JUDGMENT This revision petition is directed against the order dated the 12th of January, 1970 of the Munsif Magistrate, Patna refusing to summon Bihari Sao (Opposite party No.3) as accused in the case. 2. The facts leading to the filing of the present revision petition are as follows: On the 25th of January, 1968, samples of mustard oil obtained from the shop of Saguni Sao (Opposite party no. 2) by the Food Inspector, B.N. Singh of Phulwarisharif, were found to be adulterated on chemical analysis and he submitted a report to that effect to the District Medical officer of Health, Patna, for prosecution of Saguni Sao, vide report (Ext.5) dated the 17th of May, 1968. Sanction accorded by the petitioner, who is the District Medical officer of Health, Patna has been marked Ext, 5/1. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint against Saguni Sao (Opposite party no. 2 for his prosecution under section 16 (1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (37 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It may be stated here that the District Medical officer of Health, Patna, is duly authorised by the District Board, Patna, to file a complaint under the said Act. Accused Saguni Sao was summoned by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Patna, and the case was transferred for trial to the Munsif Magistrate whose order is under challenge in this revision. At the trial prosecution examined two witnesses including the food inspector on the 2nd of September, 1969, and thereafter filed a petition on the 12th of September, for summoning Bihari sao, son of Saguni Sao. This petition was filed presumably as the evidence before the Munsif Magistrate disclosed that it was Bihari Sao, who had actually sold the mustard oil to the food inspector and received its price. This prayer was rejected by the learned Munsif Magistrate by the impugned order and thereafter the present revision petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has urged that section 20 of the Act is no bar in summoning of persons, who in course of evidence are disclosed to have committed offences punishable under the Act. The bar in question relates only to initiation of prosecution. The relevant portion of section 20(1) of the Act on which reliance has been placed reads as follows. The bar in question relates only to initiation of prosecution. The relevant portion of section 20(1) of the Act on which reliance has been placed reads as follows. "No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of, the Central Government or the state Government or a local authority or a person, authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority." From a bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is apparent that it bars institution of prosecution for an offence, except by a written consent of competent authority as envisaged in the section. It is well settled that Jaw as to sanction in such matters is not an empty formality but is meant to serve very useful public purpose. The sanction required is not only in respect of the offence but offenders as well. It is difficult to conceive that the authority according sanction would sanction prosecution without knowing as to who has committed the offence. No sanction can be given in vacum. The sanctioning authority pas to apply its mind to the facts before according sanction. The view we have taken gains support from a decision of Rajasthan High Court in case of Bijai Lal Vs. State, A.I.R. 1965 Raj, 96, which has relied on a Bench decision of Kerala High Court in case of City Corporation of Trivandrum Vs. Arunachalam Reddier, A.I.R. 1960 Ker. 356. Similar view has been taken by Beg, J, as he then was in case of State through Nagar Mahapalika Varanasi Vs. Pram Prakash Jauhar, A.I.R. 1966 All. 504. It may be mentioned here that the Kerala High Court has reiterated the same view in case of Municipal Health Officer and Food Inspector, Kozhikode Vs. Arthala Tea Estate Co., A.I.R. 1961 Ker. 84. 4. Apart from that in the instant case, it was known to the prosecution from before that Bihari Sao was in the shop of his father Saguni Sao at the time when mustard oil was purchased by the Food Inspector and it was he who had sold it to the Food Inspector, and granted receipts for the price paid as also in token of having received a sample phial of mustard oil seized. There is no whisper about this in the report of the Food Inspector (Ext. There is no whisper about this in the report of the Food Inspector (Ext. 5) nor there is anything said about it in the written complaint (Ext. 6). It is, therefore, manifest that the authority wanted to prosecute the shop keeper Saguni Sao and not his son. It is not one of those cases where the prosecution in course of evidence knew about the complicity of Bihari Sao. It is, therefore, not a case where opposite party No.3 could have been summoned at a later stage, even if the contention of the petitioner with regard to the interpretation of section 20 of the Act was correct. 5. Learned counsel has next .submitted that Bihari Sao could be summoned under section 20A of the Act, as he would come within the meaning of expression "dealer" 'as mentioned in section 20 A which reads thus: ‘20A. Power of court to implead Manufacturer, etc.- Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person not being the manufacturer; distributor or dealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before, it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898), or in section 20 proceed against him as though a prosection had been instituted against him under section 20." Section 20A is in the nature of an exception to section 20 of the Act and lays down that certain classes of persons namely, manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article could be summoned even if no prosecution against them was sanctioned under section 20 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that as Bihari Sao sold the article in question at his father's shop, he would come within the definition of the expression 'dealer', The expression "dealer" has been used in the section ejusdem generis and cannot be given the extended meaning as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner to include anyone selling any article at the shop. A reference to section 19 of the Act also supports the view that "dealer" in section 20 A, has not been used in that general sense. Section 19(2) reads thus: "19(2). A reference to section 19 of the Act also supports the view that "dealer" in section 20 A, has not been used in that general sense. Section 19(2) reads thus: "19(2). A vendor shall not he deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves. (i) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer; (ii) In any other case, from any manufacturer distributor or dealer, with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and (b) that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it.” From the above section, it is apparent that expressions "dealer" used in section 19 (2)(a) (ii) is contradiction to the term "vendor" used in that section. Therefore, a person actually selling the article in the shop may not be a "dealer" within the expression "dealer" used in section 20A. Similar view has been taken in case of Ratanlal Rostogi and another versus The corporation of Calcutta, 76 C.W.N. 288, wherein in paragraph 6 at page 295 it has been held, "On ultimate consideration I hold that, a 'dealer' is something more than a mere 'vendor' or 'seller' of a particular article of food ..." The petition filed on behalf of the petitioner for summoning Bihari Sao also does not indicate that he is a 'dealer', and all that has been said is as follows: "That according to the law Bihari Sao son of Saguni Sao who was selling adulterated mustard oil may be summoned." It is, therefore, manifest that it is also not the petitioner's case that, Bihari Sao was the, dealer. The evidence also indicates that he was selling at his father's shop, Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel that the provisions of section 20A of the Act could be attracted for summoning Bihari Sao as an accused in the case. 6. There being no merit in the revision petition, it is dismissed. Application dismissed.