State of Uttar Pradesh v. Krishna Chandra Gupta — 1973 DIGILAW 224 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - This special appeal filed on behalf of the State of U. P. and the District Magistrate, Sitapur as Administrator Municipal Board, Sitapur, is directed against a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court under which he allowed Writ Petition No. 948 of 1972. That writ petition had been filed by Krishna Chandra Gupta respondent No. 1 as President of the erstwhile Municipal Board, Sitapur against the State of U. P. the District Magistrate, Sitapur, Sri Uma Shanker Dixit, the then Union Minister for Health. Government of India, New Delhi, Sri Dharam Datt Vaidya, Minister for Medical and Public Health U. P. Government, and Sri Abid Ali, Deputy Minister for Transport, U. P. The Municipal Board, Sitapur was also impleaded as a proforma party to this writ petition. 2. The allegations made by the petitioner in his writ petition so far as relevant for the decision of this special appeal were in brief that the Municipal Board, Sitapur after the General Elections held in June 1967 was constituted in June 1967 for a term of five years as provided in Section 10-A of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) and that term was to last upto June 11, 1972. The petitioner was elected as President of this Board after the previous President had been removed on account of a no confidence motion passed against hint on 27-8-1968. After assuming charge as President the petitioner tried his best to improve the affairs of the Board but his efforts in that direction were not liked by those members of the Board whose self-interests were adversely affected by the petitioner's efforts to bring about improvements. Some of the members turned hostile to the petitioner. He submitted a report improve the affairs of the Board for their selfish ends. But the Government did not take any action on that report. In the meantime, these members with the help of some other members were successful in bringing a motion of no confidence against him which was fixed for consideration on 25-5-1970. In the meantime, a criminal complaint had been filed against the petitioner under Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code by some interested person and during the pendency of that complaint the petitioner was suspended from his office of President of the Board under Section 48 (3) of the Act. In the meantime, a criminal complaint had been filed against the petitioner under Section 465 of the Indian Penal Code by some interested person and during the pendency of that complaint the petitioner was suspended from his office of President of the Board under Section 48 (3) of the Act. On account of this suspension he could not participate in the meeting held on 25-5-1970 for consideration of the no confidence motion against him. That motion was passed on that date. 3. The petitioner then filed the Writ Petitions Nos. 675 of 1970 and 676 of 1970 in this Court challenging the order of his suspension and the re-solution of no confidence passed against him in the meeting held on 25-5-1970. Both those writ petitions were allowed by a learned single Judge of this Court on 13-4-1971 against which special appeals are pending. The petitioner contended that he belonged to that faction of the Congress party which is known as Congress (O) while the Government of this State was headed by the other faction of the Congress known as Congress (R). In order to put pressure on the petitioner to join Congress (R) party a notice dated 14-2-72 containing some charges against the Board was sent by the Government and the Board was required to explain as to why it should not be superseded under Section 30. An explanation dated 2-3-1972 on behalf of the Board was submitted by the petitioner and thereafter nothing happened. On 7-6-1972 the existing term of the Board which was to expire on 11-6-1972 was extended for another year. The petitioner further alleged that on 11-6-1972 Sri Uma Shanker Dixit, the then Union Minister for Health, who was arrayed as opposite-party No. 3 in the writ petition, accompanied by Sri Dharam Datt Vaidya, the then Minister for local self Government, U. P. (opposite-party No. 4) and Sri Abid Ali, Deputy Minister for Transport, U. P. Government (Opposite-party No. 5) visited Sitapur and a civic address was presented to him on behalf of the Municipal Board, Sitapur which was followed by a tea party given in his honour by the Board. In the course of conversation these Ministers wanted the petitioner to make a public announcement that he had left Congress (O) and joined Congress (R) to which he did not agree and thereby incurred their displeasure. In the course of conversation these Ministers wanted the petitioner to make a public announcement that he had left Congress (O) and joined Congress (R) to which he did not agree and thereby incurred their displeasure. According to him this displeasure was shown by superseding this Municipal Board by the Government through a notification dated June 19, 1972 published in the U. P. Gazette dated 21-6-1972 under which the Board was superseded for a period of two years. 4. This order of supersession was challenged by the petitioner in that petition on the ground that it was malafide and illegal. One of the grounds on which the validity of this order was challenged was that action under Section 30 of the Act could be taken by the Government only during the original term of five years of the Board and not during its extended term as extended under the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 10-A. This ground as well as the ground of the order being malafide were not accepted by the learned single Judge. The other grounds on which the validity of this order was challenged and which found favour with the learned single Judge were that the term of the Board having been extended by the Government on 7-6-1972, the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act which were pending before the Government, shall be deemed to have been dropped and the wilful default, if any, of the Board shall be deemed to have been condoned, that the order of supersession does not record reasons as required by Section 30, that the order of supersession was bad as the Government did not consider the question that it was only wilful default which could justify supersession and there was no finding of wilful default, and that a scrutiny of the charges and the so-called reasoning of the Government could not lead to the conclusion that there was any wilful default on the part of the Board either alleged or proved. On these grounds the writ petition was allowed and the order of supersession Annexure 7 to the writ petition was a quashed. It is against that decision that the present special appeal is directed. 5. We heard the learned counsel for the parties. On these grounds the writ petition was allowed and the order of supersession Annexure 7 to the writ petition was a quashed. It is against that decision that the present special appeal is directed. 5. We heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent No 1, besides supporting the judgment of the learned single Judge on the points on which findings were recorded in his favour, also questioned the correctness of the findings on the points decided against him. In this way, the entire controversy which was raised before the learned single Judge has been raised again in this special appeal. We shall consider these points seriatim. 6. As regards malafide, besides the vague allegations contained in the writ petition that attempts were made to persuade the petitioner to join Congress (R) party to which he did not agree, which did not even indicate as to who made those attempts and on what occasion, the only specific incident that was alleged was in respect of a civic reception held at Sitapur on 11-6-1972 in which an address was presented on behalf of this Board to Sri Uma Shanker Dixit, the then Union Minister for Health. On that occasion he as well as Sri Dharam Datt Vaidya (opposite-party No. 4), the then Minister for Local Self Government, U. P. and Sri Abid Ali (opposite-party No. 5), the then Deputy Minister for Transport, U. P. were alleged to have pressed the petitioner to make a public announcement about his intention to leave Congress (O) and join Congress (R) to which the petitioner did not agree. Each of these three opposite-parties filed his counter-affidavit refuting these allegations. We agree with the learned single Judge that there is no good reason to disbelieve their counter affidavits and accept the affidavit of the petitioner on this point. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent No. 1 pointed out that Sri Uma Shanker Dixit did not categorically deny that there was any talk about the petitioner joining Congress (R) party and so it may be inferred that there was atleast some talk on this topic. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent No. 1 pointed out that Sri Uma Shanker Dixit did not categorically deny that there was any talk about the petitioner joining Congress (R) party and so it may be inferred that there was atleast some talk on this topic. The relevant part of the counter affidavit of Sri Uma Shanker Dixit is as follows : "It is denied that the deponent exercised pressure on the petitioner to join Congress (R) party and as such there was no occasion to make any announcement to that effect in the meeting. To the best of my memory and recollection there was no talk about the petitioner joining Congress (R) party. The allegations made that the reply given by the petitioner was not relished by the deponent is baseless in view of the facts stated above." We are unable to draw any such inference from this affidavit as suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. There is a clear and categorical denial so far as the petitioner's allegation goes that Sri Uma Shanker Dixit had pressed him to make a public announcement about his joining Congress (R) and also of the fact that when he did not agree to it, it was not relished by him. When two persons who till lately belonged to the same political party meet on an official function arranged by one of them in the honour of the other, it is natural that there is some conversation between them. If on such occasion any person makes a casual remark that the split in the Congress party was unfortunate, nobody would care to remember such an innocent and casual remark for more than two months. It is perhaps to rule out such a situation that Sri Uma Shanker Dixit deposed that to the best of his memory and recollection there was no talk about the petitioner joining Congress (R) party. It cannot certainly mean that any pressure was exercised on the petitioner by Sri Uma Shanker Dixit which fact is clearly denied on oath by him. 7. Sri Dharam Datt Vaidya in his counter-affidavit also denied that some members of the Municipal Board, Sitapur belonging to Congress (R) party exercised pressure on him and managed to get a notice dated 14-2-1972 issued against the Board. 7. Sri Dharam Datt Vaidya in his counter-affidavit also denied that some members of the Municipal Board, Sitapur belonging to Congress (R) party exercised pressure on him and managed to get a notice dated 14-2-1972 issued against the Board. He further deposed that the affairs of this Board were not being managed properly and even the Commissioner. Lucknow Division vide his letter dated 2-4-1970 had recommend to the State Government that the Board be superseded. He further deposed that supersession order under Section 30 of the Act was passed by the State Government after fully considering the reply sent on behalf of the Board to the charges mentioned in the charge-sheet. It has also not been indicated by the petitioner what difference his joining the Congress (R) party would have made on the fate of this party in June 1972 after it had already received a mandate from the people in the mid-term elections held in 1971. We, therefore, see no good reason to differ from the learned single Judge that the plea of malafide has not been established by the petitioner. 8. The plea raised on behalf of the contesting respondent No. I that action under Section 30 of the Act could be taken by the Government only during the original term of the Board and not during its extended term as extended under the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 10-A, is also untenable. We agree with the learned single Judge that there is nothing in the language of Section 30 which debars the Government from taking action against a Board after its term has been extended under the proviso to Section 10-A (1). Sub-Section (1) of Section 10-A reads as follows :- "Except as provided in Section 31 or 31-A, the term of every Board shall be five years : Provided that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend from time to time the term of all or any of the Boards, so, however, that the total extension in the case of any Board does not in the aggregate exceed two years." The opening words of this section "except as provided in Section 31 or 31-A" are in the nature of an exclusion clause which governs the entire Sub-Section (1) including its proviso. Once a Board is superseded under Section 30, the period of supersession and the reconstitution of the fresh Board will be governed by Section 31, and Sub-Section (1) of Section 10-A will have no application to its original term nor the proviso to this sub-section will come into play for extending the term of the Board, if the supersession is to last beyond the original term or the extended term of the Board. If the supersession is intended to last beyond. The date on which the original term or the extended term of the Board under Section 10-A (1) is to expire, the period of supersession, if it is not originally sufficient to cover that period, can be extended by the State Government from time to time by a notification under the Explanation to Section 30. Clause (c) of Section 31 provides that a fresh Board shall be constituted with effect from the date of expiry of the period of supersession as though the term fixed under Section 10-A had expired. From a combined reading of these provisions it is evident that it was permissible for the State Government to supersede this Board under the notification dated 19-6-1972 for a period of two years even though the term of this Board as extended under a notification dated 7-6-1972 was to last only till June 11, 1973. The Government has to reconstitute a Board under Section 31 (c) with effect from the date of the expiry of the period of supersession unless this period is further extended under Explanation to Section 30. For that purpose it is not necessary to have recourse to the proviso to Sub-Section (I) of Section 10-A. We, therefore, agree with the learned single Judge that the order of supersession does not suffer from any infirmity on this score. 9. The next point that has to be considered by us is whether the extension of the term of this Board for a further period of one year under a notification dated 7-6-1972 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) has the effect of dropping the proceedings under Section 30 which were pending against the Board on that date as held by the learned single Judge. It may be stated that the existing term of this Board as well as several other Boards was due to expire on June 11, 1972. It may be stated that the existing term of this Board as well as several other Boards was due to expire on June 11, 1972. It was not possible for the Government to hold general elections and reconstitute these Boards between June 7, 1972 and June 11, 1972. So if the term of these Boards had not been extended under the proviso to Section 10-A a vacuum would have been created and there would have been no authority to function as Board after June 11, 1972. So under this notification (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) the term of this Board as well as the other Boards which was due to expire on June 11, 1972 was further extended upto June 11, 1973 or till the reconstitution of new Board after general elections whichever event took place earlier. For this extension made in exercise of powers under the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 10-A, the circumstance that on that date the proceedings under Section 30 for the supersession of this Board were pending consideration, was wholly irrelevant. Similarly, this extension of the term by itself is altogether irrelevant for considering the explanation submitted by the Board in reply to the charges served on it and thereafter passing an order of super-session, if the Government thought fit to do so. It is not suggested that before June 7, 1972 the Government had considered the explanation submitted on behalf of this Board and taken a decision not to supersede it but allow it to function as usual. Had it done so, the natural course for the petitioner would have been to request the Court to summon the file in which this decision had been taken and if thereafter the Government had not produced that file by claiming privilege, the position would have been different. In this case neither the petitioner suggested nor the learned single Judge found that these charges had been considered and some decision had been taken by the Government prior to June 7, 1972. In this case neither the petitioner suggested nor the learned single Judge found that these charges had been considered and some decision had been taken by the Government prior to June 7, 1972. What the learned single Judge thinks is that there was enough time for the Government after receipt of the Board's explanation dated 2-3-1972 to consider it and take a decision on it till June 7, 1972 and if it did not do so and chose to extend the term of the Board on 7-6-1972, it shall be presumed that the proceedings under Section 30 had been dropped. The relevant portion of the judgment of the learned single Judge in which he considered this matter reads as follows : "....The contention raised in the counter-affidavit is that the State Government was left with no other alternative except to grant extension because the general elections could not be held by 11-6-1972 when the Board's term was going to expire. The argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel was that in case the term of the Board had expired on 11-6-1972 without the election being held then the State Government would have been left without an administrative machinery to carry on the functions of the Municipal Board. It was pointed out that a person to look after the functions of the Board can be appointed by the State Government under Section 31 on supersession of the Board and under Section 31-A on dissolution of the Board and that there was no provision for appointment of an Administrator to carry on the functions of the Board when its term had expired without general elections being held. This argument fails to impress because instead of granting an extension under Section 10-A the State Government could have taken action on the charges served upon the petitioner and superseded the Board instead of granting an extension. After supersession an Administrator could be appointed under Section 31 and the elections held during the period of supersession. It cannot therefore, be said that extension of the Board's term was the only expedient open to the State Government. Besides, if the holding of general elections was indeed the motivation for extension then one would have expected some concrete step to be taken towards the elections. It cannot therefore, be said that extension of the Board's term was the only expedient open to the State Government. Besides, if the holding of general elections was indeed the motivation for extension then one would have expected some concrete step to be taken towards the elections. Not even the date for holding the elections was fixed by the State Government under Section 13-A of the Act before expiry of the Board's term and indeed neither before the date of extension nor afterwards till to-day any steps were said to have been taken towards holding the elections. The explanation offered for the State Government for granting extension instead of taking decision on the charges is far from being convincing. From the grant of extension in the background of the above facts, therefore, it is to my mind a fair and inescapable inference that the charges contained in the notice dated 14-2-1972 were dropped, withdrawn or waived at the time when extension of term was granted to the petitioner on 7-6-1972 and it is equally inevitable to infer that the subsequent order of supersession passed on those very charges was the result of second thoughts." 10. We are unable to agree with these observations of the learned single Judge which are more in the nature of an advice to the Government for expeditious disposal of such cases under Section 30 than the reasons based on any legal principles. Of course, despatch and expedition in disposal of cases is desirable not only at Government level but in all other offices of the government. But it is a matter of common experience that there are delays in disposal of the cases in all offices. So far as the present case is concerned it is a matter of common knowledge that the file has to pass through several hands, and each office takes its own time to record its note or opinion, before final action can be taken by the Government under Section 30. The very explanation dated 2-3-1972 submitted on behalf of the Board was required under Annexure 2 to be submitted through the District Magistrate, Sitapur along with his comments. The very explanation dated 2-3-1972 submitted on behalf of the Board was required under Annexure 2 to be submitted through the District Magistrate, Sitapur along with his comments. If in the circumstances no final order could be passed on it for about four months it cannot be inferred merely from this delay, in the absence of any time limit prescribed by law for disposal of such cases like the time limit fixed by Section 180 (3) of the Act, that the proceedings had been dropped and the default, if any, of the Board had been condoned by the Government. So there is no legal warrant for the proposition that after 7-6-1972 a fresh notice should have been served on the Board mentioning fresh defaults, if any, on the part of the Board. 11. The next question that arises for our consideration is whether the State Government after taking into consideration the explanation of the Board to the charges served on it not only felt satisfied that the Board had made a wilful default in the performance of any duty imposed upon it by or under the Act but the reasons for that satisfaction had also been stated in the order published in the official gazette as is required by Section 30. The reasons so stated in the order must be germane to the controversy involved in the charge and should not be extraneous or irrelevant to that controversy. If the reasons are wholly irrelevant and not germane to the controversy in the sense that they do not show the in-adequacy or unsatisfactoriness of the explanation submitted by the Board and lead to an inference about the correctness of the charge, they shall not be deemed to be the reasons contemplated by this section. Once the reasons have been so stated by the Government for passing the order of supersession, this Court will not look into the sufficiency or otherwise of those reasons and will not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Government for taking the action. In this connection reference was made by the learned counsel for the respondent No, 1 to a single Judge decision of this Court in I. P. Kapoor v. State of U. P., 1967 A. L. J. 1043. In this connection reference was made by the learned counsel for the respondent No, 1 to a single Judge decision of this Court in I. P. Kapoor v. State of U. P., 1967 A. L. J. 1043. The learned Judge observed at page 1046 of the report: "It is apparent that the requirement that reasons for the order shall be published in the official gazette is to provide a safeguard against arbitrary action on the one hand and to convince the citizen and the members of the Board, of the ground on which the State Government reached the requisite satisfaction to deprive them of their right to local self-government. The purpose of the requirement that reasons shall be stated is to ensure that the reasons which have impelled the action are germane and relevant to the content and scope of the power vested in the State Government." The decision of a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Suresh v. State, A.I.R. 1970 M. P. 154 was also referred to, in which Section 422 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, which is analogous to Section 30 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, came for interpretation. It was observed in this case at pages 160-161 of the report : "In this context, the further requirement that the reasons for making the order shall be stated, must be understood to mean that reason for rejection of the explanation of the Corporation must also be stated. The statutory requirement of stating the reasons is not satisfied simply by narrating the charges and the opinion of the Government that the explanation of the Corporation has failed to meet the charges; in our view it is also necessary that reasons for that opinion should be stated." With respects, we agree with these observations far as they lay down the general principles in judging these matters. We have, however, to sec whether in the present case these requirements have been factually fulfilled or not. 12. Before we examine the various charges the explanation of the Board to those charges and the findings recorded by the State Government, we may state a few words regarding the interpretation of the expression `wilful' used in Section 30. We have, however, to sec whether in the present case these requirements have been factually fulfilled or not. 12. Before we examine the various charges the explanation of the Board to those charges and the findings recorded by the State Government, we may state a few words regarding the interpretation of the expression `wilful' used in Section 30. This word has not been defined in the Act or in any other enactment though it has been repeatedly used in sexual Acts and it came for interpretation before the Court on various occasions. On behalf of the respondent reference was made to the decisions in Omprakash Gupta v. State of U. P., A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 458, Rama Chandra Narasimha Kulkarni v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1964 S. C. 1701, Bhagilal M. Davay v. S. R. Subromania Iyer, A.I.R. 1954 Madras 514 and Radhey Mohan v. Har Narain Dash, A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 504. These decisions have been noticed by the learned single Judge in his judgment who after an examination of those cases concluded that the phrase `has made wilful default' used in Section 30 of the Act means and implies that the default of the Municipal Board concerned in the performance of its duty must be the result of deliberation or for some purpose or the consequence of a reckless omission but not the result of inadvertence, careless-ness or negligence. The Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Narasimha Nulkarni v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1964 S. C. 1701 held that the meaning to be attached to the words `wilful' and `wilfully' has to be ascertained on a close examination of the scheme and nature of the legislation in which the words appear and the context hi which they are used. We agree with the learned single Judge that in the context of Section 30 of the Act the expression `wilful default' means a failure to perform duty arising out of the Board's lack of willingness or its disinclination to perform that duty and such failure should not be the result simply of any accident, inadvertence, carelessness or negligence. It is from that point of view that the charges which the State Government held to be proved against the Board have to be examined. 13. It is from that point of view that the charges which the State Government held to be proved against the Board have to be examined. 13. The learned single Judge is of the opinion that so far as sub-heads (2), (3) and (6) of Charge No. 3 are concerned, neither the charge-sheet stated that these defaults of the Board were wilful nor the order passed by the Board has given any , reasons to support its view that the alleged failures were the result of wilful default. In our opinion, this position is not factually correct. The charge-sheet is in Hindi. Charge No. 3, after excluding those portions of it which have not been proved, may be translated thus : Charge No. 3. The Municipal Board has granted temporary leases of land to some persons for making pucca constructions thereon in contravention of the rules. Some instances of them are given below :- (1) ..... ...... ....... ....... (2) The Municipal Board granted a temporary lease of roadside payment land near old water tank on Babar Road to Sri Mukhtar Ahrnad who has made pucca construction on it. The Municipal Board has not taken any steps to prevent the work of this pucca construction on this land. (3) The Municipal Board granted temporary leases of land on roadside payment on City Post Office Road to Sarvasri........and Balak Ram.......Sri Balak Rain has with the help of some members of the Municipal Board constructed some pillars on the land given to him. (4)... .... .... .... (5)... .... .... .... (6) In Mohalla Jogi Tola, Sri Karim Bux was not prevented from making pucca constructions on roadside payment. (7).... .... .... .... (8).... .... .... .... Granting of lease of roadside payment land is against the Government Order No. 857/-11-B-210 I. T. 1949 dated 4-3-1953......................... (4)... .... .... .... (5)... .... .... .... (6) In Mohalla Jogi Tola, Sri Karim Bux was not prevented from making pucca constructions on roadside payment. (7).... .... .... .... (8).... .... .... .... Granting of lease of roadside payment land is against the Government Order No. 857/-11-B-210 I. T. 1949 dated 4-3-1953......................... In this way, the Municipal Board has made wilful default in performance of its duty under Section 7(1) (q) of the U. P. Municipalities Act which enjoins on it the duty for protecting, maintaining and developing the property vested in, or entrusted to the management of the Board." From the above it would be evident that after mentioning eight instances of the failure of the Board to protect the property vested in, or entrusted to the management of the Board, it was as charged of having made wilful default in performance of its duty enjoined on it by Section 7(1)(q). In relation to charge No. 5 this order was reversed. In the beginning the Board was charged of wilful default in making proper arrangement for the cleanliness of the city which was one of its statutory duties and thereafter some instances of that failure of the Board to perform its duty about the lighting of the streets had been stated and thereafter it was charged with wilful default in performing its duty. These are the only charges which have been held to be established against the Board. So, it cannot be said that in the charge-sheet the Board was not charged with wilful default in relation to sub-heads (2), (3) and (6) of charge No. 3. 14. So far as the order of supersession (Annexure 7) is concerned, the State Government has dealt with each item of the charge separately. After reproducing the charge and summarising the explanation submitted by the Board with respect to that charge, the Government stated its reasons for not accepting the explanation and arriving at its own conclusion. In each of these conclusions also, it has been stated that the default of the Board to perform its duty was wilful. 15. After reproducing the charge and summarising the explanation submitted by the Board with respect to that charge, the Government stated its reasons for not accepting the explanation and arriving at its own conclusion. In each of these conclusions also, it has been stated that the default of the Board to perform its duty was wilful. 15. The only point that now remains to be considered is whether the reasons stated by the State Government in its order which was published in the gazette, are germane to the controversy involved in the particular charge or they are extraneous irrelevant to that controversy so as to be no reasons within the meaning of Section 30. 16. From the above it is evident that with the possible exception of charge No. 3(3) all other charges on the basis of which action has been taken by the State Government against the Board are supported by reasons which have been stated in the order as published in the gazette and those reasons are not irrelevant or not germane to the controversy. The Government has further stated in this order that in its view each of these charges individually is sufficient to justify the supersession of the Board. Hence even if charge No. 3(3) is excluded, the decision of the Government could not have been different. 17. In the end it may be stated that respondent No. 1 who is the President of the Board in his writ petition after entering in self-praise of himself tried to give him a certificate of good conduct and efficiency in the discharge of his duties as President. But he alone does not constitute the Board. He cannot vouchsafe to the integrity and efficiency of all the members of the Board or even a majority of them. On the other hand, he himself had alleged that some of the members of the Board were corrupt and self-seekers who did not like the President's efforts to improve the affairs of the Board and they could bring the majority of the members of the Board to their point of view so as to pass a motion of no confidence against him on 25-5-1970 though this motion was subsequently found illegal by this Court on some technical grounds in another writ petition filed by the President. In our opinion, the super-session of such a Board by the State Government cannot be said to be unjustified and the order of supersession does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 18. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned single judge and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondent with costs to the appellants.