S. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals arise out of a judgment and decrees of affirmance. A consignment of 114 chests of tea was booked for transport from Gamirighat to T. T. Shed, Kidderpore through defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the Steamer Companies under Steamer Receipt No. R/62 dated 22. 6. 57. The goods were delivered on 20. 7. 57 to the plaintiff No. 1 the consignee, with damages mentioned in the schedule of the plaint of the suit referred and assessed at Rs. 6,496/ -. It appears that a sum of Rs. 1,767. 75 was realized by the sale of damaged teas held on 4. 10. 57. The amount of loss was thus Rs. 4,728. 25. This with excise duty of Rs. 70. 50 less such duty realized for Rs. 24. 25 resulted in net loss of Rs. 4,774. 50. which was assessed for damages. The plaintiff No. 2 is the insurer of the goods while the defendant No. 3 are Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta who carried the consignment from TT Shed to K. P. Docks. The plaintiffs alleged that the damages were due to misconduct or negligence on the part of the defendants independently or jointly. The plaintiff served due notices of claim as required and the suit was instituted on July 17, 1958 for a decree for Rs. 4,774. 50p. or an enquiry for damages and decree for such amount as may be found due on enquiry. ( 2 ) THE suit was contested by the defendants by separate written statements. One written statement was filed on behalf of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 who denied all material allegations in the plaint and also denied that they had any liability in the matter, as under contract of carriage, the consignment was handed over to the defendant No. 3 under clear receipt. The defendant No. 3 filed a separate written statement stating that at the time of delivery was taken at TT Shed from Steamer Companies and loaded in Port Commissioners wagon, some chest were found broken and some other in water stained conditions. There were also some shortages in the contents of some chests. There was a further defence that the suit was barred by limitation under the Calcutta Port Act, 1890. There were also some shortages in the contents of some chests. There was a further defence that the suit was barred by limitation under the Calcutta Port Act, 1890. It was further stated that the statement of claim was not filed within the six months' time allowed by the defendants for filing such claim from date of delivery of the consignment to the answering defendant. ( 3 ) ON a trial on evidence, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the suit was not barred by limitation under Section 142 of the Calcutta Port Act as causing damage to the consignment in some undisclosed manner was certainly not an act which was done or purported or professed to e done in pursuance of the Calcutta Port Act. It was further held that there was no evidence to assess the extent of damage by breakage and separating the same for damages caused by water. Accordingly the liability should be shared by all the defendants over whose system the consignment in suit was carried. The suit was accordingly decreed against the defendants and the decree was drawn up as follows: -"it is ordered that the suit be decreed on contest with costs. The defendants do pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 4,774. 50p. and also do pay Rs. 763. 50p. the costs of the suit. " ( 4 ) AGAINST this decision the Commissioners preferred an appeal, but no appeal was filed by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Subsequently, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed a cross-objection in the said appeal and grounds urged were that the learned Court should have dismissed the entire suit against the said defendants as the goods in question were taken delivery of under clear receipt by defendant No. 3 whereon the liability of the cross-objectors Steamer Companies ceased. The Appellate Court was of opinion, in agreement with the trial court, that causing the damage in consignment in suit by the defendant No. 3 in an undisclosed manner was not an act done or purporting on professing to be done by the defendant No. 3 or its officers in pursuance of the Calcutta Port Act and the suit accordingly was not barred by limitation. It was further held that the cross-objection filed by the defendant Nos. It was further held that the cross-objection filed by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was not competent in the facts of the case and further in absence of any evidence as to assessment of damage caused by breakage or water as also of shortage, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 could not be said to be absolved from liability. Both the appeal and the cross-objection were accordingly dismissed. ( 5 ) AGAINST this decision, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have preferred in S. A. No. 1025 of 1964 while the defendant No. 3 has filed the S. A. No. 196 of 1964 and both these appeals have been heard analogously. Mr. Bankim Chandra Dutt, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant in S. A. No. 196 of 1964 has contended that the Courts below erred in thinking that the provisions of section 142 of Calcutta Port Act will not apply in cases where there is an omission or negligence to do or to perform a statutory duty. Mr. Dutt referred to certain decisions which consistently held that the protection will extend to claim based not only for breach of statutory duty but also for omission to perform a statutory duty. ( 6 ) IN (1) Commissioners for Port of Calcutta v. Corporation of Calcutta, 41 Calwn 1317 (PC) it was held that the protection under section 142 of Calcutta Port Act extended not only to claim against the Commissioners based for breach of their statutory duty but also to a claim based on omission to perform statutory duty. The contention that section 142 protects against a claim based on breach of statutory duty but not against an omission to perform a statutory duty was not accepted. In (2) Basantalal v. The Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta and Others, AIR 1951 Calcutta 460 it was held by R. P. Mukherjee, J. that the expression "purporting or professing to be done" in section 142, Calcutta Port Act cannot be interpreted to exclude acts which are either improper or even mala fide. It was further held that even if in the discharge of the statutory duties any loss occurs, whether by mala fide act on the part of some one or other serving the administration or otherwise that by itself will not take the case out of the provisions of section 142. It was further held that even if in the discharge of the statutory duties any loss occurs, whether by mala fide act on the part of some one or other serving the administration or otherwise that by itself will not take the case out of the provisions of section 142. The Appellate Court has referred to the decision of Bachawat, J. in Civil Rule No. 148 of 1956 in which Privy Council decision referred to above was considered and distinguished. Relying on the above decision, it was held by the Appellate Court that the damage to the consignment in an undisclosed manner was not an act done purporting or professing to be done by the defendant No. 3 or its officers in pursuance of the Calcutta Port Act. In (3) Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Abdulla Osman and Company, 68 Calwn 814 it was observed by D. Basu of the Division Bench as follows: -"according to their Lordship (of the Privy Council in the case referred to above) by reason of the words "purporting or professing" section 142 protects against a claim not only based on breach of statutory duty. But also based on omission to perform a statutory duty. If so, section 142 would plainly protect the Commissioners for an action where they omitted to take care which they were under statutory duty to take in respect of the goods which had come into their custody as a bailee and by reason of which failure or omission the opposite party has suffered loss of a part of the goods consigned. " ( 7 ) IT was accordingly held that the protection of section 142 cannot be held to be confined to acts done in the exercise of statutory power but also extends to acts done in omission to perform such statutory duty. In (4) Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Agarpara Company Ltd. , 74 Calwn 900 it was held again by the Division Bench that "act done" also included omission to perform a duty within the scope of statutory functions of the Port Commissioners. The same principle was followed by another Division Bench in (5) Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Rishikesh Awasthi, F. A. No. 35 of 1965 dated September 16, 1971. The same principle was followed by another Division Bench in (5) Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. Rishikesh Awasthi, F. A. No. 35 of 1965 dated September 16, 1971. Applying this principle, which has been consistently followed as noted above, to this case it is obvious that the carriage of the suit consignment by the Port Commissioners was a part of their statutory duty and damages occurred as a result of omission to take appropriate care. There is no allegation or evidence that the act complained of was done by anyone in their employ for their personal gain or benefit. Accordingly the protection of section 142 applies with full force and it must be held that the suit is barred by limitation. ( 8 ) THIS appeal (S. A. 196 of 1964) is accordingly is allowed and the judgment and decrees of the courts below in so far as the same decree the suit against the appellant are set aside. The plaintiffs' suit against the defendant No. 3 is dismissed as being barred by limitation. ( 9 ) COMING now to the appeal filed by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 (S. A. No. 1025 of 1964), the primary question for consideration is whether the cross-objection, filed by the said appellants' before the lower Appellate Court was maintainable in law. The question of maintainability of cross-objection against the co-respondents has been a vexed question for a long time. The Supreme Court considered all the decisions of the different High Courts in the case of (5) Pannalal v. State of Bombay, (1964) 1 SCR 980 : (1964)1 SCA 25 and observed: -"in our opinion, the view that has now been accepted by all the High Courts that Order 41, Rule 22 permits as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exception cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being reopened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under Order 41, Rule 22 can be directed against the other respondents, is correct. " ( 10 ) IN this case, there is no question of relief against the appellant by the Steamer Companies, as the Port Commissioners are not decree-holders. Further the Steamer Companies in their grounds of cross-objection as asked for compete absolving of any liability in respect of the suit consignment. We have noticed that the suit against the Port Commissioners has been dismissed so that there is no question of the relief against the Port Commissioners being granted without the question being reopened between the objecting respondents and the other respondents. On the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court as indicated above, the cross-objection was thus not maintainable in the lower Appellate Court. ( 11 ) THAT being the position of the present appeal before this the Court against the dismissal of the cross-objection is not maintainable in law. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order for costs in either of the appeals. In view of the dismissal of the letter appeal, I do not propose to enter into other points urged by Mr. Chatterjee. Appeal dismissed.