( 1 ) THIS petition purporting to be under Art. 226 of the Constitution of india (it ought really to be under Art. 227) is by the Management of a transport undertaking. The challenge is against the order made by the labour Court computing compensation payable to the respondents workmen under S. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which will hereinafter be referred to ap the Act. ( 2 ) THE case of the plaintiffs (workmen) was that they had been employed by the Management of the transport undertaking for more than a year and that on 15-10-1967 the Management of the undertaking was transferred and therefore they were entitled to arrears of salary and the value of the benefits in terms of money and also compensation for retrenchment as per the provisions of S. 25ff of the Act. On behalf of the Management, it was stated that the employment of the workmen was terminated on account of unauthorised absence of the workmen from 15-10-1967. It was therefore contended that since the termination was on account of misconduct, there was no existing right in the workmen to claim any compensation under s. 33c (2) of the Act. It was further contended that the Labour Court while entertaining the application under Sec. 33c (2) of the Act was not competent to go into the question of the termination of the services of the workmen and it was a matter to be adjudicated only on a reference under section 10 of the Act. ( 3 ) THE case had been set down for hearing before the Labour Court on 7-3-1969. On that day, the Management which was represented by a counsel sought an adjournment on the ground that the petitioner herein could not be present in Court owing to indisposition. The case was therefore adjourned to 21-3-1969 for further consideration. On that day nobody on behalf of the Management was present and no reason was shown as to why the case had to be adjourned on that day. The Tribunal proceeded to consider the case treating the Management as ex parte. Ultimately, it made an award in favour of the workmen computing compensation payable to each of them individually. This award came to be made on 3-4-69. The Tribunal proceeded to consider the case treating the Management as ex parte. Ultimately, it made an award in favour of the workmen computing compensation payable to each of them individually. This award came to be made on 3-4-69. On 30-4-1969, the present petitioner (Management) filed an application for setting aside the order on the ground that he was prevented from sufficient cause from attending to the case on 21-3-1969 when he was placed ex parte. In support of such application, he has produced a medical certificate and some other evidence in that regard. The Tribunal however refused to consider the application of the Management for setting aside the ex parte order on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. In doing so, it relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sarojini v. Lakshmana Rao 1969 (1) LLJ. 9. It also referred to Rule 23 of the Rules framed under the Act (Mysore Rules ). Aggrieved by the order on the said application as well as the order made under S. 33c (2) of the Act the petitioner has come to this Court. ( 4 ) ON behalf of the petitioner two contentions were urged. They are (1) the Tribunal erred in thinking that it had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte order made on 3-4-1969 and failed to see that it was implicit from the very provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules that it had sufficient jurisdiction to set aside the order for sufficient cause to be shown by the party placed ex parte. In any event, there was inherent jurisdiction in the Tribunal of this character to set aside the award on the principle underlying s. 151 of the CPC. (2) The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 33c (2) of the Act in going into the question of compensation payable under Sec. 33c (2) of that the claim of the workmen had been disputed by the Management on the ground that their services had been terminated for misconduct as they had absented themselves unauthorisedly. On a careful consideration of the matter I am not persuaded to agree with either of the above contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. On a careful consideration of the matter I am not persuaded to agree with either of the above contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. On the first question my attention was invited by the learned Counsel on behalf of the workmen to a Division Bench Ruling of the Bombay High court in Malik Dairy Farms v. Its Workers Union 1968 (2) LLJ. 523, Tarkunde, J. speaking for the Divisoin Bench has stated the position thus : there is unfortuately no rule in the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) rules, 1957, which enables a party to a reference made under the industrial Disputes Act 1947, to apply to a Labour Court for setting aside an award passed ex parte. Rule 26 of these Rules lays down that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to a proceeding before a Board, Court, Tribunal or an Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex parte. A party, however, who is absent even for sufficient cause on a date fixed for hearing of a reference, has usually no opportunity to show to the Labour Court before the Court proceeds to hear the reference ex parte that his absence is for sufficient cause. If the Labour Court passed an ex parte award and the aggrieved party approaches us under Arts. 226 to 227 of the Constitution, we are unable to interfere with the award unless the Labour Court is found to be wrong in law in proceeding ex parte and it is virtually impossible for the aggrieved party to show on the basis of the record of the Labour Court that the Court erred in law in proceeding ex parte. We understand that a rule enabling an aggrieved party to apply to the Labour Court (or other Tribunal under the Act) for setting aside an ex parts award is found in the rules framed under the Industrial disputes Act 1947 by the State Government of Madras, Uttar Pradesh and Kerala. It appears to us desirable that such a rule should find place in the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957. It appears to us desirable that such a rule should find place in the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957. " ( 5 ) IT is clear from the above enunciation which has been rendered more or less in circumstances similar to those present in the instant case, that in the absence of a specific rule conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal to set aside the ex parte order, it was not open to the Tribunal to entertain an application for such a relief, as has been done in the present case. Turning now to the next contention, the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that the termination of the workmen for misconduct as alleged by the Management cannot be interfered with by a Tribunal under s. 33c (2) of the Act. It is further contended that the effect of such termination, which has been disputed by the workmen, will necessarily give rise to an issue triable only under S. 10 (l) of the Act. Once such a situation exists in a proceeding under S. 33c (2) of the Act, it is not open to. the tribunal to go into it. This argument overlooks certain aspects present in this case as pointed out on behalf of the workmen. It is submitted on behalf of the workmen that there was a transfer of Management from the present petitioner to some other person with effect from 15-10-1967 Once this event happens the provisions of S. 25ff of the Act would come into play thus enabling the workmen to claim compensation for retrenchment and such a question can be gone into for the purpose of determination of the compensation under S. 33c (2) of the Act. Indeed, it is pointed out that the Tribunal had proceeded only on this basis. But it is contended on behalf of the Management that what was transferred on 15-10-1967 was only the right to manage and there was not any transfer of undertaking land the ownership was still with the previous management represented by the present petitioner herein. This is clearly a question of fact and the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the transfer of the under taking was such as would attract the provisions of Sec. 25ff of the Act. I am not, therefore disposed to interfere with this finding. This is clearly a question of fact and the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the transfer of the under taking was such as would attract the provisions of Sec. 25ff of the Act. I am not, therefore disposed to interfere with this finding. ( 6 ) I now turn to the consideration of some of the relevant decisions relied on behalf of the parties. Considerable reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner on a decision of this Court in Mysore Sugar Co. v. Manavendra 1966 (1) Mys. L. J. 544. In that decision on a review of certain decisions of the supreme Court, this Court came to the conclusion that in the context of the scope and ambit of S. 33c (2), a claim which is made under S. 33c (2) must relate to an existing right. Besides, it should be a claim which should not be dependent upon the determination of another matter which might give rise to a labour dispute falling under S. 10 (1) or other provisions of the Act. In the instant case, the ratio of this decision is clearly inapplicable. I say so for the reason that the case as put forth on behalf of the petitioner that an industrial dispute would arise in view of the dispute relative to the manner of the termination, is not established by facts. Moreover, the case on behalf of the workmen has been considered oh the basis of the provisions of S. 25ff of the Act consequent upon the transfer of the Management of the undertaking to someone else. Hence the question that remains to be considered is whether in a proceeding under Section 33c (2) of the Act an award of compensation as per the terms of s. 25ff of the Act can be gone into. On this question it is sufficient to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Payment of Wages Inspector v. BES and I Co. AIR. 1969 SC. 590. . It is observed therein as follows : nor could the Authority have been intended to try as matters incidental to such a claim questions arising under the proviso to s. 25ff. AIR. 1969 SC. 590. . It is observed therein as follows : nor could the Authority have been intended to try as matters incidental to such a claim questions arising under the proviso to s. 25ff. It would be the Labour Court in such cases which would be the proper forum which can determine such questions under S. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which also possesses power to appoint a Commissioner to take evidence where question of facts require detailed evidence. ( 7 ) IN regard to the above enunciation, it was submitted on behalf of the management that the decision was clearly distinguishable in that it was one which arose under the Payment of Wages Act. It seems to me that the fact that that case arose under the Payment of Wages Act would not make any difference to the observation made in the Supreme Court decision in so far as it is applicable to the present case. ( 8 ) IT was also pointed out on behalf of the workmen that in view of the fact that such a claim arose on the basis of a statutory provision, it was one to be considered only under S. 33c (2) of the Act. The statutory provision in question is S. 25ff of the Act. In East India Coal Co. v. Rameshwar 1968 (1) LLJ. 6. the position has been stated thus : there is no reason to hold that a benefit provided by a statute or a scheme made thereunder without there being anything contrary under such statute or S. 33c (2) cannot fall within sub-sec. (2) i have earlier observed that the petitioner is concluded by the findings of fact relative to the retrenchment contemplated under S. 25ff of the Act. In the light of the above enunciation, it is clear that the Tribunal was competent to consider the question of retrenchment compensation in an application under S. 33c (2) of the Act. For the above reasons, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .