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1973 DIGILAW 214 (MAD)

The Collector of Thanjavur in charge of Legal Administration of Chatram Endowments having his headquarters at Thanjavur, thanjavur Dt. v. T. R. Nataraja Iyer (died)

1973-04-02

ISMAIL, NATARAJAN

body1973
Judgment :- (ISMAIL J.) 1. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 10 of 1964 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Thanjavur is the appellant herein. During the pendency of the appeal, the first respondent died and the respondents 7 to 19 were brought on record as the legal representatives of the deceased. As all the other respondents except the 9th respondent have been served we hold that the estate of the deceased first respondent is sufficiently represented in the appeal. 2. The appellant is the Collector of Thanjavur in charge of Local Administration (in charge of Chatram Endowments), Admittedly, the respondents herein were lessees of the suit lands and the suits lauds are situate in a minor Inam. The suit was instituted for recovery of a sum of Rs. 31,815.12 being, the arrears of rent, water charges and casses payable by the respondents herein for faslis 1366 to 1372 with interest and costs. The respondents herein raised several contentions in defence and on the basis of the pleadings the trial court raised as many as 12 issues. However, during the pendency of the suit, the Madras Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Madras Act 30 of 1963) was brought into force with effect from 15th February 1965. In view of the provision contained in S. 41 of the said Act, both the parties filed a joint memo dated 6th March 1965 confining themselves to the claim for faslis 1371 to 1373. In view of the said section, the respondents herein deposited into Court a sum of Rs, 15,500. Ultimately, the arrears of rent due for the last three faslis were arrived at Rs. 12,582.02 and consequently the learned Subordinate Judge on 30th March 1965 dismissed the suit in terms of S. 41(2) of the Act and declared that the appellant will by entitled to receive Rs. 12582-02 from out of the amount deposited by the respondents. He did not also award any costs in favour of the appellant. It is against this decree the present appeal has been preferred. 3. Mr. 12582-02 from out of the amount deposited by the respondents. He did not also award any costs in favour of the appellant. It is against this decree the present appeal has been preferred. 3. Mr. Srisailam, learned counsel for the appellant put forward three contentions before us, viz., (1) the suit claim involved the liability of the respondents to pay water rates as well as cesses and S. 41 of the Act referred to above has nothing whatever to do with the said water rates and cesses and consequently, the Court below should have decreed the claim of the appellant for the said amounts for the other faslis, (2) the Court below erred in disallowing interest on the amount claimed in the plaint and (3) the trial Court erroneously declined to award costs in favour of the appellant herein. 4. Let us now consider these points in seriatim. S. 41(1) and (2) of the Act states as follows: “41(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in the case of a minor inam all arrears of rent payable by a person to an inamdar in respect of any land in such inam and outstanding on the appointed day shall, to the extent to which such arrears are in excess of the renr due for three fasli years in respect of that land, be deemed to be discharged Whether or not a decree has been obtained therefor if such person pays to the inamdars the arrears of rent due for a period of any three fasli years. (2) In any suit or proceeding for the recovery of any arrears of rent referred to in sub-S. (1), the Court or authority concerned shall, upon deposit in the Court or before the authority, or upon proof by the ryot of the payment, of arrears of such rent for three fasli year-, dismiss the suit or proceeding.’ It is necessary to refer to the other sub-Sections of S. 41 of the Act. It is admitted that the Act itself does not define the term ‘rent’. On the other hand, Exs. A-1 to A-3, the registered muchilika executed by the ryots in favour of the District Board, Thanjavur which was in charge of the chatram, expressly contemplates the ryots being liable to pay road cess, village cess and water charges in addition to the rent stipulated for the lands in question. On the other hand, Exs. A-1 to A-3, the registered muchilika executed by the ryots in favour of the District Board, Thanjavur which was in charge of the chatram, expressly contemplates the ryots being liable to pay road cess, village cess and water charges in addition to the rent stipulated for the lands in question. The plaint itself specifically refers to the rent , water charges and cesses separately. All that the learned Subordinate Judge has stated is that there is no specific provision in the Act to show that the rent referred to in S. 41 of the Act does not include any other liability undertaken by the ryots under the terms of the lease deed or muchilika entered into between the parties. We are of the opinion that this reasoning of the learned Subordinate Judge is not sound. Rent is a return which a person in occupation of the land belonging to another perso n pays to the owner of the land. On the other hand, the water rates and cesses that are referred to Exs. A-1 to A-3 are statutory liabilities payable by the owner to the Government and these charges have been agreed: to be paid by the ryots. Consequently, we are of the opinion, that the expression ‘rent’ referred to in S. 41 of the Act does not include water rates as well as cesses as contemplated in Exs. A-1 to A-3 and therefore the payment or deposit into the Court of rent for three faslis 1371 to 137 3 does not wipe out the obligation of the respondents to pay the water rates and cesses as claimed by the appellant. In this case, the sum of Rs. 12582.02 arrived at, as the amount payable by the respondents for the three, faslis 1371 to 1373, is said to include the said water rates and cesses also. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the contention of the appellant in this behalf is sound and the appellant will be entitled to a decree against the respondents for water charges and cesses claimed for the faslis other than the faslis 1371 to 1373 dz., for faslis 1266 to 1370 since the statute has wiped out only the rent for the said faslis on the deposit of the rent for the other three faslis. 5. 5. As far as the second contention is concerned, we are clearly of the opinion that the appellant is not entitled to any interest on the amounts of rent actually deposited by the respondents into Court for faslis 1371 to 1373. Certainly, the appellant is not entitled to any interest on the rents for the other faslis which stand wiped out by virtue of the operation of S. 41 of the Act. For instance, if the appellant had filed a suit for recovery of rent only a for a period of three years with interest, and if, under S. 41 of the Act, the respondents deposit the rent for the three years their obligations would come to an end and therefore the suit will have to stand dismissed as provided for in Sec. 41(2) of the Act and it cannot be contended in such a situation that even though the suit will have to stand dismissed as contemplated under Sec. 41(2) of the Act in respect of the rent, the suit should be decreed for interest alone. In view of this logical position and there being nothing in the statute pointing to the contrary, we are of the opinion that the appellant herein is not entitled to any interest whatever on any portion of the rent. However, since we are holding that the appellant is entitled to recover water rates and cesses from the respondents herein for the faslis 1366 to 1370 certainly the appellant will be entitled to interest on that amount and consequently we accept the contention of the appellant only to the limited extent of providing for interest on the water charges and cesses as claimed in the suit for faslis 1366 to 1370. 6. As far as the costs are concerned, the only reason given by the learned Subordinate Judge is that no provision is made for the payment of costs, and as the Act says that on the deposit of the amount, the suit shall be dismissed, the suit will stand dismissed and there will be no order as to costs. We are Clearly of the opinion that this reasoning is erroneous. The suit was instituted on 612. 1963 and the appellant had alleged in the plaint that the respondents declined to pay the rents and the other amounts due to the appellant notwithstanding many demands made on them. We are Clearly of the opinion that this reasoning is erroneous. The suit was instituted on 612. 1963 and the appellant had alleged in the plaint that the respondents declined to pay the rents and the other amounts due to the appellant notwithstanding many demands made on them. On the day when the suit was instituted, Madras Act 30 of 1963 was not brought into force and the same was brought into force only on 15-2-1965 by virtue of the notification issued by the Government. It is in view of this subsequent notification bringing into force the Act, the respondents cot the benefit of Sec. 41 of the Act it clearly follows that the appellant was justified in instituting the suit after incurring heavy expenditure by way of court fee of Re. 2, 387 and other incidental expenses. Under Sec. 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure a direction for the payment of costs is always in the discretion of the Court, even though the said discretion is a judicial one which has to be exercised after taking into account all the circumstances of the case. We have gone through the written statement filed by the respondents herein and they offer no explanation whatever for not having paid the amounts due to the appellant earlier. The only contention put forward by them in the written statement in defence of their failure to pay the rent is the provisions contained in the Madras Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act of 1963 (Madras Act 26 of 1963) and the provisions contained in the Madras Act 30 of 1963, even though the first Act was not applicable to the lands in question and the second Act was not brought into force on the day when the written statement was filed. Therefore, it is clear that without any justification whatever the respondents herein had with held the payment of rent and the other amounts due to the appellant herein and consequently, the appellant was fully justified in instituting the suit in question. In view of the fortuitous circumstances of the Act being brought into force during the pendency of the suit and the consequential benefit that the respondents derived out of the same, the appellant herein could not be denied the costs which he had incurred. 7. In view of the fortuitous circumstances of the Act being brought into force during the pendency of the suit and the consequential benefit that the respondents derived out of the same, the appellant herein could not be denied the costs which he had incurred. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents contended before us that the costs could be awarded only on that portion of the amount which had been deposited into the trial Court. We are unable to accept this argument. As a matter of fact, as we pointed out already, there is absolutely no explanation whatever, on the part of the respondents as to why they had not paid the rents as and when they fell due and it is their default which compelled the appellant to institute the suit and by virtue of the Act coming into force during the pendency of the suit, the respondents got the benefit and that should not be a ground for denying the appellant the right to have the expenses incurred by him reimbursed by the respondents herein. In view of this, we are clearly of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to a decree directing the respondents herein to pay the appellant the full costs of this suit, In these circumstances, the appeal will stood allowed in part, viz., in decreeing the suit of the appellant for water charges and cesses for faslis 1366 to 1370 with interest and in directing the respondents to pay the full costs of the suit to the appellant. There will be no order as to costs in the appeal.