JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, C.J. 1. These Tax Referred Cases raise an interesting question, not certainly one of first impression but one where many pronouncements have been made. The question is very simple and it arises from the interpretation of a document which has been included as Annexure A-4 in the paper book at page 7. The Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal interpreted this document and from such interpretation it was stated that questions of law arise and those questions have been formulated thus: (1) Whether on the facts and circumstances stated in the assessment orders for the years 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64 there was a valid gift? (2) Whether clause 7 of the gift deed is hit by section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act or is quite in consonance with the provisions in section 19 and section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act? 2. These questions arose in relation to the assessment to agricultural income-tax for the four years 1960-61, 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64. The questions are the same for all the years and they have been dealt with by a common order of the Tribunal and as we indicated earlier, the questions have to be answered on the interpretation to be placed on the document Annexure A-4. We shall now turn to the relevant parts of the document. 3. The document is styled as "Malayalamsomooj Droo" which means a gift deed and is in favour of the children and grandchildren of the donor. Immediately after the preamble describing the nature of the document, the next paragraph described the properties which belonged to the donor in absolute right and its value. Then, in paragraph 2, it is stated that the document was executed to carry out the wish of the donor, that the properties scheduled to the document should, in his life time itself, devolve on his children and grand-children in the manner stated later on in the document. Then, in paragraph 2, it is stated that the document was executed to carry out the wish of the donor, that the properties scheduled to the document should, in his life time itself, devolve on his children and grand-children in the manner stated later on in the document. And in paragraph 3, the manner in which the properties should be distributed had been stated and that paragraph concluded with the statement: xxx xxx xxx In paragraph 7 it is stated that the donor will have the right to take the usufructs from the properties that were in the possession of the donor at the time of the document till his death, and after his death, his wife will have the right similarly to take the usufructs from certain of such properties till her death. 4. We can very easily answer the first question referred to us that there is little doubt that the document is a gift. It has been so found by all the authorities and it does not appear to us to be possible to contend that the document is not one such. We accordingly answer question No. 1 referred to us by stating that there was a valid gift. 5. Now turning to the more difficult question, we may state that it is an established principle that the document must be read in its entirety to understand its true import. Lord Herschell, Lord Chancellor expressed himself speaking for the House of Lords as follows in the decision in Orr v. Mitchell and others, 1893 A.C. 238: "I am of opinion that light may properly be sought from every part of the deed, though I do not, of course, say that every part of it is of equal weight. Where by a dispositive provision a subject is conveyed in terms clear and unambiguous, and which admit of but one meaning, it would not be right to hold that something less was conveyed because either the recitals or other parts of the deed appear to indicate that this was the intention of the parties. Where by a dispositive provision a subject is conveyed in terms clear and unambiguous, and which admit of but one meaning, it would not be right to hold that something less was conveyed because either the recitals or other parts of the deed appear to indicate that this was the intention of the parties. But where language is employed which may appropriately be used for different purposes, or which has a wider or more restricted sense, I think it is perfectly legitimate to look to other parts of the deed to see how it was intended to be used in the dispositive clause, or whether it has there such wider or more restricted sense". And Lord Macnaghten said: "When the words in the dispositive or operative part of a deed of conveyance are clear and unambiguous they cannot be corrected by reference to other parts of the instrument. When those words are susceptible of two constructions the context may properly be referred to for the purpose of determining which of the two constructions is the true meaning. In order to justify a reference to the context for this purpose, it is not necessary that the language of the dispositive or operative clause should be ambiguous in the sense that without some help you cannot tell which of two meanings should be taken. The rule applies though one of the two meanings is the more obvious one, and would necessarily be preferred if no light could be derived from the rest of the deed. For the purpose of construing the dispositive or operative clause, the whole of the instrument may be referred to though the introductory narrative or recitals leading up to that clause are, perhaps, more likely to furnish the key to its true construction that the subsdiary clauses of the deed". These succinct statements of the law, we think with great respect, correctly summarise the judicial pronouncements on the subject. The Privy Council applied the same principles, we think, in deciding Forbes v. Git and others , A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 209. Their Lordships of the Privy Council however expressed themselves in language different, and counsel for the Revenue relied on certain passages from the decision and submitted that we must in construing the document before us read paragraph 7 with paragraphs 2 and 3 to gather the true intention. Their Lordships of the Privy Council however expressed themselves in language different, and counsel for the Revenue relied on certain passages from the decision and submitted that we must in construing the document before us read paragraph 7 with paragraphs 2 and 3 to gather the true intention. The passages relied on from the decision of the Privy Council may be extracted: "The principle of law to be applied may be stated in few words. If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later clause which destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant, and the earlier clause prevails. In this case the two clauses cannot be reconciled and the earlier provision in the deed prevails over the later. Thus if A covenants to pay £ 100 and the deed subsequently provides that he shall not be liable under his covenant, that later provision is to be rejected as repugnant and void, for it altogether destroys the covenant. But if the later clause does not destroy, but only qualifies the earlier, then the two are to be read together and effect is to be given to the intention of the parties as disclosed by the deed as a whole. Thus if A covenants to pay £ 100 and the deed subsequently provides that he shall be liable to pay only at a future named date or in a future defined event or if at the due date of payment he holds a defined office, then the absolute covenant to pay is controlled by the words qualifying the obligation in the manner described. Furnival v. Coombes is an illustration of the former case: Williams v. Hathaway is an illustration of the latter. In the latter case there would be no question if the later provision of the deed were introduced by the word 'but' or the words 'provided always nevertheless,' or the like. But there is no necessity to find any such words. If a later clause says in so many words or as matter of construction that an earlier clause is to be qualified in a certain way, effect can be given and must be given to both clauses". 6. But there is no necessity to find any such words. If a later clause says in so many words or as matter of construction that an earlier clause is to be qualified in a certain way, effect can be given and must be given to both clauses". 6. Counsel contended that there is no real repugnancy between paragraphs 2 and 3 on one hand and paragraph 7 on the other, that paragraph 7 merely qualified paragraph 3, not even paragraph 2 and that paragraphs 3 and 7 must be read together and then it will be clear that the intention of the donor was not to absolutely give away the properties with full and immediate right of enjoyment of the properties gifted but to create a vested interest in the properties as regards title to the properties by the execution of the document and to reserve in regard to some of the properties that were in the actual possession of the donor, a right to enjoy till his death and to lesser extent, in his wife, who will have similar right of enjoyment of a part of such properties. 7. When it is said that a document must be read in its entirety it does not mean that a clear and unambiguous dispositive clause in a document must be qualified or turned down with reference to a later clause in the same document. A document of course must be read in its entirety but if the dispositive clauses of a deed as distinct from a will created absolute interests any subsequent clause therein cannot abrogate or even limit or qualify the import of the dispositive clause. A reading of the entire document in such cases, we think, is only for the purpose of understanding the true import of the various clauses to find out which are the dispositive clauses and what is the meaning conveyed by reading those clauses and which are mere recitals or clauses which are repugnant to the dispositive clauses. The rule that the earlier clause must prevail, we think, it still the accepted law. Odgers in his book "The Construction of Deeds and Statutes" has said at page 53: "The old rule was stated to be that if two parts or clauses of a deed be repugnant, the first shall be received and the later rejected, in a will the reverse was the rule. Odgers in his book "The Construction of Deeds and Statutes" has said at page 53: "The old rule was stated to be that if two parts or clauses of a deed be repugnant, the first shall be received and the later rejected, in a will the reverse was the rule. This seems to be a mere rule of thumb, totally unscientific and only to be resorted to when all else fails. It did happen in the last case cited above that the repugnancy was in the later clause and this no doubt often happens; the rejection however, of a repugnant clause or proviso is not based on the fact that it comes after another, but that its rejection is necessary to effectuate the real intention of the parties". No doubt the intention must be gathered and this must be by reading the whole document but, when the intention is clear from the dispositive clause no later clause which is repugnant to the earlier clause will have the effect of qualifying the intention clearly gatherable from the earlier dispositive clause. 8. We have, no doubt, relied on the passages from Odgers Construction of Deeds and Statutes that we have extracted above, in a judgment to which one of us was a party in K. Appukuttan Panicker and another v. S.K.R.A.K.R. Anthappa Chettiar and others, A.I.R. 1966 Kerala 303. The gathering of the intention from a later clause will also become necessary in certain cases. These have been referred to by their Lordships of the Houses of Lords in the passages that we have extracted and that is what exactly the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said in the decision in Forbes v. Git and others, A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 209. Those are cases where the dispositive clauses or the operative clauses are ambiguous, ambiguous not in the sense that they by themselves do not indicate the obvious meaning to be given to those clauses but in that those clauses were also capable of another meaning. It is only in such cases that it will be possible to read the earlier clauses with the latter clauses. It is only in such cases that it will be possible to read the earlier clauses with the latter clauses. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was interpreting a contract and it is obvious that notwithstanding the absence of words like "but" or "provide always nevertheless", the later clauses were part of the earlier clauses and had to be read along with that to understand the true intention of the contract. 9. The principles that we have stated have also been accepted by the Supreme Court in the decision in Radha Sunder Dutta v. Mohd. Tahadur Rahim and others, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 24 in Sahebzada Mohammed Kamgaragh Shah v. Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Beb and others, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 953 and in Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 890. 10. When immovable property is disposed of the matter is now governed by statute law and we must in this connection refer to section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The first paragraph of the section is in these terms: "Where on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction". 11. We understand paragraph 3 of the document as creating an absolute interest of enjoyment of the properties in favour of the donees. Paragraph 7 contains a direction that such interests shall be enjoyed by the donees in a particular manner. The donee is entitled to ignore such a direction. 12. The Supreme Court accepted the contentions raised by counsel before it in Sahebsada Mohammed Kamgargh Shah v.Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Beb and others, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 953. The principle relied on by counsel therein was: "The first of these is that the intention of the parties to a document of grant must be ascertained first and foremost from the words used in the disposition clause, understanding the words used in their strict, natural grammatical sense and that once the intention can be clearly understood from the words in the disposition clause thus interpreted it is no business of the courts to examine what the parties may have said in other portions if the document. Next it is urged that if it does appear that the later clauses of the document purport to restrict or cut down in any way the effect of the earlier clause disposing of property the earlier clause must prevail. Thirdly it is said that if there be any ambiguity in the disposition clause taken by itself, the benefit of that ambiguity must be given to the grantee, the rule being that all documents of grants must be interpreted strictly as against the grantor. Lastly it was urged that where the operative portion of the document can be interpreted without the aid of the preamble, the preamble ought not and must not be looked into". 13. In regard to this submission, the Supreme Court said: "The correctness of these principles is too well established by authorities to justify any detailed discussion. The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties, the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. In doing so the parties must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later clause. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor's document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee". 14. We shall refer to another passage from later decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 890. "The golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words, in their ordinary, natural sense. 14. We shall refer to another passage from later decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkishore Lal v. Kamal Narain, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 890. "The golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words, in their ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain this intention the Court has to consider the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account the circumstances under which the particular words were used. Very often the status and the training of the parties using the words have to be taken into consideration. It has to be borne in mind that very many words are used in more than one sense and that sense differs in different circumstances. Again, even where a particular word has, to a trained conveyancer, a clear and definite significance and one can be sure about the sense in which such conveyancer would use it, it may not be reasonable and proper to give the same strict interpretation of the word when used by one who is not so equally skilled in the art of conveyancing. Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary instruments that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. What is to be done where this happens? It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempt to restrict the title already given". 15. The only question therefore is whether by reading paragraphs 2 and 3 which, we have no doubt, are dispositive clauses dealing with operative portions it is possible to say that an absolute right of immediate enjoyment of all the properties has been created. We have no doubt that there has been. 15. The only question therefore is whether by reading paragraphs 2 and 3 which, we have no doubt, are dispositive clauses dealing with operative portions it is possible to say that an absolute right of immediate enjoyment of all the properties has been created. We have no doubt that there has been. These absolute interests cannot be whittled down by a clause similar to paragraph 7 which is clearly repugnant to what is said in paragraphs 2 and 3. We must therefore ignore that clause. 16. No other argument with reference to sections 19 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act has been advanced before us and we do not think that these sections are attracted. 17. In the light of the above, we answer question No. 2 by stating that paragraph 7 of the gift deed is hit by section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act. 18. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs. 19. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Trivandrum.