( 1 ) THE petitioner in writ petition 397 of 1973 is working as Foreman and the petitioner in WP. 398 of 1973 is working as Asst Foreman in the controllerata of Inspection Electronics, Bangalore, which, is under the Defence ministry, Govt of India. The petitioner in WP. 397/73 was holding a degree in Engineering when he was appointed as Foreman. The petitioner in WP. 398/73 possessed B. SC, degree When he entered service. He however acquired the qualification of AMIE which was equivalent to a degree in Engineering after he entered service By letter No. 96850/v-1967/ dtta/884/d (Civ-I)dt. 4-2-69, increments were sanctioned by the Govt of india to certain classes of defence, employees who acquired a degree, in engineering or an equivalent degree while in service The relevant part of that letter reads as follows :" I am directed to say that the President is pleased to decide that a civilian employee paid from the defence services estimates, who acquires a degree in Engineering or an equivalent qualification such as the associate Membership of the Institution pf Engineers (India) or the graduateship of the Institution of Telecommunication Engineers India which is among the qualifications prescribed for recruitment to the Central engineering Services Class I, while he is serving in a non-gazetted technical scientific grades shall have his pay refixed with effect from the date on which he acquires the above mentioned qualification at the stage in his scale of pay which would give him three advance increments. " ( 2 ) LATER on by an order d. 2-6-1971, the benefit of three increments was also extended to the officials who possessed a degree in Engineering at the time of their entry into Govt service in non-gazetted. technical scientific grade in the Defence Depts. By an order d. 5-9-1972, it was declared that the benefits of advance increments would not be admissible in the cases of non-gazetted technical scientific grades where a degree in Engineering or an equivalent examination was a minimum qualification prescribed for appointment to such posts. Because one Off the minimum qualifications prescribed for recruitment to the post of Foreman or an Asst Foreman was a degree in Engineering, the petitioners who had been accorded three increments earlier were deprived of them. Aggrieved by the order dt. 5-9-1972, the petitioners have filed these petitions. Because one Off the minimum qualifications prescribed for recruitment to the post of Foreman or an Asst Foreman was a degree in Engineering, the petitioners who had been accorded three increments earlier were deprived of them. Aggrieved by the order dt. 5-9-1972, the petitioners have filed these petitions. ( 3 ) UNDER the recruitment rules the minimum qualifications prescribed for the post of a Foreman are degree in basic subject or diploma in basic subject with two years' experience, or B. Sc. degree with five years' experience. The qualifications prescribed for the post of Asst Foreman are a degree in basic subject or diploma in basic subject with one, years experience or B. Sc. degree, with three, years' experience in the supervisory capacity in the same field. It has to be mentioned here that there are, several other categories of posts in the non-gazetted technical/scientific grade for which a degree in Engineering is not a minimum qualification. The Govt order dt. 4-2-1969, which is extracted above did not expressly make, any distinction between the non-gazetted posts for which a degree in engineering or an equivalent qualification was a minimum qualification and the other non-gazetted posts for which a degree; in Engineering or equivalent qualification was not a minimum qualification. Hence it was understood by the authorities that the three advance increments sanctioned by the Govt order dt. 4-2-1969, had to be extended to all officials in the non-gaztted technical scientific grade who acquired a degree in Engineering or an equivalent qualification after they entered service. On the above basis the petitioner in WP. 398/73 who acquired AMIE after he entered service was given the benefit of three increments. The petitioner in WP. 397/73 was given the benefit of three increments on the basis of the Govt. order dt. 2-6-1971, which stated that even those who possessed the degree before they Wintered service would be entitled to three increments. The matter appeals to have been re-examined by the Govt of India. After such re-examination the impugned order dt. 5-9-1972, came to be passed. The said order reads as follows :"i am directed to refer to this Ministry's letter No. 96850/v-1967/ dtta/884 ID (civ-I) dt. 4-3-1969 as amended by letter No. 96850/v-1967 dtta/4709id (Civ-I) dt. 2-6-1971 and No. 96850/v-1967/dtta/1962d (Civ-I) dt. After such re-examination the impugned order dt. 5-9-1972, came to be passed. The said order reads as follows :"i am directed to refer to this Ministry's letter No. 96850/v-1967/ dtta/884 ID (civ-I) dt. 4-3-1969 as amended by letter No. 96850/v-1967 dtta/4709id (Civ-I) dt. 2-6-1971 and No. 96850/v-1967/dtta/1962d (Civ-I) dt. 19-2-1972 on the above subject and to say that it has been provided for in the above quoted Govt orders that non-gazetted civilians paid from defence services estimates who are serving in