JUDGMENT : B.K. Ray, J. - Plaintiff is the Appellant in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit properties described in Schedules A and B of the plaint. 2. The case of the Plaintiff is stated below : The suit properties originally belonged to Somenath who died leaving behind him two sons Sukru and Satyabadi. On the death of Sukru, his widow Ahalya remarried Satyabadi and Satyabadi possessed all the properties in suit. Plaintiff is the daughter of Satyabadi through his first wife Maya who had been driven out by Satyabadi when Plaintiff was an infant. Maya, after she was driven out by Satyabadi remarried another. Satyabadi died twenty years prior to the suit. On the death of Satyabadi, Ahalya possessed the suit properties till she died in 1965. On Ahalya?s death, Plaintiff succeeded to the suit properties left by Satyabadi. After Ahalya?s death, when the Plaintiff went to possess the suit properties, the Defendants prevented her on a false plea that Defendant No. 1 was the adopted son of Satyabadi and that Defendant No. 8 got a portion of the suit properties under a gift. The,deeds of gift and adoption set up by the Defendants ate forged ones. Further, Defendant No. 1 taking advantage of his relationship with Ahlya got some documents from her in favour of his (Defendant No. 1) wife (Defendant No. 4) and his (Defendant No. 1) minor sons (Defendant Nos. 5 and 6). Under these documents, an area of 13.74 acres of suit lands are alleged to have been sold by Ahalya to Defendant Nos. 4 to 6. With these allegations the Plaintiff instituted the suit for the aforesaid reliefs. 3. Defendant No. 7 remained ex parte. The other Defendants filed three different written statements even though their defence is common., The defence taken by these Defendants is as follows : Satyabadi had only one wife. viz. Ahalya. The Plaintiff is not the daughter of Satyabadi. Defendant No. 1 is the adopted son of Satyabadi and Ahalya. On 12-8-1938 Satyabadi and Ahalya executed a document acknowledging Defendant No. 1?s adoption. On the death of Satyabadi, Defendant No. 1 as his adopted son possessed all the properties in suit left by Satyabadi. viz. Ahalya. The Plaintiff is not the daughter of Satyabadi. Defendant No. 1 is the adopted son of Satyabadi and Ahalya. On 12-8-1938 Satyabadi and Ahalya executed a document acknowledging Defendant No. 1?s adoption. On the death of Satyabadi, Defendant No. 1 as his adopted son possessed all the properties in suit left by Satyabadi. On the very same day, when the deed acknowledging the adoption was executed, Satyabadi out of his own free will by a gift deed, gifted away 11.24 acres of suit lands in favour of Defendant No. 8 who, as a donee under the gift, is possessing the properties covered by it. For necessity, Ahalya and Defendant No. 1 sold 13.74 acres out of the suit lands, to Defendant Nos. 4 to 6 for Rs. 6, 000/- by a registered sale deed dated 10-8-1964 and since then Defendant Nos. 4 to 6 are in possession of? the lands purchased by them. Satyabadi and Ahalya surrendered suit plot Nos. 896 and 897/993 to the Lambardar on 16-1-1927. After the surrender, the Lambardar leased out the plots to the father of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 by executing a patta. Since the date of the patta, the father of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are in possession of the same. Thereafter, plot No. 681 was transferred to Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 who have been recorded in respect of the same. Defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 7 have perfected their title to plot Nos. 681, 896 and 897/993 by possessing them peacefully and continuously for more than the statutory period. 4. The trial Court has found that the Plaintiff is the daughter of Satyabadi through his first wife, Maya. P.ws. 1 to 4 have supported the Plaintiff?s case on this point. D.ws. 2 and 7, have also admitted the Plaintiff to be the daughter of Satyabadi through a wife other than Ahalya. Learned Counsel for Defendants in the trial Court conceded as appears from the impugned judgment that Plaintiff is the daughter of Satyabadi. The Respondents before me also do not challenge the Plaintiff?s status as the daughter/of Satyabadi. Hence, I accept the finding of the trial Court that Plaintiff is the daughter of Satyabadi through his wife, Maya. 5. The learned Subordinate Judge has also found that Defendant No. 1 is the adopted son of Satyabadi and Ahalya. The Respondents before me also do not challenge the Plaintiff?s status as the daughter/of Satyabadi. Hence, I accept the finding of the trial Court that Plaintiff is the daughter of Satyabadi through his wife, Maya. 5. The learned Subordinate Judge has also found that Defendant No. 1 is the adopted son of Satyabadi and Ahalya. In support of the case of adoption, there is the oral evidence of d.ws. 1 to 3, 7, 8 and 10 who testify that about 28 years before they deposed in the case, Satyabadi and Ahalya adopted Defendant No. 1. They speak about the details of the adoption ceremony. They further say that after adoption Satyabadi and Ahalya executed a deed of adoption (Ex. A). D.w. 1 is the scribe of this document. D.w. 7 is a witness to the deed of adoption. D.w. 10 who is the natural mother of Defendant No. 1; d.w. 6, the Nariha of the village, d.w. 9, father-in-law of Defendant No. 1; d.w. 2 for Defendant No. 8, the husband of Satyabadi?s sister and d.w. 1 for Defendant Nos. 2 and 8, the natural brother of Defendant No. 1 also support the case of adoption of Defendant No. 1 by Satyabadi. Besides the aforesaid oral evidence, voluminous documentary evidence, such as, deed of adoption (Ex. A), gift deed (Ext. 1/A) executed by Satyabadi and Ahalya, sale deeds (Exs. B to F), mutation entries (Exs. Hand J) and entry in a rent receipt back (Ex. K) corroborate the oral evidence of adoption. The Plaintiff on her side has only adduced oral evidence of negative character against the story of adoption. In addition to this, she has relied up an the electoral roll of 1966 (Ex. 1) in which Defendant No. 1 is described as the son,of his natural father. The entry in this document has been found to be incorrect by the trial Court for goad reasons. After weighing the evidence an either side, I am satisfied that Defendant No. 1 has been able to prove his case of adoption and hence I agree with the finding of the trial Court on this point. 6. The trial Court has further held that Ex.A/1 is a valid and genuine document and Defendant No. 8 has acquired good title to the properties covered by it. The evidence led in support of Ex. 6. The trial Court has further held that Ex.A/1 is a valid and genuine document and Defendant No. 8 has acquired good title to the properties covered by it. The evidence led in support of Ex. A/I has been thoroughly discussed by the trial Court which has given good reasons far its acceptance. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the trial Court that Ex. A/I is a valid document and has conveyed title to Defendant No. 8. 7. The learned Subordinate Judge has found that the sale deed (Ex. F) executed by Ahalya and Defendant No. 1 in favour of Defendant Nos. 4 to 6 is collusive and with aut consideration and that there was no surrender of any of the suit plots as alleged by the Defendants. But unless the Plaintiff-Appellant succeeds in showing that she has an interest in the properties in suit, she cannot get a declaration that the said transfer and surrender are not binding on her, even assuming that the findings of the trial Court regarding the sale and surrender are not correct. Confronted with this position Mr. S.C. Mahapatra, learned Counsel for Appellant argues that assuming that Defendant No. 1 is the adopted son of Satyabadi, after Satyabadi?s death subsequent to the introduction of the Hindu Women?s Right to Property Act, the properties left by Satyabadi would devolve bath an Defendant No. 1 and Ahalya, each having Rs. -/8/- interest therein. Ahalya being in possession of her interest in the properties on the date of commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, u/s 14 of the Act, she became the absolute owner of her interest in the properties of Satyabadi. Ahalya died in 1965, and hence her Rs. -/8/- interest in the suit properties would devolve both upon Defendant No. 1 and the Plaintiff, who is the daughter of Satyabadi. According to Mr. Mohapatra, u/s 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve firstly upon sons and daughters and the husband. Since the Plaintiff is a daughter, she is entitled to half of the interest of Ahalya in the properties of Satyabadi. The word ?daughter? used in Section 15(1)(a) of the Act, according to Mr. Mohapatra, includes a step-daughter and since the Plaintiff is admittedly a step-daughter, she would succeed along with Defendant No. 1 to the interest of Ahalya in the suit properties. Mr. The word ?daughter? used in Section 15(1)(a) of the Act, according to Mr. Mohapatra, includes a step-daughter and since the Plaintiff is admittedly a step-daughter, she would succeed along with Defendant No. 1 to the interest of Ahalya in the suit properties. Mr. Mohapatra invites my attention to Section 15(2)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act where it has been provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), any, property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased not upon other heirs referred to in Sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father. According to Mr. Mohapatra. by use of the expression ?of the deceased? just after the expression ?any son or daughter? in Section 15(2)(3) of the Hindu Succession Act, the Legislature intends that ?sons and daughters? mentioned in this provision must be born of the body of the female Hindu. ?Mr. Mohapatra then urges that absence of the expression ?of the deceased? after the expression ?sons and daughters? used in Section 15(1)(a) is significant and intentional. By omitting the expression ?of the deceased? in Section 15(1)(a), the Legislature intends to include a son and a daughter of the husband of the female Hindu within the meaning of the expression ?son and daughter?. Therefore, though the Plaintiff is the step daughter of Ahalya she being the daughter of Satyabadi would succeed to Ahalya?s interest in the suit properties along with Defendant No. 1. For this proposition, reliance is placed on a decision reported in Ram Katori v. Prakashwati 1968 All, Law Journal 484. That decision clearly supports Mr. Mohapatra. The following passage from the judgment of that decision may be quoted here: The words used in Section 15(1)(a) are ?sons add daughters? and not ?son or daughter of the deceased?. The legislature has obviously made this distinction to bring all the children of the deceased husband of the female Hindu within the ambit of the rule laid down in Section 15(1)(a). It could be said that the expression ?son and daughters? as used in Section 15(1)(a) does not refer only to the sons and daughters of a female Hindu dying intestate but also includes the sons and daughters of her deceased husband. The legislature by deleting the words ?of the deceased? It could be said that the expression ?son and daughters? as used in Section 15(1)(a) does not refer only to the sons and daughters of a female Hindu dying intestate but also includes the sons and daughters of her deceased husband. The legislature by deleting the words ?of the deceased? in Section 15(1)(a) has protected the interest of the children of the husband of a Hindu female dying intestate, particularly in those cases where the female had inherited the property from her husband and not from her father or mother. If that had not been so, the rule would have been patently unfair to the children of the husband of the Hindu female from his predeceased wife or even a co-wife. Construing the expression ?sons and daughters? in Section 15(1)(a) in view of the corresponding words used in Section 15(2) Clauses (a) and (b) the conclusion is irresistible that the sons and daughters as indicated in Section 15(1)(a) would also include the children of the husband by a pre-deceased wife and consequently the Plaintiff Ram Katori would have a half share in the property which initially belonged to her father and which had been inherited from the Plaintiff?s father by Ram Kali. After the death of "Ram Kali and Plaintiff has an equal share in the property in dispute along with Prakashwati. To me, it appears that the said decision does not represent the correct position in law. The use of the expression ?of the deceased? in Section 15(2)(a) and (b) is only to obviate the confusion that might result in the absence of that expression. If the expression ?of the deceased? would not have been there, the expression ?in the absence of any son or daughter? might mean in the absence of any son or daughter of the father or mother or husband of the female. Hindu dying intestate. In my view, the expression ?of the deceased? has been used for the above purpose and by deleting the expression in Section 15(1)(a), the legislature never meant to protect the interest of the children of the husband of the female Hindu dying intestate as indicated in the above decision. While dealing with a case of a step-son u/s 15(1)(a), it has been clearly stated in Mulla?s Hindu Law (13th edition) at page 835 that "a step-son is not entitled as a ?son? While dealing with a case of a step-son u/s 15(1)(a), it has been clearly stated in Mulla?s Hindu Law (13th edition) at page 835 that "a step-son is not entitled as a ?son? to inherit to his step-mother as one of the heirs under this entry but can succeed to her property as an heir of her husband under Entry (b) of the sub-section". In Mulla?s Hindu Law referred to above, it has been further said that the rules relating to a ?son? stated above apply mutatis mutandis to the case of a daughter. This is also the view taken by their Lordships of the Mysore High Court in a decision reported in Mallappa v. Shivappa AIR 1962 Mys 140. The following passage appearing in paragraph 8 of the judgment in the aforesaid decision is quoted below: In the absence of any definition or explanation to the effect that the word ?son? would also include a stepson, that word should be given its natural meaning; if so, a son of a deceased female would mean a male issue of ?the body of that deceased female. (It may also include a boy taken in adoption, who, in law, stands on the same footing as a natural son; but, with this question, we are not at present concerned). The position, therefore, is that the Plaintiff who is a son of the stepson of the Defendant No. 4, cannot claim to be a son of the deceased 4th Defendant. As the son of a step-son, he may have the right to succeed u/s 15(1)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, as the heir of the husband of the deceased Defendant No. 4; but, Defendant No. 1 being the son of the deceased Defendant No. 4, has the right to succeed u/s 15(1)(a) and would be the preferential heir. Their Lordships have also relied upon the passage quoted above from Mulla?s Hindu Law. 8. In my view, therefore, the words ?the sons and daughters? used in Section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act do not include a step-son or a step-daughter. Hence, the point raised by Mr. Mohapatra has no substance. 9. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed