( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed by the second defendant in suit No. 422 of 1957 on the file of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, (Now Munsiff), Kumta, and against the judgment of the District Judge, Karwar, in C. A. 161/62. The suit was for dissolution of Partnership and accounts and filed by the first respondent herein. ( 2 ) THE partnership firm was constituted in the name and style of Salt marketing Association, Sanikatta, in the year 1947. The exact date of the constitution of the partnership is not made known, nor the deed of partnership which ought to be in the custody of the defendant, has been produced. The case of the plaintiff is, that the partnership was constituted for the purpose of purchase and sale of salt for a period of three years only. After the said period expired the business was continued and a balance sheet was prepared only in the year 1956. He therefore, filed the present suit for dissolution in 1957. ( 3 ) IT is admitted that one of the partners, Padmanabha by name, died on 8-12-1954. On behalf of the appellant herein and the other defendants it was contended that the business came to an end in the year 1952 and the same was continued thereafter only for the purpose of clearing away the stock of salt still with the firm and collection of the outstandings due to it. The appellant herein who was the Secretary of the Society has also spoken to the fact that the stock of salt was cleared by the end of December 1952, and the outstandings were collected only in the year 1955. It is also contended that all the members of the present firm became members of another Co-operative Society, thus virtually allowing the firm to be absorbed in the said Society. It is, therefore, contended that the dissolution took place in the year 1952. and in December of that year at the latest. In this view of the matter, the suit having been filed more than three years beyond that date, that is or. 7-12-1957, was barred by time. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the dissolution of the firm took effect in the year 1952 itself having regard to the provisions of s. 42 of the Partnership Act, and that being so, the suit was clearly barred by time. 7-12-1957, was barred by time. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the dissolution of the firm took effect in the year 1952 itself having regard to the provisions of s. 42 of the Partnership Act, and that being so, the suit was clearly barred by time. In appeal by the plaintiff, the learned District Judge reversed the said finding and decreed the suit as prayed for, with certain directions. Aggrieved by this decree, the second defendant appeals. ( 4 ) ON behalf of the appellant Sri T. S. Ramachandra, the learned Counsel, mainly placing reliance on the provisions of S. 42 of the Partnership Act, in particular clauses (a) and (b) thereof, contended that the dissolution took place, as concluded by the trial Court in the year 1952. He argued that as all the members of the firm joined another co-operative society there by putting an end to the adventure or undertaking permanently, the partnership came to an end within the meaning of clause (d) of S. 42 the Act. He also contended that it was the common case of the partis that the period during which the partnership was to run was only three years, if not earlier determined. In that view, whether or not the business was continued merely for the purpose of selling the salt that was found in stock and for the collection of the outstandings due to the firm would not be of any materiality in regard to the point of time of the dissolution of the partnership business. In this context, he placed reliance on clause (a) of Section 42 of the Partnership Act. ( 5 ) ON a careful consideration of the matter, I am cleary of opinion that this contention is unacceptable. The fact that the firm was continued for the limited purpose of clearing stock on hand and collecting the outstandings is not seriously disputed. The question is, whether such continuance, in the absence of any other circumstance of a conclusive character leading to an inference that the firm had been dissolved earlier, has the effect of postponing the dissolution of partnership. It seems to me that the answer to this, ia to be found in the enunciation of the High Court of Madras in Katta Gundayya v. Katta Siddappa AIR,1937 Mad. 599. It seems to me that the answer to this, ia to be found in the enunciation of the High Court of Madras in Katta Gundayya v. Katta Siddappa AIR,1937 Mad. 599. Varadachariar, J. (as he then was) has stated the position thus, at page 602 of the above report. ( 6 ) WE may add that even if it should be assumed that in 1915 the relationship of partners came into existence between plaintiff 1 and defendant 1, the present suit would not be barred unless the defendants also make out that there has been a dissolution of the partnership more than three years prior to suit and the burden of making out such a dissolution is on the defendants; and it is well established that the mere fact that after a particular date no further business was done will not amount to a dissolution of the partnership. Indeed, Sri Ramachandra depended on this enunciation and endeavoured his best to show that such dissolution had taken place on the expiry of the term of such partnership. But. this statement of the law is subject to a contract to the contrary. In the instant case, as earlier observed, the business was continued for a limited purpose and the balance sheet of the partnership came to be struck only in the year 1956. This would clearly show that the firm continued and did not automatically stand dissolved on account of the efflux of time agreed to under clause (b) of S. 42 of that act, which lays down that on completion of the adventure or undertaking, in regard to which the partnership was constituted, the firm shall stand dissolved. This clause again is subject to a contract to the contrary, and, if I may add whether expressed or implied. ( 7 ) THE question that still remains to be considered is as to when the partnership actually stood dissolved. It is in the evidence that the Chairman of the firm Padmanabha who was also a partner had died on 8-12-1957. This event by operation of law would bring about the dissolution of partnership. That it would be so can be seen from the very decision cited earlier. It is in the evidence that the Chairman of the firm Padmanabha who was also a partner had died on 8-12-1957. This event by operation of law would bring about the dissolution of partnership. That it would be so can be seen from the very decision cited earlier. Taking that as the point of time for the commencement of running of time against the appellant and the other partners the present suit would be clearly in time having been filed on the last day of the prescribed period of limitation. For all these reasons, the judgment of the court below must be accepted as correct. ( 8 ) THE result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed, but without costs. --- *** --- .