JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - The Petitioner who is the same-in all the five writ applications prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the appellate order dated 6-5-1969 passed by the Minister, Transport, Orissa in M.V. Appeals Nos. 3 to 7 of 1969. 2. The facts giving rise to these proceedings are these : The State Transport Authority, Orissa issued a notice inviting applications so as to reach it by 25-11-1968 for the grant of a permanent stage carriage permit on the inter-State route Parlakhemedi to Gunupur. In all, twelve applications were received by the State Transport Authority as indicated in Annexure. 2 to the petition. Out of the twelve applications, five were received beyond the time fixed, these five Applicants being Narayano Patra, Noroshimo Patro, Vasya Raju Kamaraju, B. Koteswar Rao and V. Lakumu Raju. The substance of these twelve applications was published in the prescribed manner on 13-12-1968 and written objections or representations thereto were invited to reach the authority on or before 14-1-1969, as required by Sub-section (3) of Section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act IV of 1939) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). At the seventyfifth meeting of the State Transport Authority held on 21-1-1959, the applications were 'taken up for consideration. The five applications referred to above and which were received beyond the time filed in the advertisement were rejected. It may be stated here that Noroshimo Patra and Naravano Patra, besides submitting applications which were beyond time, had earlier submitted two applications which had been received by the State Transport Authority within the time prescribed. But on 21-1-1969, when the seven applications which were within time were taken up for consideration, it was found that the two applications submitted by Noroshimo Patra and Narayano Patra were not in proper form in as much as the applications were in forms meant for securing temporary permits. These two defective applications were therefore rejected with the result that there remained only five applications which were in proper form and had been received within the time prescribed. One of these five applications was one Rabinarayan Misra who however was absent at the meeting of the State Transport Authority held on 21-1-1969. On that ground his application was rejected. These two defective applications were therefore rejected with the result that there remained only five applications which were in proper form and had been received within the time prescribed. One of these five applications was one Rabinarayan Misra who however was absent at the meeting of the State Transport Authority held on 21-1-1969. On that ground his application was rejected. That left in the field only the remaining four Applicants, namely, M.K.D.N.V. Prasad Rao, M. Ramachandra Rao, I Sanyasi Rao (the Petitioner in the present writ applications), and I.V. Rao. Orders were passed granting to each of these four Applicants a permit for the advertised route. Thereupon, Noroshimo Patra and Narayano Patra and the three others, whose applications for the permit, having been received late, had been rejected, filed appeals u/s 64 of the Act before the Minister, Transport, Orissa. 3. On behalf of the Appellants, two main contentions were raised before the appellate authority, namely, (1) the State Transport Authority should have exercised its discretion to condone the delay in filing the application since during the relevant period communications between Cuttack and Parlakhemundi were disrupted due of cyclone and the newspapers containing the advertisement reached Parlakhemundi only after the prescribed date. Thus due (sic) reasons beyond their control the Appellants could not file their applications in time. (2) The advertisement having been made for a stage carriage permit, the State Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to grant-four permits. The first ground did not find favour with the appellate authority but he found considerable force in the second contention raised before him. He thought that since the advertisement was only for one permit, many intending Applicants might not have applied and consequently the State Transport Authority had been deprived of a wider range of selection and thus public interest suffered. He, therefore, allowed the appeals, set aside the decision of the State Transport Authority and directed the latter to re-advertise the route and after receiving applications to dispose them of in accordance with law. Aggrieved by this appellate order, I. Sanyasi Rao who was one of the successful Applicants before the State Transport Authority has filed the five writ applications praying for quashing the appellate order passed by the Minister. 4. Aggrieved by this appellate order, I. Sanyasi Rao who was one of the successful Applicants before the State Transport Authority has filed the five writ applications praying for quashing the appellate order passed by the Minister. 4. It may be incidently stated that pending disposal of these writ applications, operation of the order passed by the State Transport Authority has not been stayed and the validity of the permits issued for a period of five years from the date of issue is going to expire in January next. Three substantial points were urged before us in support of these applications. Firstly, that the appeals before the Minister were not maintainable having been filed by persons whose applications were rejected as being not within time, secondly that the grant of four permits, although the advertisement was for a permit, has not offended and statutory provision of the Act and the Rules and thirdly, that in any case, what the Minister ought to have quashed was only the grant of permits and not the advertisement which was without any flaw and that consequently his order directing that there should be fresh advertisement is illegal. 5. To appreciate the first contention it is necessary to set down the provision regarding appeals under the Act. Section 64 of the Act in so far as is material runs thus: 64. Appeals.-Any person: (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional. Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, xxxxxx may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard. It is contended by Mr. B.M. Patnaik appearing for the Petitioner that in the case of the Appellants before the Minister, it cannot be said that the State Transport Authority had refused to grant permits to them, because there was no occasion to consider their cases on merits by reason of the fact that their applications having been received beyond the time prescribed had been summarily rejected. In support of his contention, he relies on a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in the Central Karnataka Motor Services, Ltd. v. The Mysore Board of Revenue AIR 1960 Mys 72. In support of his contention, he relies on a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in the Central Karnataka Motor Services, Ltd. v. The Mysore Board of Revenue AIR 1960 Mys 72. In that case, the application for permit did not contain the particulars mentioned in Clauses (a)(b) and (c) of Section 46 of the Act. The Mysore case is therefore dearly distinguishable on facts. In the cases before us, the applications submitted by the Appellants were not defective in the sense that they did not contain the particulars required by Section 46 of the Act. The only flaw pointed out in respect of those applications is that they were received beyond time. Those applications had not been summarily rejected because Ext. 2 makes it clear that all the twelve applications including the five that were received beyond time were notified u/s 57 of the Act and objections were called for. All the twelve applications were taken up for consideration by the State Transport Authority in its meeting held on 21-1-1969. It was open to the State Transport Authority to condone the delay in the receipt of those applications, but that authority did not choose to do so and having taken up the applications for consideration he rejected them on the ground that they were not received in time. In the circumstances, therefore, it was a case of refusal to grant the permit within the meaning of Section 64(a) of the Act, and they were therefore competent to prefer the appeals before the Minister. 6. That apart, no such objection about the maintainability of the appeals was raised before the appellate authority. Had that been done, it would have been open to the Minister to deal with the cases in his revisional jurisdiction if he so chose. We are, therefore, not prepared at this belated stage to entertain the contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioner that the appeals before the Minister were not competent. 7. The circumstances under which High Courts would issue writs under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in cases under the Motor Vehicles Act are well established. We are, therefore, not prepared at this belated stage to entertain the contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioner that the appeals before the Minister were not competent. 7. The circumstances under which High Courts would issue writs under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in cases under the Motor Vehicles Act are well established. The High Court would issue them only in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the, correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made. The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. There is a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. See Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others. Both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction, whatever its extent, has not to be confused with an appellate jurisdiction which, is normally co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal There are certain limitations within which these two Articles must be made to operate, and those limitations, whatever their extent may be, clearly indicate that there is no jurisdiction equal to the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal. What the High Court has to find out is that there has been an error of jurisdiction or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or the decision is otherwise manifestly unjust. It is only where there has been substantial error of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice, or the order is manifestly unjust, that interference can be made by the High Court, but not otherwise. The question, therefore, is whether the appellate order passed by the Minister in this case is so manifestly unjust and has resulted in a miscarriage of justice to warrant interference by the High Court. Admittedly, in this case, the advertisement was issued for the issue of a stage carriage permit. But actually four permits were issued. This action of the State Transport Authority is sought to be justified on the ground that previous to calling for applications, a decision had been taken by the State Transport Authority u/s 47(3) of the Act to issue four permits. The State Transport Authority is required to arrive at its decision u/s 47(3) of the Act having regard to matters mentioned in Section 47(1) independent of any representation by operators or any hearing. The deliberation as well as the decision of the Regional Transport Authority u/s 47(3) is confined to its own administrative policy and order. The decision of the authority u/s 47(3) of the Act need not therefore be in the form of a formal resolution and is never published. That order can subsequently be modified by the same authority. There is, therefore, no scope for members of the public at any stage to know whether and if so what decision had been taken by the Transport Authority u/s 47(3) of the Act. Therefore, when it is a case of new route which is being opened for the first time and an advertisement is issued calling for applications for such a new route, specifying the number of vacancies for it is reasonable to infer that when the number of vacancies is specified that shows the limit which must have been decided upon by the Transport Authority u/s 47(3). In this case, therefore, the public were entitled to think having regard to the advertisement issued by the State Transport Authority that the authorities had decided u/s 47(3) to issue only one permit and that accordingly applications were invited for the issue of a permit. It does not require e la borate arguments that the number of applications, be it for the issue of a permit or for any other purpose, depends to a large extent on the number of vacancies available. The Minister, is, therefore, right in taking the view that if the advertisement had mentioned that four permits would be issued there was likelihood of a larger number of applications to be received and that if a larger number of applications had been received that would have given a larger scope for choice to the authorities. As it is out of the total number of 12 applications, five were rejected on the ground that they were received beyond time, two were rejected on the ground that they were not in proper from and one was rejected on the ground that the concerned Applicant was not present, that left in the field only the remaining four, and each was given a permit without due consideration of the merits of their claim and there by public interest has suffered. In these circumstances, and having regard to the fact that a decision had been taken u/s 47(3) to issue four permits, the State Transport Authority itself having discovered the mistake that the advertisement was issued only in respect of one permit, could have cancelled the entire proceeding and issued a fresh advertisement calling for applications for the grant of four permits. There is no reason why the appellate authority namely, the Minister, whose powers are co-extensive with that of the State Transport Authority can not exercise such a power. 8. The fact that the permit granted to the Petitioner would expire in the normal course within a period of four months hence, and that, therefore, he should be allowed to operate the buses till then is beside the point. He had already derived enough advantage by reason of the fact that operation of the orders passed by the State Transport Authority had not been stayed and on that ground alone he cannot ask for further advantage. 9. In the result, all the writ applications fail and are dismissed with costs. He had already derived enough advantage by reason of the fact that operation of the orders passed by the State Transport Authority had not been stayed and on that ground alone he cannot ask for further advantage. 9. In the result, all the writ applications fail and are dismissed with costs. Consolidated hearing fee in all the five writ applications is assessed at Rs. 250/- (Rupees two hundred and fifty only). S. Acharya, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed