JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This appeal has been filed against the judgment, of a learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant by which he challenged the validity of the order of the Director of Consolidation passed under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter called the Act). 2. In proceedings under Section 9 of the Act the Consolidation Officer held that Nathu Ram appellant was in possession of the land since 1361-F. and had acquired Bhumidhari rights and Chheda Lal, respondent No. 2, was not entitled to the land. Appeal filed against the order was allowed by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and Chheda Lal was held entitled to the land. Against this order a second appeal was filed. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, by his order dated 5-1-63, allowed the appeal and directed that the name of Nathu Ram should be maintained in the records as Bhumidhar and not that of Chheda Lal. Against the order a revision under Section 48 of the Act was preferred and the Director of Consolidation allowed the revision on 14-6-66. The Director of Consolidation went into the merits of the matter, and on the fresh findings of fact recorded by him, held that Chheda Lal and not Nathu Ram was entitled to be the Bhumiahar of the holding in dispute. Against this order Nathu Ram filed the Writ Petition challenging it on the ground that the Director had travelled beyond his jurisdiction in going into the merit on the matter and recording findings of fact on the basis of his own appreciation of evidence. The contention was that the powers of the revisional authority were limited to matter of jurisdiction as contained in Section 48 of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act of 1963. The Writ Petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge on the finding that the amended Section 48 was applicable and the Director had a right to go into the questions of fact and give his own findings. He relied be a decision of this Court in Prem Chand v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1966 A.L.J. 641. The Writ Petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge on the finding that the amended Section 48 was applicable and the Director had a right to go into the questions of fact and give his own findings. He relied be a decision of this Court in Prem Chand v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1966 A.L.J. 641. Learned single Judge also held that the petitioner was not entitled to get any relief from this Court as he had not appeared before the Director of Consolidation and had not applied for getting the ex parte order passed in revision set aside. In the appeal before us learned counsel has challenged the correctness of both the views, taken by the learned single Judge. 3. In my opinion, the learned single Judge was in error in holding that the provisions of the amended Section 48 were applicable to the present revision and not those of the unamended section. Sec. 48 as it stood prior to the amendment gave to the Director only limited powers of interference, he could interfere only if the Deputy Director had exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law or failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him or acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity. After the amendment of Section 48 by U.P. Act No. 8 of 1963, the revisional powers were enlarged and the Director of Consolidation was given the power to examine the record in any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority and, to pass such orders as he thought fit, and could examine, in passing that order, the correctness, legality or propriety of the order of the subordinate authority. In case the amended section applied, the order would be justified, but if the unamended section applied, the order passed by the Director of Consolidation would be liable to be quashed. 4. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 47 of U. P. Act No. 8 of 1963 runs as follows : "(1) In units notified under Section 4 of the principal Act, prior to the date on which this Act comes into force, hereinafter referred to as the said date, all work in regard to or connected with consolidation operations. 4. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 47 of U. P. Act No. 8 of 1963 runs as follows : "(1) In units notified under Section 4 of the principal Act, prior to the date on which this Act comes into force, hereinafter referred to as the said date, all work in regard to or connected with consolidation operations. (i) beyond the stage of publication of the statement of proboscis under Section 20 of the principal Act, where, on or before the said date, that statement had already been published; and (ii) upto and inclusive of the stage of confirmation Statement of principles under Section 18 of the principal Act, where, on or before the said date, notices under Section 9 of the principal Act had already issued ; shall be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act, as if this Act had not come into force:- Provided that as respects second appeals and revisions, which lay under the provisions of the principal Act, as it stood prior to its amendment by this Act, but had not been instituted before the said date, the principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall apply and be deemed always to have applied as if this Act had been in force on all material dates." This Act came into operation on March 8, 1963. The Deputy Director had decided the second appeal on 5-1-63 under the provisions of the unamended Act. If the proviso mentioned above did not apply to the present case, the revision with be under the principal Act as if the amendment had not been made in Sec. 48. It is not disputed that both the second appeal and the revision lay under the provisions of the principal Act. 5. The contention of the respondent is that the revision having been filed subsequent to March, 1963, will be governed by the amended Act even though the second appeal may have, been instituted and decided before March 8. This contention is based on a misreading of the proviso. A plain reading of the proviso suggests that it refers to cases where both the second appeal and the revision had not been instituted and not to cases where only the revision had not been instituted. After the word `but' in the proviso we will have to read some nouns as subject to the verbal phrase had not been instituted'. A plain reading of the proviso suggests that it refers to cases where both the second appeal and the revision had not been instituted and not to cases where only the revision had not been instituted. After the word `but' in the proviso we will have to read some nouns as subject to the verbal phrase had not been instituted'. These nouns are provided in the earlier part of the proviso, viz., second appeals and revisions. Hence the clause in the proviso will read : "but second appeal and revision had not been instituted". These words can lead to no other inference except that the proviso will apply only to a case where both second appeal and revision had not been instituted. The relevant words, properly set, to be interpreted are : "Provided that..............(second appeal and revision) had not been instituted before the said date." In the opening part of the proviso, between the words `appeal' and `revisions' the word `or' has been used, but the word `and' has been used, which signifies that both of them should not have been instituted before the said date for attracting the proviso. If the proviso were to apply even if the appeal had been instituted and not the revision, the word `or' should have been used. Hence, if no violence is to be done to the words, the proviso must be deemed to apply only to such a case where both second appeal and revision had not been instituted and not to such a case where the appeal had been instituted and only the revision had not been instituted.' If this were not to be the meaning, the effect would be, where second appeal was decided before March 8, and the revision was instituted a day prior to March 8, 1963, it will be decided under the unamended Act and if the same revision was instituted a day after, it will be governed by the amended Section 48, giving much wider powers to the Director of Consolidation. This could not have been the intention of the Legislature, because the principle normally is that similar proceedings are treated at par and dealt with similarly. 6. The unamended Act provided for two appeals on facts and law and a revision on questions of jurisdiction. This could not have been the intention of the Legislature, because the principle normally is that similar proceedings are treated at par and dealt with similarly. 6. The unamended Act provided for two appeals on facts and law and a revision on questions of jurisdiction. The amended Act provides for one appeal on law and fact and a wide power of revision amounting to an appellate power. The effect both of the amended and unamended provisions is to give the right to litigants of two appeals both on law and fact. Hence, if the second appeal has already been instituted before March 8, 1973, it will, have to be decided both on facts and law. If the second appeal has already been decided on merits or is entitled to be decided on consideration both of facts and law, revisional powers will be confined to errors of jurisdiction. Sec. 47 of the 1963 Act purports to substitute the second appeal and the revision by a revision and not only the limited revision by an enlarged revision. 7. Learned single Judge relied upon the case of Prem Chand which was subsequently overruled in Gauri Shanker v. S. N. Tewari, 1968 A.L.J. 933 for holding that where second appeal had been instituted before 8th March 1963 and revision had not been so instituted, the amended Section 48 will apply. The proposition decided in that case was entirely different. The question relevant for our purposes referred for answer in that case was: "1. (a) On the facts and circumstances of the case was a revision against the order of the Deputy Director dated 22-3-1963 maintainable in the present case. (b) If so, would such a revision be governed by amended Section 48 or 48 as it stood prior to its amendment by Act VIII of 1963." The answer to question (1) (a) was `Yes', and to question 1 (b) was that it would be governed by unamended Sec. 148. In that case second appeal had been instituted prior to 8th March 1903 and the revision had been instituted alter that date, and the Full Bench held that the unamended Section 48 was applicable. This case in fact lends support to the view I am taking that unless both the second appeal and the revision had not been instituted before March, the revision will be under the unamended Sec. 48. This case in fact lends support to the view I am taking that unless both the second appeal and the revision had not been instituted before March, the revision will be under the unamended Sec. 48. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to the case of "Gauri Shanker v. S. N. Tewari", 1968 A.L.J. 933 and contended that an observation. (i) If the first appeal or the second appeal was decided before 8-3-63 and a second appeal or revision was filed before that date. (ii) If the first appeal or second appeal was decided before 8-3-63 but a second appeal or revision was not filed before that date. (iii) If the first appeal or second appeal is decided on or after 5-3-1963. It was then observed : "As to (i) and(ii), there is no dispute or difficulty and the same result would follow on any interpretation of the word `lay'." As the word `or' has been used in example (ii) quoted above, between `appeal' and `revision', learned counsel contended that the learned Judge had held that in a case where second appeal had been decided before 8th March 1963 and revision had not been filed before that date, revision under the amended Act will lie. Learned Judge was only considering the interpretation of the word `lay' as given in the earlier Full Bench and did not purport to decide the proposition arising in the present case. The observation quoted above cannot thus be treated as amounting to a decision. The question referred to the Bench was, "whether the proviso to Section 47 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963 is applicable to this case or made in the judgment of one of the learned Judges who constituted that Bench (Hon'ble G. C. Mathur, J.) supported the view that if only the second appeal had been instituted and revision had not been instituted prior to March 8, revision will be governed by amended Sec. 48. The observation referred was made in relation to the interpretation of Prem Chandra's case. It was mentioned : "The consequences of the interpretation put on the proviso by the Full Bench are these:- The second appeal revision will be governed by the unamended Act. A revision under the amended Act will lie. A second appeal or revision will lie under the unamended Act." not". It was mentioned : "The consequences of the interpretation put on the proviso by the Full Bench are these:- The second appeal revision will be governed by the unamended Act. A revision under the amended Act will lie. A second appeal or revision will lie under the unamended Act." not". The first appellate court had dismissed the appeal on 8th March 1963 and neither the second appeal nor the revision had been instituted before 8th March 1963. The proviso, in these circumstances, was held to apply and the revision was held to under the amended Act against the first appellate order. The learned Judge (Hon. G. C. Mathur) had in the concluding paragraph of his judgment observed: "For these reasons, I am of opinion that Prem Chandra's case was not correctly decided and that the proviso to Section 47 of the Amending Act applies to all cases where the unamended Act provided for second appeals and revisions and such second appeals and revisions had not been filed before 8-3-1963." It cannot, therefore, be held that even Hon. G. C. Mathur, J. in Gauri Slianker's case had decided that in a case where second appeal had been instituted before 8-3-63 and revision had not been instituted before that date, the Director of Consolidation will nave the power to decide the revision under the amended Section 48 and not the unamended Sec. 48. 8. The Director of Consolidation, therefore, acted beyond his jurisdiction in deciding the revision when he entered into the merits of the case and decided questions of fact. He had jurisdiction to decide the revision only m accordance with the restricted powers conferred on him by the unamended Sec. 48. He could interfere only if he had found that the order of the Deputy Director suffered from some error of jurisdiction as contemplated by the unamended Sec. 48. 9. It is also not possible to hold that the petitioner became in capacitated from seeking his remedy through the writ petition against the order of the Director of Consolidation simply because he had not applied before him for setting aside the ex parte order. The two remedies are exclusive of each other. He could have applied for setting aside of the ex parte order if he had sufficient cause for his absence. If he had no sufficient cause, he could not have applied for setting aside. The two remedies are exclusive of each other. He could have applied for setting aside of the ex parte order if he had sufficient cause for his absence. If he had no sufficient cause, he could not have applied for setting aside. In case the petitioner can show that the order passed by the authority concerned suffers from an error of jurisdiction, he cannot be debarred from getting the relief simply because he did not approach the authority concerned for setting aside the ex parte order. 10. Learned counsel, for the respondent then tried to urge that this Court should not interfere because the Director of Consolidation had passed his judgment on certain findings which showed that the Deputy Director had committed errors of jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal. But the order of the Director itself is not very specific and it is not possible to take facts from his judgment, particularly when he had no jurisdiction to enter into the facts. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of learned single Judge is set aside, the writ petition is allowed and order of the Director of Consolidation dated 14-6-66 is quashed and he is directed to rehear and decide the revision in accordance with an and in the light of the observations made above. Parties will bear their own costs. G. C. Mathur, J. - I agree.