JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - The Appellant Sabitri Dei, wife of Chema Singh of village Chhotraipur was tried on the charge that on the night of 27th of October, 1969, she committed murder of her younger daughter Mali Dei, aged about four years. 2. Chema and Sabitri had two daughters Dasu (p.w. 1) is the elder daughter and the deceased Mali was the younger one. They are daily labourers by profession. On the date of occurrence, Chema Singh had been to a neighbouring village to work as a labourer. The Appellant, however, did not go for work but along with her elder daughter had been to some nearby fields wherefrom she returned home in the evening with some fish. While the Appellant was engaged in cooking the fish, her elder daughter Dasu (p.w. 1) went -to the house of her aunt. At that time she had noticed her younger sister Mali sleeping in the Dhinkisal (seed set apart for husking paddy) of their house. After a while, she came back home and found her mother (the Appellant) sitting silently and her younger daughter Mali lying dead in a pool of blood in the Dhinkisal. On her enquiry from her mother, the latter did not say anything but simply caught hold of her hand and took her towards the jungle near the village. Some time thereafter Chema returned home and finding his younger daughter lying dead in a pool of blood raised an alarm, hearing which some of the villagers came to the spot and finding the girl dead and the Appellant and p.w. 1 missing from the house, they instituted a search for them in the neighbourhood. Finding no trace either of the Appellant or of p.w. 1, one Baghu Singh (p.w. 2) went to the police station and lodged information (Ext. 2) at about 7.00 A.M. the next day. The Sub-Inspector came to the spot, held an inquest over the dead body and sent it for post-mortem examination to the Baripada hospital. He also sent constables to search for the Appellant and her eldest daughter. At about 11.00 A.M. the Appellant and p.w. 1 were found loitering near the border of the nearby reserved forest and were brought to the spot where the Appellant was arrested by the Sub-Inspector. The sari (M.O. I.) which she was wearing and which was blood-stained was seized under seizure list Ext. 6. At about 11.00 A.M. the Appellant and p.w. 1 were found loitering near the border of the nearby reserved forest and were brought to the spot where the Appellant was arrested by the Sub-Inspector. The sari (M.O. I.) which she was wearing and which was blood-stained was seized under seizure list Ext. 6. A spade (M.O. II.) was also seized by the Sub-Inspector from the house of the Appellant. The lady doctor (p.w. 7) who conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body found on it two external injuries; the first one being an incised wound extending from the middle of the right cheek upto the 7th spine and the second, an incised wound extending from half inch below from the right angle of mandible up to the right mastoid process. On dissection, she found that the right carotid artery and the right jugular vein were cut. In her opinion all the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and the death of the child was the result of those injuries which according to her were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. She further opined that the injuries could be caused by the sharp edge of the spade M.O. II. M.Os. I and II were sent to the Chemical Examiner for examination. The Chemical Examiner after examination detected blood on both the M.Os. The Serologist who examined the M.Os. I and II opined that they were stained with human blood. 3. After completion of the investigation, a charge sheet u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code was submitted against the Appellant. After preliminary enquiry she was committed to the Court of Session to stand her trial. It appears from the order sheet of the learned Sessions Judge that on the charge u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code being read and explained to the Appellant, she pleaded guilty. The learned Sessions Judge, however, chose nut to convict the Appellant on the basis of her plea but proceeded to record evidence. 4. Seven witnesses were examined for the prosecution at the trial and none for the defence. The learned Sessions Judge, however, chose nut to convict the Appellant on the basis of her plea but proceeded to record evidence. 4. Seven witnesses were examined for the prosecution at the trial and none for the defence. P.w. 1 is the elder daughter of the Appellant who stated that when she went to her aunt?s house in the evening of the date of occurrence, she found her younger sister (the deceased) sleeping in the Dhinkisal and her mother (the Appellant) cooking fish, and when after some time she came back from her aunt?s house, she found her younger sister lying dead in a pool of blood and her mother sitting there silently. When she questioned her mother as to who killed her sister, the Appellant did not tell anything but simply caught hold of her hand and took her into the forest nearby, P.ws. 2 and 3 came to the spot only after the Appellant?s husband Chema raised an alarm and on coming to the spot they found the deceased lying in a pool of blood and the Appellant and p.w. 1 missing from the house P.w. 7 is the lady doctor who conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body and p.w. 6 is the investigating officer P.w. 5 is a witness to the seizure of M.Os. I and II. P.w. 4 was the Chief Medical Officer of Mayurbhanj and the Superintendent of the Circle Jail at Baripada. On the requisition given to him by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Baripada, he had kept the Appellant under his observation from 6-12-69 to 29-12-69 with a view to observe her mental condition. During this period he found her to be sleeping normally, taking her diet regularly and passing urine and stools normally. She was also obeying orders. In his opinion, she did not exhibit any signs of lunacy during the period of observation. Relying on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the circumstances referred to above, the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that it was the Appellant who killed her daughter. He, therefore, convicted her u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced her to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. Hence this appeal. 