JUDGMENT B. D. Singh, J. This application by eleven petitioners under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the order of the Magistrate passed in an enquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code committing all the petitioners to the Court of Session to stand their trial under sections 147, 323 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code. Jagarnath Sah, petitioner no. 6, has been further directed to stand trial under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. In order to appreciate the points involved in this application, it will be necessary to state briefly the; relevant facts. The prosecution case, in short, is that on the 19th May, 1968, which was a Hat day in village Sarouni in the district of Santal Parganas, while the Hat was in full swing, some alarm was raised regarding pick-pocketing having been committed there. Subsequently, a riot ensued among Hindus and Muslims. Several persons of the two communities took part there in which resulted in looting of shops, assault on several persons and some damage to the properties. In the said riot two persons, namely, Akil Mian and Buttan Mian, were killed. The prosecution case was initiated on a written report of Md. Manir Mian (P.W.1). A counter case was also lodged by one Koka Rai. After completing investigation B. Singh, officer-in-charge, Godda P.S., submitted charge sheet in both the cases, which came up before Mr. J. Sinha, Judicial Magistrate. In the counter case, as it appears from the certified copy of the judgment dated the 7th January, 1971, the learned Magistrate was pleased to acquit all the accused persons mentioned therein of the charges under sections 379, 323, 337 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, whereas in the present case the aforesaid petitioners have been committed to the court of Session to stand their trial as mentioned earlier. 3. Mr. Baldeo Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has assailed the impugned order and has raised chiefly three points for consideration by this Court: (i) There is complete absence of materials justifying the Magistrate to commit the petitioners to the court of Session. Learned counsel pointed out that on behalf of prosecution 12 eye witnesses were examined before the Court but none of them supported the case of prosecution. They were, however, declared hostile. Learned counsel pointed out that on behalf of prosecution 12 eye witnesses were examined before the Court but none of them supported the case of prosecution. They were, however, declared hostile. In this connection he also pointed out that the Magistrate had erred in passing the order on consideration of the documents, which were not at all substantive evidence. (ii) Learned Magistrate, according to learned counsel, has erred in holding that only 12 out of 31 charge-sheet witnesses were examined and that there might be some more eye-witnesses; and (iii) the allegations against the petitioners other than Jagarnath Sah were only under sections 147, 323 and 380 of the penal Code, which are not exclusively triable by the Court of Session. Hence, the Magistrate has committed error in committing those petitioners also to the Court of Session. 4. Mr. R. N. Tewary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, has, however, raised a preliminary point and has contended that since the commitment order has been passed under section 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the Code, the application of the petitioners was not maintainable under section 561A of the Code. He further submitted that the petitioners, if at all, could have challenged the order only on the question of law, as contemplated under section 215 of the Code. 5. It will be convenient to deal with the preliminary point raised on behalf of the State first. In my opinion, there is no merit therein. Reference may be made to Tribeni Kahar V. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1960 Pat. 131 where K. Sahai J. and N. L. Untwalia, J. (now C.J.) had occasion to deal with similar point arising out of sections, 207 A, 215 and 561 A of the Code. In that case also a point was raised on behalf of the State that the High Court has no power to quash any commitment made in a case started on the basis of a police report. It was pointed out that before the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act (Act 26 of 1955) came into force, there was only one procedure for commitment enquiry in all kinds of cases and that, after Section 214 was repealed by Act XII of 1923, the only section under which commitment could be made was section 213. It was pointed out that before the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act (Act 26 of 1955) came into force, there was only one procedure for commitment enquiry in all kinds of cases and that, after Section 214 was repealed by Act XII of 1923, the only section under which commitment could be made was section 213. Section 207, as modified by the Amendment Act, lays down that the procedure prescribed in the new Section 207 A would be followed in a proceeding instituted on a police report whereas the procedure provided in the other sections of Chapter XVIII would be followed in any other proceeding. As a consequence of this change, commitment in a case arising on a police report is now made under sub-section 10 of Section 207 A and commitment in any other case continues to be made, under Section 213. The argument on behalf of the State was that as the commitment in that case had been made under section 207A and as section 215 did not provide for the quashing of a commitment made under that section, the High Court had no power to quash that commitment. Sahai, J., who delivered the judgment for the Court, held: “in my opinion, a lacuna has been clearly left due to oversight. While modifying section 207 and introducing S. 207A under the Amendment Act the Legislature should have made some provision similar to S. 215 for the quashing of a commitment made under S. 207 A or should have made an appropriate modification in S. 215 itself. This is a matter which requires the attention of the Government of India in the department concerned.” His Lordship further held: “The omission of the Legislature, however, does not appear to me to deprive the High Court of power to quash a commitment made under S. 207A. Section 561A gives the High Court ample power to interfere in any case in order to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. If commitment is allowed to stand in a case where there is no evidence at all to justify it, it will surely mean an abuse of the process of the court. It will also be in the ends of justice to quash a commitment of this kind.......” 6. In this instant case also the proceeding was initiated on a police report. It will also be in the ends of justice to quash a commitment of this kind.......” 6. In this instant case also the proceeding was initiated on a police report. Therefore, section 207 A is attracted. In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the preliminary point raised on behalf of the State. 7. Now I turn to consider the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner under point no. (i). Learned counsel placed before me the relevant portion of the impugned order in order to show that only 12 eye-witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution, and all of them were declared hostile. No doubt, they had made statements against the petitioners before the police. Learned counsel submitted that those statements are not substantive evidence. No reliance should have been placed by the Magistrate on those statements. Therefore, he urged, there was complete lack of evidence. If any commitment order is passed by the Magistrate without any evidence, this court has ample jurisdiction to quash the same under section 561 A of the Code. In order to find support to his contention he relied on Alamohan Das V. The State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 863 . He drew my attention to paragraphs 7 and 10 of the judgment. In paragraph 7 it was observed that the High Court would be justified in exercising its revisional jurisdiction where a substantial question of law arises on which the correctness of the order of commitment may be effectively challenged, where there is no evidence on which the order of commitment could be made, where there has been denial of a right to fair trial, where there is reason to think because of failure to comply with the rules of procedure or conditions precedent to initiation of criminal proceedings, where by ignoring the substantive law which constitutes the offence or misconception of evidence on matter of importance grave injustice has resulted, and on similar other grounds. But in other cases, interference with the order of the Magistrate committing the accused for trial may not be justified and the Court of Session should be allowed to run its course. The relevant portion of paragraph 10 pointed out to me was that a Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely as a recording machine. But in other cases, interference with the order of the Magistrate committing the accused for trial may not be justified and the Court of Session should be allowed to run its course. The relevant portion of paragraph 10 pointed out to me was that a Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely as a recording machine. He is entitled to shift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is his duty to discharge the accused: If there is some evidence on which a conviction may reasonably be based he must commit the case. 8. In my opinion, the above observation of their lordships are of no avail to the petitioners in the present case. It has already been mentioned earlier that 12 witnesses, examined on behalf of the prosecution, were declared hostile. It is also not disputed that they had made statements before the investigating officer supporting the case of prosecution. In that view of the matter they were rightly declared hostile by the Magistrate. Reference may be made to Emperor V. Haradhan AIR 1933 Pat 517 where Dhavle and Rowland, J.J., while dealing with the provisions under section 154 of the Evidence Act observed that it was not correct to say that when a witness was cross-examined by the party calling him, his evidence could not be believed in part and disbelieved in part but must be excluded from consideration altogether. The correct rule is that either side may rely upon his evidence and that the whole of the evidence so far as it affected both the parties favorably or unfavorably must be considered for what it was worth. This judgment was also relied by the Court in Sarjug Prasad V. The State AIR 1959 Pat 66 K. Sahai and Choudhuri, J.J., observed that the true rule is that either party may rely upon the evidence of such a witness and the Court can come to its own conclusion after a consideration of the whole of his evidence. In Mohinder Singh V. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 79 similar situation arose. In Mohinder Singh V. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 79 similar situation arose. In that case in the committal court, the prosecution examined all the eye-witnesses who were named and Sham Singh and Kehar Singh who were witnesses of the search. The prosecution also produced documents mentioned in S. 173 of the Code relating to the crime. Curiously enough, some of the eye-witnesses in the committal court in examination-in-chief deposed to the main occurrence as described, but under cross-examination added that Mohinder Singh was not one of the assailants. Previously in the same statement, they had named him and also fully described the occurrence. The other eye-witness did not name him at all, stating that after receiving their injuries, they fell down unconscious and did not see anything. The latter were cross examined by the prosecution on the basis of the statements made to the police; they denied that they had been won over by the accused. The learned Magistrate relying upon the evidence such as it was, held that there was a prima facie case against the accused, which ought to be tried by the Court of Session and committed them. It may also be noticed that in that case before the Court of Session the eye-witnesses changed their version and deposed against the accused supporting the entire prosecution case. They were cross-examined by the accused with reference to their earlier statements in the committal court and they stated that they had deposed as they had done because of fear of the accused. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution case against Mohinder Singh, and convicted him under section 302 of the Penal Code. The High Court also affirmed his conviction and refused certificate. Hence the matter went up to the Supreme Court. Their lordships in paragraph 13 observed that from what had happened it was very easy to see that those witnesses, who had stood firm before were won over in the interval, and deposed contrary to their earlier versions, and documents signed by them, and upheld the conviction and dismissed the appeal. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this regard. 9. Under this head learned counsel also submitted that the learned Magistrate has erred in relying on the documents regarding the statements of the witnesses before the police, which were not substantive evidence. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this regard. 9. Under this head learned counsel also submitted that the learned Magistrate has erred in relying on the documents regarding the statements of the witnesses before the police, which were not substantive evidence. In my opinion, this submission of the learned counsel is also not acceptable. Reference may be made to A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 79 (supra). In paragraph 7 their Lordships observed that under Chapter XVIII of the Code, the Magistrate is entitled not only to look into the evidence before him, but also into documents which are referred to in S. 173 of the Code. 10. Now I turn to consider the submission of learned counsel under point no. (ii). He argued that the Magistrate in the impugned order had referred that only 12 witnesses out of 31 charge sheet witnesses were examined and he held that there might be some more eyewitnesses to be examined on behalf of the prosecution. According to learned counsel, all the eye-witnesses of the occurrence have to be examined by the prosecution before the committing court. Therefore, the Magistrate has erred in presuming that there might be some more eye-witnesses. In my view, this submission of learned counsel is not acceptable. There are exceptional circumstances in which eye-witnesses may not be examined before the committing Court. Reference may be made to Kirpal Singh V. The State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R 1965 S.C. 712 where their lordships in paragraph 8 observed that it is the duty of the Magistrate to examine all such witnesses as may be produced by the prosecutor as witnesses to the actual commission of the offence alleged, but his duty does not end with such examination. He must apply his mind to the documents referred to in S. 173, and the testimony of witnesses, if any, produced by the prosecutor and examined, and consider whether in the interest of justice it is necessary to record the evidence of other witnesses. In inquiries relating to charges for serious offences like murder, normally the Magistrate should insist upon the examination of the principal witnesses to the actual commission of the offence. Failure to examine the witnesses may be justified only in exceptional cases. That clearly shows that there may be exceptional cases also. 11. Now I advert to consider the last point. In inquiries relating to charges for serious offences like murder, normally the Magistrate should insist upon the examination of the principal witnesses to the actual commission of the offence. Failure to examine the witnesses may be justified only in exceptional cases. That clearly shows that there may be exceptional cases also. 11. Now I advert to consider the last point. Under this head, as pointed out above, learned counsel submitted that the offences attributable to petitioners other than Jagarnath Sah, are only under sections 147, 323 and 380 of the Penal Code. Therefore, the Magistrate, learned counsel submitted, had erred in committing those petitioners also to the Court of Session along with Jagarnath Sah. In my opinion, in such matters the Magistrate has ample discretion. It is well established that a Magistrate though having power to try case himself may commit to the Court of Session if he thinks that gravity of the case requires that it should be tried by such Court. Reference may be made to Rex V. Matoley A.I.R 1949 All. I. It is true that while doing so he must give reasons. But when upon the evidence of the witnesses whom the Magistrate examined and upon the view he has expressed, it can possibly be said that it did appear to the Magistrate that the case should be committed to the Court of Session, the order of commitment passed by him cannot be interfered with by the superior court merely on the ground that in its opinion the Magistrate had taken a more serious view of the matter than he ought to have taken in the case. In the present case, as mentioned earlier, two murders had taken place and all the petitioners were committed to the Court of Session under section 147 of the Penal Code. Besides, the occurrence for which the petitioners other than Jagarnath Sah were charged arose out of the same transaction and, therefore, I do not find any law in the order of the Magistrate in that regard either. 12. In an enquiry the Committing Magistrate has only to find out that there is evidence, which, if believed, will establish a prima facie case. He is not entitled to try the case on his own and forestall the decision of the Court of Session. 12. In an enquiry the Committing Magistrate has only to find out that there is evidence, which, if believed, will establish a prima facie case. He is not entitled to try the case on his own and forestall the decision of the Court of Session. He has only to see whether there are sufficient grounds for commitment, and not whether there are sufficient grounds for conviction. If upon reasonable view of the evidence a conviction is possible, he has to commit. While considering the evidence for commitment the test which he has to apply is not whether conviction is probable, but whether it is possible. In A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 863 (supra) also, on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel of the petitioners, their Lordships observed that a Committing Magistrate is entitled to sift and weigh materials on record, only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. 13. In the remit, after careful consideration I find no merit in the application, which is dismissed and the order of commitment passed by the Magistrate is upheld. Application dismissed.