Judgment S.P.Sinha, J. 1. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the seizure of silver coins and melted silver belonging to petitioner no. 1, by the Customs authorities at Forebesganj, District Purnea and the prayer is that the goods seized be returned forthwith and a writ of mandamus be issued upon the respondents, namely, the Customs authorities, from taking any further steps against the petitioners in the matter of the said silver coins and melted silver. The facts as per the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners to this writ petition are as under; petitioner no. 1, M/s. Rara Brothers is a partnership firm carrying on business at Nalbari in the District of Kamrup, Assam. In course of its trade and business it purchases old silver ornaments, coins and melts the ornaments into Thakkas . Calcutta is one of the places where these goods are sold by petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 2, Mahabir Pd. Jain, is one of the partners in the aforesaid firm and petitioner No. 3, Parmeshwar Singh, is one of the employees of petitioner No. 1. For the purposes of carrying on its business and despatch of silver from Nalbari to Calcutta, either by means of car or any other vehicles, a general power of attorney and affidavit dated the 28th of July 1972 at Nalbari has been executed by petitioner No. 1 in favour of petitioner No. 3 which the latter carries along with himself whenever he moves with the articles of the firm to Calcutta or any other place. 2. On the 15th of June, 1973 certain old silver ornaments, Thakkas and silver coins were decided to be sent to Calcutta on an ambassador car, bearing registration no. WMA 2521 from Nalbari to Calcutta, the distance between the two places being about 900 miles. Having so decided, on the 16th of June, 1973, petitioner no. 1, issued a challan in the name of petitioner no. 3 for the carriage of the articles mentioned therein. The challan was signed by one Ghisalal Jain, accountant of petitioner No. 1 and also by Parmeshwar Singh, petitioner no. 3 in whose custody the said articles were put for being carried to Calcutta. 1, issued a challan in the name of petitioner no. 3 for the carriage of the articles mentioned therein. The challan was signed by one Ghisalal Jain, accountant of petitioner No. 1 and also by Parmeshwar Singh, petitioner no. 3 in whose custody the said articles were put for being carried to Calcutta. It is said that the said car WMA 2521 left Nalbari in the morning hours of the 16th of June, 1973 loaded with the silver articles and occupied by four persons, namely, (1) Mahendra Chandra Tallukdar (the driver), (2) Satya Deo Mahto (Khalasi), (3) Parmeshwar Singh (Petitioner No. 3) and (4) Naresh Kumar Jain. The car proceeded on its journey to Calcutta by National High Way no. 31 which passess through Cooch Behar, Siliguri, Kishanganj, Rampur, on to Calcutta. This National High way does not pass through any foreign territory nor it crosses any border check post of foreign territory. There are of course several inter-State check posts of the States of Assam, Bengal, and Bihar on the said National Highway. At about 2.30 P.M. on the 17th of June, 1973 the said car reached near Rampur check post. At the said check post respondent no. 1 who is the Superintendent of Customs posted at Forbesganj, stopped the car. Respondent no. 1 was accompanied by respondent nos. 2 to 5, who are Inspectors of Customs. On having learnt that the car was carrying silver, they asked for the relevant documents concerning the goods contained in the car. According to the petitioners, the challan was duly shown to them, but they did not permit the car to move towards its onward journey. The silver goods were thereafter taken out of the car and put by the respondents in a jeep for taking it to Kishanganj. Petitioner No. 3 got into the same jeep and the other members of his party following the jeep in the car to Kishanganj. At Kishanganj the article were kept in the Customs office. It is stated on behalf of the petitioners that when petitioner no. 3 demanded receipt of the articles which the respondents had taken out from the Car, WMA 2521, he was threatened by them with arrest and dire consequences. Petitioner no. At Kishanganj the article were kept in the Customs office. It is stated on behalf of the petitioners that when petitioner no. 3 demanded receipt of the articles which the respondents had taken out from the Car, WMA 2521, he was threatened by them with arrest and dire consequences. Petitioner no. 3 and his companions were even asked to leave the materials and go away from the place but petitioner No. 3 insisted in not parting with the goods until a proper receipt was granted to him in respect of those goods. On the 18th of June, 1973 the respondents then carried the goods from Kishanganj to Forebesganj, but even there the Customs authorities did not grant them any receipt for those goods. According to the petitioners, respondents 1 and 4 demanded illegal gratification from petitioner no. 3 for the release of the goods. The demand was for a sum of Rs. 8,000. When petitioner no. 3 stated that he had not got so much money in his possession, he was asked to inform his principals to manage the same. Petitioner no. 3 sent telegram to his principals from Forebesganj on the 18th of June informing about the detention of the silver goods as also of the refusal of the authorities to grant any seizure list. He further telegraphed that he hoped that the goods would be released by the 19th. A copy of the telegram has been annexed to the writ petition and it has been marked as annexure 5. 3. The further case of the petitioners is that petitioner no. 3 put in a lightning telephone call from Forebesganj telephone no. 16 intimating the Gauhati Branch Office of Petitioner no. 1 about the intention of the Customs authorities, but the principals did not agree to the illegal demand of the Customs authorities, inasmuch as, according to them they had not violated any law whatsoever and therefore they could not be penalised in this fashion. On the 19th of June, 1973 at about 9.30 P.M. petitioner No. 3 disclosed to the Customs authorities the talks which he had with the principals and thereafter petitioner no. 3 was removed out of the office room and the Khalasi Satya Deo Mahto was called inside. He was asked to give his thumb impression on two blank sheets of paper which he did under threats and coercion from respondent Nos. 3 was removed out of the office room and the Khalasi Satya Deo Mahto was called inside. He was asked to give his thumb impression on two blank sheets of paper which he did under threats and coercion from respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. The same method was adopted on Mahendra Chandra Tallukdar, the driver, and he also gave thumb impression on a blank sheet of paper. The third person to be called inside the office room was Ajoy Kumar Banik, a Student, who has travelled in the car from an intervening place. He gave his statement in his own handwriting. Petitioner no. 3 had already given statement in his own handwriting on the 17th of June, 1973 when the car had been stopped and interrogation had been made by the Customs authorities with regard to the silver goods contained in the car. He also gave his statement which was recorded by respondent No. 2. It was then on the 20th of June, 1973 that petitioner No. 3 was given a seizure list both in respect of the silver articles and the challan as also with regard to the car WMA 2521. Although the date put on the seizure list was day earlier, namely, the 19th of June, 1973 it has been asserted on behalf of the petitioners that the seizure list was given on the 20th of June, 1973. All the four occupants of the car were then arrested at 6 P.M. on the 20th of June, 1973 and were sent to Arraria Jail, where they were provisionally released on bail. They were rearrested on the 5th of July, 1973 and were released on bail by the learned Sessions Judge, Purnea on the 9th of July, 1973. It may be stated that on the 13th of July, 1973 a complaint was filed in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Arraria regarding the illegal manner in which the thumb impressions of the driver and the Khalasi were taken on blank sheets of paper. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate called for a report on the allegations by sending a copy of the petition to the Superintendent of Customs, Forebesganj. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate called for a report on the allegations by sending a copy of the petition to the Superintendent of Customs, Forebesganj. According to the petitioners, the Customs authorities have acted mala fide with malicious intention and for collateral purposes in exercising their jurisdiction under section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 and more so, because they had no reason to believe, at the time they seized the silver articles, that those articles were liable to confiscation. It has, therefore, been prayed that since the entire proceeding is illegal, mala fide , capricious and arbitrary, it should be quashed and the seized silver goods be returned to the petitioners. 4. Since the allegations made in the petition were grave concerning mal-practices on the part of the customs authorities, respondent No. 1 filed an affidavit in reply to the petition at the stage of the admission of the case itself. According to this affidavit, importation of silver and silver coins from foreign countries into India was prohibited by law. Respondent no. 1 had secret prior information that petitioner no. 3 and Staya Deo Mahto were in Birat Nagar in the territory of Nepal purchasing silver and silver coins. They had further information that petitioner no. 3 along with Satya Deo Mahto were likely to smuggle silver and silver coins of Indian origin from Nepal into India through Galgalia border. Due to this information a checking party went towards Kishanganj and kept constant watch on the border areas and similarly other officers kept watch on the other border areas. According to respondent no. 1 whosoever would try to pass through Indian territory by road from Galgalia check post, was bound to come to Rampur. When the car in question was seen at some distance from Rampur check post on the 17th of June, 1973, signal was given to stop, but the driver speeded up the car. The car had, however, to stop near the barrier and there after the respondents made interrogation. Parmeshwar Singh, petitioner no. 3 began to give evasive reply. Respondent no. 1 further stated that :- ...... These respondents suspected that there must have been contraband goods inside the car. Outward inspection of the car indicated that something was kept hidden beneath the seat of the car and the suspicion was confirmed. ...... Parmeshwar Singh, petitioner no. 3 began to give evasive reply. Respondent no. 1 further stated that :- ...... These respondents suspected that there must have been contraband goods inside the car. Outward inspection of the car indicated that something was kept hidden beneath the seat of the car and the suspicion was confirmed. ...... Parmeshwar Singh produced a challan but on examination it appeared to be a fake one and the respondents had reasons to believe that the goods were liable to seizure under section 110 and for confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962 .... According to respondent no. 1 as search was not possible at and near the National Highway where the detection was made and for the safety of the goods and the car as well as of the respondents, the goods and the car were brought under armed guard to Kishanganj, temporary camp. The occupants of the car including Parmeshwar Singh came there and remained there all along keeping watch over the goods and the respondents posted armed guard to watch the goods and the car. That at Kishanganj, temporary camp, it was felt necessary to take the goods and the car to Forebesganj. Divisional Head Quarter of Customs where the Assistant Collector of Customs is posted, for search and interrogation and assistance of some other staff was also required which were not available there. The occupants were asked to come to Forebesganj and Parmeshwar Singh was told that receipt would be given on completion of preparation of search list and interrogation. This was on the 18th of June, 1973. The Customs Officers and the party started for Forebesganj, but on the way there was a major break down of the car in question (meaning thereby the Ambassador car WMA 2521) which had to be repaired by the party on heavy expenditure requiring several hours and then they reached Forebesganj in the late hours of the night on the 18th of June, 1973. On the next morning i.e. on the 19th of June, 1973 search was made after observing due formalities in presence of the independent witness of the locality and a copy of the same was given to Parmeshwar Singh on the same day i.e. on 19th of June, 1973 but as it now transpires. On the next morning i.e. on the 19th of June, 1973 search was made after observing due formalities in presence of the independent witness of the locality and a copy of the same was given to Parmeshwar Singh on the same day i.e. on 19th of June, 1973 but as it now transpires. Parmeshwar Singh has acknowledged receipt of the search list surreptitiously mentioning the date of receipt as the 20th of June, 1973. Another inventory for the detention of the Car WMA 2521 was prepared on the 19th of June, 1973 and its copy was given to the driver Mahendra Chandra Tallukdar on the same day. The receipt of the same was acknowledged on the 19th of June, 1973. Respondent no. 1 has further stated that the challan dated the 16th of June, 1973 which accompanied the silver goods is a fictitious document created by the other side in order to avoid detection by Customs authorities or any other authority. The challan did not bear any serial number and it did not tally with the weight of goods recovered. The challan shows, upon calculation, that 18405 tolas of silver equivalent to 214.595 Kilograms were despatched, but the actual weight was found to be 224.910 K.Gs. According to respondent no. 1, this proves beyond doubt that the goods detected and seized were not the goods described in the challan and the goods so seized were smuggled goods. Respondent no. 1 has categorically denied the allegations relating to any threat having been given to petitioner no. 3 or his companions of arrest, assaults or abuse or of refusal to grant receipts for the goods seized or demand of illegal gratification by the respondents or taking of signatures of the driver and the Khalasi on blank papers under pressure of threat or coercion. Respondent no. 1 has further stated that the Collector of Customs (Preventive), Patna has already called for the papers from the respondents and show cause notice have been issued to the persons concerned as a condition precedent for according sanction for the prosecution. It was now for the petitioners to file show cause before the adjudicating Officer (Collector of Customs, Preventive, Patna) and if the adjudicating officers feels satisfied that no provision of law has been violated by the petitioners, the seized goods and the car shall be released forthwith. 5. It was now for the petitioners to file show cause before the adjudicating Officer (Collector of Customs, Preventive, Patna) and if the adjudicating officers feels satisfied that no provision of law has been violated by the petitioners, the seized goods and the car shall be released forthwith. 5. After admission of the Writ petition, a further counter affidavit by way of reply has been filed on behalf of the respondents, this time sworn by the Assistant Collector of Customs of Forebesganj. According to him on the 14th of June, 1973, the Customs authorities of Jogbani got secret written information that two persons, one Parmeshwar Singh and the other Satya Deo alias Sattu were purchasing silver or old silver coins of British period at Biratnagar in Nepal. They were also informed that the aforesaid two persons would cross the Indo-Nepal Border into India and smuggle the goods at Galgalia. A further secret information was received on the 15th of June, 1973 by the same authorities that man, named, Parmeshwar with his servant Satya Deo alias Sattu had purchased huge quantity of silver and silver coins at Biratnagar and wanted to go to Bhadrapur on foot where they should cross the border and enter into India with the goods and there a car would be waiting for them somewhere not near the border. Another secret information was received that a man had engaged some coolies for taking some Thakkas and silver coins for smuggling the same into India through Galgalia on the 15th of June, 1973. The information further was that they might take a day or two to reach Galgalia. According to this deponent since there was no round the clock checking at Galgalia, smugglers preferred to smuggled the goods via that route, although it is easier to cross into India at Jogbani, where however, there is round the clock checking. These informations were passed on to the Assistant Collector of Customs at Forebesganj and the Officers at different posts where alerted. It is further stated that with this prior information, the respondents knew that after crossing into India the smugglers were bound to come to Rampur. The deponent has been stated that when car No. WMA 2521 was seen at some distance from Rampur check post, proceeding at its maximum speed towards Calcutta, it was signalled to halt by the checking squad. The deponent has been stated that when car No. WMA 2521 was seen at some distance from Rampur check post, proceeding at its maximum speed towards Calcutta, it was signalled to halt by the checking squad. This was at about 2 P.M. on the 17th of June, 1973. The car however, did not stop and proceeded towards the check post. It is then stated, which statement is an improvement upon the first affidavit, that the Customs authorities chased the car on a jeep and succeeded in intercepting it before it reached the check post and stopped it. Parmeshwar Singh petitioner No. 3, began to give evasive reply whereupon, it is stated. ...the members of the checking squad (respondent nos. 1 to 5) got reasonable suspicion that there must have been contraband goods in the car. Outward inspection of the car indicated that something was kept hidden beneath the sent of the car and the suspicion was confirmed. None of the petitioner produced any permit for importation nor gave any evidence that the goods were not smuggled, although the onus was upon them. No cash memo or evidence of purchase of the silver coins and Thakkas at Balbari was produced by the petitioners. The other parts of the statements are virtually the same as have been stated by respondent no. 1 in his affidavit which he filed prior to the admission of this writ petition. 5. In order to appreciate the allegations and counter allegations I feel it necessary to inflicate in brief the location of the respective places, namely, of Biratnagar, Bhadrapur, Galgalia, Kishanganj and Rampur. Biratnagar and Bhadrapur lie in Nepal territory. If one has to reach Galgalia from Biratnagar via Bhadrapur one has to cross river, on the northern bank of which is Bhadrapur and on the southern is Galgalia. The total distance between Biratnagar and Galgalia, as has been stated by the Assistant Collector of Customs in his counter affidavit, is about 102 Kilometres. From Galgalia to Rampur check post the distance is about 48 K.M. Rampur check post lies on the National Highway no. 31. After starting from Nalbari on the said National Highway one has to pass Cooch Behar, Siliguri and Kishanganj for reaching Rampur check post. The road to Galgalia branches out of Kishanganj, going towards north. There is a customs check post at Galgalia. 31. After starting from Nalbari on the said National Highway one has to pass Cooch Behar, Siliguri and Kishanganj for reaching Rampur check post. The road to Galgalia branches out of Kishanganj, going towards north. There is a customs check post at Galgalia. For going to Kishanganj from Nalbari there are a few police check posts on the National Highway no. 31, the one is at Chalia, which is the Bengal-Assam check post. This lies in the district of Gwalpara, Assam. The other is Patla-khowa check post which lies just a little ahead of Cooch Behar. The distance between Nalbari and Cooch Behar is 315 K.Ms. and from Cooch Behar to Siliguri the distance is 225 K.Ms. and from Siliguri to Kishanganj it is 110 K. Ms. The road from Nalbari to Kishanganj meanders from east to west. At Kishanganj one has to travel about 46 K.Ms. straight north to reach Galgalia, but for reaching Rampur one has to maintain proceeding west-ward. According to the petitioners, the car WMA 2521 passed the Chagalia police check post at about 10.45 P.M. on the 16th of June, 1973 on which date it had started in the morning hours from Nalbari. An entry had been made at the police post to this effect showing also the name of the driver who drive the car. At 11.30 in the night the car reached Cooch Behar and stopped for the night at the shop of M/s. Keshavlal Banik which has business relationship with petitioner no. 1 on the 17th of June, 1973 the car started early morning for its onward journey with one more passenger added, namely, Ajoy Kumar Banik son of the proprietor of the aforesaid M/s. Keshavlal Banik. (He is a student of B.A. Class in Tinsukhiya College and was to go to Rai Ganj). On this day at 7.10 A.M. the car passed through Patlakhowa check post and reached Rampur at about 2.30 P.M. where the car was, apprehended. The petitioners have further seated in their petition that petrol was filled in into the car on the 16th of June, 1973 which was evident from the cash memo issued by Bilas Rai Mangtu Rai and Co. of Nalbari (vide Annexure 4). The petitioners have further seated in their petition that petrol was filled in into the car on the 16th of June, 1973 which was evident from the cash memo issued by Bilas Rai Mangtu Rai and Co. of Nalbari (vide Annexure 4). There was breakdown of the car on the 16th of June, 1973 at Kokrajhar in the State of Assam and the car had to be repaired which is evidenced by the bill issued by Singh Motor Works (vide Annexure 4/1). As stated earlier, while starting from Nalbari a challan had been issued covering the goods which were being carried by the car. This challan was issued on the 16th of June, 1973 and was countersigned by petitioner No. 3 was not at Biratnagar on the dates alleged by the respondents and that the silver goods had been loaded in the car at Nalbari and further that the car along with the occupants and the goods loaded were duly checked at two check posts. Galgalia and Patlakhowa. In other words the goods seized had not been smuggled into India via Galgalia from Nepal territory. The respondents have denied having been apprised of the above facts or of the cash memos issued for fuelling of the car or for its repairs. As to whether or not these facts, stated by the petitioners, are correct cannot be gone into in a writ proceeding before tills court. The basic facts which however emerge from the affidavits and the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the parties are mat car WMA 2521 was apprehended by the respondents near Rampur Check post and on search 224.910 Kgs. constituting silver Thakkas and silver coins were recovered from the car. The challan which was produced by petitioner No. 3 however showed the total weight of goods being carried 214.595 Kgs. only. In other words the actual weight of goods found was in excess by about 10 Kgs. and odd over the weight mentioned in the challan. Although the car and the goods were apprehended on the 17th of June, 1973 at about 2.30 P.M., the seizure list of the goods as and the car was given to the petitioner only on the 19th of June, 1973 (though according to the petitioners, even later, i.e. on the 20th of June, 1973). Although the car and the goods were apprehended on the 17th of June, 1973 at about 2.30 P.M., the seizure list of the goods as and the car was given to the petitioner only on the 19th of June, 1973 (though according to the petitioners, even later, i.e. on the 20th of June, 1973). According to the customs authorities when the car was stopped by them near Rampur check post and they received evasive replies from Parmeshwar Singh, they got reasonable suspicion that the car contained contraband goods but they got the  reason to believe that the goods were liable to seizure under section 110 of the Customs Act when on examination of the challan they found that it appeared to be fake. 6. Mr. A.K. Sen appearing for the petitioner has contended that the respondents had no reason to believe, within the meaning of section 110 of the Customs Act, at the time they seized the goods that the goods were liable to confiscation and that therefore the seizure was illegal. The seizure being illegal, no proceeding consequent upon it would be valid. According to Mr. Sen the goods had been seized not because the respondents had reason to believe that the goods had been smuggled from Nepal into India but had been seized with ulterior motive. The seizure was entirely mala fide and must therefore, be quashed. 7. Mr. Ashwini Kumar Sinha, Standing Counsel for Union of India appearing for the respondents, submitted that the seizure had been properly made because the respondents had reason to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation. He further submitted that since alternative remedy was available to the petitioner which had nor been exhausted, the writ petition ought not to be maintained. He stated that inquiry under section 122 of the Customs Act having already started and the petitioners having been asked to show cause, whatever grievance they had in respect of the seizure could be ventilated in the adjudication proceeding itself. In any event, Mr. He stated that inquiry under section 122 of the Customs Act having already started and the petitioners having been asked to show cause, whatever grievance they had in respect of the seizure could be ventilated in the adjudication proceeding itself. In any event, Mr. Sinha submitted that by reason of the following circumstances the respondents had reasons to believe at the time of the seizure of the goods that these goods were liable to confiscation : (a) the large quantity of silver that was being carried in the car, (b) the manner in which the goods had been kept concealed in the car, (c) the speeding up of the car even when asked by the customs authorities to stop, (d) the evasive reply given by petitioner no. 3 when interrogated by the respondents, and (e) the challan being without a serial number and not specifying the exact quantity of silver being carried in the car, which showed that the challan was not genuine. 8. Before I enter into a discussion on the principal question as to whether or not the respondents had reasons to believe at the time of the seizure of the goods that the goods were liable to confiscation. I would like to dispose of the objection raised by Mr. Sinha concerning the maintainability of the writ petition. It is well settled that where the challenge is of the jurisdiction of the authority concerned to do an act the petitioners need not wait to exhaust the alternative remedies available under the Act under which the authority is purported to have acted. In the instant case the petitioners are challenging the very basis for the seizure of the goods by saying that the respondents had no reasonable belief at the time when they seized the silver that the same was liable to confiscation. In the case of Bapalal Khushaldas Gosalia v. R. Prasad (AIR 1965 Gujarat 135) which was a case concerning Sea Customs Act, in which a similar ground was agitated in a writ petition and the maintainability of the writ petition was challenged, it was held that under the circumstances of the case, the petitioners need not wait for the alternative remedies. I need not discuss this point any further because if the jurisdiction itself is challenged, the person challenging the jurisdiction was obviously denying the applicability of the provisions of the Act under which the jurisdiction had been taken by the respondents. In such a case alternative remedies provided under the Act will be no remedy at all. 9. I now turn to the principal question, namely, whether the respondents had reason to believe at the time when they seized the goods that the goods were liable to confiscation. I am alive to the position, as has been indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Pukhraj v. D.R. Kohili [ 1983 (13) E.L.T. 1360 (S.C.) = AIR 1962 SC 1559 ] that when a court is seized of the question as to whether or not the belief in the mind of the officer who effected the seizure was reasonable, the court is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the said officer. All that is to be considered is whether there is ground which prima facie justifies the said reasonable belief. Even, in doing so, however a court must necessarily look to the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case to arrive at its conclusion. Thus, for example, in the aforesaid decision their Lordships felt that a person carrying a large quantity of Gold and found travelling on railways without a ticket may well have raised a belief in the mind of the officer that the Gold was smuggled. And yet in the case of M.G. Abrol and Another v. Amichand Vallamji and Others ( AIR 1961 Bombay 227) Shah J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court, held that the Customs authorities did not have reasonable belief while seizing the goods that the goods were liable to confiscation, even when one of the employees of the business firm was observed running hurriedly straight to the places where the goods were melted at Bombay Bullion Refinery at Zaveri Bazar without waiting at the counter where the Gold is weighed and is taken over by the officials of the Refinery before melting and further that 152 tolas of gold was found to be in possession of that employee at that time. Again in the case of Bapalal Khushaldas Gosalia ( already referred to above) Shelat G., J. (as he then was) held, in spite of the fact that the gold bullion seized had foreign marking as on it, that the authorities did not have a reasonable belief while seizing the said bullion to be an article liable to confiscation. Thus, there cannot be a constant measure for determining as to whether or not at the time of seizing the goods the seizure had been made under a reasonable belief that the goods were liable to confiscation. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Bearing this aspect in mind I now proceed to examine some of the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and also of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, which are relevant for the purpose of this case. The export or import of certain kind of goods as are notified by the Central Government from time to time restricted under section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (Act 7 of 1947). If such goods are imported or exported without a valid permit from the proper authority the goods are liable to confiscation. Such restricted goods are : manufactured gold, diamonds and watches. By a notification under the aforesaid section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, silver bullion, silver coins and silver articles have been included in the same category. Now under section 110(1) of the Customs Act if the proper officer has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under this Act he may seize such goods. Section 111 describes the goods which are liable to confiscation if brought from a place outside India without a valid permit. Section 115 of the Act lays down the circumstances under which the conveyance used for the purpose of carrying the goods are also liable to be confiscated. Section 120 lays down that notwithstanding any change in the forth of the goods the same may be seized if it is found to be smuggled. Section 122 of the Act provides for adjudication on confiscation and the penalties for the offence. Section 123 of the Act lays down that the burden of proving that the notified goods were not smuggled goods shall lie on the person from whose possession the goods were seized. Section 122 of the Act provides for adjudication on confiscation and the penalties for the offence. Section 123 of the Act lays down that the burden of proving that the notified goods were not smuggled goods shall lie on the person from whose possession the goods were seized. Section 136 is in the nature of a check against dereliction of duty by the officers of the customs, which would include seizing goods without there being any reasonable belief that the goods seized were liable to confiscation. 10. Thus, the scheme appears to be that if the goods which are not permitted to be brought into the country without a valid permit are brought into the country without such permit, the customs authorities have a right to confiscate such goods. The step prior to confiscation, is seizure of such goods, where goods are to be seized by the customs authorities, section 110 of the Act enjoins, that the authority must have reason to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation under the Act. Such belief is a condition precedent to the seizure. In the case of M.G. Abrol (referred to above), which was a case under the Sea Customs Act, one of the questions in issue was as to the point of time when reasonable belief, as required under section 178A of that Act, should exist. It was held that :- ......there is one and only one construction possible of this section, so far as the point of time at which the reasona- ble belief should exist in regard to the seizure of any smuggled goods is concerned and the construction is that where-ever the goods are seized, the officer seizing the goods must at the time of seizure have a reasonable belief in his mind that the goods that he was seizing were smuggled goods. Any subsequent acquisition of such belief would be of no avail... Although this decision of the Bombay High Court has not been specifically noticed in the decision of the Supreme Court in the Pukhrajs case, referred to above, yet the principle seems to have been accepted that whatever actions are contemplated as a result of seizure under section 178A of the Sea Customs Act, would be valid only if the seizure has been effected with a prima facie reasonable belief. In other words the condition precedent for all further actions would be the reasonable belief of the authorities at the time when they seized the goods that the goods which they were seizing were liable to confiscation. 11. Similar is the position in the instant Act Section 110(1) of the Act reads thus. If the proper officer has reason to believe that any goods are liable to confiscation under this Act he may seize such goods. The seizure of the goods must follow only if the proper officer has reason to believe that the goods were liable to confiscation, not otherwise. The view expressed by the Bombay High Court in M.G. Abrols case is a salubrious view. A reasonable belief must exist in the mind of the officer seizing the goods at the time of the seizure itself, and only then the seizure would be valid. 12. Now coming to the facts of the instant case, according to the respondents, the factors, which weighed with them in giving them the reason to believe as required under section 110 of the Act, were - (a) The secret information, (b) the quantity of silver which was being carried in the car, (c) the manner in which the goods were placed in the car, (d) the speed with which the car was moving, (e) when questioned, Parmeshwar Singh gave evasive reply, and lastly, (f) the challan was not genuine because it did not contain any serial number and there was difference in the weight of silver as mentioned in the challan and the actual weight of the goods. Although the petitioners have given their own version of the whole matter, I do not want to enter into such controversies of fact and more so in writ jurisdiction. I, therefore, proceed to examine whether the aforesaid five factors constituted such date from which one could have prima facie a resonable belief that the silver goods were smuggled goods liable to confiscation. The quantity of the silver is no doubt heavy and I will assume that the car was being driven at a high speed and further that the actual weight of silver found in the car exceeded the weight of silver as mentioned in the challan. The quantity of the silver is no doubt heavy and I will assume that the car was being driven at a high speed and further that the actual weight of silver found in the car exceeded the weight of silver as mentioned in the challan. The question, as I have posed above, is whether these facts would prima facie inculcate a reasonable belief in the mind of the respondents at the time when they seized the goods that the goods were liable to confiscation. Reasonable belief is not a mere suspicion or a mere subjective satisfaction. It is something more than that. It is a belief which a prudent man on applying his mind judicially to the facts will arrive at. 13. In the instant case as per the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, there was prior information of silver being purchased at Biratnagar in the territory of Nepal by one Parmeshwar Singh, and Satyadeo Mahto or Sattu. There was also information that the said two persons were likely to cross into India at Galgalia, or near about it. They apprehended a car which was proceeding on the National Highway No. 31 towards Calcutta coming from Kishanganj side, and at least 47 kms. away from Galgalia. Obviously, therefore, the secret information was not the cause for stopping this particular car; or at least when the car was stopped the respondents could not have known that it was this car for which they were waiting. The car had not been described in the secret information, but what had been described was the person who would be smuggling the silver goods into India. The secret information, as recorded and received by the respondents has been produced before this Court, and I have gone through it. It describes Parmeshwar Singh as a person with bushy moustaches. A person bearing the same name was no doubt sitting in that car, but he did not have any moustache which was the identifying mark given in the secret information. Thus on seeing the car proceeding towards Rampur the respondents could not have connected it with the secret information which they had received. Moreover, the place where the car had been apprehended was nowhere near Galgalia. Thus the secret information could not be the basis for stopping the car. Thus on seeing the car proceeding towards Rampur the respondents could not have connected it with the secret information which they had received. Moreover, the place where the car had been apprehended was nowhere near Galgalia. Thus the secret information could not be the basis for stopping the car. As a matter of fact the respondents in their second counter-affidavit have admitted that their action in stopping the car WMA 2521 was purely on suspicion. 14. Now having stopped the car the respondents made an outward inspection of the car and also interrogated Parmeshwar Singh. They did not find out the actual goods being carried in the car. They had not searched into the car and had only made an outward inspection of it. They had neither known the actual weight of the silver which was being carried in the car not anything else concerning the contents of the car. When, however, they interrogated Parmeshwar Singh he produced the challan for the goods in the car and then the respondents state in paragraph 4(F) of their second counter-affidavit. That on examination the challan appeared to be fake one and the respondents had reason to believe that the goods were liable to seizure under section 110 and for confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962 . It passes my comprehension as to how even without seeing the goods in the car anybody could get a reasonable belief that the goods were liable to seizure and confiscation. Obviously, therefore, the reasonable belief till this stage was not concerned with the silver in the car, but with the fakeness of the challan. Such a reasonable belief will not give the respondents the jurisdiction to seize the silver in the car. As a matter of fact the respondents themselves state in paragraph 17 of the second counter-affidavit that the challan was not in respect of the goods in the car. That being so, the fakeness or genuineness of the challan will have no bearing on the nature of the goods in the car. In other words, till this time i.e., till the time when the respondents made outwards inspection of the car and also examined the challan, they had no reasonable belief about the goods in the car being liable to seizure and confiscation. 15. In other words, till this time i.e., till the time when the respondents made outwards inspection of the car and also examined the challan, they had no reasonable belief about the goods in the car being liable to seizure and confiscation. 15. Notwithstanding the above position, the respondents took into their custody the silver articles which were in the car WMA 2521 by getting it transferred into their jeep. Thereafter for full two days the respondents did not hand over any receipt for the seizure, either concerning the goods or the car WMA 2521, but all the same carried the goods and the car from place to place. If the respondents had reason to believe that the goods were liable to seizure under section 110 and for confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962 , as has been stated by them in paragraph 4(F) of the second counter-affidavit, they should have seized the car and the goods immediately as they apprehended the car near Rampur. They did not do so. They have, however, explained this delay thus : 5. That as search was not possible on or near the National Highway where the detection was made and for the safety of the goods and the car as well as of the Respondents, the goods and the car were brought under armed guard to Kishanganj temporary camp. The occupants of the car including Parmeshwar Singh also came there and remained there all along keeping watch over the goods and respondents posted armed guards there to watch the goods and the car. 6. That at Kishanganj temporary camp on 18-6-1973 it was felt necessary to take the goods and the car to Forbesganj Divisional Head Quarters of Customs, where the Assistant Collector of Customs is posted, for search and interrogations and assistance of some other staff was also required which were not available there. The occupants were asked to come to Forbesganj and Parmeshwar Singh was informed that the receipt would be given on completion of the search the preparation of search list and completion of interrogation. The Customs Officers and the party started but on the way major breakdown of the Car in question which had to be repaired by the party on heavy expenditures requiring several houses and then reached Forbesganj in the last hours. The Customs Officers and the party started but on the way major breakdown of the Car in question which had to be repaired by the party on heavy expenditures requiring several houses and then reached Forbesganj in the last hours. On the next morning i.e. on 19-6-1973, the search was made after observing formalities in presence of independent witnesses of the locality in presence of Parmeshwar Singh and others and silver and old silver Indian coins were recovered. Search list was prepared in presence of independent witnesses and copy given to Parmeshwar Singh on the same day i.e. on 19-6-1973 and a copy given on the same day to Parmeshwar Singh but it now appears that he put 20-6-1973 without our knowledge. Another inventory for the detention of the car bearing registration no. WMA 2521 was prepared on 19-6-1973 and its copy was given to driver Mahendra Chandra Talukdar on the same day. 16. Whatever the explanation be, it indicates a wavering mind of the respondents as to whether the goods were liable to confiscation. They took more than two days, after first intercepting the car WMA 2521 and the goods, to issue to seizure list for seizing the goods and the car. Such a conduct does not lend support to the respondents case that they had reason to believe when they seized the goods that the goods were smuggled goods and liable to confiscation. Thus on the own showing of the respondents neither the secret information nor the bulk of the silver goods nor the challan nor any of the other factors gave them the reasonable belief as required under section 110 of the Customs Act, at the time when they say they got the reason to believe and seized the goods. This conclusion also gets support from these further facts. The respondents called upon each of the occupants of the car to make statement before them. The statements in original have been produced before this Court. Looking to the statement of the driver, Mahendra Chandra Talukdar. I find that the last sentence, which is the most vital sentence in his statement supporting the case of the respondents, has been interpolated into the statement and I cannot think of any reason except that by interpolating this sentence the respondents have tried to make out a case of reasonable belief to seize the silver goods. I find that the last sentence, which is the most vital sentence in his statement supporting the case of the respondents, has been interpolated into the statement and I cannot think of any reason except that by interpolating this sentence the respondents have tried to make out a case of reasonable belief to seize the silver goods. That sentence translated into English means -  That the silver which I loaded in my car at Galgalia had been brought from Bhadrapur by Parmeshwar Banu and Satyadeo. No part of the earlier statement made by him give any indication that the silver had been smuggled from Nepal or had been loaded at Galgalia. It is only this sentence which gives that indication. In my opinion, the making of the interpolation clearly shows that there had been no reason to believe that the goods were smuggled goods and yet having seized it, the respondents have made efforts to give a show of having reason to believe that the goods were smuggled goods liable to confiscation. It amazes me to think that although the respondents had prior information with regard to the smuggling of silver and silver coins from Nepal into India at Galgalia, yet no effort is made to apprehend the smuggling at Galgalia or in the near vicinity of that place. On the contrary the respondents have felt content by stating that smuggler crossing into the Indian border from Galgalia check post was bound to come to Rampur. I do not see any valid reason for this sanguine belief of the respondents. A smuggler crossing into India at Galgalia can straightaway go to Siliguri without touching Rampur; can come up to Kishanganj and turn left to enter into Assam territory. I do not, therefore, see as to how the respondents felt that any car having been loaded with smuggled silver at Galgalia was bound to touch Rampur. Even in the secret information given to the respondents, I do not find any such anticipation about the car in question. Obviously, therefore, the statement that a smuggler entering Indian Border at Galgalia was bound to come to Rampur, is just to fit in with the actions already taken by the respondents, namely of apprehending the car near Rampur check-post. 17. Obviously, therefore, the statement that a smuggler entering Indian Border at Galgalia was bound to come to Rampur, is just to fit in with the actions already taken by the respondents, namely of apprehending the car near Rampur check-post. 17. Now, therefore, the position is this that although the respondents had secret information of likelihood of smuggling of silver and silver coins from Nepal into India, crossing into Indian border at Galgalia the respondents did not act upon that information by trying to catch the smuggler at or near about Galgalia. When, however, they saw a car proceeding at some speed towards Rampur check post, they stopped it and per chance, a sizeable quantity of silver and silver coins was found in the car. Petitioner no. 3 having produced the challan concerning the goods in the car and also having stoutly denied the goods to be of doubtful origin, the respondents were unable to decide as to whether at all seize the goods. They, however, detained the car and after some preliminary interrogation of the occupants of the car transferred the silver goods from the petitioners car into their jeep. On the facts and circumstances, which I have discussed above, obviously, when the silver goods were transferred from WMA to the jeep, the respondents did so only under suspicion. They did not have reasons to believe at that time that the goods which were transferred into their jeep were liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, and when they handed over the seizure list to the petitioners, seizing the silver goods and the car, has been interpolated. I have already referred to the decision of the Bombay case in M.G. Abrol and Anothers case in which it has been held - That reasonable belief must exist in the mind of the officer seizing the goods at the time of the seizure itself. Subsequent acquisition of such belief could be of no avail. In the instant case if transfer of the goods from the petitioners car to the jeep is taken as the seizure of the goods, clearly the respondents did not have the reasonable belief at that time that the goods which they were transferring into their jeep was liable to confiscation and when they handed over the seizure list to the petitioners, they had no further materials before them. Even at that time, as the facts discussed above indicate, they did not have the reasonable belief. 18. In my opinion, therefore, the seizure of the goods is wholly illegal. Having regard to the above position all proceedings consequent upon the seizure of the goods are void and illegal. The respondents are, therefore, directed to forthwith return the goods mentioned in annexures 6/2 and 6/3 of this writ petition to the petitioners. 19. Although the action of the respondents has been attributed to mala fide on their part and various circumstances have been referred to in support of such an intention. I am not prepared to go to the length of saying that the action of the respondents in seizing the goods was mala fide . The seizure, as I have observed in the earlier portions of this judgment, was on suspicion, and not on reasonable belief, but I do not think a case of mala fide on the part of the respondents has been proved by the petitioners. 20. In the result the respondents are directed to return the silver goods described in annexure 6/2 of the writ petition to petitioner no. 3 from whose possession it had been seized, and the car to its owner as described in annexure 6/3 of the writ petition. The respondents shall forbear from taking any further step against the petitioners in relation to the goods which they have illegally seized from the petitioners. The application is allowed, but without costs. [Order per : Shambhu Prasad Singh, J.]. - I agree. I would also like to make some observations of my own on some of the questions arising for decisions in this case. In my opinion, this Court has got discretion to refuse issuance of a writ where an alternative remedy is available and not exhausted. In appropriate cases it may refuse to issue a writ on the ground of alternative remedy being available even in cases where the challenge is of the jurisdiction of the authority concerned to do an act except where the matter involves fundamental right of a citizen. This Court can also issue writ in cases where there is no challenge to the jurisdiction of the authority concerned though an alternative remedy is available and has not been exhausted. The discretion is to be exercised judicially and on the facts and circumstances of each case. This Court can also issue writ in cases where there is no challenge to the jurisdiction of the authority concerned though an alternative remedy is available and has not been exhausted. The discretion is to be exercised judicially and on the facts and circumstances of each case. The law on the subject has been explained in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Dilip Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (1970 P.I.J.R. 319). 2 It was contended before us by Mr. A.K. Sen, learned Counsel for the petitioners that in the circumstances of the case, it was not possible to accept the case of the respondents that they had received secret information about purchase of silver and silver coins by Satyadeo and Parmeshwar in Nepal. According to that secret information, the silver and silver coins purchased by the aforesaid two persons were to be taken into India at Galgalia. There is a road which connects Galgalia to Kishanganj. Persons who have to go to northern part of West Bengal or Assam have to take a turn towards east at Kishanganj. Those who have to go to Calcutta or other parts of India have to take a turn towards west. Rampur where the silver and silver coins were seized by the custom authorities is towards west of Kishanganj. Respondents, therefore, are not correct in saying that any one coming from Nepal for going to various parts of India must pass through Rampur. Had the custom authorities found and checked the vehicle somewhere between Galgalia and Kishanganj, there could be no doubt that the vehicle was coming from the border of Nepal. Since no checking was done between Galgalia and Kishanganj, the possibility of the vehicle coming from Assam for going to Calcutta, as is the case of the petitioners, cannot be said to be definitely incorrect. There is no explanation forthcoming on behalf of the respondents why they did not attempt to check the vehicle between Galgalia and Kishanganj. After having received secret information, the natural conduct on the part of the custom authorities should have been to try to check the vehicle and seize the goods somewhere between Galgalia and Kishanganj. There is no explanation forthcoming on behalf of the respondents why they did not attempt to check the vehicle between Galgalia and Kishanganj. After having received secret information, the natural conduct on the part of the custom authorities should have been to try to check the vehicle and seize the goods somewhere between Galgalia and Kishanganj. Their conduct in not doing so throws doubt on their assertion that they had received secret information from Nepal about purchase of silver and silver coins by Satyadeo and Parmeshwar and of their design to smuggle those into India at Galgalia. There appears substance in the aforesaid contention of learned counsel for the petitioners, and if the contention of the respondents as to the secret information received by them is not found true, then it is not possible to hold that they could have reasons to believe at the time of the seizure of the goods that they were liable to confiscation. 3 If really the respondents had not received any secret information from Nepal as to purchase of silver and silver coins there, by Satyadeo and Parmeshwar and they have concocted that story and on account of the delay in not seizing the goods and issuing receipts at once mala fide on their part may also be inferred. However, in view of the fact that the petition succeeds on the ground that the respondents had no reason to believe at the time of the seizure of the goods that they were liable to confiscation, it is not necessary to record a definite finding on the question of mala fide.