JUDGMENT M.U. Isaac, J. 1. The petitioner was assessed under the Kerala General Sales tax Act, 1963 for the year 1965-66 by the first respondent, the Sales tax Officer, Special Circle 2, Kozhikode by his order, Ext. P-1, dated 22nd March 1967. The second respondent, the Deputy Commissioner for Agricultural Income-tax and Sales tax, North Zone, Kozhikode in exercise of his power under section 35 of the Act called for and examined the records of the case. It appeared to him that the Sales tax Officer, while making the assessment, wrongly exempted from tax certain sales under the head accommodation sales. He, therefore, issued a notice, Ext. P-2, dated 28th February 1971, to the petitioner to show cause why the exemption granted by the Sales tax Officer in respect of the turnover of such sales should not be revoked and the assessment revised accordingly. The petitioner filed two objections, Exts. P-3 and P-4 both, dated 15th March 1971, objecting to the proposed revision on two grounds. One was that what the Deputy Commissioner was actually proposing to do was to assess an alleged escaped turnover, that section 35 of the Act under which he was exercising jurisdiction did not permit him to do that, and that at any event a re-assessment of escaped turnover cannot be done beyond the period fixed in section 19 of the Act, namely four years from the end of the year to which the assessment related. The second objection was that the disputed turnover really related to accommodation sales. The Deputy Commissioner rejected both the objections. But he found that the goods sold by the petitioner to his sister concerns consisted of goods which he purchased from dealers within the State, as well as from dealers outside the State, and since the said goods were liable to tax only at a single point of sale, the petitioner could be taxed only in respect of goods which had not already been subject to sales tax. Accordingly, he passed an order, Ext. P-5, dated 20th March 1971, setting aside the order of assessment, and remanding the case to the Sales-tax Officer for fresh disposal according to law. In obedience to Ext. P-5, the Sales tax Officer issued a notice, Ext. Accordingly, he passed an order, Ext. P-5, dated 20th March 1971, setting aside the order of assessment, and remanding the case to the Sales-tax Officer for fresh disposal according to law. In obedience to Ext. P-5, the Sales tax Officer issued a notice, Ext. P-6, dated 2nd June 1971, to the petitioner to show cause why the exemption originally granted to the petitioner under the head accommodation sales should not be disallowed to the extent of Rs. 12,118.06 in the light of the order of the Deputy Commissioner, and the assessment modified accordingly. The petitioner filed an objection, Ext. P-7 on 8th June 1971. The Sales-tax Officer after hearing the petitioner and considering the objection passed an order, Ext. P-8, dated 9th June -1971, limiting the exemption in respect of accommodation sales to Rs. 68,019.37, and disallowing any exemption in respect of sales to the extent of Rs. 12,118.06 as proposed in his notice, Ext. P-6. This petition has been filed to quash the said order. 2. The only ground urged by counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order, Ext. P-8, is in substance and under law one of re-assessment of an exempted turnover by an assessing authority under section 19 of the Act, that the said order is without jurisdiction, since it has been passed beyond the period fixed by the said section for the exercise of that jurisdiction, namely four years from the expiry of the year to which the tax relates. It was also submitted that the fact that the order was passed pursuant to a direction of the Deputy Commissioner does not make any difference on the legal character of the order, and that the Deputy Commissioner himself has no jurisdiction to interfere under section 35 of the Act, since the case was one of escapement of turnover from assessment, which is a subject falling entirely within the jurisdiction of the assessing authority under section 19 of the Act. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the case fell within the ambit of section 35 of the Act, that the fact that it may also fall within the ambit of section 19 of the Act, does not affect the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under section 35, that the Deputy Commissioner has passed orders within the period fixed in section 35, and that there is no limitation of period for the assessing authority to pass an order in obedience to an order of remand made by the Deputy Commissioner. This controversy has been the subject-matter of quite a few decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court. If I may say so with great respect, some of the statements contained in some of these decisions have confounded the true legal position. 3. Before referring to the decisions, it would be useful to read the relevant sections in the Kerala General Sales tax Act, 1963. Section 19 which deals with assessment of escaped turnover reads: "19. Assessment of escaped turnover. (1) Where for any reason the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax in any year or has been under assessed or has been assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable, or any deduction has been wrongly made therefrom, the assessing authority may, at any time within four years from the expiry of the year to which the tax relates, proceed to determine to the best of its judgment the turnover which has escaped assessment to tax or has been under assessed or has been assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable or the deduction that has been wrongly made and assess the tax payable on such turnover after issuing a notice on the dealer and after making such enquiry as it may consider necessary: Provided that before making an assessment under this sub-section the dealer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2) In making an assessment under sub-section (1), the assessing authority may, if it is satisfied that the escape from assessment is due to wilful non-disclosure of assessable turnover by the dealer, direct the dealer to pay, in addition to the tax assessed under sub-section (1), a penalty not exceeding one and a half times the tax so assessed: Provided that no penalty under this sub-section shall be imposed unless the dealer affected has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such imposition. (3) The powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the assessing authority even though the original order of assessment remained stayed under the orders of a civil court or other competent authority shall be excluded." Section 35 is as follows: "35. Powers of revision of the Deputy Commissioner suo motu. (1) The Deputy Commissioner may, of his own motion, call for and examine any order passed or proceedings recorded under this Act by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner or any officer or authority of rank below that of an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and may make such enquiry or cause such enquiry to be made and, subject to the provisions of the Act, may pass such order thereon as he thinks fit. (2) The Deputy Commissioner shall not pass any order under sub-section (1) if (a) the time for appeal against the order has not expired; (b) the order has been made the subject of an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal or of a revision in the High Court; or (c) more than four years have expired after the passing of the order referred to therein. (3) No order under this section adversely affecting a person shall be passed unless that person has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard.'' Counsel for the petitioner contends that a Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction under section 35 of the Act to remand that case to make a further investigation regarding escaped turnover and assess the same. In support of the above contention he relies on the following passage of a Division Bench of this Court in Kannu v. State of Kerala, 1970 K.L.T. 1088. In support of the above contention he relies on the following passage of a Division Bench of this Court in Kannu v. State of Kerala, 1970 K.L.T. 1088. The passage is at page 1092 "We summarise hereunder the effect of the five Supreme Court decisions discussed by us on the question before us in the following manner; that the revisional power of the Deputy Commissioner and the power of the Sales tax Officer to assess escaped turnover are two different and distinct powers two independent jurisdictions; that these two powers operate in two different fields; that the power of revision of the Deputy Commissioner cannot trench upon the power of the Sales tax Officer to assess escaped turnover; and that in exercising the revisional power, the Deputy Commissioner may call for the records, and, on perusing them, if he finds that the order of the Sales tax Officer is illegal, irregular or improper, may direct even a further investigation, but such further investigation cannot trench upon any power conferred by the Act or the Rules on any other authority, more particularly, the power of the Sales tax Officer to assess escaped turnover. In other words, the revisional power of the Deputy Commissioner, including the power of further investigation, is to be used only to correct the illegality, irregularity or impropriety of the order which he is entitled to revise, and is not to be used in another field or jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Sales tax Officer to assess escaped turnover. In the light of these principles drawn from the decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the order of the Deputy Commissioner in this case directing the Sales tax Officer to make further investigation regarding escaped turnover and to assess the same is illegal." 4. I had occasion to consider the question arising in this case in a judgment which I rendered on 8th July, 1968 in O.P. Nos. 3988 and 4137 of 1966. In O.P. 3988, the Sales tax Officer accepted an assessee's case that he was not the first seller in the State in respect of part of his turnover and exempted it from tax on that basis. The Deputy Commissioner took up the matter in revision and assessed that exempted turnover on finding that the assessee's case was untrue, and that he was really the first seller. The Deputy Commissioner took up the matter in revision and assessed that exempted turnover on finding that the assessee's case was untrue, and that he was really the first seller. In O.P. 4137, the Sales tax Officer assessed the whole turnover of copra purchased by a miller, and exempted the wholesale turnover of oil and cake produced by him. Under the relevant statutory provision, the turnover in respect of sale of oil and cake was entitled to exemption only to the extent of the price of copra purchased during the assessment year and necessary to produce the said oil and cake. The Deputy Commissioner took up the matter in revision and assessed the turnover which was wrongly exempted from tax by the Sales tax Officer. The O.Ps. were filed to quash the revisional orders of the Deputy Commissioner, and the contentions before me were the same as have been advanced in the present case. I have examined the matter in that case in some detail with reference to the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court; and held that the impugned orders were within the revisional jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner, though in one sense both cases involved assessment of escaped turnover. The provisions of law concerned in both these cases were section 15 (1) of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales tax Act, 1125, and rule 33 (1) of the Rules made thereunder. Section 15 (1) of that Act corresponds to section 35 of the Kerala Act; and rule 33 (1) corresponds to section 19 of the Act. Dealing with the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner, I stated as follows: "The power under rule 33 (1) of the Rules is a power vested in the assessing authority, while the power under section 15 (1) of the Act is a power vested in the Deputy Commissioner, who is a superior authority. They are distinct and separate powers; and different periods of limitation are prescribed for the exercise of these powers. The power of revision created and vested in a superior authority by the Act cannot be taken away or controlled by, or be subject to, a power created and vested in a subordinate authority by the Rules. They are distinct and separate powers; and different periods of limitation are prescribed for the exercise of these powers. The power of revision created and vested in a superior authority by the Act cannot be taken away or controlled by, or be subject to, a power created and vested in a subordinate authority by the Rules. I may also observe with great respect that the Rule of construction 'that when a special power is given to an authority and also a general one, the authority can exercise only the special power, when the facts attracting the exercise of that power arises', may apply when both powers are vested in the same authority or in co-ordinate authorities. It may not also apply, when the general power is created by a statute, and the special power is created by rule-making authority. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the action taken by the Deputy Commissioner falls within the ambit of section 15 (1) of the Act." The above decision has been noticed by the Division Bench in Kannu v. State of Kerala, 1970 K.L.T. 1088. It has partly endorsed the view expressed by me in the above passage. The Division Bench declined to express any view on the correctness or otherwise of my decision on the assumption that it was pending in appeal. As a matter of fact, the appeal filed from that decision as W.A. 145 of 1968 had already been dismissed by another Division Bench by its judgment, dated 19th August 1969 in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 802 and 804 of 1967. The above decision of the Supreme Court is Deputy Commissioner v. Dhanalakshmi Vilas Cashew Co., (1969) 24 S.T.C. 491 . That was a case where certain amount of turnover was wrongly exempted by the Sales tax Officer and the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of his revisional power revised the assessment. The Supreme Court said that the order was within the revisional power of the Deputy Commissioner, and that the power to assess escaped turnover was normally to be exercised in respect of matters de hors the records of the assessment proceedings; in other words, it was to assess a turnover which has escaped the notice of the assessing authority it in the proceedings for assessment. 5. 5. The matter has been further clarified by the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. K. E. Nainan, (1970) K.L.T. 1088. That was a case where an exemption was wrongly given in respect of part of the turnover by the Sales tax Officer; and this Court held that the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to deal with such, a case, as it amounted to assessment of an escaped turnover. The Supreme Court in reversing the decision of this Court stated as follows: "Although it is stated in the Judgment of the High Court that the present cases were of escaped turnover we are altogether unable to endorse that view. The question which the Deputy Commissioner had to consider was one of the legality, propriety and regularity of the exemption of the turnover granted under the licence in respect of the auction sales. This fell strictly within the purview of section 15 (1) of the Act and there was no question of any action being taken under rule 33 on the ground that there had been escapement of turnover. The period of limitation for such proceedings is prescribed by section 15 itself to be four years from the date on which the order was communicated to the assessee.,, 6. It is unnecessary for me, and it is also beyond my competence to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Kannu v. State of Kerala, (1970) 26 S.T.C. 251 and the dictum laid down therein to the effect "that the power of revision of the Deputy Commissioner cannot trench upon the power of the Sales-tax Officer". It is true that the case before the Division Bench was one in which the Deputy Commissioner sought to exercise his revisional jurisdiction in respect of a turnover which escaped the notice of the Sales tax Officer, while making the assessment. But I am doubtful whether it can be correctly said that such a case would not fall within the revisional jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner for the sole reason that it is a case of escapement of assessment falling within the jurisdiction of the Sales tax Officer. But I am doubtful whether it can be correctly said that such a case would not fall within the revisional jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner for the sole reason that it is a case of escapement of assessment falling within the jurisdiction of the Sales tax Officer. The ambit of rule 33 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales-tax Rules, 1950, which was the provision concerned in the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above and of the corresponding provision, namely section 35 in the Kerala General Sales tax Act, 1963 is so wide that there can be no doubt that the Sales tax Officer could have in both those cases taken proceedings to assess the turnover which escaped assessment, since the escapement happened by granting exemption from assessment as a result of mistake of law on the part of the Sales tax Officer. Still the Supreme Court held that the proceedings taken by the Deputy Commissioner to assess such a turnover would fall within the ambit of his revisional jurisdiction. Therefore the dictum that the power of revision of the Deputy Commissioner cannot trench upon the power of the Sales tax Officer to assess escaped turnover may not hold good. I venture to restate that the true position is what I indicated in my decision in O.P. Nos. 3988 and 4137 of 1966, to which reference has been already made. Under the Kerala General Sales tax Act, 1963, a power of suo motu revision is vested in the Deputy Commissioner by section 35. The scope and ambit of that power are to be determined on a true interpretation of that section. I am unable to find anything in that section or in any other provision in the Act which would indicate that, even though a case would fall under section 35, the Commissioner should not invoke his revisional jurisdiction under that section since the case would also fall under section 19 of the Act, which empowers the Sales tax Officer to assess an escaped turnover. The jurisdiction of a superior officer cannot be affected by that of a subordinate officer, though they may overlap in certain cases. Therefore, the objection taken to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under section 35 of the Act in the instant case cannot be sustained. 7. The jurisdiction of a superior officer cannot be affected by that of a subordinate officer, though they may overlap in certain cases. Therefore, the objection taken to the exercise of jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under section 35 of the Act in the instant case cannot be sustained. 7. It has not been seriously contended before me that if the case falls within the ambit of section 35 of the Act the Deputy Commissioner has no power to remand the case for a further enquiry and disposal according to law in the light of the directions given by him. Then the question arises whether the Sales tax Officer to whom the case was remanded, can pass an order pursuant to the directions of the Deputy Commissioner, after the expiry of the period of 4 years fixed in section 35 for exercising his revisional power. I have no doubt that the Sales tax Officer cannot pass an order of reassessment after the aforesaid period. If the Deputy Commissioner cannot himself pass an order bringing the escaped turnover to assessment after the above period it would be absurd to hold that he can direct a subordinate authority to pass such an order, and that the subordinate authority could do so after the expiry of the said period. 8. In the result I hold that the impugned order, Ext. P-8, is without jurisdiction since it has been passed beyond the period of limitation fixed under section 35 of the Act. The said order is, therefore, quashed. There will be no order as to costs.