5. Relying on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the circumstances referred to above, the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that it was the Appellant who killed her daughter. He, therefore, convicted her u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced her to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. Hence this appeal. 5. It is contended by learned Counsel for the Appellant that the evidence on record does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant had committed the murder of her child; that no motive is proved as to why she should have committed such a heinous crime and that the learned Sessions Judge was considerably influenced in arriving at the conclusion that the Appellant is guilty by the alleged admission of her guilt when the charge was read over and explained to her. 6. Sub-section (1) of Section 271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that at the commencement of trial in a Court of Session, the charge shall be read out in Court and explained to the accused and he shall be asked whether he is guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. Sub-section (2) provides that it the accused pleads guilty, the plea shall be recorded and he may be convicted thereon. The expression " may" is significant and it means that the Court is not bound to accept the plea of " guilty" and may in spite of it, proceed to take down the evidence of the witnesses and come to its own conclusion on the basis thereof. When an accused pleads his guilt, he is not to be taken at his words, unless the plea is expressed in unmistakable terms with full appreciation of the essential ingredients of the offence. This rule of law is applied with all the greater stringency where the offence charged is so complicated in its nature and serious in its consequence as "murder". It is therefore, that a practice has grown up that in capital cases the Courts prefer to err on the side of caution and not accept the plea of "guilty". It may so happen that a charge u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code may be understood by an accused as meaning that he is charged for/killing the deceased and with that understanding of the import of the charge he may plead guilty. It may so happen that a charge u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code may be understood by an accused as meaning that he is charged for/killing the deceased and with that understanding of the import of the charge he may plead guilty. But evidence may disclose that the killing might come under one of the exceptions mentioned in Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, in which case the offence would not be one of murder but of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In such a case the Court accepting the plea of " guilty" will result in the miscarriage of justice. That is the reason why in very serious cases like murder it is always considered safe not to accept the plea of " guilty" but to proceed to take evidence of the witnesses. 7. In this particular case, the learned Sessions Judge ought to have noticed that during the course of investigation, the Appellant had been produced before a Magistrate to record her confession. But she did not confess her guilt and stated that the police had been asking her to admit her guilt but that she had not committed any offence. This ought to have put the learned Sessions Judge on his guard and he should not have accepted the plea of " guilty" without satisfying himself that the accused was taking that plea after full appreciation of the essential ingredients of the offence of murder. That at the time her plea was recorded, the accused was not fully cognizant of the ingredients of the offence is clear not only from the fact that previously during her examination u/s 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure she denied having committed the offence, but also from the fact that during her examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Sessions Judge she denied having committed the offence. 8. We, however, find on a consideration of the evidence and the circumstances of the case that they are sufficient to sustain the conviction of the Appellant irrespective of the plea of the accused when the charge was read out and explained to her. Admittedly there was no eye witness to the occurrence and the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. We, however, find on a consideration of the evidence and the circumstances of the case that they are sufficient to sustain the conviction of the Appellant irrespective of the plea of the accused when the charge was read out and explained to her. Admittedly there was no eye witness to the occurrence and the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. The most important circumstance is that when the Appellant?s elder daughter Dasu (p.w. 1) left her house in the evening of the date of occurrence for her aunt?s house, she found that her younger sister, the deceased, was sleeping in the Dhinkisal and her mother was cooking fish. Besides the deceased and the Appellant, there was no other inmate in the house. When p.w. 1 came back a little after she found her younger sister lying dead in a pool of blood and her mother, the Appellant quietly sitting there. That the little child had been murdered admits of no dispute. If at all the Appellant had not committed the murder, her natural conduct would have been to raise an alarm when she discovered her child lying dead in a pool of blood. But we have the testimony of p.w. 1 that she found her mother sitting silently cy the side of the dead child and to her question as to how the child was killed, the Appellant did not give any answer but silently dragged p.w. 1 and took her inside the nearby forest. We further have the evidence of p.w. 1 that while taking her to the forest her mother told her that she was hastening to the forest because she was afraid that her husband on his return might kill her. This conduct on the part of the Appellant cannot at all be consistent with innocence. There is evidence not only of p.w. 1 but also of p.ws. 2 and 3 that throughout the rest of the night of the occurrence, the Appellant was absent from her house. This again is a piece of circumstance which lends considerable weight to the prosecution case. 9. It is then argued unbehalf of the Appellant that p.w. 1 is a child, seven years old, and it would, therefore, be dangerous to base the conviction of the accused on her testimony. This again is a piece of circumstance which lends considerable weight to the prosecution case. 9. It is then argued unbehalf of the Appellant that p.w. 1 is a child, seven years old, and it would, therefore, be dangerous to base the conviction of the accused on her testimony. While judging the value to be given to the evidence of p.w. 1, we are fully conscious of the rule of prudence that it is unsafe to rely on the evidence of a child witness unless it is sufficiently corroborated. In this case corroboration to the evidence of p.w. 1 is afforded by the fact that immediately after the occurrence the Appellant ran away from the house and was throughout the night wandering inside the nearby jungle. That apart when on the following day she was apprehended it was found that the sari she was wearing was stained with blood, which on examination by the Serologist was found to be human blood. The Appellant has not given any explanation for the presence of human blood on her sari. One possibility for the presence of human blood in her sari is that on seeing her child lying dead in a pool of blood, she out of affection would have caught hold of the dead child in her arms. But that is not the explanation given by the Appellant and no such suggestion was made to p.w. 1 during her examination in Court. The evidence of p.w. 1 is clear and straightforward and there is nothing therein to suggest that she had been tutored to say what she had deposed in Court. On careful consideration of the evidence and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied beyond any doubt that it is the Appellant who has actually killed her younger daughter, the deceased. 10. The prosecution has not suggested that the Appellant could have had any motive to murder the child. But where, as in this case, it is established that the accused has committed the murder, the plea of absence of motive is of no consequence. It is argued that if at all the Appellant committed the murder, she must have done it in a fit of insanity, but on this point there is no evidence. P.ws. 2 and 3 who are her co-villagers have deposed that the Appellant was never found to be insane. It is argued that if at all the Appellant committed the murder, she must have done it in a fit of insanity, but on this point there is no evidence. P.ws. 2 and 3 who are her co-villagers have deposed that the Appellant was never found to be insane. The Chief Medical Officer (p.w. 4) who examined the Appellant in the jail found her mental condition to be normal. It is true that the mental condition that is material is what it was at the time of the commission of the offence and the onus to prove that at the time the offence was committed, the accused by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what she was doing was either wrong or contrary to law is on the accused. The fact that immediately after the occurrence the Appellant absconded from the house indicates that she was fully a ware of the nature of the act committed by her and being afraid that her husband might harm her on that account, she went away from the house. These circumstances, belie the suggestion that the Appellant must have committed the crime in a fit of insanity. The benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is, consequently, not available to the Appellant. Legally, therefore, we cannot interfere either with the conviction of the Appellant u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code or with the sentence imposed on her. 11. It is true that we are unable to discover any motive for a mother as the Appellant is to kill her infant child, but this is a circumstance, which the State Government, if they so choose, may take into consideration while dealing with the case of this Appellant under Article 161 of the Constitution. 12. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed. S. Acharya J. 13. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed