JUDGMENT This revision petition is directed against an order dated 1.7.1970 of Shri G.P. Singh, Magistrate, 1st Class, Buxar, in a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred. to as 'the Code') declaring possession of the Opposite Party in respect of the lands in dispute. An area of 8 dhurs appertaining to plot no. 2742, khata no. 1331 and an area of 1 katha 3 dhurs of plot no 2743, khata no. 996, situate in Sohni Patti, Buxar, was in dispute. 2. The case of the petitioner, who was first party in the proceeding, is that Bibi Sobratan got these two plots by inheritance, as she was the widow and only heir of the last male holder of the plots in question. The petitioner claimed through Bibi Jumni, who according to the petitioner, was the sister of Bibi Sobratan and inherited the plots in dispute after the death of Sobratan. 3. The case of the opposite party, who are second party in the proceeding, on the other hand, is that the two plots in question originally belonged to Pir Ali, great-grand-father of Opposite party no. 1. Opposite party no. 1 is the son of Anwar, a grand son of Pir Ali, and the two disputed plots were allotted to Anwar in a Civil Court decree dated 11-12-1922. Thereafter, Anwar executed a Baimokaca in lieu of dower debt in respect of the house standing on plot no. 2743, which is one of the plots in dispute. It is the case of the second party that Bibi Zeenat came in possession of the house along with sahan lands which are the remaining part of plot no. 2743 as well as 8 dhurs of plot no. 2742 which are also in dispute. 4. Both the parties filed documents and affidavits in respect of their respective claims and after hearing them, the learned Magistrate declared possession of the opposite party, which has been challenged in this revision application. 5. This revision application has been referred to a Division Bench as each of the parties relied on a Bench decision of this Court in support of their submissions. That is how the matter is before us. 6. Mr. Anwar Ahmad, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has urged that in Mahesh Thakur and others Vs. 5. This revision application has been referred to a Division Bench as each of the parties relied on a Bench decision of this Court in support of their submissions. That is how the matter is before us. 6. Mr. Anwar Ahmad, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has urged that in Mahesh Thakur and others Vs. Lakshman Prasad Thakur and others a Bench of this Court held that an affidavit in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code, which has not been sworn before a Magistrate, who was in seisin of the case, was inadmissible. He therefore, urged that the affidavits being inadmissible could not be received in evidence on the language used in Section 145 of the Code. It was contended that this defect was not curable under Section 537 of the Code as held in a subsequent Bench decision of this court in Jaldhari Mahto Vs. Most. Rudia and analogous cases and there is a conflict in these two Bench decisions. Learned Counsel has relied on the following expressions as used in the last part of subsection (1) of Section 145 of the Code in support, of his submission: ".......and further requiring them to put in such documents, or to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely in support of such claims." Learned Counsel has relied on the expression “to adduce by putting in affidavits, the evidence of such persons, as they rely in support of such claims” which has been underlined by us, His contention is that expression means that affidavits should be sworn before a Magistrate himself who is in seisin of the proceeding to be evidence in the proceeding as held by this Court in Mahesh Thakur's case. The same view has been affirmed in the subsequent Bench decision of this Court in Jaldhari Mahto's case in which it has been held as follow. "In my opinion, there does not appear to be any cogent ground for differing with the view expressed in the two cases and for referring these cases to a larger Bench." 'The references to the two cases are (1) Mahesh Thakur's case (ii) another Single Bench decision which has been relied upon in Mahesh Thakur's case. "In my opinion, there does not appear to be any cogent ground for differing with the view expressed in the two cases and for referring these cases to a larger Bench." 'The references to the two cases are (1) Mahesh Thakur's case (ii) another Single Bench decision which has been relied upon in Mahesh Thakur's case. It is, therefore, manifest that there is no conflict between the two Bench decisions in so far as the question of admissibility of affidavits in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code is concerned. The submission of learned Counsel that the defect was such as was not curable under Section 537 of the code is in teeth of the decision of the Supreme Court in Banwari Vs. State of U.P. where evidence recorded in one sessions case was used in two other sessions cases, although the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that they were not legal evidence in the other two sessions cases. This decision has been relied, amongst others, by the latter Bench decision of this Court in the case of Jaldhari Mahto for coming to the conclusion that the defect in question was curable under Section 537 of the Code. As this point was not considered much less decided in the earlier Bench decision, there is no question of any conflict between the first Bench decision any the latter Bench decision, as urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not advanced any argument before us that any prejudice has been caused by reception of affidavits sworn before another Magistrate in the instant case. In absence of any prejudice, no interference in this revision application is called for only on the ground that the affidavits sworn before another Magistrate have been used in the present proceeding by the Magistrate. 7. Coming to the merit, learned Counsel has submitted that his documents and affidavits have not been properly considered. There is no substance in this submission of learned Counsel as well. The learned Magistrate has fully considered the documents filed by the parties and has not accepted the documents of either party as sufficient to support their case of possession over the disputed plots. There is no substance in this submission of learned Counsel as well. The learned Magistrate has fully considered the documents filed by the parties and has not accepted the documents of either party as sufficient to support their case of possession over the disputed plots. The documents of the petitioner have not been accepted as they failed to establish that Bibi Jumni, through whom he claimed, was the sister of Bibi Sobratan in whose name the documents stood. The documents of the opposite party were only in respect of a portion of plot no. 2743 on which the house stood and there was no document filed in respect of the remaining portion of that plot as also with regard to the other plot no. 2742. It was in this context that it was held that the opposite party were also not adequately armed with documents in support of their case of possession, as the same were not in respect of the disputed lands. The Magistrate however, relied on the document of the opposite party which was in respect of the house on plot no. 2743 as a circumstance in favour of their being in possession of the sahan lands situated contiguous to the house. The learned Magistrate has not relied on the affidavits of the petitioner and has characterized them as false and has given cogent reasons for the same in the last but one paragraph of the order. The reasons are not non-est reasons and are germain to the question which arose for consideration in this proceeding. Therefore, no fault can be found with the order of the Magistrate in rejecting the affidavits of the witnesses of the parties. We do not find any merit in this revision application which is dismissed. Application dismissed.