JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. The petitioner company was manufacturing sewing thread in its mills situate at Koratti in Trichur District. The name of the company was changed from Jumna Thread Mills Private Limited to J. and P. Coats (India) Private Ltd. during the course of the proceedings which is the subject matter of the Original Petition. 2. For the purpose of its business the petitioner required large quantities of wooden spools. It is on these that the thread manufactured in the mills is wound. These spools were to be made out of a particular type of wood, namely, birchwood, and these were being imported from foreign countries. While so, the petitioner was told by the Government of India that it should get them prepared in India for its use. But as the proper wood was not available in India, the petitioner sought to import wood necessary for the manufacture from Canada. It is said that the petitioner made enquiries with the Textile Commissioner, Government of India who informed it that the wood for such manufacture can be imported under a bond and would be allowed free of duty, on the petitioner producing a certificate to the effect that the imported wood has been consumed in the manufacture of wooden spools. 3. The petitioner imported a consignment of birch-wood blocks for the purpose of manufacturing spools. This consignment arrived at Cochin Port in October, 1953. When customs duty on the said consignment was demanded the petitioner approached the Textile Commissioner of the Government of India and requested him to write to the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Cochin to exempt the wood so imported from payment of Excise duty. It is seen from Ext. P-1 letter written by the Textile Commissioner to the Collector of Customs on the 16th October, 1953 that the former requested that concession may be allowed to enable the petitioner to clear consignments under bonds and the question of issuing certificate as to the actual consumption will be taken up by the Textile Commissioner in due course. Third respondent permitted the clearance of the goods on execution of a bond by the petitioner. It was so executed on 29th October 1953. The time originally fixed for production of certificate was later extended. The Textile Commissioner gave Ext. P-3 certificate to satisfy the Customs authorities about the actual consumption of the birchwood. Third respondent permitted the clearance of the goods on execution of a bond by the petitioner. It was so executed on 29th October 1953. The time originally fixed for production of certificate was later extended. The Textile Commissioner gave Ext. P-3 certificate to satisfy the Customs authorities about the actual consumption of the birchwood. The certificate referred to the utilisation of the entire quantity of the wood imported in the manufacture of spools. It was then that the Customs authorities took the view that Customs duty was leviable since exemption was limited to wood imported for the purpose of being converted into 'bobbins' and spools were not synonymous with bobbins. 4. Item 40 of the Schedule I of the Indian Customs Tariff read as follows: "40. Wood and timber, all sorts, not otherwise specified, including all sorts of ornamental wood." This item was subject to duty at the rates specified. But by a notification No. I-Customs dated 9th March 1946, issued under section 23 of the Sea Customs Act, 1828, the Central Government directed, among other things that, "Wooden blocks cut to shape and size, imported for manufacture of bobbins and shuttles" will be exempt from customs duty leviable thereon. By a further notification dated 15th October 1946 this item was amended to read, "Wood for the manufacture of shuttles and bobbins". At the time of the import by the petitioner of the consignment with which we are concerned in this case this was the position. The birchwood imported was not leviable with customs duty if the Customs authorities were satisfied that it was in fact used for the purpose of manufacture of shuttles and bobbins'. The certificate Ext. P-3 was sufficient, no doubt, to satisfy them that they were used for the manufacture of spools, but, apparently, the view taken by the third respondent was that bobbins were different from spools and therefore proceedings for imposition of duty were taken. 5. The third respondent by his order dated 17th December 1954 held that the consignment was assessable to duty at 31¼ per cent and demanded payment of Rs. 1,15,840-14-0. Ext. P-4 is the copy of the order passed by the third respondent. This amount so demanded was paid under protest by a cheque dated 28th March 1955. 5. The third respondent by his order dated 17th December 1954 held that the consignment was assessable to duty at 31¼ per cent and demanded payment of Rs. 1,15,840-14-0. Ext. P-4 is the copy of the order passed by the third respondent. This amount so demanded was paid under protest by a cheque dated 28th March 1955. The petitioner, while so protesting, contended that the term, 'bobbin' was a generic expression which included 'spools' as well as various ether similar accessories. Against Ext. P-4 order an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the second respondent, the Central Board of Excise and Customs. But by order dated 6th February, 1956, Ext. P-5, this appeal was dismissed. A revision filed to the Government of India was also similarly dismissed by order dated 20th November, 1956. Ext. P-6 is the copy of the order. The petitioner avers in its petition that legal advice was then obtained as to the course to be taken and on such legal advice the petitioner filed a suit O.S. 238 of 1957 in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ernakulam, transferred and re-numbered as O.S. 84 of 1958 of the Cochin Sub Court. The suit is seen filed on 17th December 1957. This suit, though contested by the third respondent was decreed on 11th December 1959 upholding the claim of the petitioner for refund of the amount due finding that the wood imported by the petitioner was not liable to Customs duty because of the exemption. The matter was taken to this court in A.S. 577 of 1960. By judgment dated 2nd July 1962 this Court remanded the matter to the trial court for the purpose of enabling the parties to adduce evidence on the meaning of the terms 'spools' and 'bobbins'. Pursuant to the remit and after taking further evidence the Subordinate Judge again held that the expression 'spool' was synonymous with 'bobbin' and at any rate 'spool' was included in the generic term 'bobbin' and therefore the birchwood imported was exempt from Customs duty. The court gave a decree directing refund of the amount received. Pursuant to this, in execution, a sum of Rs. 1,67,991.91 was paid to the petitioner by the respondents by deposit in court on 19th August 1964. 6. The court gave a decree directing refund of the amount received. Pursuant to this, in execution, a sum of Rs. 1,67,991.91 was paid to the petitioner by the respondents by deposit in court on 19th August 1964. 6. Again an appeal was filed in this court by the respondent as A.S. 114 of 1964 and that appeal was disposed of by this Court by its judgment Ext. P-10 dated 4th September, 1969. In that judgment this court elaborately considered the meaning of the terms 'bobbin' and 'spool' and held that the Subordinate Judge was right in his conclusion. But this court took the view that a Civil suit would not lie to seek refund of the amount said to have been wrongly collected. The suit was therefore dismissed. 7. It is said that earlier, when the petitioner had been advised that the proper remedy was to file a suit and the suit was so filed, there was no authoritative pronouncement by any court indicative of what remedy would be available to an aggrieved party in such a case. It is also stated in the petition that even as late as 1961, this court had in the decision reported in State of Kerala v. Gopalakrishna Pillai, 1961 K.L.T. 375 in a similar matter held that a suit was maintainable. At the time of the hearing of the appeal A.S. 114 of 1964 it was brought to the notice of the court that on 3rd September 1969 the "Hindu" had reported that the Supreme Court had, in a similar case, held that section 188 of the Sea Customs Act barred the jurisdiction of Civil courts. The judgment in the case or its full report was not available at that time. It is the petitioner's case that arrangements were made to obtain a copy of the judgment of the Supreme Court and it was so obtained later. Ext. P-11 is that copy. The petitioner avers that because of this judgment the petitioner was advised again not to pursue the matter to the Supreme Court and was also advised that the proper remedy was to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The certified copy of the judgment pronounced by this court on 4th September 1969 in A. S. 114 of 1964 was obtained by the petitioner on 5th December 1969. The certified copy of the judgment pronounced by this court on 4th September 1969 in A. S. 114 of 1964 was obtained by the petitioner on 5th December 1969. According to the petitioner this court has been approached without any further delay. This Original Petition was filed on 28th January 1970. The delay in filing the petition is thus explained in the Original Petition. 8. The petitioner seeks that Ext. P-4 order of the Collector of Customs, Ext. P-5 order in appeal and Ext. P-6 order passed by the Government of India in revision should be quashed. The petitioner further seeks the issue of a writ of mandamus or any appropriate direction to the respondents to restrain them from taking steps for realisation of the Customs duty on the consignment imported in 1953. 9. The learned Single Judge, before whom the matter came up for hearing earlier referred the case for hearing by a Division Bench, since, it appears, the learned Judge doubted whether the petitioner should be denied relief for the reason that there is delay in moving this court. 10. We are concerned mainly with three aspects. The first of these is, whether, on the merits, it could be said that the term 'bobbins' does not include within its meaning 'spools' also and whether the view taken by the third respondent is reasonable. We have further to consider whether we should decline to interfere in this case because of the delay in moving this court. There is also the question whether this court should interfere in a matter where the dispute concerns the scope of an entry in regard to which the Customs authorities have already taken a view. 11. In Ext. P-10 judgment there has been very elaborate consideration of the meaning and the scope of the terms 'bobbin' and 'spool'. In addition to the ordinary dictionary meaning of these terms the way these are understood in the Textile Industry has been considered by the Judges. Of course the respondent could very well plead that the findings in Ext. P-10 judgment should not conclude the matter at all or should not even be held to bind them because ultimately the suit was dismissed. That of course is true. We make it clear that we are not basing our decision on Ext. P-10 judgment. 12. The terms 'bobbin' and 'spool' have relation, particularly to the Textile Industry. P-10 judgment should not conclude the matter at all or should not even be held to bind them because ultimately the suit was dismissed. That of course is true. We make it clear that we are not basing our decision on Ext. P-10 judgment. 12. The terms 'bobbin' and 'spool' have relation, particularly to the Textile Industry. But the dictionary meaning of these terms may also be relevant here because these are terms used in common parlance too and also because, as we would presently show, the technical meanings of these terms are in no way different from the dictionary definitions. The Chamber's 20th Century Dictionary defines 'bobbin' as 'a reel or spool for winding yarn'. The Collins Encyclopaedia and Dictionary defines 'bobbin', as a 'small wooden cylinder on which thread is wound' and 'spool' according to this means 'a small cylinder for winding thread, yarn, etc., reel: bobbin'. The Readers' Digest Great Encyclopaedia Dictionary gives two meanings to the term 'bobbin': (1) Cylinder on which thread, wire, etc. may be wound: reel: spool. (2) Rounded piece of wood attached to a screen for raising door latches. Ext. P-13 in this case is a collection of dictionary meanings of the terms bobbin, spool, etc. The Everyman's Encyclopaedia defines bobbin as "small wooden or metal roller flanged at both ends (rarely at one only), and bored through the axis so that it may be placed on a spindle. The commonest form is the spool on which ordinary sewing thread is wound". It is therefore evident from these definitions that bobbins and spools are understood quite often as interchangeable terms. At any rate bobbin is a generic term within the scope of which the term spool is also to be comprehended. It has not been attempted to be shown that these terms had acquired different meanings in the industry, namely, the Textile Industry. On the other hand it appears to be otherwise, as is seen from the standard books on the subject. It has not been attempted to be shown that these terms had acquired different meanings in the industry, namely, the Textile Industry. On the other hand it appears to be otherwise, as is seen from the standard books on the subject. The Mercury Dictionary of Textile Terms defines bobbins: "These are small appliances used in the textile trade and on which yarn is wound, they are known as cops, pirns, spools, tubes, reducing, roving and warping bobbins." Callway Textile Dictionary defines 'bobbins' and 'spools' thus: "Bobbins: A device of various materials and construction, with a head at one or both ends, and usually with a hole bored through its length by which it may be placed on a spindle, skewer, etc. It is used to hold roving yarn, thread, etc. A small pin or ivory or wood used to hold the yarn in making bobbin, or pillow, lace. The small metal spool upon which is wound one of the threads used in a sewing machine. Spool: A double-headed bobbin.� We are left in no doubt as to the meaning of these terms, whether it be in common parlance or in the industry with which these are associated. It appears to us, that 'spools will be taken within the scope of 'bobbins' in the notification issued by the Government of India. That the industry understood it in that manner is also evident from Ext. P-3 certificate issued by the Textile Commissioner, Bombay. Ext. P-3 refers only to the consumption of the imported birchwood for the manufacture of spools, though it is evident from the certificate that the Textile Commissioner was of the view that if the imported woods were so consumed that will be sufficient for the petitioner to claim exemption from Customs duty. This court in Ext. P-10 judgment considered very elaborately the scope of these terms and found that the expression bobbin includes spools. This court further said that: We would even go further and say that bobbin and spool are used as synonymous in the textile industries." A contention was raised before this court at the time the appeal was heard that the construction of these terms by the authorities could not be said to be perverse and therefore it was not a case where the court was competent to interfere. This court noticed this plea and observed: "Counsel are at variance whether the misconstruction of a revenue authority, that the word bobbins will not cover spool on which sewing thread is wound, amounts to a perversity in construction. We think that the defect connotes something more than a misconstruction." 13. In the light of what we have said here we are of the view that the contention of the petitioner that under the notification to which we have already adverted it is entitled to seek exemption in regard to the levy of customs duty on the birchwood imported from Canada if such wood is utilised in the manufacture of spools is sustainable. If so, the petitioner would be entitled to the relief prayed for, provided that, for other reasons, this court is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. We will necessarily have to consider whether this court will be justified in looking into the meaning of the terms, 'bobbin' and 'spool' when the Customs authorities have given a meaning to it different from the meaning as may be found here. It is vehemently urged by counsel for the respondents, Sri Prabhakaran, that even if the court finds that there has been a misconstruction of the provision relating to exemption the court will not be justified in interfering in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In other words the contention of counsel is that it is possible that the term bobbins may be understood as either synonymous with spools or as including within its scope spools also. It may equally well be said that this is not the case. If these two constructions are equally possible and the Customs authorities functioning under the relevant statute empowering them to levy Customs duty adopt one construction the court should not exercise its jurisdiction merely for the reason that the other construction is equally possible. Interference by court, if at all should be limited to cases where the construction adopted by the Customs authorities is so unreasonable that it could be said to be perverse, a construction that no reasonable man will adopt. 15. Interference by court, if at all should be limited to cases where the construction adopted by the Customs authorities is so unreasonable that it could be said to be perverse, a construction that no reasonable man will adopt. 15. In Collector of Customs, Madras v. K. Ganga Setty, 1963 (2) S.C.R. 277 the Collector of Customs appealed to the Supreme Court questioning the jurisdiction of the High Court in considering the validity of an order of the Customs authorities interpreting the provisions of the entries in the Tariff Schedule as regards the imposition of duties. The levy of duty in that case was on the import of feed-oats. The controversy was whether feed-oats fell within the term 'grain' in entry 32 of the Customs Tariff Schedule. The Judges of the High Court proceeded as if the decision of the Customs authorities as regards the entry in the Tariff classification within which an imported commodity fell was not final but was open to judicial review. They held, that in the case before them, entry 32 relating to 'grains' had to be, in the absence of any specific entry regarding feed-oats read as excluded by entry 42 relating to fodder. Since the feed-oats were imported as horse feed they also held that it fell within item 42 relating to fodder. The Supreme Court noticed that the matter was really beyond the pale of controversy by reason of the specific reference to 'oats' in entry 32 where 'grain' was classified into two categories 'oats' and other ˜grains'. The Supreme Court noticed that the attention of the High Court had not been drawn to the entry in full, as was evident from the indications in the judgment that entry 42 would have been construed differently if there had been a specific reference to oats in entry 32. It is in this context that Ayyangar, J. speaking for the court said: "As regards the limits of the jurisdiction of the court it is sufficient to refer to the decision in Venkateswaran v. Wadhwani (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1506). That was a case where a party moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and not as here under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act under which the power of the court to interfere is certainly narrower and not wider. That was a case where a party moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, and not as here under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act under which the power of the court to interfere is certainly narrower and not wider. This court proceeded on the basis that it is primarily for the Import Control authorities to determine the head or entry under which any particular commodity fell; but that if in doing so, these authorities adopted a construction which no reasonable person could adopt i.e., if the construction was perverse then it was a case in which the court was competent to interfere. In other words, if there were two constructions which an entry could reasonably bear, and one of them which was in favour of Revenue was adopted the court has no jurisdiction to interfere merely because the other interpretation favourable to the subject appeals to the court as the better one to adopt." The same learned Judge speaking for the court in another case, in Girdharilal Bansidhar v. Union of India, 1964 (7) S.C.R. 62 said at page 68: "This apart, we must emphasise that a court dealing with petition under Article 226 is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the Customs authorities and therefore the correctness of the conclusion reached by those authorities on the appreciation of the several items in the Hand-book or in the Indian Tariff Act which is referred to in these items, is not a matter which falls within the writ jurisdiction of the High Court." These decisions were referred to by the Supreme Court again in V. V. Iyer, Bombay v. Jasjit Singh, Collector and another, 1972 (2) S.C.W.R. 690. The Bombay High Court was moved by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Collector of Customs finding that the petitioner therein was liable to imposition of a penalty under section 167B of the Sea Customs Act. The appellant had imported Express Battery Sprayers. He claimed exemption from payment of duty in regard to these and that was allowed by the Customs authorities. But, later, finding that these were not goods in respect of which they were entitled to exemption, proceedings were taken against the importer. The appellant had imported Express Battery Sprayers. He claimed exemption from payment of duty in regard to these and that was allowed by the Customs authorities. But, later, finding that these were not goods in respect of which they were entitled to exemption, proceedings were taken against the importer. The petitioner was entitled to exemption in regard to import under the terms of his licence only as regards spare parts of power-driven agricultural machinery. The Express Battery Sprayers imported were found to be such as could be operated without the help of power-driven pumps. The Customs authorities found that since these could be operated by hand these could not be termed as spare parts in power-driven agricultural machinery and therefore found that the goods the appellant had imported were not covered by any valid import licence. It was admitted by the appellant that the spraying machines could be operated by hand too. But, according to the importer, the efficiency of the machines, in that case, would be reduced to a considerable extent. The Collector of Customs had recorded a finding that these sprayers had no self-contained pump by which they could be operated. They could be operated by hand or by power. They were not specially designed for exclusive use with power pumps and therefore they could not be classified as parts of power-driven agricultural machinery. It was this finding of the Customs Collector that was challenged by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was in this connection that the Supreme Court held that it was not for the court to consider whether there should be interference with the decision of the Customs Collector on the facts proved in the case. 16. The circumstances under which the courts had occasion to say that there was no justification to interfere under Article 226 with the decision of Customs authorities apparently indicate that if the construction reached by the authorities concerned was reasonable the court may not substitute its judgment for that of such authorities. 16. The circumstances under which the courts had occasion to say that there was no justification to interfere under Article 226 with the decision of Customs authorities apparently indicate that if the construction reached by the authorities concerned was reasonable the court may not substitute its judgment for that of such authorities. But if it appears to a court that taking note of the context of the notification, the apparent purpose thereof and meaning of the term as generally understood and as understood particularly in connection with the trade or industry in relation to which the term is used it is reasonable to hold that the notification could have been read only in a particular manner, the mere fact that it is capable of being literally read in another way and that meaning has been ascribed to it by the authorities need not deter the court from interfering with the decision of such authorities. As in the case before us, if the term 'bobbins', in the context in which it has been used in the notification relating to exemption, could be understood reasonably only as including spools also within its meaning and the Collector of Customs has taken a different view interference would be justifiable. 17. We have said earlier that whether it be on the basis of the meaning of the term as defined in the general dictionaries or on the basis of the meaning given to it in the dictionaries relating to the terms employed in the particular industry the term bobbin is understood as including spools also. The claim by the petitioner for exemption was not an after-thought. Even before the goods were imported, the Textile Commissioner had been contacted and the Textile Commissioner had written Ext. P-1 letter. He had issued Ext. P-3 certificate later. It is true that the Customs authorities later wanted to give a different meaning to the term bobbin. On the materials placed before us we can only reach the conclusion which had been reached by this court in Ext.P-10 judgment. The petitioner is entitled to the exemption claimed and we see no warrant to justify reading the notification in the manner the third respondent has done. 18. Our attention has been drawn to the decision in India Carbon Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati and others, 28 S.T.C. 603. The petitioner is entitled to the exemption claimed and we see no warrant to justify reading the notification in the manner the third respondent has done. 18. Our attention has been drawn to the decision in India Carbon Ltd. v. Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati and others, 28 S.T.C. 603. There the question was about the rate of the tax payable by an assessee under the Assam Sales tax Act, 1947 in regard to dealing in petroleum coke. If it was an item of declared goods the tax would be payable only at 2 paise per rupee but if it was otherwise tax was chargeable at 5 paise per rupee under the Act. Section 14 of the Excise Act, 1946 declared, inter alia, that coal including coke in all its forms constitutes goods which are of special importance in interstate trade or commerce. "Coal including coke in all its forms" called for construction. Whether petroleum coke would also be comprised within the scope of the term as it is not coke made out of coal was the question that had to be decided. The High Court was of the view that the word coal within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Central Act must be taken to mean coke derived from coal. The High Court in other words said that it must be coke which has been derived or acquired from coal following the usual process of heating or burning. Petroleum coke being not one such the assessee's contention was held not entitled to succeed. This was in consonance with the interpretation given to the term by the Sales tax authorities. The Superintendent of Taxes had informed the assessee by notice that they were assessable at the rate of 5 naye paise and the demand was made in regard to sale of petroleum coke subsequent to September 1964. The Supreme Court construed the term petroleum coke to mean coke as defined in dictionaries. The court said: "We do not consider that when the Parliament used the word 'coke' in section 14 (i) of the Central Act it had any intention to give it a meaning which would cover petroleum coke. The Supreme Court construed the term petroleum coke to mean coke as defined in dictionaries. The court said: "We do not consider that when the Parliament used the word 'coke' in section 14 (i) of the Central Act it had any intention to give it a meaning which would cover petroleum coke. At any rate, the language employed is so wide, viz., 'coke in all its forms', that petroleum coke which is a form of coke cannot possibly be excluded merely by reference to the word 'coal'." Accordingly the writ petition filed in the High Court was allowed to the extent of liability to tax being limited to the rate specified under section 15 of the Central Excise Act. Counsel for the petitioner relies on this in support of his stand that interference in regard to such entries is permissible where the meaning is quite apparent to the court and what is called for is the construction of the term. We do not think we need advert to this matter in view of what we have held earlier. 19. There remains only the question of delay. We have already indicated the dates on which various proceedings were commenced and were terminated. There is no case that the petitioner was not vigilant at any time in prosecuting his case. The decision Ext.P-6 by the Government of India was followed by a suit notice and a suit was filed. If the remedy of the party appeared to be to file a suit it may not be said that there was laches on the part of the party in resorting to the Civil Court at that time. He had approached it within reasonable time keeping in view the fact that 3 years was available to the party to sue the Government for recovery of the amount wrongly collected. It was when the suit was ultimately disposed of by the court by its judgment Ext.P-10 that the question of filing a petition to this court would have arisen. Though the judgment was pronounced on 4th September 1969 it is seen that the copy of the judgment was issued only on 5th December 1969. It was when the suit was ultimately disposed of by the court by its judgment Ext.P-10 that the question of filing a petition to this court would have arisen. Though the judgment was pronounced on 4th September 1969 it is seen that the copy of the judgment was issued only on 5th December 1969. It is also seen that though the decision of this court was based on the Supreme Court report the full report was not available at the time and only a report of the gist of the decision in "Hindu" dated 3rd September, 1969 was then available. Ext. P-11 was obtained some time later. There has been only an interval of less than two months since the copy of the judgment was obtained by the party and this petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 20. A petition to the High Court under Article 226 is not a suit or application to which any provision of the Limitation Act would apply. The grant of relief to the petitioner is discretionary and in exercising the discretion the court should consider whether the party was vigilant in prosecuting his case. The court may decline to exercise its discretionary powers in favour of those who sleep over their rights. If the petitioner shows that he has been vigilant in prosecuting his case and his conduct in so pursuing it before resorting to this court under Article 226 was bona fide the petition ought not to be thrown out on the ground of delay. If a claim has become stale or the party has been negligent in the matter of pursuing his case at some point of time the court may not encourage such a party and may be very reluctant to interfere with orders which have become final. So also the question of interference with the rights vested in third parties due to lapse of time would be a relevant consideration. If the result of granting relief to a petitioner would be to prejudice the interests of third parties for no fault of theirs the court will necessarily consider it as a circumstance to deny relief to a party who makes a belated motion. In other words though there is no rule of limitation very often the courts apply the ad hoc rule of time limit of 90 days within which a party should approach the court. In other words though there is no rule of limitation very often the courts apply the ad hoc rule of time limit of 90 days within which a party should approach the court. If he has not, the petition cannot be said to be barred but the delay is the test applied in ordinary cases to find out how far the petitioner has been earnest. The over all circumstances will have to be taken into account in the assessment of the conduct of the party so as to determine whether the attempt is really to revive a stale claim. In a case as the one before us where the party was called upon to pay a huge amount as duty and ever since he had been prosecuting his case before the authorities, we will not be justified in thinking that there were laches in the conduct of its case. Against the order of the Collector of Customs appeal and revision were taken and the statutory remedies exhausted. It is true that a petition under Article 226 would have been an easier remedy than a suit but if the party resorted to a suit that was only because of the advice given that a suit would lie and not a petition. That suit ultimately ended in dismissal though on the merits the court found that the case was sustainable. Naturally the party would like to see the judgment before taking any further action and it cannot be said that there was lapse of any considerable period of time between the date on which the party got the copy of the judgment and the date he filed the petition in this court. 21. The Supreme Court had in the decision in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, A.I.R. 1970 S. C. 898 occasion to consider the question of delay in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. Hidayatullah, C.J. said for the majority in paragraph 12: "12. Applying these principles to the present case what do I find ? The petitioner moved the High Court for relief on the ground that the recovery from him was unconstitutional. He set out a number of grounds but did not set out the ground on which ultimately in another case recovery was struck down by this court. That ground was that the provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The petitioner moved the High Court for relief on the ground that the recovery from him was unconstitutional. He set out a number of grounds but did not set out the ground on which ultimately in another case recovery was struck down by this court. That ground was that the provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The question is: can the petitioner in this case take advantage, after a lapse of number of years, of the decision of this court? He moved the High Court but did not come up in appeal to this court. His contention is that the ground on which his petition was dismissed was different and the ground on which the statute was struck down was not within his knowledge and therefore he did not know of it and pursue it in this court. To that I answer that law will presume that he knew the exact ground of unconstitutionality. Everybody is presumed to know the law. It was his duty to have brought the matter before this court for consideration. In any event, having set the machinery of law in motion he cannot abandon it to resume it after a number of years, because another person more adventurous than him in his turn got the statute declared unconstitutional, and got a favourable decision. If I were to hold otherwise, then the decision of the High Court in any case once adjudicated upon and acquiesced in may be questioned in a fresh litigation revived only with the argument that the correct position was not known to the petitioner at the time when he abandoned his own litigation. I agree with the opinion of my brethren Bachawat and Mitter, JJ., that there is no question here of a mistake of law entitling the petitioner to invoke analogy of the Article in the Limitation Act. The grounds on which he moved the court might well have impressed this court which might have also decided the question of the unconstitutionality of the Act as was done in the subsequent, litigation by another party. The present petitioner should have taken the right ground in the High Court and taken it in appeal to this court after the High Court decided against it. The present petitioner should have taken the right ground in the High Court and taken it in appeal to this court after the High Court decided against it. Not having done so and having abandoned his own litigation years ago, I do not think that this court should apply the analogy of the Article in the Limitation act and give him the relief now. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs." What has been said by the learned Judges with regard to the petition under Article 32 would apply with equal force to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. We do not, in these circumstances, feel that the petitioner should be denied relief on the ground that the petition is belated. We do not think that the conduct of the petitioner disentitles him to seek relief from this court. In the result we allow this petition. It is agreed that by the execution of the decree at an earlier stage the amount due to the petitioner has been received. Therefore it is sufficient if we limit our direction to restraining the respondents from recovering any amounts claimed under Ext. P4 order of the third respondent. We also make it clear that Exts. P-4, P-5 and P-6 stand quashed. But in the circumstances we direct the parties to suffer costs in the petition.