A. Abdul Karim Sahib and Sons, Etc. , Tiruchirapalli v. Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Madras
1973-03-29
RAGHAVAN, VEERASWAMI
body1973
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- VEERASWAMI, C. J. Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kailasam dated 28.6.65 and made in A.A.O. No. 267/62--preferred against the order dated 26.4.1962 of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Madras made in T.L.A. 948 Restoration of Trade Mark No. Mysore 2671 to the Registrar. This Appeal coming on for hearing on this day, the court delivered the following : Judgement : The appellant's trade mark was registered on April 4, 1949. Under the provisions of section 19(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, the Registrar is required to send notice to the proprietor in this prescribed manner the date of expiration and the conditions as to payment of fees for renewal. If at the expiration of the time prescribed, the conditions have not been duly complied with the Registrar may remove the trade mark from the register. He does so subject to such conditions, if any, as to its restoration to the register as may be prescribed. The prescription is in the form of Rule 49 of Trade Marks Rules, 1942. Sub-rule (2) of this Rule says that, after the mark has been removed from the register, the Registrar may, on receipt of a request made in that behalf in the prescribed form, restore the mark to the register on being satisfied that it is just to do, and upon such conditions as he may think fit to impose. For the Department they stand taken was that a notice was sent to the appellants on February 15, 1956, under certificate of posting and the fact of non-payment of fees for renewal was advertised on June 1, 1956. On November 6, 1956, the trade mark was removed from the register and this fact was also advertised on December 1, 1956. In about July 1961, the appellants seem to have started correspondence which involved them in trouble because of the attitude taken by them. Their case was that they never received any notice. Apparently the Department, in a mood of self defence, approached the matter which was not helpful to the appellants. At the end of the correspondence on November 14, 1961, the appellants applied for restoration. The Registrar dismissed this petition. The order of the Registrar shows that he did not apply his mind properly to the question of restoration.
Apparently the Department, in a mood of self defence, approached the matter which was not helpful to the appellants. At the end of the correspondence on November 14, 1961, the appellants applied for restoration. The Registrar dismissed this petition. The order of the Registrar shows that he did not apply his mind properly to the question of restoration. When a power is intrusted to a statutory authority, it is always meant for exercise and not for denial at personal pleasure or arbitrarily. The Registrar defended himself by stating that he despatched notice and ruled out the appellant's statement that they had not received the notice. We will assume that the Registrar sent notice. Equally, there is no reason to disbelieve the appellant's statement that they had not received the notice. It is true that the fact of non-payment of the fees and the removal of the trade mark from the register was advertised and the appellants--we will assume--by their negligence failed to notice that fact. Even so, the question is whether the appellants, who are proprietors of the trade mark, should be denied restoration. The question, in our view, should not be approached from any penal point of view. No punishment is contemplated by the statute. If restoration is just, it is bound to be made. That is the effect of the rule. It is true that there is an inordinate delay. But, if that delay has led to registration of the trade mark in favour of someone else, it would, of course, be a proper ground for denial of restoration. The justness for the purpose of Rule 49 (2) should be viewed, particularly from the point of view whether by restoration any third party would be prejudiced. In this particular case, were are satisfied that the appellants would be entitled to restoration. The appeal is allowed. No costs.