( 1 ) THE petitioners who own. certain lands in Ranebennur taluka of the dharwar district, have challenged in these writ petitions notifications issue by the Stats Government on 4th Septembr, 1969 and 8th September, 1970 produced in the cases as Exts. 'a' and F' respectively issued under the Mysore Industrial Area Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), in so far as they pertain to acquisition of petitioners' lands. They have also prayed for the quashing of the communication from the assistant Commissioner, Haveri Sub-Division, Haveri produced in the cases as Ext. 'h', wherein it is stated that fresh proceedings will be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Act for awarding compensation to the owners whose lands have been acquired under the impugned notifications. ( 2 ) THE first contention of Shri S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, is that the acquisition of the 'petitioners' lands by the impugned notifications under the Act is fraud on power. It was submitted that the acquisition of about 700 acres of land belonging to different persons under the impugned notifications was solely for the purpose of providing land for M/s. Harihar Poly-fibres and not for achieving any of the purposes of the Act. It was submitted that if land is required for an ordinary company for the purpose of establishing its own, industry in a particular place, the ordinary provisions of the Land Acquisition Act could have been invoked. It was submitted that whereas under the ordinary provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, possession of the land could be taken only after the award is made and the amount is tendered, under the Act the authorities are empowered to take possession even before the compensation amount is determined and the same is tendered to the citizens whose lands are acquired. ( 3 ) THE learned Advocate General, at the outset, took the stand that the petitioners, being guilty of laches and acquiescence, should not be permitted to assail the acquisition made under the impugned notifications. The notification under S. 28 (1) of the Act was published in the Gazetta of 4th September, 1969 and the notification under S,28 (4) of the Act was published in the Gazette of 8th September, 1970. These writ petitions were filed by the petitioners in April, 1972. The notification under S. 28 (1) of the Act was published in the Gazetta of 4th September, 1969 and the notification under S,28 (4) of the Act was published in the Gazette of 8th September, 1970. These writ petitions were filed by the petitioners in April, 1972. It is also clear from the pleadings that even before the final notification was issued under S. 28 (4) of the Act, the petitioners did deliver possession of the lands some time in June, 1969. It is not possible to draw any inference that the delivery of possession of the lands by the petitioners and others in June, 1969 was a result of either undue influence or coercion or force. This is, therefore, a case where the petitioners, after the law was set into motion, voluntarily delivered possession of the respective lands. It is stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the administrative Officer of the Mysore Industrial Areas Devlpt. Board, Bangalore that after the lands were vested in the Board and were made over to M/s. Harihar Polyfibres, erection of the industrial unit commenced to the knowledge of the petitioners, involving huge expenditure. As already mentioned, the writ petitions were filed some time in April, 1972, whereas the notification was issued under S. 28 (4) of the Act in September, 1970. These circumstances, in my opinion, justify the contention of the learned- advocate General that the petitioners are guilty of laches and acquiescence. ( 4 ) EVEN on merits, I find it difficult to accede to the contention of shri Venkataranga lyengar, taht there has been a fraud on power. S. 28 (1) of the Act provides that if at any time, in the opinion of the State government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act, the State government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land. After giving notice as provided by law and considering the objections, the State Government is empowered by sub-sec. (4) of S. 28 to make a declaration to the effect that the lands are needed for acquisition as notified in the notification issued under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 28. Sub- sec. (5) of S. 28 provides that on the publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration under sub-sec. (4) of S. 28 to make a declaration to the effect that the lands are needed for acquisition as notified in the notification issued under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 28. Sub- sec. (5) of S. 28 provides that on the publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration under sub-sec. (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the state: Government free from all encumbrances. Sub-sec. (8) of S. 28 provides that where the land has been acquired for the Board, after it has taken possession of the land, it may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired. It is clear from sub-sec. (1) of S. 28 that under the Act land could be acquired either for the purpose of development by the Board or for any other purpose in furtherance of the object of the Act. The object of the Act can be gathered from the preamble to the Act, which reads as follows :" An Act to make special provision for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Mysore and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Areas Development Board for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid. "the expression 'industrial area' has been defined in S. 2 (6) of the Act to mean any area, declared to be an industrial area by the State Government by notification which is to be developed and where industries are to be accommodated; and includes, an industrial estate. Sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 2 defines 'industrial estate' to mean any site selected by the State Government where factories and other buildings are built for use by any industries or class of industries. It is, therefore, clear that lands could be acquired under the Act for development of industrial area, which expression itself includes an industrial estate, as defined in sub-sec. (7) of S. 2 of the act. It is not disputed that in these cases the State Government has issued a notification declaring the area where the lands acquired are situate, as an industrial area. It is also not disputed that the lands acquired were given to M/s. Harihar Polyfibres for the purpose of establishing an industry and that in fact an industry has been established. It is not disputed that in these cases the State Government has issued a notification declaring the area where the lands acquired are situate, as an industrial area. It is also not disputed that the lands acquired were given to M/s. Harihar Polyfibres for the purpose of establishing an industry and that in fact an industry has been established. Prima facie, therefore, the purpose for which the lands were acquired fall within the object of the Act. ( 5 ) BUT, it was contended by Shri Venkataranga Iyengar that the real object of acquisition of lands is not the development of an industrial area under the Act but to benefit M/s. Harihar Polyfibres. Shri Venkataranga Iyengar wants me to draw such an inference mainly from two circumstances. The first circumstance pressed into service is the admitted fact that even before the notification was issued under S. 28 (1) of the Act, the Mysore Industrial Areas Development Board, Bangalore constituted under the Act had received large amounts from M/s. Harihar Polyfibres towards the cost of providing the lands for the establishment of their industry. The second circumstance pressed into service is the fact that the entire area acquired which consists of nearly 700 acres has been given to m/s. Harihar Polyfibres and not to any other industry. The learned advocate General, relying upon S. 21 of the Act, contended that the Board did not commit any impropriety or illegality in receiving large amounts from m/s. Harihar Polyfibres towards the cost of the land. Sec. 21 of the Act provides that the Board may accept deposits on such conditions as it deems fit from perrons, institutions or authorities to whom allotment or lease or sale of lands, buildings or sheds is made or is likely to be made in furtherance of the objects of the Act. S. 21 of the Act clearly empowers the Board to receive deposits in advance in contemplation of allotment of lands to any person, institution or authorities. It cannot, therefore, be said that any adverse inference is required to be drawn against the State or the Eoavd on the ground that- large amounts were received from M/s. Harihar Polyfibres towards the cost of the land to be allotted to them. It cannot, therefore, be said that any adverse inference is required to be drawn against the State or the Eoavd on the ground that- large amounts were received from M/s. Harihar Polyfibres towards the cost of the land to be allotted to them. As a corollary, it also follows that even before initial starts are taken for acquisition of land for the purpose of the Act, negotiations could be made with persons, institutions or authorities who may be in need of land for establishing industries. As long as the acquisition of the land is for the purpose of the Act, that negotiations were made with individuals concerned before taking steps for acquisition under the Act cannot, by itself, be regarded as a circumstance justifying an inference that there has been a fraud on power. The essential question to be determined is, as to whether the acquisition is really for the purpose of the Act or it is only a camouflage for achieving some other object. As already mentioned, a notification was issued by the State government declaring the area in question as an industrial area. The lands were acquired for the purpose of establishing an industry. The expression 'industrial estate' means any site selected by the State Government where factories and other buildings are built for use by any industries or class of industries. Even if in a particular place, a single industry is established, the same would answer the definition of the expression 'industrial estate', as defined in S. 2 (7) of the act. The preamble itself clearly states that one of the objects of the Act is to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries in industrial areas. If, therefore, the lands in question were acquired for the purpose of establishing an industry by Mis. Harihar Polynbres with a view to secure a planned and orderly development of industries in that particular area, it cannot, be said that the action taken for acquisition of the lands amounts to fraud on power. ( 6 ) SHRI Venkataranga Iyengar relied upon the decision of the Supreme court in Ramtanu C. H. Society v. State cf Maharashtra, AIR. 1970 SC. 1771. ( 6 ) SHRI Venkataranga Iyengar relied upon the decision of the Supreme court in Ramtanu C. H. Society v. State cf Maharashtra, AIR. 1970 SC. 1771. I may quote bere with advantage paragraph 21 of the judgment, on which reliance was placed :" Coursel on behalf of the petitioners contended that there was procedural discrimination between the Land acquisition Act and the Act in the present case. It was said that there was a special procedure designated by the Land Acquisition act of acquisition of land for companies whereas in the present case the State was acquiring land for companies without adopting the procedure of the Land Acquisition Act. It is to be remembered that the Act in the present case is a special one having the specific and special purpose of growth, development and organisation of indusrties in the State of Maharashtra,. The Act has its own procedure and there is no provision in the Act for acquisition of land for a company as in the case of Land Acquisition Act. In the present case, acquisition under the Act is for the purpose of development of Industrial estates or industrial areas by the Corporation or any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. The policy underlying the Act is not acquisition of land for any company but for the one and only purpose of development, organisation and growth of industrial estates and industrial areas. The Act is designed to have a planned industrial city as opposed to haphazard growth of industrial areas in all parts of the State. The Act is intended to prevent growth of industries in the developed parts of the State. Industries are therefore to be set up in the developing or new parts of the State where new industrial towns will be brought into existence. The object of the Act is to carve out planned areas for industries. On one side there will be engineering industries and on the other there will be chemical industries. . There will be localisation of industries with the result that the residents and, dwellers of towns and cities will not suffer either from the polluted air or abnoxious chemicals of industries or the dense growth of industries and industrial population, with and near about the residential areas. . There will be localisation of industries with the result that the residents and, dwellers of towns and cities will not suffer either from the polluted air or abnoxious chemicals of industries or the dense growth of industries and industrial population, with and near about the residential areas. The Land Acquisition Act is a general Act and that is why there is specific provision for acquisition of land by the State for public purpose and acquisition of land by the State for companies. The present act on the other hand is designed for the sole purpose of development of industrial areas and industrial estates and growth and development of industries within the State. Industrial undertakings or person who are engaged in industries all become entitled to the facilities on such industrial growth. Under the Land Acquisition Act acquisition is at the instance of and for the benefit of a company whereas under the present Act acquisition is solely by the State for public purpose. The two Acts are dissimilar in situations and circumstances. "the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Maharashtra Industrial development Act, 1961, which, in many respects, is similar to the Act with which we are concerned. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have emphasized that under the Industrial Development Act, the policy underlying is not acquisition of land for any company, but for the one and only purpose of development, organisation and growth of industrial estates and industrial areas. If acquisition of land is made under the Act for the purpose of development, organisation and growth of industrial estates and industrial areas, the fact that a single industry belonging to a single company or institution was established in a particular area does not mean that the acquisition of the land was for the particular individual or institution, and not for the purpose of development, organisation and growth of indus- trial estates and industrial areas. On the facts, I have no hesitation incoming to the conclusion that the lands in question were acquired for the purpose of development, organisation and growth of industrial estates and industrial areas in the area in question and not for a particular company. As the acquisition of the lands is for the purpose of the Act, I do not find it possible to accede to the contention of Shri Venkataranga, Iyengar that there has been fraud on power. As the acquisition of the lands is for the purpose of the Act, I do not find it possible to accede to the contention of Shri Venkataranga, Iyengar that there has been fraud on power. ( 7 ) THE next contention of Shri Venkataranga Iyengar is that the assistant Commissioner, Haveri Sub-Division, Haveri had no jurisdiction to direct, by his order Ext. 'h' dt. 17-6-71 that fresh proceedings for determination of compensation should be conducted in, accordance with the act. It was. contended that the Assistant Commissioner has determined and fixed compensation as per his award dated 31-12-1970 produced in the case as Ext. 'g'. The determination of compensation under the Act is regulated by S. 29 of the Act. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 29 provides that where any land is acquired by the State Government under Chapter VII of the act, the State Government shall pay for such acquisition compensation in, accordance with the provisions of the Act. Sub-sec. (2) provides that where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement. Sub-sec. (3) provides that where no such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid. Sub-sec. (4) provides that on receipt of a reference under sub-sec. (3), the Deputy Commissioner shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested therein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land. S. 30 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respect of lands acquired under Chapter VII. The award dated 31-12-1970, it was contended, must be regarded as an agreement between the State Government and the persons whose lands are acquired under sub-section (2) of s. 29 of the Act. If compensation is determined by agreement, as provided by sub-sec. The award dated 31-12-1970, it was contended, must be regarded as an agreement between the State Government and the persons whose lands are acquired under sub-section (2) of s. 29 of the Act. If compensation is determined by agreement, as provided by sub-sec. (2) of S. 29, it was asserted that the question of taking further steps for determining the compensation under the Act would not arise in this case. The very award was challenged in this Court by some other person whose lands were similarly acquired. This Court in the judgment rendered in Jeevanbhat Narayan Bhat Ugarad v. Deputy Commissioner, WP. 2052 of 1071 dt. 8-9-71. held that the aforesaid award cannot be regarded as an agreement between the State Government and the persons to be compensated. In view of the said decision of this Court, it is not possible to accede to the contention of Shri Venkataranga Iyengar that I should regard the award in question as one falling under sub-sec. (2) of S. 29 of the Act. ( 8 ) IT was alternatively contended that the award should be regarded as one falling under sub-sec. (3) of S. 29 of the Act. Sub-sec. (3) provides that where no agreement is reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid. The reading of the award does give an impression that the Assistant Commissioner did proceed to determine compensation. But, the Assistant Commiesioner himself states in the award that he has made the same in exercise of the powers of the State Government under sub-sec, (2) of S. 29 of the Act delegated to him. It is, therefore, clear that the Assistant Commissioner himself does not proceed to, make an award under sub-sec, (3) of S. 29 of the act. Besides, the award under S. 29 (3) could be made only when there is a failure to reach the agreement and the State Government refers the case to the Deputy Commissioner. It is, no doubt, true that under Rule 14 of the Mysore Industrial Areas Development Rules, 1966, the State government has delegated its powers under sub-sees. (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) of S. 28 and sub-sees. It is, no doubt, true that under Rule 14 of the Mysore Industrial Areas Development Rules, 1966, the State government has delegated its powers under sub-sees. (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) of S. 28 and sub-sees. (1), (2) and (3) of S. 29 to the Assistant commissioner in charge of the revenue sub-division. As a result of delegation of power under the aforesaid rule, the Assistant Commissioner gets power under sub-sec. (3) of S. 29 to refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determining the amount of compensation in the event of there being a failure to reach an agreement between the parties in regard to the compensation to be paid to the lands acquired. The Assistant Commissioner, it is obvious, could not have himself proceeded to determine compensation under sub-sec. (3) of S. 29 of the Act. In the event of failure to reach an agreement, all that the Assistant Commissioner could have done, in exercise of the; delegated powers, is to refer the case to the Deputy commissioner for determination of compensation. The Assistant Commissioner has not made any such reference in this case. It is only on a reference made by the Assistant Commissioner that the Deputy commissioner could determine compensation after following the procedure prescribed by sub-sec. (4) of S. 29 of the Act. It is, therefore, not possible to treat the so called award dated 31-12-1970 as an award made under sub-sec. (3) of S. 29 of the Act. ( 9 ) IT was submitted by Shri Venkataranga lyengar that the award dated 31-12-1970 was made by one Shri Adhip Chaudhuri, the Assistant commissioner, Haveri Sub-Division, Haveri. It is his successor Shri D. S. Jainar as Assistant Commissioner of Haveri Sub-Division that made the order as per Ext. 'h' to the effect that fresh proceedings will have to be taken in consonance with the provisions of the Act for determining compensation reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in deokinandan Prashar v. Agra Dist. Co-op. Bank, AIR 1972 SC 2497 . that a quasi judicial order passed by a statutory authority in exercise of its jurisdiction was not liable to be simply withdrawn by an officer who succeeds him. This is not a case of the successor withdrawing an order made by his predecessor. Co-op. Bank, AIR 1972 SC 2497 . that a quasi judicial order passed by a statutory authority in exercise of its jurisdiction was not liable to be simply withdrawn by an officer who succeeds him. This is not a case of the successor withdrawing an order made by his predecessor. As already mentioned, this Court has come to the conclusion that the award in question dated 31-12-1970 cannot be regarded as an agreement under S. 29 (2) of the Act. . The award itself does not purport to be one under sub-sec. (3) of S. 29 of the Act, On an examination of the true character of the award, I have come to the conclusion that it cannot be regarded as an award made by the Deputy Commissioner on a reference made to him under sub-sec. (3) of S. 29 of the Act, This is, therefore, a case where no award as such has been made under sub-sec. (3) of s. 29 of the Act. All that the successor Shri D. S. Jainar has done is to take note of the fact that no award has yet been made under the Act and that therefore steps have to be taken to make a proper award in accordance with law. Hence the principle laid down by the Supreme Court cannot at all be invoked in this case. As no determination of compensation under the Act has been made, it is obvious that necessary steps have to be taken in that regard. ( 10 ) I cannot fail to notice the hardship and inconvenience caused to the petitioners and. others whose lands have been acquired, as compensation amount due to them has not yet been determined and paid to them. As already noticed, under the Act the citizen loses possession of the land even brfore the compensation amount is determined and tendered to him. In cases arising under the Act, the State has necessarily to take expeditious steps for determining and payment of compensation to persons whose lands are acquired. The learned Advocate General, having regard to all these circumstances, made a statement that as far as possible, attempts will be made to determine and pay compensation to the petitioners and others similarly situated within about four months from today. The authorities may consider if some ad hoc payments could be made to the petitioners pending final determination of compensation. The learned Advocate General, having regard to all these circumstances, made a statement that as far as possible, attempts will be made to determine and pay compensation to the petitioners and others similarly situated within about four months from today. The authorities may consider if some ad hoc payments could be made to the petitioners pending final determination of compensation. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons stated above, these writ petitions fail and are dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .