JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal raises a short but important question namely whether a breach of assurance by an employer can be said to be unfair labour practice. 2. ON July 31, 1959, a settlement of an industrial dispute was arrived at between the appellant and its workmen, represented by the Assam Railways mazdoor Congress, with regard to the pay scale of the appellant's workmen and other connected matters. The appellant owned four different collieries. All the workmen of these collieries were covered by the settlement. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to refer to the terms of this settlement. This settlement, however, could not be worked out as the appellant informed the union, representing the workmen that unless the Central Government agreed to raise the selling price of coal by Re. 1.50 per ton, the management would not be in a position to implement the agreement. The appellant also wrote to the Central Government on September 28, 1959, by which the latter was requested to accept the claim to increase the selling price of coal by Re. 1.50 per ton. On January 14, 1960, the union representing the workmen wrote to the appellant that as it was doubtful about the company's assurance regarding implementing the agreement, the workers would go on strike from January 15, 1960. The strike in fact started on the appointed date and continued until January 29, 1960. On January 30, 1960 most of the workmen returned to work and on the same day the appellant served charge-sheets on 86 workmen of four different collieries. Five charges were made against the workmen namely :- (i) Absence without sufficient cause for more than ten days; (ii) Causing damage to work in progress; (iii) Breach of Coal Mines regulations; (iv) Riotous or disorderly behavior ; (v) Abatement of any of the above five acts of misconduct. Broadly speaking the above-mentioned five charges were the charges brought against the workmen though, there were some modifications in individual cases. 3. FROM time to time several statements, which have been described as hand-outs, were issued by the appellant. In one of these statements dated December 30, 1959, it was stated that the appellant had received information from Delhi that the representation made to the Central Government for increase in the sale price of coal was receiving attention. 3. FROM time to time several statements, which have been described as hand-outs, were issued by the appellant. In one of these statements dated December 30, 1959, it was stated that the appellant had received information from Delhi that the representation made to the Central Government for increase in the sale price of coal was receiving attention. The workmen were requested to have patience as in this respect the appellant's interest was the same as that of the workmen. Another statement was issued on January 22, 1960 during the continuance of the strike, in which it was stated that until the strike situation ceased, no decision could be taken, that the strike was held illegal and unjustified and therefore no wages would be paid for the strike period, and that unless the workmen resumed their work on or before January 25, 1960 they would be considered to have voluntarily vacated the company's service. In another statement also issued during the strike period on January 27, 1960, it was stated that an extension was granted up to January 30, 1960, during which period anyone reporting for duty would be given employment. It was added that those who did not report for work on or before January 30, would be subject to such disciplinary action as the management thought fit. This assurance or promise in the statement of January 27, 1960, has a good deal of bearing on the issue involved in this appeal, as it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the subsequent disciplinary proceedings against the 86 workmen, in breach of the assurance given in the above statement was unfair labour practice which vitiated the order of dismissal of some of the workmen who had joined by January 30, 1960, in view of the assurance. 4. DISPUTES arose between the workmen and the appellant and attempts were made at conciliation by the Conciliation officer Shillong, which having proved infructuous an order of reference was made by the Central Government on august 1, 1964. The issue referred to the Tribunal was whether the dismissal of 89 miners of the Assam Railways and trading Co. Limited on February 12, 1960, was justified. If not, to what relief are the workmen entitled ? Thereafter a list of 89 workmen was set out in the order of reference. On December 8, 1966, the respondent No. 1 made its award in this reference. Limited on February 12, 1960, was justified. If not, to what relief are the workmen entitled ? Thereafter a list of 89 workmen was set out in the order of reference. On December 8, 1966, the respondent No. 1 made its award in this reference. By this award the respondent No. 1 found that the dismissal of 36 work men of the appellant was not justified. With regard to 53 workmen the tribunal found that the order of dismissal was in accordance with the Standing orders and in pursuance of the procedure and therefore the dismissal was justified. Dissatisfied with this award the appellant obtained a Rule nisi in an application under Article 226 of the constitution which was discharged by a judgment and order dated June 12, 1970, against which this appeal has been preferred. 5. AT the outset it is to be noted that Mr. Sankar Das Banerjee appearing for the appellant did not seriously challenge the order of the Tribunal regarding three workmen, namely, nagendra N. Talukdar, Provin Gogoi and Chitta Das. With regard to these three workmen the Tribunal held that the order of dismissal was bad and counsel for the appellant did not seriously challenge this order. But with regard to the order of dismissal of 33 other workmen whose names have been set out in paragraph 15 of the award at page 440 of the paper book, counsel for the appellant argued that the finding of the tribunal that the order of dismissal could not be justified as there was unfair labour practice was perverse and could not be sustained. It was argued that the Tribunal came to a clear finding that the strike was illegal, and that a charge-sheet was served upon the workmen concerned, who were given an opportunity to submit their explanation to the charges brought against them, and evidence of the witnesses examined was duly recorded. Counsel for the appellant also argued that there was no finding by the Tribunal that rules of natural justice had been violated. On the contrary there was a clear finding by the tribunal that with regard to 14 of the workmen whose dismissal order was challenged on the ground of violation of rules of natural justice, there was in fact no such violation. 6. On the contrary there was a clear finding by the tribunal that with regard to 14 of the workmen whose dismissal order was challenged on the ground of violation of rules of natural justice, there was in fact no such violation. 6. THE principal contention on behalf of the appellant however was that the Tribunal in paragraph 11 of its award held that there was no material to justify the conclusion that the management wanted to crush legitimate trade union activities of its workmen, or that active union workers were chosen for being charge-sheeted and dismissed. It was also found that none of the workmen appeared to be important office bearers of the union and that charge-sheets were served only on those workmen, about whom there was information of taking active part in intimidation or inciting other workers to take part in the illegal strike. The Tribunal also came to the conclusion that in this respect namely attempt to crush trade union activities and taking disciplinary proceedings against office bearers of the union, there was no unfair labour practice. Relying on this finding of the tribunal, counsel for the appellant contended, that there was a clear finding by the Tribunal in paragraph 11 of its award that there was no unfair labour practice. But it, was argued, the tribunal, on another aspect of the case, namely whether two letters dated January 27, 1960, and marked Exts. J. and J1 were actually sent to the union, so as to reserve the right of the management to take disciplinary action against the workmen, came to the conclusion that these letters were net actually issued to the General Secretaries of the Union and in view of the assurance given in the second hand-out by the appellant, there was unfair labour practice in proceeding against the workmen who had joined by January 30, in view of the assurance. It was contended by counsel for the appellant that this finding of the tribunal was arbitrary and perverse, having regard to its earlier finding that there was no unfair labour practice on the part of the management. Mr. It was contended by counsel for the appellant that this finding of the tribunal was arbitrary and perverse, having regard to its earlier finding that there was no unfair labour practice on the part of the management. Mr. Ramen Banerjee appearing for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the finding of the tribunal that there was no unfair labour practice in paragraph 11 of the award was confined to the question of victimisation, by serving charge-sheets on office bearers of the union and also by attempting to crush legitimate trade union activities. He argued that the tribunal was perfectly justified in holding that there was unfair labour practice on the ground that there was a breach of assurance committed by the management, while at the same time holding that there was no unfair labour practice with regard to victimisation of workers by charge-sheeting office bearers of the union, and by attempting to crush legitimate trade union activities. The decision in this appeal turns on the question whether firstly the Tribunal while holding that there was no unfair labour practice with regard to some questions, can at the same time hold that there was unfair labour practice with regard to certain other matters. Secondly whether the Tribunal's finding is perverse and thirdly whether breach of an assurance or promise made by the management, whatever other consequence, it may have, can be said to be unfair labour practice in industrial law. 7. UNFAIR labour practice has acquired a clear concept in industrial law. Even though it has received no statutory definition, the term has received judicial attention and interpretation, and is by no means uncertain, indefinite or vague. Broadly speaking unfair labour practice is committed by an employer when he does or omits to do something, which act or omission is an invasion of the legitimate rights or interests of the workmen. Within this class would be included any act or omission of the employer aimed at punishing a workman for his union activities or for organised opposition to any proposal of the management. It is neither desirable nor possible to lay down the limits of unfair labour practice in the fast developing course of industrial law. The basic principle in the concept of unfair labour practice is the involvement of the relationship of employer and employee. It is neither desirable nor possible to lay down the limits of unfair labour practice in the fast developing course of industrial law. The basic principle in the concept of unfair labour practice is the involvement of the relationship of employer and employee. In other words, the question of unfair labour practice can arise only when something is done or omitted in connection with regulating the relationship of employer and employee. It is not permissible to ascribe unfair labour practice, to something done or omitted, in connection with a matter which has nothing to do with the relationship of employer and employee. This is the basic or fundamental principle underlying the concept of unfair labour practice. A breach of promise or assurance or undertaking by an employer, whatever other consequences it may have, cannot be said to be an unfair labour practice. A breach of promise or assurance may be illegal, it may amount to a breach of contract, it may be a malafide act, it may even be a fraudulent act, but in so far as it is not in separately connected with the relationship of employer and employee, it cannot be said to be unfair labour practice. What is it that has happened in this case to justify the conclusion that there was unfair labour practice in taking disciplinary action against the workmen ? The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the two letters addressed by the management to the union, reserving the former's right to take disciplinary action against the workmen, were not actually issued to the workmen, and because of this failure or omission to issue the letters, there was a breach of the assurance given in the hand-out of January 27, 1960, by which the management promised that the workmen who joined by January 30, 1960, would be given employment and that those who did not report for employment on or before that date would be subject to such disciplinary action as the management thought fit. Without a doubt there has been an unequivocal promise to offer employment to those who joined duties up to January 30, 1960. Equally without a doubt there has been no promise, express or implied, in the hand-out that no disciplinary action would be taken against the employees if they are found guilty of misconduct or of any other offences under the Standing Orders of the appellant. Equally without a doubt there has been no promise, express or implied, in the hand-out that no disciplinary action would be taken against the employees if they are found guilty of misconduct or of any other offences under the Standing Orders of the appellant. Charge-sheets appear to have been served on the employees on the day they joined their duties. In the charge-sheets served upon the workmen the charges, inter alia, were absence without sufficient cause for more than ten days, riotous or disorderly behaviour, causing damage to work in progress, obstructing willing workers from discharging their duties and breach of Coal Mines Regulations, 1957. Excepting the charge of absence without sufficient cause for more than ten days the other charges have nothing to do with the assurance or promise made by the management to the workmen, it can by no means be said that because of the assurance given by the hand-outs the management had granted to the workmen a charter of immunity from all disciplinary proceedings for misconduct. There is nothing in the assurance to warrant a conclusion that the workmen were granted wholesale immunity from penal action for misconduct, which has nothing to do with the strike or abstention from work without sufficient cause. It is impossible to hold that the management had assured the workmen not to take proceedings against them for riotous or disorderly behaviour, or for obstructing willing workers from discharging their duties. It is equally impossible to hold that the management had surrendered its duty and obligation to enforce law and order among the workmen and maintain industrial discipline. 8. TURNING how to the charge of absence without sufficient cause for more than ten days the first thing to be noticed is that it was one of several charges brought against the workmen and was not the only charge. Secondly at best or at worst it is a breach of promise or assurance and by itself has no conviction with regulation of the relation ship between employer and employee. Such a breach of contract can occur in the case of any two parties to a contract, and is certainly not confined to the relationship of employer and employee. Secondly at best or at worst it is a breach of promise or assurance and by itself has no conviction with regulation of the relation ship between employer and employee. Such a breach of contract can occur in the case of any two parties to a contract, and is certainly not confined to the relationship of employer and employee. A general claim arising put of a breach of promise, or assurance by one contracting party to a contract or engagement should not be confused or equated with, something done or not done by an employer which may amount to unfair labour practice, which, as I have said earlier, is something strictly and exclusively confined to the regulation of the relationship of employer and employee. To hold that a breach of promise or assurance of the type involved in this appeal is unfair labour practice would have the effect of introducing an unknown concept into industrial law, the aim and object of which are to maintain industrial peace and to provide a fair deal for the employer and the employee. Counsel for the appellant contended that in coming to the conclusion that the two letters both dated January 27, 1960, from the management to the general Secretary of the union were not actually issued, the Tribunal acted merely on suspicion and not on proof. It was argued that this could not be done, as it was not open to the Tribunal to act merely on suspicion. In support of this contention reliance was placed on a Bench decision of this Court (1) Sreemun Chunder Dey v. Gopal chunder Chuckerbutty reported in 7 Weekly Reporter 10. Reliance was also placed on a decision of the supreme Court (2) Duvvur dasratharammareddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1971) 3 S. C. C. 247, in which it was held that the strongest suspicion against an accused person does not amount to legal proof. That was a criminal case, and the principles of proof of guilt of an accused person cannot be applied to the requirement of proof in a civil proceeding. In my view, it. Can not be said that the tribunal was not entitled to draw its own conclusion regarding receipt of the two letters by the union, on the materials before is. In my view, it. Can not be said that the tribunal was not entitled to draw its own conclusion regarding receipt of the two letters by the union, on the materials before is. It cannot be said that merely because the Tribunal drew the inference that the letters were not actually despatched by the management to the union, the Tribunal acted on mere suspicion. It seems to me that so far as the two letters are concerned, they have hardly any bearing on the management's right to take disciplinary action against the workmen. In these two letters the attention of the General secretary of the Union was drawn to the hand-out issued oil the Same day namely January 27, 1960, and it was stated that the statements in the handout were without prejudice to the disciplinary action now contemplated against workmen who were mainly responsible for commencing and continuing the strike and for other activities in breach of the Standing Orders. 9. IT was argued by counsel for the respondent that the first charge namely absence without sufficient cause for more than ten days, ought not to have been made against the workmen at all, having regard to the statement in the hand-out dated January 27, 1960, in which it was stated that an extension was granted by the appellant up to January 30, 1960, during which period anyone reporting for work would be given employment and those who did not so report for work, would be subject to disciplinary action. It was contended that this charge ought not to have been made against the workmen, having regard to the assurance given by the appellant. Counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that the charge-sheets were drawn up sometime before the workmen joined their duties on January 30, 1960, as the collieries were situated in far flung areas and for that reason the charge-sheets were drawn up and kept ready in advance, so that they might be issued to the workmen in time. It seems to me that this contention of counsel for the appellant is well-founded. It seems to me that this contention of counsel for the appellant is well-founded. It appears from the oral evidence of the Chief Engineer, of the appellant that cyclostyled forms of the charge-sheets were kept in the head office, and these were collected on January 27, 1960, and between that date and January 30, 1960, they were filled up by putting a date on the charge-sheet being the date on which they were served on the workmen and the date in the charge-sheet was treated as the date up to which the workmen concerned had been absent from work. It is clear that the charge regarding absence from work was included in the charge-sheets sometime before the workmen joined their duties and were issued on the assumption that the workmen did not join their duties. In these facts I am unable to hold that there was any malafide or unfair motive in including that charge in the charge-sheet. 10. THE right of the management to take disciplinary action against the workmen for acts of misconduct, such as commencement and continuation of an illegal strike and activities in breach of the Standing Orders, are neither derived from nor protected by the letters mentioned above. Subject to the provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the limitations if any imposed by standing Orders, the employer clearly has the right to take disciplinary action against the employees for all acts of misconduct or acts violative of the rules of discipline. In so far as the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was unfair labour practice on the part of the management to proceed against workmen who joined by January 30, in view of the assurance given in the hand-out, it cannot but be held that the Tribunal's conclusion was perverse. The statements contained in the hand-out of January 27, 1960, did not grant a general immunity to the workmen from all proceedings arising out of misconduct, nor did the management surrender its rights to take such proceedings against the workmen. The statements contained in the hand-out of January 27, 1960, did not grant a general immunity to the workmen from all proceedings arising out of misconduct, nor did the management surrender its rights to take such proceedings against the workmen. As the finding of the Tribunal that there was unfair labour practice was entirely based on the non-issue and non-receipt of the two letters by the union, the conclusion that there was unfair labour practice on that ground cannot be upheld and must be held to be perverse on this point reliance was placed by counsel for the appellant on a decision of the Supreme Court (3) Bengal Bhatdee coal Co. Lid. v. Ram Probesh Singh and ors. A.I.R. (1964) S.C. 486. In that case a few workmen had obstructed certain other workmen from discharging their duties during the strike. In consequence charge-sheets were served on these workmen on the ground of violation of the coal Mines Regulations. Explanations were submitted by the workmen and the Enquiry Officer found all of them guilty of the charge and recommended their dismissal. As another reference was pending an application was made under S. 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial disputes Act for approval of the action taken against the workmen. The tribunal approved of the action taken by the employer, and thereafter a reference was made under S. 10 of the Act. In this reference the workmen contended that there was no proper enquiry as the chance to defend themselves was not given. The Tribunal, however, held that the Enquiry was proper. But it also held that it was a case of victimisation and on this finding set aside the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement of the workmen. Pealing with this question the Supreme Court held that the misconduct in question took place during the strike, which was found to be illegal and the misconduct consisted of obstruction to willing workers. It was also held that this was a serious misconduct on the part of the workmen and the order of dismissal was justified and also that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that there was victimisation. It was also held that this was a serious misconduct on the part of the workmen and the order of dismissal was justified and also that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that there was victimisation. It seems to me that the facts in the appeal now before us are identical in material respects with some of the acts of misconduct with which the workmen were charged namely riotous or disorderly behaviour, breach of Coal mines Regulations and obstructing willing workers. There is in my view no escape from the conclusion that the finding of the Tribunal that there was unfair labour practice was erroneous and perverse. Our attention was also drawn by counsel for the appellant to another decision of the Supreme Court (4) Workmen of the Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v. Management of Motor Industries Co. Ltd. and Anr. A.I.R. (1969) S.C. 1280. In that case a suspension order was served on a workman and this was followed by a strike at 2-30 p. m. but was settled at 5 p. m. When the workmen returned to work, Charge-sheets were served upon five workmen alleging stoppage of work, abandoning place of work, inciting others to join the strike, disorderly behaviour including victimisation and assault. A domestic enquiry was held and the enquiry Officer found that three workmen were guilty of acts of misconduct under Standing Orders. The management agreeing with the report dismissed the three workmen and thereupon a reference was made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. In its award the Labour Court found that the enquiry was validly held and that the management was justified in passing the order of dismissal. This award was challenged on the ground that the dismissal order was illegal, that the strike itself was not illegal, that the disciplinary proceedings were in contravention of an agreement between the parties and that the dismissal amounted to unfair labour practice, having regard to the agreement between the parties, that dismissal of only three workmen was victimisation as a large number of workmen had participated in the strike. In the settlement arrived at between the parties before the workmen returned to work it was provided that four days notice should be given by the workmen if they wanted to resort to a strike, and by the management, if it wanted to resort to a lockout and it was also provided that no disciplinary action would be taken against workmen for the strike. On the basis of this agreement it was argued that the charge-sheets against three workmen in violation of the agreement amounted to unfair labour practice. With regard to the agreement Labour court found that the union failed to prove that the management had agreed not to take any action against any workmen in connection with the strike, though it might have agreed not to victimise any workmen for participating in the strike. This finding of the Labour Court was upheld by the Supreme Court. On the question of victimisation it was held that each one of the acts of misconduct with which the workmen were charged justified the punishment of dismissal, but it was noticed the management took no action against the three dismissed workmen with regard to the charge for strike or stoppage of work, and for loitering about in the company's premises, but the action was taken on the ground of incitement to strike and riotous and disorderly conduct. It was held that the management did not discriminate against the three dismissed workmen who were found guilty of the charges, as against the rest, and also that there was no victimisation. It was further held as the order of dismissal was based on the findings of the domestic enquiry which did not suffer from any infirmity it could not be impeached. It seems to me that the facts in the instant appeal now before us are almost identical with the facts in the case of discussed above, excepting for this difference that the Labour Court found that there was no agreement not to take action against any of the workmen in. connection with the strike, though there was an agreement not to victimise any workmen for participating in the strike, which to my mind is of no significance. connection with the strike, though there was an agreement not to victimise any workmen for participating in the strike, which to my mind is of no significance. The argument in that case also was that the order of dismissal was vitiated by unfair labour practice and this was rejected by the labour Court and also by the Supreme Court, though it was found there was an agreement not to victimise any work men for participating in the strike. It seems to me that the finding of the domestic enquiry that the workmen were guilty of riotous and disorderly behaviour and also of obstructing willing workers from discharging their duties, were certainly grave and serious enough to justify the order of dismissal by the management. It is also clear to me that the enquiry before the domestic tribunal did not suffer from any infirmity and therefore the order of dismissal of the 33 workmen should not have been interfered with by the Tribunal. 11. COUNSEL for the respondent, how ever, drew our attention to a British statute, in Industrial Relations Act 1971 and particularly to Sections 22 and 24 of the said Statute, which deal with unfair dismissal. He however, frankly conceded that there was no provision in any Indian Statute corresponding to the provisions in the British Statute. It is therefore not necessary for me to examine trend of modern legislation in this respect and express my opinion on such trend. But quite apart from this difference between the British law and the law in this country, it should be noticed what the British Statute was dealing with was not unfair labour practice as is known in this country, but unfair dismissal. There is a good deal of difference between unfair labour practice and fair and unfair dismissal. Mr. Ramen Banerjee, also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (5) Indian iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Am. v. Their workmen, A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 130 on which reliance was placed by the trial court. There is a good deal of difference between unfair labour practice and fair and unfair dismissal. Mr. Ramen Banerjee, also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (5) Indian iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Am. v. Their workmen, A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 130 on which reliance was placed by the trial court. It was held in that case that in case of dismissal for misconduct, the tribunal did not act us a Court of Appeal, and substitute its own judgment for that of the management, and also that the tribunal should interfere only when there was want of good faith or when there was victimisation or unfair labour practice or when the management had been guilty of basic error or violation of principles of natural justice or when on the materials, the finding was completely baseless or perverse. Applying these principles it seems to me that the tribunal ought not to have interfered with the order of dismissal as I have come to the conclusion, that there was no unfair labour practice, on which ground alone the Tribunal set aside the order of dismissal of the 33 workmen. 12. IT now remains to deal with a few other cases on which counsel for the respondent relied, namely, a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court (6) National labour Relations Board v. Joseph T. Strong reported in A.I.R. (1969) U.S.S.C. 61. In that case the employers' association and an union had negotiated a contract establishing compensation levels for employees of all the employers. One of the employers withdrew from the association and refused to sign the contract. The National Labour relations Board found that the employer's refusal to sign the contract constituted unfair labour practice and the Board directed the employer to sign the contract. The U.S. Supreme Court held that it was unfair labour practice on the part of the employer to refuse to sign the contract. It seems to me that neither the decision nor the principles underlying it are of any assistance to the respondent in the facts of the case now before us. Reliance was also placed by the counsel for the respondent on a decision of the Allahabad High court (7) Eveready Flash Light Co. v. Labour Committee reported in A. I. R. (1962) All. 497. In that case there is a discussion with regard to the meaning of unfair labour practice. Reliance was also placed by the counsel for the respondent on a decision of the Allahabad High court (7) Eveready Flash Light Co. v. Labour Committee reported in A. I. R. (1962) All. 497. In that case there is a discussion with regard to the meaning of unfair labour practice. The learned judge came to the conclusion that it was not possible to lay down an exhaustive test and concluded by saying that any practice violating the principles of article 43 of the Constitution and other principles declaring decent wages and living conditions should be considered as unfair labour practice. I am unable to accept the view of the learned Judge as to the extent end scope of unfair labour practice as seated by him. Counsel for the respondent next drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court (8) Ghatage and Patil Concern's union v. Ghatage and Patil Transport. Ltd. reported in A.I.R. (1968) S.C. 503. In that case the question was whether the employer could engage hirers to run transport trucks so that the employer might not have to engage drivers to avoid compliance with regulatory provisions in the Motor Transport Workers act. It was held that there was no bar in law to this course of action by the employer. It was also held that although contract labour was declared by the supreme Court to be an unfair labour practice, because the intention was to introduce a middleman to avoid observance of laws and to deny to labour the advantages labour had acquired by bargaining or as a result of awards, that principle could not be applied in the case of engagement of independent hirers to run transport trucks. I do not see how this decision is of any assistance in this case. 18. All in all, it seems to me the tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that there was unfair labour practice on the part of the appellant in taking disciplinary action, followed by an order of dismissal against the 33 workmen whose names have been set out under paragraph 15 of the award. In my view, the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the 83 workmen is perverse and must therefore be quashed. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal are set aside. In my view, the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the 83 workmen is perverse and must therefore be quashed. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal are set aside. The rule is made absolute to the extent mentioned above. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.