JUDGMENT H.L. Agrawal, J. This miscellaneous appeal has been filed under order 43 Rule 1 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure by the appellant, an employer of the respondents, engaged in the manufacture of Biri. He had originally come up to this court in civil revision no. 91 of 1972, which has been ultimately converted into the present appeal. An application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’, was filed by the respondents in the court of the sub-divisional officer, Buxar, all authority appointed under section 15 of the Act to hear and decide claims; complaining that the appellant had not paid their wages for a period of nine days amounting to Rs. 1247.32. The claim of the respondents was resisted by the appellant, but by order dated the 7th December, 1970, the said authority allowed the claim of the respondents in full. An appeal being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4 of 1971, was filed by the appellant before the District Judge of Shahabad at Arrah under section 17 of the Act, which was admitted on the 24th February, 1971. Under section 17 of the Act, an appeal against the order of the authority constituted under section 15 of the Act has been prescribed, which has to be filed before a District Court within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in question. By Act 15 of 1964, a new subsection, namely, (1-A) was inserted in section 17 of the Act, which reads as follows: "No appeal under clause (a) sub-section (1) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against." 2. It is admitted that the appellant filed the appeal before the District Court without the certificate granted by the authority to the effect that he had deposited the amount payable under the order dated the 7th December, 1970, of the authority. It is admitted that the appellant filed the appeal before the District Court without the certificate granted by the authority to the effect that he had deposited the amount payable under the order dated the 7th December, 1970, of the authority. The amount in question was not deposited is apparent from the record of this appeal, in as much as this court by order dated the 16th March, 1972 had passed an ad-interim order of stay staying realisation of the amount in question, and by a subsequent order dated the 13th February 1973, the appellant was directed to deposit the amount in question within a period of two months from that date, which amount was, however, not to be paid to the respondents during the pendency of the present appeal in this court. 3. In the District Court, however a sum of Rs. 49.50 was demanded as process fee by an order dated the 24th February 1971 for issue of appeal notices upon the respondents. This amount not having been deposited inspite of several adjournments the appeal was dismissed for default on the 7th June, 1971. A Miscellaneous Judicial case No. 18 of 1971 was filed by the appellant for restoration of the said appeal under order 41, rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure on two grounds, namely, (i) the appellant fell ill and his Pairvikar had gone home in connection with the marriage ceremony of his daughter and as such he could not deposit the process fee, and (ii) the demand of the process fee in question was illegal as there is no provision under the Bihar Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1965, for deposit of process fee. The second ground does not appeal to have been urged in the court below as the District Judge in the impugned order dismissing the Miscellaneous Judicial case has considered the first ground only. On a consideration of the facts and the circumstances of the case, the learned District Judge by his order dated the 23rd December 1971 came to the conclusion that no sufficient cause had been made out for restoration of the appeal and, therefore, the miscellaneous case was dismissed. As already stated, the appellant moved this court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, which was later converted into the present Miscellaneous appeal. 4. Mr. As already stated, the appellant moved this court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, which was later converted into the present Miscellaneous appeal. 4. Mr. Ray Paras Nath, learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal has pressed before this court only the second ground taken in the District Court, namely, that the demand of the process fee by the district Court was itself without jurisdiction and as such the dismissal of the appeal for default in the court below on failure to pay such illegal demand cannot be sustained in law. Learned counsel contended that the appeal before the District Court was under a special forum and, therefore, unless the rules framed under the payment of Wages Act, either under the Central or the State Rules, provided for payment of process fee, there could be no liability of the appellant to pay the same. It is difficult to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel. In my opinion, the moment an appeal is provided to a Civil Court by any special statute, unless a contrary intention is indicated or any particular rule or procedure is prescribed, the appeal must be governed by the general provisions applicable to the Civil Court. The appellant himself has acted in that way. There is no provision in the Act for filing an application for restoration of an appeal filed in pursuance of section 17 of the Act before the District Court and the Miscellaneous Judicial case was itself filed by him under the provision of order 41, rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no provision for filing a revision to this court or any appeal against an order of the District Court, but the appellant did file originally a Civil Revision which has now been converted into the present appeal. However, as is well settled, no amount of consent of a party can confer jurisdiction to a court, if there is none on the subject. The appellant is thus not estopped from raising this question for his conduct indicated above. 5. In Raj Kumar Mills Ltd, Indore Vs. Inspector, Payment of Wages, a question was raised in the Madhya Bharat High Court as to whether the District Court hearing the appeal under section 17 of the Act as a Civil Court was subordinate to the High Court or was a Persona designate. 5. In Raj Kumar Mills Ltd, Indore Vs. Inspector, Payment of Wages, a question was raised in the Madhya Bharat High Court as to whether the District Court hearing the appeal under section 17 of the Act as a Civil Court was subordinate to the High Court or was a Persona designate. On a review of a large number of authorities on the question, the learned Judges held as follows : "When an appeal is provided for under section 17 to the District Court, that court is appealed to as one of the ordinary courts of the country. Consequently its order and decrees will be governed by the rule of the C. P. Code". A similar question was also considered by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of the General Manager, North Eastern Railway, and others Vs Paras Nath Tewari where it was held that the District Court hearing an appeal under section 17 of the Act, is a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court and not as a persona designate. References may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Vs. James Chadwick and Bros Ltd. In this case an appeal against the order passed by the Registrar under the Trade Marks Act, which was made appelable to the High Court, was filed. Against the decision of a learned single Judge of the High Court, a Letters Patent appeal was sought to be filed on a question as to whether such an appeal was competent, and it was held that Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable. It was observed that the Trade Marks Act did not provide for any procedure to be followed in the conduct of appeals and therefore, once an appeal came to the High Court, it had to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that court in accordance with the provisions of the Charter under which that Court is constituted. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court quoted with approval the remarks of the House of Lords in National Telephone Co., Ltd., Vs. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court quoted with approval the remarks of the House of Lords in National Telephone Co., Ltd., Vs. His Majesty's Postmaster General which are as follows: "When a question is stated to be referred to an established court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that court are to attach and also that any general rights of appeal from its decision likewise attached". 6. I may also refer to the provision of order 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 of this order prescribes that every process issued under the Code of Civil Procedure shall be served at the expense of the party on whose behalf it is issued. Under Chapter IV of the Court Fees Act, provision has been made for the process fee and under section 20, every High Court has been authorised to make rules, interalia, relations to the matter of fee chargeable for serving and executing processes issued by such court in its appellate jurisdiction and by the other Civil and Revenue Courts established within the local limits of its jurisdiction. The Patna High Court in pursuance of the provision of section 20 of the Court fees Act has prescribed for such fees and costs in para V. of the Civil Court Rules. 7. From the discussions made above, I am of the definite view that an appeal filed under section 17 of the Act in the District Court must be governed by the ordinary procedure and provisions applicable to the Civil court and the same has to be disposed of according to the rules of procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code. The order of the District Judge dated the 24th February, 1971 demanding process fee from the appellant was, therefore, a perfectly legal and valid order, and in default in compliance of the said order, the dismissal of the appeal was fully legal and valid. 8. Some argument was also advanced on behalf of the respondents with reference to sub-section (1-A) of section 17 referred, to above regarding the in competency of the appeal itself in the lower court. The requirement of the provision is, in my opinion mandatory, and an appeal filed without being accompanied with a certificate referred to in the said provision is itself not maintainable. The requirement of the provision is, in my opinion mandatory, and an appeal filed without being accompanied with a certificate referred to in the said provision is itself not maintainable. Be that as it may, since the question pressed in this court on behalf of the appellant has been answered against him, it is not necessary for me to advert to this ground for dismissal of this appeal. 9. For the reasons indicated above, this appeal has got no merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed. The respondents will be entitled to their costs. I would assess the hearing fee at Rs. 100.00 only. Appeal dismissed.