) is not attracted. 13. In Tej Bahadur Singh v. Board of Revenue, 1968 R.D. 27, brother Ashtana, J. repelled the submission that the retrospective operation of the U. P. Act XVI of 1953 affected vested rights. It was held that once the deeming clause is , given its full effect, no right whatsoever could vest in the daughter's son on March 24, 1953 as on that day the law would be that it is the brother who will prefer over the daughter's son. 14. In Puran v. State of U. P., W.P. No. 2579 of 1965. D/d. 22.12.1969a learned Single Judge held that the retrospective operation of Section 39 violated Art. 19(1) (f) and 31(1) of the Constitution and so the provisions of that section would operate only prospectively. The learned Judge did not consider the effect and the manner of operation of legal fiction. We are unable to sustain this view. 15. Our answer to the question referred to us is that the addition of sister's son as an heir takes effect from July 1, 1952 and not prospectively. 16. Let the papers be returned to the learned Judge concerned with this opinion and answer.