technical/scientific grade and who possess a degree in Engineering or an 'equivalent qualification such as Associate Membership of the Institution of Engineering (India) or the Graduateship of the Institution of Telecommunication Engg (Indtia) or the Associate, Membership of the Aeronautical Engineering Societty of India which is among the qualifications prescribed for recruitment to the central Govt Engineering Services Class I, will be entitled io three advance increments for possessing such qualifications. While implementing the above orders a doubt was raised by the Audit whether the benefit of advpnce increments as envisaged in the above Govt orders will be admissible in certain types of cases. The points raised were as follows : (1) Whether technical qualifications including the degree in metallurgy, Chemical Engineering, AMIE (Lond) LIMIIIM etc. which are recognised as qualifications for purposes of recruitment (appointment to superior posts and services should be regarded as equivalent qualifications within the meaning of. this Ministry's' letter dt. 4-2-1969 for purposes of granting advance increments provided for therein; (ii) Whether the provisions of Ministry of Defence letter d (. 4-2-1969 arp applicable to categories of Supervisors and Planners etc, in the non- industrial Estates and Industrial Employees possessing requisite technical qualifications as prescribed in the Govt Orders; and (iii) Whether the individuals who have acquired requisite, qualifications but are either drawing pay at the maximum off their scale or at a stage in thet scale, after which 3 advance increments, cannot he granted, may be granted the same benefit on promotion to the next higher grade. (2) The above points have been examined and are clarified as under; (i) (a) It is clarified that the list of Engineering qualifications specified in Ministry of Defence letter dt. 4-2-1969 is merely an illustrative list and not an exhaustive one. (2) The above points have been examined and are clarified as under; (i) (a) It is clarified that the list of Engineering qualifications specified in Ministry of Defence letter dt. 4-2-1969 is merely an illustrative list and not an exhaustive one. Basically, the Intention of the Govt is to grant advance fncrements to all non-gazetted employees in the technical /scientific grade who possess Engineering qualification in various branches which are recognised as qualifications for recruitmet/appoiniment in Class i superior services posts. Accordingly, the non-gazetted employees who possess degree in Metallurgy, Chemical Engineering and who have passed amiim (Calcutta), AMEI (Lond)LIM/iim etc. which are also, recognised as equivalent to degree for purposes of appointment to Class I superior posts are entitled to, advance incrementts as provided for in the above G. Os. ; (b) The benefits of advance increments will not be admissible In the case of non-gazetted technical scientific posts where a degree in engineering or an equivalent qualification is a minimum qualification prescribed for appointment to that post; (ii) Basically, the intention of the Govt is to grant the advance increments as an incentive to the non-gazetted employees for possessing higher technical qualifications. The provisions of this Ministry's letter dt. 4-2-1969 are applicable to the posts involving duties of a technical/scientific nature as clarified by the appointing authorities irrespective, of the fact whether they are industrial or non-industrial. (iii) The benefit of advance increments is not available to those who have already reached the maximum of the seale of the post and in other cases the advance increments Should be so regulated that it should not exceed the maximum of the scale. (3) The above clarificatory instructions will be applicable, retrespectively with effect from 1-12-1968-, The pay of the affected individuals will be refixed suitably and arrears allowed. So, tar as the individuals appointed to posts referred to in para 2 (i) (b) above are concerned, the over-payments, if any, may be treated as waived. (4) This issues with the concurrence of the Ministry of Finance (Defence) vide their U. O. No. 3053/pr of 1972. "in support of these two petitions, Sri M. Rama Jois, learned Counsel for the petitioners, urged three points: (i) the order dt. 4-2-1969, having been passed by the President of india it could not be either altered or modified by the letter dt. "in support of these two petitions, Sri M. Rama Jois, learned Counsel for the petitioners, urged three points: (i) the order dt. 4-2-1969, having been passed by the President of india it could not be either altered or modified by the letter dt. 5-9-1972 which does not say that it had been issued under the directions of the president; (ii) that the order dt. 5-9-1972, does not in fact modify or annul the decision contained in the letter dt. 4-2-1969; and (iii) that the order dt. 5-9-1972, which has been passed without affording an opportunity to the petitioners to show cause as to why the increments already granted to, them should not be withdrawn is a nullity. Point (i): It is not the case of the petitioners that the letter dt. 4-2-1969, contains a rule made by the President under the proviso to. Art. 309, of the Constn. It no doubt deals with the, conditions of service off the employees of the Govt of India,. It is now well settled that as long as there is no law made by the Parliament or a rule made by the President in exercise of his powers under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constn, it is open to the Central Govt to pass orders regarding the conditions of service of the employees of the Govt of India in exercise of its powers under Art. 73 of the Constn which provides that the executive power of the Union shall extend to masters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws. Entry 70 in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constn authorises the Parliament to make laws in respect of the Union Publice Services. It is therefore clear that under Art. 73 the Union Govt has the power to pass orders regarding the conditions of service of Union Public Services. The above view received support from the decision of the Supreme Court in b. N. Nagarajan v. Slate of Mys. , AIR. 1966 SC 1942. in which the Supreme Court; has held that it is open to the State Govt in exercise of its power under Art. 163 to pass orders regarding the State Public Services in view of Entry 41, in list II of the Seveath Schedule of the Constn. ( 4 ) SRI Rama Jois however tried to make a distinction between the letter dt. ( 4 ) SRI Rama Jois however tried to make a distinction between the letter dt. 4-2-1969 and the letter dt. 5-9-1972, on the basis of their contents. He drew the attention of the Court to the wards "i am directed to say that the Presidert is pleased to decide. . " appearing in the letter dt. 4-2-1969. and to the words "i am directed to refer to this Ministry's letter. . . and to say that it has been provided,. . . " appearing in the letter dt. 5-9-1972 and contended that in the absence of any reference to the 'president' in the letter dt. 5-9-1972, it should be held -that the letter dt. 5-9-1972, had no effect on the contents of the letter dt. 4-2-1969. In the statement of objections filed on behalf of the Union of India it has been stated that the omission to refer to the President in the letter dt. 5-9-1972, is only accidental but in fact the, said letter has been issued by the Govt of India and it has the effect of modifying the decision of the Govt of India contained in the letter dt. 4-2-1969. ( 5 ) I find it difficult to agree with the submission made by Sri Rama Jois. There is no prescribed form in which a decision of the Govt of India should be communicated. Art. 77 of the Constn states that all executive actions of the Govt of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the president of India, that orders and other instruments made, and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rulep to be made by the President, and thei validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President. When Article 166 of the Constn which contains a provision similar to Art. 77 came, up for consideration before, the Supreme court in Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1829. When Article 166 of the Constn which contains a provision similar to Art. 77 came, up for consideration before, the Supreme court in Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1829. the Supreme Court observed as follows :" Under Art. 166 of the Constn all executive action of the Govt of a. State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor, and that orders made in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified In rules to be made by the governor and the validity of an order which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. " ( 6 ) IF the conditions laid down in this Article are complied with, the order cannot be called in question on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. It is contended that as the order in question was not issued in the name of the Governor the order was void and no interviews could be held pursuant to that order. The law on the subject is well settled. In Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangurkar v. State of Bombay (1863 SCR 612 at p. 625= air 1952 SC 181 at pp. 185-186), das, J. as he then was observed :"strict compliance with the requirements of Art. 166 gives an immunity to the order in that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor, If, therefore, the requirements of that Article are not complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be claimed by the State. This however, does not vitiate the order itself. . . . . Art. 166 directs all executive action to be expressed and authenticated in the manner therein laid down but an omission to comply with those provisions does not render the executive action a nullity. Therefore, all that the procedure established by law requires is that the appropriate Govt must take a decision as to whether the detention order should be confirmed or not under S. 11 (1)". Therefore, all that the procedure established by law requires is that the appropriate Govt must take a decision as to whether the detention order should be confirmed or not under S. 11 (1)". ( 7 ) THE same view was reiterated by this Court in State of Bombay v. Purushotham Jog Naik (1952 SGR 674= air 1952 SC 317 ) where it was pointed out that though the order in question there was defective in form it was open to the State Govt to prove by other means that such an order had been validly made. This view has been reaffrmed by this Court in subsequent decisions: see Ghaio Nall and Sons v. State of delhi ( 1959 SCR 1424 = air 1959 SC 65 ) and it is therefore, settled law that provisions of Art. 166 of the Constn are only directory and not mandatory in character and if they are not complied with, it can be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Govt or the Governor. The judgment of this Court in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab ( (1962) Supp, 3 SCR 713= air 1963 SC 395 ) does not help the appellants, for in that case, the order signed by the Revenue Minister was not communicated to the party and, therefore, it was held that there was no effective order. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, let us look at the facts of this case. Though Annexure IV does not conform to the provisions of art. 166 of the Constn, it ex facie says that an order to the effect mentioned therein was issued by the Govt and it is not denied that it was communicated to the selection committee. In neither of the affidavits filed by the appellants there was any specific averment that no such order was issued by the Govt. In the counter-affidavit filed by E. R. Verma, Deputy Secretary to the Govt of Mysore, Education Dept, there is a clear averment that the Govt gave the direction contained in Annexure IV and a similar letter was issued to the Selection Committee for admission to Medical Colleges and this averment was not denied by the appellants by filing any affidavit. In the counter-affidavit filed by E. R. Verma, Deputy Secretary to the Govt of Mysore, Education Dept, there is a clear averment that the Govt gave the direction contained in Annexure IV and a similar letter was issued to the Selection Committee for admission to Medical Colleges and this averment was not denied by the appellants by filing any affidavit. In the circumstances when there are no allegations at all in the affidavit that the order was not made by the Govt we have no reason to reject the averment made by the Deputy Secretary to the Govt that the order was issued by the govt There are no merits in this contention. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, in the affidavit filed on Behalf of the Union of India as already mentioned, it is asserted that the letter dt. 5-9-1972, also contains the decision of the Union Govt just like the letter dt. 4-2-1969, contains the decision of the Union Govt. Para 33 of the Central Secretariat Manual of Office Procedure appearing in Chap. VI deals with the forms in which the written communication of the Govt of India should be couched. Para 33 (1) (b) lays down that official letters emanating from all departments and purporting to convey the views or orders of the, Govt of India must specifically be expressed to have been written under the directions of govt. In Appendix 6 to the Manual a specimen form of communication containing the orders of the Gpvt of India is given It reads as follows:" No. . . . . . . . . . . . . Govt of India (Bharat Sarkar) department of. . . . . . (. . . Vibhag) New Delhi, the to sub:. . . . . . . . . ,. Sir, with reference to your letter No. . . . . . dt. . . . . . . . . I am. . . . . . . . . directed to say that yours faithfully, under Secy to the Govt of India. " ( 9 ) IT is clear from the specimen form extracted above that wherever the words " I am directed to say " are used it must be, presumed that the said letter contains the deeision of the Govt of India. . . . . . directed to say that yours faithfully, under Secy to the Govt of India. " ( 9 ) IT is clear from the specimen form extracted above that wherever the words " I am directed to say " are used it must be, presumed that the said letter contains the deeision of the Govt of India. We have the words " I am directed to say " both in the letter dt. 4-2-1969 and in the, letter dt. 5-9-1972. From the specimen form it is clear that ordinarily the word 'president' is not used in all such letters. In view of the averments madei in the state ment of objections filed on behalf of the Union of India and the observations made by the Supreme Court in Chitralekha's case (2), i am of the view that it has been established by the respondents in this case that both the letter dt. 4-2-1969 and the letter dt. 5-9-1972, are issued under the directions of the same authority and they are, traceable to Art. 73 of the Constn of India,. At this stage it is necessary to refer to the; decision of the. Supreme court in S. N. Karkhanis v. Union of India, 1974 1 SCWR 598. in which it has been observed that a Presidential resolution which draws its authority from the, proviso to Art. 309 of the Consrtn cannot be amended or modified by a letter of the Govt of India,. Sri Rama Jois contended on the basis of the above decision that the letter dt. 5-9-1972, would not have the effect of modifying the letter dt. 4-2-1969. The submission made by Sri Rama Jois overlooks the fact that the Supreme Court was concerned in the above case with a presidential resolution which had been made in exercise of the powers of the President under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constn. The said decision does not deal with a case where the order in question is one passed in exercise of the powers of the Govt of India under Art. 73 of the Constn. An order passed by the Union Govt under Art. 73 and issued in the name of the President under Art. 77 of the Constn can be modified by another order made in etxerisa of the powers under Art. 73 and issued under Art. 77 of the Constn. An order passed by the Union Govt under Art. 73 and issued in the name of the President under Art. 77 of the Constn can be modified by another order made in etxerisa of the powers under Art. 73 and issued under Art. 77 of the Constn. I, therefore, hold that the first point is liable to be rejected and it is rejected. ( 10 ) THE second point urged by Sri Rama Jois is that the letter dt. 5-9-1972, does not in fact take away the concession which had been extended to the employees in the non-gazetted cadres by the letter dt. 4-2- 1969, and that the letter dt. 5-9-1972, was only clarificatory in nature as stated in it. It is no doubt true that in one part of the said letter it is stated that it had been issued in clarification of the Order contained in the letter dt. 4-2-1969. But a reading of the letter dt. 5-9-1972, leaves no dqubt in one's mind that the benefit of advance increment which had been extended by the letter d. 4 -2-1969, to those officials who were working in the non-gazetted cadres where a degree in Engineering or equivalent qualification was a minimum qualification was taken away by the letter dt. 5-9-1972. The relevant portions of the letter dt. 5-9-1972, which are material are, as follows :" 2. The above points have been examined and are clarified as under: (b) The benefits of advance increments will not be admissible in the case of non-gazetted technical/scientific posts where a degree in Engineering or an equivalent qualification is a minimum qualification prescribed for appointment to that post; 3. The above clarificatory instructions will be applicable retroppectively with effect from 1-12-1968. The pay of the faceted individuals will be remixed suitably and arrears' allowed. So far as the individuals appointed to posts referred to in para 2 (i) (b) above are conoerned, the overpayments, if any, may be treated as waived. " ( 11 ) IT is, therefore, clear that the Govt off India was of the view that with effect from 5-9-1972, persons who were working in the non-gazetted cadres where a degree in Engineering or an equivalent qualification is a, minimuni qualification and who had been paid advance increments earlier pursuant to the letter d]. " ( 11 ) IT is, therefore, clear that the Govt off India was of the view that with effect from 5-9-1972, persons who were working in the non-gazetted cadres where a degree in Engineering or an equivalent qualification is a, minimuni qualification and who had been paid advance increments earlier pursuant to the letter d]. 4-2-1969, would not be eligible to the said increments with effect form 1-12-1968, butt any over-payments already made would be waived. It follows that the directions contained in the letter dt. 4-2-1969, and in the letter dt. 2-6-1971, by which officials who, possessed the prescribed qualification at the time, of their entry into Govt service were also accorded the advance increments, were withdrawn on and after 5-9-1972. Sri Rama Jois however argued that para 2 (i) (b) of the letter dt. 5-9-1972, does not apply to the petitioners at all because the minimum qualification prescribed for the posts which the ptitjoners were holding was not merely a degree in Engineering but there were other qualifications also. He drew my attention to the qualifications prescribed in respect of the posts of foreman and Asst Foreman and submitted that the qualifications for the post of a Foreman were, a degree! in the basic subject or diploma in the basic subject with two years experience or B. Sc. with five years experience and that the qualifications prescribed for the Asst Foreman were a degree in the basic subject or diploma in the basic subject with one year's experience or B. Sc. with three years' experience in a supervisory capacity in the same field. He argued that in view of the qualifications prescribed for the twp posts, the minimum qualification was not a degree, in Engineering alone, but was also a diploma or a B. Sc. degree wtih certain experience it was, therefore, contended that para 2 (i) (b) of the letter dt. 5-9-1972, did not refer to the petitioners at all. This contention again is not a tenable one. ( 12 ) THE user of an indefinite article V before the words " minimum qualification in para 2 (i) (b) suggests that if amongst several minimuni qualifications prescribed fox a post, one of them is a degree in Engineering or an equivalent qualification, then para 2 (i) (b) would be applicable to the holders of those posts. ( 12 ) THE user of an indefinite article V before the words " minimum qualification in para 2 (i) (b) suggests that if amongst several minimuni qualifications prescribed fox a post, one of them is a degree in Engineering or an equivalent qualification, then para 2 (i) (b) would be applicable to the holders of those posts. I do not also find' any substance in the contention that in