M. N. De v. B. N. Mukherjee — 1973 DIGILAW 221 (CAL)

JUDGMENT A. K. Janah, J. 1. The first appellant Ha very distinguished physician commanding a large practice in Calcutta. In 1964 he decided to donate Rs. 50,000/- to the Calcutta National Medical Institute. There was some discussion between him and the management of the Institute with regard to the terms of the donation. Finally, these terms were set forth in a letter of the Secretary of the Institute to the first appellant dated August 6, 1964. These terms are as follow: (i) A Ward in the medical block of the hospital would be nominated as Dr. M. N. De Block. (ii) The first appellant and his heirs would be entitled to nominate one student possessing qualifications as laid down by the governing body for admission to the Pre-Medical Course of the college. 2. IT is the second term mentioned above which gave rise to a dispute, which occasioned the writ petition out of which this appeal arises. The first appellant nominated the second appellant for admission to the Pre-Medical Course at the college for the academic session 197.2-73. According to the appellants she was qualified for admission according to the Rules in force in 1964 when the donation of Rs. 50,000/- by the first appellant was accepted on behalf of the management of the Institute. The Rules for admission were changed from time to time and in 1972 a new set of administrative instructions, called the West Bengal State Medical and Dental Colleges (Admission of Students) Rules, 1072, came into force. According to the respondents these Rules governed the second appellant's case for admission to the Pre-Medical Course. Under Rule 6(4) The second appellant, as a nominee of a donor, is required to obtain a minimum of 50% marks in the aggregate in the three science subjects Physics, Chemistry and Biology in the Higher Secondary Examination, West Bengal. According to the respondents, as the second appellant had not obtained these marks, she was not qualified for admission to the course. According to the appellants on the other hand, her case for admission is to be determined by the Rules in force in 1964, when the donation was accepted, and under these Rules, qualification for admission to Pre-Medical Course was Higher Secondary (W.B.) or Pre-University (C.U.) in Second Division with Physics, Chemistry and Biology or an examination recognised by the 'Calcutta University as equivalent to it. According to the appellants also the qualification for admission laid down in the Rules in existence in 1964 could not be altered subsequently so as to prejudice or abridge the first appellant's right to nominate a student for admission, which was a condition of the donation Notice should be taken at this stage of certain other events which took place after the first appellant's donation in 1964. In 1967 the Governor of West Bengal promulgated an Ordinance for taking over the control, management and maintenance of the Calcutta National Medical College, together with its hospitals and dispensaries. Subsequently Act XVII of 1967 came into force, replacing the Ordinance. The effect on the Ordinance, and the Act, was that for a period of ten years from June 9. 1967. the Institute stood transferred to the State of West Bengal and was to remain, under the control and management of the State Government under S.3(2) of the Act all deeds of gift, endowment, bequest, etc. covering all properties and assets of the Institute shall be construed as if they were executed in favour of the State Government under S. 3(3) of the Act all contract debts and liabilities of the Institute shall be deemed to be contracts, debts and liabilities of the State Government. Under the provision of the statute therefore the donation is to be deemed to have been made in favour of the State Government. Under the provisions of the Act the College and hospitals are at present under the management of the State Government, According to the appellants the contract between the first appellant and the Institute, relating to the donation has been recognised by the statute, and therefore the respondents are bound by the terms of the donation mentioned earlier in this judgment. 3. The second appellant is the adopted daughter of the daughter of the first appellant. In 1971 the second appellant passed the Higher Secondary Examination of the Board of Secondary Education, West Bengal, securing 565 marks and was placed in the Second Division. The marks secured by the second appellant as set out in paragraph 8 of the petition are 71% in Mathematics, 42% in Physics, 56% in Chemistry and 17% in Biology. In 1971 the second appellant passed the Higher Secondary Examination of the Board of Secondary Education, West Bengal, securing 565 marks and was placed in the Second Division. The marks secured by the second appellant as set out in paragraph 8 of the petition are 71% in Mathematics, 42% in Physics, 56% in Chemistry and 17% in Biology. The respondents applied the 1972 Rules in determining the question of eligibility of the second appellant for admission, and thereupon rejected the first appellant's nomination, on the ground that she had not secured 50% in the aggregate in the three science subjects Physics, Chemistry and Biology, in the Higher Secondary Examination. Aggrieved by this rejection the appellants moved a writ petition and obtained a Rule nisi, which was discharged by a judgment and order dated March 13, 1973, against which this appeal has been preferred. 4. APPEARInG for the appellants Mr. Nani Coomar Chakrobarti raised three points in support of this appeal. The first point urged by him was that the statute having recognised the donation with all its terms, these terms were binding upon the State Government and the appellants' right to nominate a student could not be abridged or altered in violaion of the terms of the donation. The second point urged by Mr. Chakrabarti was that the first appellant's right to nominate was to be governed by the qualifications as laid down by the governing body in 1964, when the donation was made and subsequent alteration by purported rules regarding qualifications would not affect the first appellant's right to make a nomination. The third point urged by Mr. Chakrabarti was that the 1972 Rules were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, in as much as there was discrimination between donor's nominee and nominees of the Central Government. The fourth point to be considered is the contention on behalf of the respondent that the appellants writ petition was not maintainable and no relief could be granted to them on this petition. I now proceed to deal with the contention raised on behalf of the parties. There can be no doubt or dispute on the question whether the first appellant has obtained statutory recognition as a donor. Section 3 (2) of the Act clearly provides that a deed of gift, among other different kinds of deeds shall be construed as if it was executed in favour of the State Government. There can be no doubt or dispute on the question whether the first appellant has obtained statutory recognition as a donor. Section 3 (2) of the Act clearly provides that a deed of gift, among other different kinds of deeds shall be construed as if it was executed in favour of the State Government. The question, however, is whether the 1972 Rules has the effect altering the terms of the donation so as to affect the first appellant's right to nominate a student. 5. IT was argued by counsel for the appellants that the 1972 Rules, which were nothing better than administrative instructions, could not affect the first appellant's statutory right to nominate a student in accordance with the qualifications prescribed by the governing body in 1964. IT was submitted that no statutory Rules had been framed by the State Government in exercise of its powers under section 6 (2) (a) of the Act, and although a statute could take away or modify the first appellant's rights to nominate a student, such rights which had obtained statutory recognition, could not be abridged or modified by administrative orders. IT was conceded by Mr. Chakrabarti that the first appellant's rights could be modified either by the statute or by any Rules framed under it. But, Mr. Chakrabarti contended, that neither the statute nor any Rules framed under it touched the first appellant's rights and, therefore, such rights could not be prejudiced by the administrative instructions called the West Bengal Medical and Dental Colleges (Admission of Students) Rules, 1972. 6. IT seems to me that there is good deal of force in this contention of counsel for the appellants. The first appellant's rights as donor have been recognised by the statute, Which by section 3(2), says that all deeds of gift, endowment etc., shall be construed as if they were executed in favour of the State Government. The contention of counsel for the appellants that the donor's statutory rights cannot be prejudiced or altered by administrative orders must be upheld. But the question in this case is not whether the right to nominate has been altered or prejudiced, but whether the nomination should be made according to the Rules as it stood in 1964, or should be governed by the administrative orders framed in 1972. It is no disputed that the appellant's right to nominate a student for admission has not been denied. It is no disputed that the appellant's right to nominate a student for admission has not been denied. Indeed, upon the rejection of the second appellant as a nominee for admission, the first appellant was called upon to make a fresh nomination. Therefore, it is clear to us that the right to nominate a student for admission, as a donor has neither been denied nor disputed. But what is disputed is the first appellant's right to nominate the second appellant who did not fulfill the requirement of the 1972 Rules, in as much as she did not secure 50% marks in the aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Biology as required by Rule 6(4) (b) of the 1972 Rules. This brings us to the second point urged by Mr. Chakrabarti, namely, that the first appellant's right to nominate was to be governed by the qualifications as laid down by the governing body in 1964, and that the subsequent alteration by the 1972 Rules could not affect the first appellant's rights to nominate the second appellant for admission. This involves construction of the terms in the second paragraph of the Letter of the Honarary Secretary of August 6, 1964, which runs as follows "We further agree that you and your heirs will be entitled to nominate rate student possessing qualifications as laid down by the governing body for admission to the Pre-Medical Course of our college" It was argued by counsel for the appellants that the phrase "qualification as laid down by the governing body should be construed to mean the qualifications as laid down in 1964 and should not be construed to mean qualifications as laid down from time to time by the governing body. He argued that the qualifications laid down in 1964 must he treated to be immutable in character, and did not confer upon the respondents the right to change the qualifications from time to time so far as the 1st appellant's nominees were concerned. In other words, it was contended that the qualifications prescribed for a nominee student of the 1st appellant must to treated to be such as could not be unilaterally altered to the prejudice of the first appellant. Mr. In other words, it was contended that the qualifications prescribed for a nominee student of the 1st appellant must to treated to be such as could not be unilaterally altered to the prejudice of the first appellant. Mr. Chakrabarti repelled a contention of counsel for respondents that if the construction suggested on behalf of the appellants was accepted, it would mean that the qualifications could not be altered even for centuries, by arguing that the right to nominate was confined only to the first appellant and his heirs, and could not be claimed by the heirs of the heirs of the first appellant. In other words, it was argued by Mr. Chakrabarti that the right was a limited right, and was strictly confined to the first appellant and his heir, and could not be claimed by the descendants of the heirs of the first appellant. It seems to me that there is good deal of force in this contention of counsel for the appellants. In our opinion the right to nominate a candidate on behalf of the donor could not be claimed by the descendants of the donor in perpetuity. Quite plainly the right of nomination was conferred upon the first appellant and his heirs, and could not be claimed by the descendants of such heirs. 7. TURNInG now to the question whether the qualification prescribed in 1964, could be altered subsequently, it seems to me that the contention of counsel for the appellants that the governing body could not alter the qualifications and enforce such altered qualification against the donor's nominees cannot be accepted, even though the argument seems to be attractive, for more than one reason. It is to be noticed that the degree M.B.B.S. is a degree of the Calcutta University which can prescribe the minimum qualification for admission to a course of study for that degree. In the event of the University's changing the minimum qualification so as to raise the standard of qualifications, the governing body of the institute would be bound to enforce the amended Rules of the University and all candidates admitted to the Pre-Medical Course, including donor's nominees, must necessarily conform with and Fulfill the minimum qualification prescribed by the University. In that event the first appellant, cannot insist upon his right to nominate a candidate for admission in accordance with the qualifications prescribed by the governing body in 1964. Mr. In that event the first appellant, cannot insist upon his right to nominate a candidate for admission in accordance with the qualifications prescribed by the governing body in 1964. Mr. Chakrabarti very frankly and fairly conceded that in the event of University's changing the minimum qualification, the first appellant could not validly insist upon his rights to nominate a candidate according to the, qualifications prescribed in 1964. On a question of construction, there fore, it cannot be held that the phrase "qualification as laid down by the governing body" should be construed to mean that the qualifications could never be altered, by the governing body so long as the right to nominate a student could be exercised by the first appellant and his heirs. Apart from changing the qualification by statutory provisions or by Rules framed by a statute the University's right to alter the minimum qualification for admission cannot be denied or disputed. The second reason for which the contention on behalf of the appellants on this question cannot be accepted is that the Higher Secondary or Pre-University Courses may be abolished by the Board of Secondary Education and some other courses of studies may be prescribed by the authorities. In such an event which is not an improbability having regard to the manner in which things are moving, it cannot be said that the qualifications prescribed for the session 1964-65 must be adhered to and cannot be altered. The third reason for which the contention of the appellants' counsel cannot be accepted is that the Board of Secondary Education or any other similar authority in India conducting the Higher Secondary Examination, or a similar qualifying examination, may conceivably change the classification of successful candidates from the existing groups of first, second and third division and may classify the successful candidates in new groups such as Grade I, Grade II and Grade III or such as "passed" or "passed with distinction." If any such thing happened it will be impossible for the first appellant to claim his right to nominate candidate according to the qualifications prescribed at the time of the donation, and it will be equally impossible for the respondents to give effect to the terms of the contract. For these reasons, the contention on behalf of the appellants that he terms of the agreement should be treated to be immutable in character and must be given effect to strictly according to its terms cannot be accepted. 8. In support of the contention that the contract between the first appellant and the management of the institution could not be enforced strictly according to the letter of the agreement, counsel for the respondents relied upon a decision of the Judicial Committee (5) George Richards Laffer v. Francis Arnold Guillen A.I.R. (1927) P.C. 275 in which it was held that in construing a deed the court should consider all the surrounding circumstances, the position of the parties to the agreement, its subject- matter and the apparent purpose and object thereof and in particular the provisions to be construed. On the same question reliance was placed on a Special Bench decision of this court reported in A.I.R. (1961) Cal. 578. Our attention was also drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court (7) Khardah Co, Ltd. v. Raymon and Co. (India) Ltd. A.I R. (1962) S.C. 1810 in which it was held that when a contract was reduced to writing the court should look only to that writing for the terms of the agreement between the parties and that it was only what was set out expressly and in so many words in the document that could constitute a term of the contract, and if on a reading of the document as a whole it could be fairly deduced from the words used that the parties had agreed on a particular term, there was nothing in law which prevented them from setting up that term. It was further held that the terms off a contract could be express or implied, and that in construing a contract it would be legitimate to take into account the surrounding circumstances. In my opinion this contention of counsel for the respondents is well founded. It is clear to me that a strict adherence to the letter of the contract was not intended by the parties and could not have been so intended, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances and particularly to the possibility of a change in the minimum qualification by authorities who could make such a change. It is clear to me that a strict adherence to the letter of the contract was not intended by the parties and could not have been so intended, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances and particularly to the possibility of a change in the minimum qualification by authorities who could make such a change. The next question to be considered is whether the appellants are entitled to maintain a writ petition for the relief which they are seeking. It was argued by counsel for the respondents that the rights of the parties were governed and controlled by a written contract, and if the terms of the contract were broken by the refusal of the respondents to accept the nominee of the first appellant, the proper remedy of the appellants was to institute a suit for such relief as they might be entitled to. In other words, it was argued that a writ petition could not be filed for enforcement of the terms of a contract or for any relief to which a party might be entitled for a breach of such terms. In support of this contention counsel for the respondents relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court (12) Smt. Shantabai v. State of Bombay and Ors. A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 532. In that case a landlord had executed a document in favour of his wife granting her right to enter forest areas and cut timber. The document purported to be a lease for 12 years for a consideration. In 1951 the rights of the landlord vested in the State by statutory provision and thereafter the wife was stopped from cutting any timber from the forest. Action was taken against her for unlawful cutting of timber including forfeiture of the timber already cut. An application was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution for setting aside the order of the authority restraining the wife from cutting timber and forfeiting the timber on the ground that it infringed the fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution. It was in these facts that it was held that the petitioner was free to sue the grantor upon the contract and recover damages by way of compensation. It was in these facts that it was held that the petitioner was free to sue the grantor upon the contract and recover damages by way of compensation. It was also held that the State was not a party to the contract and was not bound by its terms and that the contract was purely personal and even if the petitioner thought that the State was bound by the contract, she could enforce the contract in the ordinary way and sue the State if she was so advised and claim damages or compensation. I do not see how this decision is of any assistance to the respondents, as admittedly in that case the State was not a party to the contract which was sought to be enforced. In the instant case now before us on the other hand the State Government had taken upon itself all the obligations of the contract between the parties by the provisions in the Act. Reliance was next placed by counsel for the respondents on another decision of the Supreme Court (10) Lekhraj Sathrandas Lalvani v. N. M. Shah Deputy Custodian cum Managing Director A.I.R. (1966) S.C. 334. In this case the appellant was appointed manager of two firms which vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property for the State of Madras. It was later on decided by the Central Government that the two firms would be sold to the manager and until such sale the manager should continue to function as manager. The sale, however, was not completed and an advertisement was issued for sale of the two firms by public auction. A writ petition was moved by the appellant for an order restraining sale of the firms by public auction and this application was allowed by the Kerala High Court. In the meantime an order was made by which the appellant's management was terminated and possession of the business was taken over from him. On this termination the appellant again filed a writ petition in the Kerala High Court and some of the reliefs prayed for was granted but the relief relating to sale of the business by public auction was refused. On this termination the appellant again filed a writ petition in the Kerala High Court and some of the reliefs prayed for was granted but the relief relating to sale of the business by public auction was refused. The matter ultimately went up to the Supreme Court and it was held that even if the order terminating the management of the appellant was illegal the appellant was not entitled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus, as that writ could be granted only in a case where there was a statutory duty imposed upon an officer concerned and there was a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. It was also observed that the chief function of a writ of mandamus was to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers within the limits of their jurisdiction. It was further observed that a duty or obligation falling upon a public servant within a contract could not be enforced by writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. I do not see how this decision is of any assistance to the respondents in this case as the only question before the Supreme Court in that case was whether an order terminating the management of the appellant under a contract of employment could be enforced by writ proceedings. Our attention was next drawn by counsel for the respondents on another decision of the Supreme Court (1) Banchkanidhi Rath v. The State of Orissa and Ors. A.I.R. (1972) S.C. 843. In that case the Headmaster of a school was retired from service. The school was recognised by true State Government in accordance with the terms of the Education Code and grant-in-aid was given to the institution. The" Headmaster moved a writ petition challenging the order of retirement. It was held that he could not enforce the contract of employment in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution and that if a right was claimed in terms of contract such a right could not he enforced in a writ petition. This decision is again of no assistance to the respondents as the question decided was that an employee could not enforce the terms of a contract by a writ petition. 9. This decision is again of no assistance to the respondents as the question decided was that an employee could not enforce the terms of a contract by a writ petition. 9. COUNSEL for the appellants on the other hand contended that the order refusing to accept the first appellant's nominee for admission could not be equated to an order of dismissal under a contract. Besides, he argued that the challenge to the order was on the ground of discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was further argued that quite apart from the question of discrimination, a public servant was required to act fairly, which the respondents had failed to do. In support of this contention counsel for the appellants relied on a decision of the Supreme Court (4) The D.F.O. South Kheri and Ors. v. Ram Sanehi Singh A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 205. In that case an auction was held by a forest officer and a person purchased the right-to cut the timber for a certain period. Certain sleepers cut from the forest were cancelled and an order was made that the sleepers be re-inspected against the allotment of a subsequent season. A writ petition filed by the purchaser was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court on the ground that the officer concerned had exercised his authority under a contract and that relief in respect of such a contract could be obtained only in a regular suit. This order was reversed in appeal by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The matter went up to the Supreme Court and it was held that merely because the source of a right was initially a contract, the party injured by the breach of such a contract by arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority could file a writ petition and was not confined to a relief in a suit, and that the writ petition could be maintained even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, as the action challenged was of a public authority invested with statutory powers 10. COUNSEL for the appellants next relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court (2) Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. The Uhasnagar Municipal Council and Anr. A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 1021. COUNSEL for the appellants next relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court (2) Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. The Uhasnagar Municipal Council and Anr. A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 1021. In that case Octori duty was sought to be imposed upon a company who had established a factory on a site purchased from the State. No octroi duty was payable for goods imported by the company into the area where the factory was situated. The State Government proposed to constitute a municipality including therein the area where the factory was situated and a notification was accordingly issued Representations were made to the State Government and thereupon a proclamtion was issued that the area would be excluded from the municipal jurisdiction. The new municipality, on the other hand made representations to the State Government for including the area within the municipality and agreed to exempt the existing factories to the area from payment of octroi for 7 years. The Stare Government agreed to the representation of the municipality to retain the area within the limits of the municipality. The area accordingly came within the limits of the municipality in accordance with the arrangement between the State Government and the municipality. The company claimed that relying upon the assurance given by the municipality that octroi would not be levied for 7 years, it had expanded its activities and commenced manufacture of new products by setting up new plants which it .would not have done but for the concessions given. Two years afterwards the State legislature passed an act whereby a new municipality was created which took over the previous District Municipality with all the assets and the affairs of that municipality. This municipality passed a resolution to levy octroi duty on all goods imported into the area. Thereupon the State Government wrote to the municipality about the assurance given previously to industrial undertakings in. the area and advised the municipality to pass a resolution confirming exemption previously granted and honour the commitments already made. This advice of the State Government was ignored by the municipality, who decided that representation of a tax payer for exemption from payment of octroi would be considered on merits. This was followed by an attempt by the municipality to levy octroi on the company, who thereupon moved a writ petition in the Bombay High Court, which was dismissed in limine. This was followed by an attempt by the municipality to levy octroi on the company, who thereupon moved a writ petition in the Bombay High Court, which was dismissed in limine. The matter thereafter went up to the Supreme Court and it was held that the High Court in exercise of its discretion might decline to issue writs under Article 226, if the petitioner's claim was frivolous, vexatious or prim facie unjust or might not be appropriately tried in a petition but the party claiming to be aggrieved by the action of a public body or authority on the plea that the action was unlawful, high-handed, arbitrary or unjust was entitled to a hearing of its petition on merits. It was also held that a representation that something would be done in future might involve an existing intention to act in future in the manner represented and if a representation was acted upon by another person it. might, unless the statute governing the person provided otherwise, result in an agreement enforceable at law. It was lastly held that if the statute required that the agreement should be in a certain form no contract might result from the representation but the law was not powerless to raise in appropriate cases an equity against him to compel performance of the obligation arising out of the representation. On the question of obligation of public bodies to fulfill representations it was held that public bodies were as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of fact and promise relying on which other persons had altered their position to their prejudice and that obligations against an individual arising out of a representation amounting to a promise might be enforced ex contractual by the person who acted upon the promise and further that a contract enforceable at law against a public body might be enforced against the public body in equity even though the contract was not in the form prescribed by the statute. Relying upon this decision it was argued that the State Government had taken upon it the obligation to carry out the terms of the bargain between the appellants and the management of institute and by reasons of its failure to do so, the appellants were entitled to seek relief in a writ petition. Relying upon this decision it was argued that the State Government had taken upon it the obligation to carry out the terms of the bargain between the appellants and the management of institute and by reasons of its failure to do so, the appellants were entitled to seek relief in a writ petition. On the same question counsel for the appellants also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court (15; Union of India v. Messrs. Anglo-Afghan Agencies Ltd. A.I.R, (1968) S.C. 718. Reliance was placed by counsel for the appellants on another decision of the Supreme Court (8) A.K. Kraipak and Ore. v. Union of India and Ors. A.I.R. (1970) S.C. 150. In that case it was held that the concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State were not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. This decision to my mind was primarily concerned with the question whether the action of the public officer was administrative in nature or was quasi judicial and it was in that context that the observations mentioned above were made. I do not think that this decision throws much light on the question of maintainability of a writ petition by a person in the circumstances as in this appeal. In my opinion the contention of counsel for the appellants that his clients are entitled to maintain the writ petition arc sound and must be upheld. It is true that originally the .rights of the parties arose out of a contract but it is equally true that by operation of law the State Government took over all the obligations arising out of the agreement between the first appellant and the management of the institute. What the statute imposed upon the State Government is the obligation to carry out the terms of the bargain between the parties, and the appellants' contention is that the State Government had unlawfully failed to discharge such obligations. This is not a case where the terms of a contract as such, have been brought up before this court for relief, on the ground that a breach has taken place. This is not a case where the terms of a contract as such, have been brought up before this court for relief, on the ground that a breach has taken place. The appellants contend that the State Government and its officers had failed to discharge the obligations imposed upon them by statute and that being so, in our view the appellants are entitled to seek relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The contention of counsel for the respondents that the appellants are not entitled to relief in a writ petition is, therefore, overruled. 11. I now turn to the last question involved in this appeal, namely, whether the administrative order or Rule known as the West Bengal State Medical and Dental Colleges (Admission of Students) Rules, 1972 are discriminatory m nature and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and should, therefore, be struck down. In order to appreciate this contention the relevant provision in the Rule should be set down : "6(4) The candidates for admission to the Pre-Medical Course shall have passed the Higher Secondary Examination of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education, or the Pre University Examination of the Calcutta University or of the North Bengal University, or the University Entrance Examination of the Burdwan University, or any other Examination of any other Board or University recognised as equivalent by the Calcutta University for the purpose, with Physics, Chemistry and Biology, subject to the following conditions: (a) For admission against the seats reserved in terms of sub-rule (1) of rule 4 supra for the nominees of the Government of India, the candidates must have passed such qualifying Board or University Examinations at least in the Second Division. (b) For admission against the seats reserved for nominees of donors, the nominees must have secured a minimum of fifty per cent, marks in the aggregate in the three science subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Biology, in any of such qualifying Board or University Examinations." 12. (b) For admission against the seats reserved for nominees of donors, the nominees must have secured a minimum of fifty per cent, marks in the aggregate in the three science subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Biology, in any of such qualifying Board or University Examinations." 12. COUNSEL for the appellants argued that there was patent discrimination between the nominees of the Government land nominees of donors, in as much as, whereas in the case of Government nominees the requirement was only that they should pass the Board Examination tin the second division, the donor's nominees are required to secure a minimum of fifty per cent, mark in the aggregate in Physics, Chemistry and Biology in the Board Examination. It was contended that both the Government nominees and the donors nominees were in the same class and laying down of different qualification Rules, for the nominees who belonged to the same class, was discriminatory in nature and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also argued that there was no reasonable nexus in classifying the donors nominees into different groups and the object of admission into the college, which was higher medical education. It was also argued that if the second appellant secured the nomination of the Central Government with the marks obtained by her in the Higher Secondary Examination, she would have 'been readily accepted by the respondents for the admission. But merely because she happened to be a nominee of the first appellant, her qualification for admission based on the marks obtained by her, were found to be inadequate. It was there fore, contended that a candidate who secured marks below fifty per cent in any of the three subjects mentioned above, if nominated by a donor would be rejected, but if the same Candidate was nominated by the Central Government would be accepted for admission This, it was argued, was manifestly discriminatory in nature, and the Rule quoted above laying down the classifications was clearly violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution and should, therefore, be struck down. The argument of counsel for the appellants appears to us on the first flush to be attractive. But on a closer scrutiny and having regard to the law as it stands at present, we are unable to Up held the contention. The argument of counsel for the appellants appears to us on the first flush to be attractive. But on a closer scrutiny and having regard to the law as it stands at present, we are unable to Up held the contention. The question to be decided is whether the classification of: the Central Government and of the other donors is a reasonable classification. To pass this test two conditions are required to be fulfilled, namely, (a) that the classification is founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those who are not included in the group, and (b) the differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. It is by applying these two tests that the question of reasonable classification has to be determined. It is not in dispute that the Central Government's grant is a major source of revenue for the institute and it is because of this grant that counsel for the appellants contended that the general body of donors and the Central Government form one class. The Central Government has to cater to the needs of education of students from different states all over India, and it cannot be overlooked that the standard of examination, corresponding to the Higher Secondary Examination of West Bengal, vary from state to state in India. Keeping in mind these different standards of examination in different parts of India, it cannot be said that there is no intelligible differentia which distinguishes the Central Government from other donors, for whom a more strict admission Rule has been laid down. Once it is recognised that the Central Government can recommend candidates from states or areas where the standard of education is not high, compared to other states or areas, it cannot be said that there is no reasonable next with the object of imparting higher medical examination. The Central Government has got to keep the needs and demands of different states in the Union of India, where the standard of examination or the merits of the candidates for admission, may very well be not as high as those in other states. The Central Government has got to keep the needs and demands of different states in the Union of India, where the standard of examination or the merits of the candidates for admission, may very well be not as high as those in other states. If the Central Government decides to nominate a candidate from a state where the standard of education is comparatively less advanced there certainly will be a nexus between the classification of the Central Government as a class with the object of imparting medical education and also of selection of candidates for admission to the Medical College. In applying the test of reasonable classification in order to sec- if Article 14 of the Constitution has been infringed, the qualify required by Article 14 must be among equals and not among unequals. The Central Government who has to fulfill varying demands and obligations, in the matter of medical education, cannot be treated as an equal of other individual donors, who have contributed to the funds of the college for advancement of education. It is easy to pick up features in support of a contention that the two groups are not equal, but it is less easy to hold that the two groups are so unequal in all respects that there can be no nexus between the classification of the groups and the object sought to be attained. It is well settled that while Article 14 prohibits discriminatory legislation directed against one individual or class of individuals, it does not forbid reasonable classification and that for that purpose even one person or group of persons can be a class (See A.I.R 1963 S.C. 222 and A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41). In this connection the observation of the Supreme Court in (11) Ramkrishna Dalmia v. S. R. Tendulkar A.I.R. (1958) S.C. 538 at p. 297 may be kept in mind : "That a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if on Account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others that single individual may be treated as a class by himself". 13. In my view the position of the Central Government who provide funds for advancement of medical education generally, ought not to be overlooked in determining the question of reasonable classification between the Central Government and the other donors. 13. In my view the position of the Central Government who provide funds for advancement of medical education generally, ought not to be overlooked in determining the question of reasonable classification between the Central Government and the other donors. The Central Government undoubtedly has to keep in mind the interest of students with varying educational background and qualification. It cannot, by reason of its constitutional duties and obligations, ignore the interest of students who come from what is frequently described as backward areas. The opportunities for education upto the secondary education standard cannot be the same in different parts of the Union of India. In a large country like India there is bound to be variations in tests and standards but merely because tests and standards are different, the Central Government cannot and ought not be allowed to ignore the interest of students who are less fortunate in being compelled to pursue their studies at places where better instructions are not available. It is no fault of the students if they have been denied better instructions in Higher Secondary Education. But for this Efficiency in the education of the students, the Central Government can, not shake off its obligation to give opportunities for higher medical education to such students who are less proficient than Others. Keeping these considerations in mind if provision has been made for a less stringent standard of qualification for Central Government nominees, it cannot be said that the classification is unreasonable so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution. 14. I now refer briefly to several decisions on which the counsel for the respondents relied in support of his contention that Rule 6 (4) does not suffer from the vice of discrimination and is not violative of Article 14 on the ground that there is no reasonable classification. The first case relied upon was (3) Kumari Chitra Ghosh and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. A.I.R. (1970) S.C. 35 In that case certain students had passed the Premedical Examination of the Delhi University and obtained 62.5% marks and thereafter applied for admission to the first year M.B.B.S. class of a Medical College but they were not admitted. Thereafter they applied for admission to another Medical College which was a constituent of the University of Delhi and was established by the Central Government. Thereafter they applied for admission to another Medical College which was a constituent of the University of Delhi and was established by the Central Government. According to the prospectus 125 Students were admitted annually, 15% of the seats were reserved for scheduled caste candidates, 5% for scheduled tribe candidates and 25% were reserved for girl students. The prospectus also prescribed several categories of students who alone were eligible for admission. The applicants for admission were domiciled in Delhi and claimed Admission and would have been admitted hut for the reservation of seats for nomination by the Central Government. The Central Government nominated some students for admission who had obtained less percentage of marks than the applicants. The applicants thereupon applied for writs and orders striking down the nomination of the Central Government and for directing the authorities to admit the applicants and all other students who were eligible strictly in order of merit. By an order made on this petition the authority of the Central Government to select candidates for reserved seats was upheld, but it was found that among the nine seats filed in by Government nominees, two nominations had been made contrary to the Admission Rules and these two seats were directed to form part of the general pool. The matter went up to the Supreme Court and it was held that the classification of students into different group for admission was based on intelligible differentia which distinguished the applicants from the other groups who were nominated by the Central Government. The next case relied was in (15) Western U. P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Ors. A.I.R. (1970) S.C. 21. In that case it was held that the object of Article 14 was to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment and did not operate against rational classification and that a person complaining of unequal treatment must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced some were treated to their prejudice and the differential treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by law. The next case relied upon by the counsel for the respondents was also a decision of the Supreme Court (6) Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer A.I.R. (1953) S.C. 591, in which it was held that if a law which appeared to treat all persons that Ml within a class alike, if in effect it operated unevenly on persons similarly situated the law offended the equality clause, and conversely a law might treat persons who appeared to be similarly situated differently; but on investigation it may be found that such persons are mot similarly situated. It was further held that if there was equality and uniformity within each group the law would not be condemned as discriminatory. Our attention was also drawn by the counsel for the respondents to another decision of the Supreme Court, (9) Lachmandass v. State of Punjab A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 222, in which it was again held that Article 14 prohibited discriminatory legislation directed against one individual or class of individual but it did not forbid reasonable classification and for this purpose even one person or group could form a class. The last case relied upon on behalf of the respondents was also a decision of the Supreme court (13) The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu Narendra Nath and Ors. A.I.R. (1971) S.C. 2560. In that case there were four medical colleges run by the State Government and the total number of seats for admission to the M.B.B.S. course were 550. Rules were framed every year for selection of candidates for admission into the medical colleges. In July, 1970 a test was held of candidates who had applied for admission. An exemption was granted from the test examination to candidates who had taken M.Sc or B.Sc degrees. A large number of candidates took the test and as then under of seats were limited quite a large number failed to secure admission. Writ petitions were filed challenging the validity of the entrance test prescribed and the method of selection to the medical college. A large number of candidates took the test and as then under of seats were limited quite a large number failed to secure admission. Writ petitions were filed challenging the validity of the entrance test prescribed and the method of selection to the medical college. It was in these facts that it was held that the Government which ran the colleges had the right to make a selection out of a large number of candidates and for this purpose it could prescribe a test of its own which is not against any law and that the University merely prescribed a minimum qualification and also that merely because the Government supplemented the eligibility Rule by written test it could not be impeached. The question of discrimination between different groups of donors was, however, not the subject-matter of decision in this case and I, therefore, do not see how this decision is of any assistance to the respondents. In my opinion the tests of valid classification are satisfied in this case. The object of making the classification in this case into two groups, namely the Central Government and the other donors is not to discriminate between the nominees of the two groups but to provide opportunities for higher medical, education to candidates from different, parts of the country. It was argued on. Behalf of the appellants that whatever the object of the classification might be, the: result was discrimination between the; candidates nominated by the two groups. It seems to me that this is not the correct approach to the question. If the classification is reasonable and satisfied, the two tests, namely, that it is founded on intelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things that are grouped together from those who are not included in the group and the differentia had a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved, it must be held to be valid In this case the provision treating the Central Government as a separate class among all those who contributed to the revenue of the institute, does not offend against the two tests of reasonable classification and for that reason it cannot be Said that the impugned Rule or administrative order is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and the order rejecting the second appellant as a nominee of the first appellant suffers from the vice of discrimination. If the classification is valid as in this case, the fact that in its operation there is apparent discrimination between nominees of the two groups would not make the Rule providing for the classification bad or invalid on the ground that it results in a denial of equal opportunity or on the ground of discrimination. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.