Ismail, J.-The defendants in O. S. No. 3224 of 1964 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, are the appellants herein. They executed a prcmissarry note, Exhibit A-1 dated 6th April, 1960 for a’ sum of Rs. 5,000 payable with interest at 12 per Cent. per annum in favour of one Peter Manickam (P. W. 1). The said Peter Manickam endorsed the promissory note in favour of the respondent herein on 10th September, 1964 as evidenced by Exhibit A-2. It is on the basis of this endorsement, the respondent herein instituted the suit against the appellants for recovery of Rs. 6,800 made up of the principal of Rs. 5,000 and interest of Rs. 1,800 due under the promissory note, but prayed for a decree only against the first appellant — first defendant. In his written statement, the first appellant contended that the respondent herein was not a holder in due course under law, since there was no notice of transfer and that the respondent had knowledge of the partial discharge, of the suit promissory note to the extent of Rs. 3,000 on 7th August 1961 even before the transfer, and that consequently the claim of the respondent for the whole of the suit promirsory note instead of only claiming the balance of Rs. 2,000 was prima facie fraudulent and collusive. He further contended that the respondent who was abetting the original payee in all the transactions knew about all the facts stated above and that the assignment of the suit promissory-note in his favour was not a bona fide transfer and was a fraudulent and collusive One. The second appellant herein filed a separate written statement in which she also contended that the appellants had paid Rs. 3,000 to the original promisee on 7th August, 1961, that the original promisee, as his usual custom did not allow the first appellant to endorse the payment of this sum of Rs. 3,000 paid towards the principal amount under the suit promissory note and the same was ignored, that the original promisee has not given due credit for this payment of Rs. 3,000 and had fraudulently transferred the suit promissory note in favour of the respondent and that to a notice sent to the original promisee demanding him to give credit for the same,, there was no reply. 3,000 and had fraudulently transferred the suit promissory note in favour of the respondent and that to a notice sent to the original promisee demanding him to give credit for the same,, there was no reply. The further case of the second appellant was that the respondent was not a holder in due course and that the assignment of the suit promissory note in his favour was not bona fide, as it was vitiated by fraud and that there was also no notice of assignment or demand from the respondent to the appellants herein. 2. The learned VII Assistant Judge, who tried the suit, framed the following issues: (1) whether the plaintiff is not a bona fide holder in due course? (2) whether the principal amount of the suit promissory note was partially discharged by the defendant by payment of Rs. 3,000 on 7th August, 1961 apart from payment of interest upto 27th September, 1961 to the original payee? (3) Is the suit liable to be dismissed against the 2nd defendant? (4) To what amount if any the plaintiff is entitled? 3. On issue No. 2, the learned VII Assistant Judge accepted the case of the appellants herein that a sum of Rs. 3,000 was paid by the first appellant to the original payee, namely, P.W. 1, under the promissory note on 7th August, 1961 as evidenced by Exhibit B-5. On issue No. 1, he held that the appellants had not established that the respondent herein was not a bona fide holder in due course. On issue No. 3 he held that the appellants had jointly executed the suit promissory note and were jointly and severally liable and therefore the respondent was entitled to pray for a decree only against the first appellant and that on that ground it could not be held that the suit was liable to be dismissed as against the second appellant. In view of these findings, he decreed the suit as prayed for. Hence, the present appeal by the defendants in the suit. 4. In view of these findings, he decreed the suit as prayed for. Hence, the present appeal by the defendants in the suit. 4. The only point urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the suit promissory note had matured on the date of the endorsement by the original payee in favour of the respondent herein, namely, on 10th September, 1964, that consequently section 59 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, hereinafter referred to as the Act, applied to the facts of this case and that therefore the respondent herein was entitled to claim only the balance of the amount due under the promissory note, after giving credit for the sum of Rs. 3,000 paid by the first appellant to the original payee, and not the full amount for which the promissory note was executed. The factual basis for this contention is Exhibit B-1, dated 6th December, 1961 a notice sent by the Counsel for the original payee, namely, P.W.1, to the first appellant herein demanding payment of the amount due under the promissory note. It is the correctness of this contention that we propose to consider in this appeal. 5. We may immediately mention that the appellants had not established that the respondent herein was aware of the payment of Rs. 3,000 made by the first appellant herein on 7th August, 1961 or of the issue of the notice by the Counsel for P.W.1 to the first appellant on 6th December, 1961 under Exhibit B-1, at the time when he became an endorsee of the suit promissory note, namely on 10th September, 1964. It is against this admitted fact that the question raised will have to be considered. Section 59 of the Act omitting the proviso reads: "The holder of a negotiable instrument, who has acquired it after dishonour, whether by non-acceptance or nonpayment with notice thereof, or after maturity, has only, as against the other parties, the rights thereon of his transferor". A promissory note may be payable either "on demand "or "at a fixed or determinable future time". In the present case, Exhibit A-1, is payable on demand. According to section 22 of the Act, the maturity of a promissory note in the date at which it falls due. A promissory note may be payable either "on demand "or "at a fixed or determinable future time". In the present case, Exhibit A-1, is payable on demand. According to section 22 of the Act, the maturity of a promissory note in the date at which it falls due. In view of this, a Bench of this Court in Nunna Gopalan v. Vuppuluri Lakskminarasamma1, has held, following Glasscock v. Balls2, Harry Van Ingen v. Dhunna Lall Lallah3, and Shaha and Company v. Bengal National Bank Ltd4, that in the case of a promissory note which is payable until demand is made and on the demand being made, it falls due immediately. Basing himself on this legal position and on Exhibit B-1, the learned Counsel for the appellants contended that section 59 of the Act is attracted to the facts of this case and that consequently the respondent herein will have only such rights against the appellants herein as P.W.1, the endorser, who had received a sum of Rs. 3,000 had against the appellants. we have extracted the relevant portion of section 59 already. That section applies only to a holder and does not apply to a holder in due course. Section 118 of the Act deals with certain presumptions and one such presumption is that a holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course (section 118 (g)). According to section 9 of the Act, "Holder in due course" means any person who for consideration became the possessor of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque, if payable to bearer, or the payee or indorsee thereof, if payable to order, before the’ amount mentioned in it became payable, and without having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of the person from whom he derived his title. Admittedly in this case at the time when the respondent herein became an endorsee of the promissory note in question on paying the full amount due thereunder, he had no knowledge of either the notice, Exhibit B-1, or the payment made under Exhibit B-5. In view of this, the question for consideration is, whether the appellants had established, having regard to sections 9 and 118 of the Act, that the respondent herein was not a holder in due course. In view of this, the question for consideration is, whether the appellants had established, having regard to sections 9 and 118 of the Act, that the respondent herein was not a holder in due course. There is absolutely nothing in the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants to establish this case namely, that the respondent herein if not a holder in due course. From the mere fact that there is a notice, Exhibit B-1, issued on behalf of the original payee to the first appellant herein demanding payment of the money due under the promissory note or that the first appellant herein paid a sum of Rs. 3,000 to P.W.1, as evidenced by Exhibit B-5, it cannot be concluded that the respondent herein is not a holder in due course, unless it is further established that the respondent had knowledge of either or both of the facts referred to above. with reference to a promissory not payable on demand, whether a demand for the payment of the same has been actually made or not, will not be apparent on the face on the document and consequently the promissory note cannot be said to be overdue under section 59 of the Act so as to affect the endorsee. 6. In M.L.M. Ramanadan Chettiar v. Gundu Ayyar and others5, the facts were these: Defendant No. 1 therein had executed three promissory notes for Rs. 3,000, Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 500 respectively in favour of the second defendant. The first two notes were executed on succeeding days, 7th July, 1920 and 8th July, 1920 and the third one on 15th March, 1921. The second defendant endorsed these notes in favour of the appellant-plaintiff in that case. when the appellant-plaintiff demanded payment, the first defendant repudiated his liability. Thereupon the appellant-plaintiff give notices of dishonour to the second defendant and demanded payment of the amount of the notes from him. He also repudiated his liability. The suit instituted by the appellant-plaintiff was resisted by the defendants. The first defendant’s contentions were that the promissory notes were vitiated by fraud, that they were not fully supported by consideration, that even the partial consideration was unlawful and that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course. He also repudiated his liability. The suit instituted by the appellant-plaintiff was resisted by the defendants. The first defendant’s contentions were that the promissory notes were vitiated by fraud, that they were not fully supported by consideration, that even the partial consideration was unlawful and that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course. On the other hand, the second defendant contended that the suit notes were fully supported by consideration; but the transfer of the notes to the plaintiff-appellant was subject to an express condition that the second defendant as endorser must be completely exonerated from any liability to the plaintiff-appellant in respect of the notes transferred to him and hence the claim against him was not sustainable. The trial Court had upheld the first defendant’s plea that the promissory notes were obtained by the second defendant by fraud and the consideration for the said notes were unlawful since the monies were knowingly given for immoral purposes. However it found that the plaintiff-appellant was only a holder, but was not a holder in due course because at the time he became the endorsee of the suit notes, namely, on 5th January, 1923 they were either over due or he was put on enquiry as to the infirmity of the title of his transferor, the second defendant, and if he had made any enquiry, he would have found that those notes were vitiated by fraud. "while considering the claim of the appellant that he was a holder in due course, Phillips, J., observed that when the plaintiff-appellant’s agent was told that the money could not be collected, the notice could certainly be imputed to him that the notes had been dishonoured by non-payment and that the plaintiff knew that a demand for payment had been made and if a demand for payment had been made, the notes became overdue. On this finding, the learned Judge held: "Under section 59, therefore, whether we take it that the notes had been dishonoured or that they had matured, the plaintiff can only obtain the rights therein of his transferor, Defendant No. 2. As found above, Defendant No. 2. On this finding, the learned Judge held: "Under section 59, therefore, whether we take it that the notes had been dishonoured or that they had matured, the plaintiff can only obtain the rights therein of his transferor, Defendant No. 2. As found above, Defendant No. 2. having obtained the notes by fraud and for an unlawful consideration, has no rights at all against Defendant 1 and consequently the plaintiff has also no right." Thiruvenkatachariar, J., has observed: "The view that the bona fide holder for value of a promissory note payable on demand, cannot be affected by any previous demand for payment of which he had no notice seems to me to be warranted by section 59 of the Act". Referring to the decision in Glasscock v. Balls1, in which Lord Esher, M.R. had held: "If a negotiable instrument remains current, even though it has been paid, there is nothing to prevent a person to whom it has been endorsed for value without knowledge that it has been paid, from suing". the learned Judge concluded: "If the actual payment in discharge of the note cannot be set up against such a holder much less can a demand for payment which was not honoured, be set up". It was also the conclusion of the learned Judge that if the promissory note was not tainted with illegality, the transferee would also have the benefit of the presumption raised in section 118 (d) that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity: 7. A single Judge of this Court (Pandrang Row, J.) in Alluri Venkataratnam v. Alluri Kanakasundara Rao and another2, held: "The law is very clear that where an endorsee of a promissory note payable on demand is not aware that the promissory note has been discharged or that any demand was made he must be deemed to be a holder in due course even if as a matter of fact the endorsement in hi- favour was made after the discharge". We are in entire agreement with this conclusion. 8. In view of the above legal position, it must be held that the right of the respondent herein to sue on the promissory note and recover the full amount due thereunder cannot be said to have been affected by section 59 of the Act. 9. We are in entire agreement with this conclusion. 8. In view of the above legal position, it must be held that the right of the respondent herein to sue on the promissory note and recover the full amount due thereunder cannot be said to have been affected by section 59 of the Act. 9. However, the learned Counsel for the appellants repeatedly contended before us that on 10th September, 1964, when the respondent obtained the promissory note by endorsement, it was long over due, since the promissory note was dated 6th April, 1969. we are unable to accept this argument. It is no doubt true that the second of the endorsements of payment of interest has been made on 27th September, 1961, as evidenced by Exhibit A-1 (b) and the respondent himself obtained the promissory note by endorsement on 10th September, 1964, namely, just 17 days before the suit thereon would have been barred by limitation. But we are unable to hold that this alone will make the respondent herein as a person, not a holder in due course. As pointed out by Thiruvenkatachariar, J., in the judgment referred to already: “If nothing more appears than that the instrument has been left outstanding for a pretty long period it cannot be concluded from that alone that the instrument had become payable when it was endorsed over to the holder as a promissory note payable on demand is according to custom and practice treated as a continuing security. For the same reason it cannot be held from that circumstance alone, that the endorsee had sufficient cause to suspect any defect in the title of the endorser”. “We entirely agree with this observation of the learned Judge. 10. The case of the appellants can now be looked at with reference to the payment of Rs. 3,000 as evidenced by Exhibit B-5 dated 7th August, 1961. It is admitted that this payment is not endorsed on the promissory note itself. we have already referred to the contention of the appellants in the written statement that as was usual, P.W. 1 did not allow the first appellant to endorse the payment of Rs. 3,000 made towards the principal amount under the promissory note. However that case has not been made out. we have already referred to the contention of the appellants in the written statement that as was usual, P.W. 1 did not allow the first appellant to endorse the payment of Rs. 3,000 made towards the principal amount under the promissory note. However that case has not been made out. On the other hand, the evidence will show that such a plea is not true.” we have already referred to the case of the appellants that the interest due under the promissory note upto 27th September, 1961, had been paid by the appellants to P.W.1. As a matter of fact, the promissory note, Exhibit A-1, contains two endorsements of payment of interest one dated 28th July, 1961, marked as Exhibit A-1 (a) and the other dated 27th September, 1961, marked as Exhibit A-1 (b). It is significant to note that the payment of Rs. 3,000 towards the principal has been made on 7th August, 1961, namely, after Exhibit A-1 (a) endorsement and before Exhibit A-1 (b) endorsement. Therefore when the first appellant made Exhibit A-1 (b) endorsement on 27th September, 1961, there was nothing to prevent him from making the endorsement of payment of the principal amount of Rs. 3,000 on 7th August, 1961. Therefore, on the face of it, the case of the appellants that P.W.1, did not allow them to endorse the payment of the principal of Rs. 3,000 on 7th August, 1961 is not true. Hence, when the respondent obtained the promissory note, Exhibit A-1, by the endorsement dated 10th September, 1964, as evidenced by Exhibit A-2, the promissory note, apart from containing two endorsements of payment of interest did not contain any endorsement of payment of the principal sum of Rs. 3,000. In such a situation, the question is whether the respondent is prevented from suing on the promissory note for the entire amount due thereunder. Even at the risk of repetition we may point out that it is not established that the respondent had knowledge of this payment of Rs. 3,000. In such a situation, it was held in Annamalai Chettiar v. Maung Saing and another1: “Where the promissory note has no endorsement of any payment and there is nothing to show that the endorsee was aware of any payments to the endorser and he is a holder in due course, he is entitled to recover according to the apparent tenor of the instrument. If the instrument has been discharged, the remedy of the person paying is to sue the original payee to refund the amount which he had to pay over again”. 11. This decision directly applies to the facts of this case. Consequently, if the appellants herein, by not making an endorsement of payment of Rs. 3,000 on the promissory note, enabled P.W.1 to perpetrate a fraud by endorsing the note in favour of the respondent herein, the appellants alone would have to bear the loss. In Nunna Gopalam v. Vuppuluri Lakshminarasamma 1 , to which we have already made reference the facts were the respondent therein executed a promissory note in favour of the second defendant in the suit on 10th December, 1933, but paid the amount due on the promissory note two days later; however the instrument was left in the hands of the payee, who, on the next day endorsed it to the petitioner. The petitioner instituted a suit on the promissory note. The question was, whether the respondent could be made liable or not. This Court held that when the respondent paid the amount due under the promissory note, she should have insisted on its return to her and when she did not do so and left the instrument in the hands of the payee and thus gave him an opportunity to commit a fraud, she must suffer in preference to the petitioner. Similarly, in the present case, when the appellants paid a sum of Rs. 3,000 to P.W.1 on 7th August, 1961 and did not make an endorsement thereof on the note itself and thereby enabled P.W.1 to endorse the note to the respondent herein for full value, they alone must suffer the loss in preference to the respondent herein. After all, it should not be forgotten that even when section 59 of the Act applies to a particular case, it merely provides for the rights of an endorsee being subject to all equities. 12. Under these circumstances, the appeal fails and is dismissed. However having regard to the fact that the appellants had suffered by payment of Rs. 3,000 to P.W.1 and not endorsing the same on Exhibit A-1, we do not make any order as to costs. P.S.P. -------------------- Appeal dismissed.