the, absence, of any reference to the minimum qualification in the cadre; and Recruitment Rules, para 2 (i) (b) does not convey any meaning at all because the expression "qualification " referred to in the Cadre and Recruitment Rules can only be a minimum qualification. As already mentioned there are certain non-gazetted posts in the technical/scientific cadres in the Ministry of Defence for which the minimum qualification prescribed is only a diploma and not a degree in Engineering and those, posts carry a pay scale which is lower than the pay scale which is prescribed for the posts for which the minimum qualification is a degree, in engineering or a diploma with certain experience or a B. Sc. degree with certain experience. The classification of the posts on the basis of the minimum qualification for the purpose of giving advance increments cannot be considered as unreasonable. The decision of the Govt of India to take away the benefit of the advance increments that had been extended to the petitioner and other persons similary situated by the letter dt. 4-2-1969, cannot he assailed either on the ground, of incompetency or on the ground Of unreasonableness. Hence, 1 hold that the letter dt. 5-9-1972, expressly takes away the benefit which had been extended to the petitioners by the letter dt. 4-2-1969. ( 13 ) THE third contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the benefit of advance increments sanctioned to the petitioners could not be taken away by the Union Govt without giving the petitioners a reasonable opportunity to show cause as to why such action shuld not be taken. In support of the above contention Sri Rama, Jois reliad upon a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in k. Babu Rao v. Govt of India, WA. 43 of 1973. and connected casep decided on 30-1-74. ( 14 ) IN that case, also the petitioners had questioned the validity of the letter dt. 5-9-1972. In support of the above contention Sri Rama, Jois reliad upon a decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in k. Babu Rao v. Govt of India, WA. 43 of 1973. and connected casep decided on 30-1-74. ( 14 ) IN that case, also the petitioners had questioned the validity of the letter dt. 5-9-1972. Dealing with the contention based on the principles of natural justice the High Court of Andhra Pradesh observed as follows :" In regard to the other ground, however, we have no manner of doubt that the Govt of India could not have affected the rights of the petitioners without providing them with an opportunity of being heard. State of Punjab v. K. R. Erry (1972 SLR 836); Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1971 SLR 175)and Appukwttan Nair v. State of Kerala (1969 SLR 496) take that view. We would, therefore, agree, with the learned single Judge that the impugned order suffers from that infirmity and could not be allowed to stand. " ( 15 ) NO reasons in support of the view taken by their Lordships are to be found in the decision. Reference is however made by their Lordships to the three decisions referred to by them. The first two decisions are rendered by the, Supreme Court and the third decision is by the High Court of Kerala. In the first two cases the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether after an official had put in the necessary qualifying service and retired it would be, open to the Govt to reduce his pension to which he was entitled without giving an opportunity to the official concerned to show cause why his pension should not be reduced. As observed by the Supreme Court in those decisions, after an official has put in the necessary qualifying service he would become entitled to the pension prescribed by the Rules and if any reduction in the quantum of pension has to be, made, it would be necessary for the Govt to observe rules of fair-play and justice before doing so. In the instant case we are not concerned with a case of pension earned by an official after putting in the necessary quarrying service. In the instant case we are not concerned with a case of pension earned by an official after putting in the necessary quarrying service. The expectation on the part of an officer to be paid salary in future at the rate at which he had been paid earlier cannot be enervated, to the level of a proprietary right as in the case of a pension. It is well settled that the pay scale at which a salary of an official should be disbursed is a condition of service and that a condition of service can always be modified by the Govt unilaterally without the concurrence of the official concerned. ( 16 ) I am of the view that just like a condition relating to age of superannuation can be modified by the Govt unilaterally without issuing notice to the concerned officials it can also, modify the pay scale at which the salary is disbursed to official. In E. V. Naidus cose, AIR. 1973 SC. 698. dealing with the question whether an opportunity should be given to conerened officials before reducing the age Off superannuation, the Supreme Court observed that it was not necessary to afford an opportunity to show cause to the Govt servants as to why the) age of retirement should not be reduced. Sri Rama, jois however drew my attention to some of the decisions of this Court wherein this court had held that an opportunity should have been given to officials when their pay was reduced. It has to be mentioned that in all those cases the State Govt had not merely reduced the pay but had ordered recovery of amounts which had been over paid. In the instant case there is no direction to recover the over-payments which have already been made. Hence those decisions are of no assistance to the petitioners. ( 17 ) IT is no, doubt true that in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 relying upon an earlier decision in State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 . the Supreme Court has observed as follows ;" The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure, justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage; of justice. These, rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made,. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 . the Supreme Court has observed as follows ;" The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure, justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage; of justice. These, rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made,. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has under gone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely, (1) no one , shall be a judge in his own cause (memo debet esse judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable, hearing (audi alteram partem ). Very soon thereafter a third rule, was envisaged and that is that quasi- judicial enqiuiri,es must be held in good fath, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years may more subsidiary rules came, to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the Courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the, purpose of the, rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see, why those, rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administative enquiries from quasi judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered, as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of kerala (CA. 990 of 1968 dt. 15-7-1968= air 1969 SC 198 ) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of kerala (CA. 990 of 1968 dt. 15-7-1968= air 1969 SC 198 ) the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice, should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle, of natural justice had been contravened the Court has to decide whether the Observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. " ( 18 ) IT is seen from the observations of the Supreme Court extracted above that it is the duty of the Court to decide in each case having regard to, the facts and circumstances whether it is obligatory on the part of the authority concerned to follow the principle of audi alteram partem before taking a decision. In the instant case it is seen that the, decision that has been taken is an administrative decision, The decision is not the result of any enquiry. The Union Govt was not concerned with any individual case. The Union govt was deciding whether a particular increment which had been given earlier should be allowed to continue or not. I find it difficult to extend the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kraipak's case (7) to the case on hand. I am of the view that the enunciation made in K. V. Naidu's case (6) in connection with the alteration of age of superannuation to the prejudice of the officials is more apposite. ( 19 ) THE decision of the High Court of Kerala in Appukuttan Nair's case on which the High Court ' of Andhra Pradesh depended to reach the conclusion that the letter of Sep. 5, 1972, was a nullity no doubt supports the petitioners. That was also a case in which the State Govt had with- drwan the increment which had been given to loyal employees during the period of strike. 5, 1972, was a nullity no doubt supports the petitioners. That was also a case in which the State Govt had with- drwan the increment which had been given to loyal employees during the period of strike. The High Court of Kerala in coming to the conclusion that the rules of natural justice should have been observed by the State govt relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei, With great respect to the learned Judges of the high Court of Andhra Pradesh and of the High Court of Kerala. I find it difficult to agree that in the circumstances of this case the order by which certain increments which had been given earlier hpd been withdrawn prospectively can be treated as a nullity on the ground that principles of natural justice had not been followed If the views expressed by the High court of Kerala and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh are accepted as correct, then it would be impossible for any Govt to amend any rule relating to conditions of service wherever such amendment would affect them adversely without giving notice to the employees, I do not think that such a view can be accepted. The Union Govt was, therefore, under no obligation to issue notices to the petitioners before withdrawing the advance increments which had already been granted to the petitioners prospectively. No other point was urged. These petitions, therefore, fail and they are dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .