ORDER R.L. Gulati, J. - This and the connected petitions raise a common question and can conveniently be decided by a single judgment. In Writ Petition No. 742 of 1971 (Sri Ram Narain Pathak v. The State of U. P. and others) there is a small additional point which will be dealt with separately. This judgment, therefore, shall dispose of all the petitions. 2. The facts of the petition of Sri Panna Lal Gupta may now be briefly stated. 3. The petitioner was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police in Uttar Pradesh on February 2, 1942. He was promoted as Circle Inspector in the year 1950 and was confirmed in that post with effect from August 2, 1958. The petitioner's allegation is that in November 1955, a selection committee consisting of the Chief Secretary, the Inspector General of Police and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, U. P. had selected him for permanent appointment as a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Thereafter a selection committee was again convened in the month of May, 1962, for the revision of the list of candidates selected for permanent appointment earlier in 1955 and for bringing on the list some more names. The petitioner's name continued to be borne on that list. Thereafter the Commission again met in the year 1969 when it interviewed about 300 candidates out of whom sixty candidates were selected for promotion to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The petitioner's name did not appear in that list. The petitioner has challenged the selection held in the year 1969 in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The first contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that he having been selected for permanent appointment in the year 1955 and again in the year 1962, it was not necessary for him to be interviewed again in the year 1969. He was entitled to the promotion as a matter of right on the basis of the selection already made. In the alternative he challenged the selection of the year 1969 on the ground of its being contrary to the rules, unfair and biased. 5. Now, the first thing to be seen is whether the petitioner was really selected for permanent appointment in the year 1955. In the alternative he challenged the selection of the year 1969 on the ground of its being contrary to the rules, unfair and biased. 5. Now, the first thing to be seen is whether the petitioner was really selected for permanent appointment in the year 1955. Under Rule 5 (ii) of the U. P. Police Service Rules, 1942, only confirmed Inspectors below 45 years of age are eligible for the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Admittedly the petitioner was confirmed in the post of Circle Inspector with effect from August 2, 1958, and as such he could not have been selected for permanent appointment to the post of the Deputy Superintendent of Police in November, 1955. The very foundation of the petitioner's argument thus disappears. In fact in November, 1955, selection was made only of the candidates for appointment in temporary vacancies. This is clear from the letter dated December 20, 1955, from the U. P. Civil Secretariat Appointment (A) Department, Lucknow, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure 'A' to the counter-affidavit of Sri A. B. Joshi. This letter clearly states: "I am desired to say that the Selection Committee which met at Lucknow in November last and interviewed candidates for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police (Complaints) selected 63 officers whom they considered suitable for appointment in temporary vacancies. The Commission have approved all the 63 names and I am to forward a copy of the list in duplicate. The names have been arranged in order of seniority....." The list of 63 candidates shows that the petitioner's name appears at Serial No. 55. 6. From Paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit of Sri A. B. Joshi it appears that a selection committee did meet in 1962 for considering the case of officiating Deputy Superintendents of Police for confirmation. In fact a similar Selection Committee had met earlier in 1959 also. 6. From Paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit of Sri A. B. Joshi it appears that a selection committee did meet in 1962 for considering the case of officiating Deputy Superintendents of Police for confirmation. In fact a similar Selection Committee had met earlier in 1959 also. In the year 1959 as well as 1962, the petitioner was not found suitable by the selection committee for confirmation and his name continued to be borne on List B and was not brought to List A. It may be mentioned here that under the rules then existing two lists used to be prepared; Lists A and B. List A contained the names of candidates who were selected for permanent appointment, while List B was comprised of the candidates who were found fit for officiating appointments. 7. It is true that Rule 17 (2) before its amendment contemplated only a preliminary list for permanent appointments and a supplementary list of candidate placed in reserve and did not contemplate a list for officiating and temporary appointments. But this rule was amended by the U. P. Police Service (Amendment) Rules, which came into force with effect from November 15, 1962. Under the amended rule, two lists are contemplated. List I in respect of candidates selected for permanent appointment and List II in respect of candidates selected for officiating appointments. It, however, appears that the practice of preparing a list for officiating appointments was being followed by the Police Department even prior to the amendment of Rule 17 as is clear from the letter of December 20, 1955 (Annexure 'A' to the counter-affidavit of Sri Joshi). Why was such a practice being followed is not clear, but the fact remains that the petitioner was never selected for permanent appointment either in the year 1955, or 1959 or in 1962. He was only selected for officiating appointment in the year 1955 and continued to be regarded as fit for officiating appointments only. In the circumstances the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that he had been selected for permanent appointment in the year 1955 and later on in the year 1962 is factually incorrect and cannot be accepted. 8. The next question to be examined is as to whether the selection held in 1969 is in any way contrary to the rules and suffers from any other infirmity, as alleged by the petitioner. 8. The next question to be examined is as to whether the selection held in 1969 is in any way contrary to the rules and suffers from any other infirmity, as alleged by the petitioner. The main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that according to rule 17 (1) of the amended rules, selection had to be made on merits and the word 'merit' has been defined in G. O. No. 2056/II-B-1954, dated July 19, 1954. A true copy of this G. O. giving the definition of the word 'merit' has been annexed as Annexure 'A' to the writ petition. According to this G. O. "claims of individuals for promotions should be considered by an assessment of merit in the light of the following qualities: (i) Competence. (ii) Efficiency, (iii) Initiative. (iv) Straight-forwardness. (v) Dependability. (vi) Integrity. (vii) Missionary zeal. (viii) Effective Supervision. (ix) Efforts to eliminate corruption. 9. It is argued that the selection committee should have awarded separate marks under each of the nine heads set out above. This was not done and the selection committee awarded only over all marks. This procedure according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, vitiates the entire selection. I find absolutely no substance in this contention. To my mind, 'merit' is a comprehensive term and the nine components, enumerated above, are merely its attributes. They cannot be regarded is separate headings or topics for which separate marks could be allotted. Moreover, the nine attributes of merit enumerated above in the G. O. are not exhaustive. Many more such attributes can be added, such as academic qualifications, distinction in the University, character, alertness of mind, physique, personality etc. In fact the term 'merit' is the sum total of a large number of qualities or attributes of a person which are not capable of being placed in water-tight compartments. Indeed, if separate marks were to be allotted under the nine different heads, as suggested by the learned counsel, it might lead to startling results. For instance, if a person possesses all the eight qualities except integrity, he might well be selected, even if he fails to obtain any marks for integrity. Indeed, if separate marks were to be allotted under the nine different heads, as suggested by the learned counsel, it might lead to startling results. For instance, if a person possesses all the eight qualities except integrity, he might well be selected, even if he fails to obtain any marks for integrity. No one can doubt for a minute that a person, who lacks integrity, can never be regarded as fit for promotion to the responsible post of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, even if he possesses all other qualities in the world. The G. O., to my mind, merely recites for the guidance of the selection committee certain attributes and qualities which must be present before a candidate is selected for promotion. It does not define the word 'merit' which in the very nature of things is difficult to define, as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Gurnam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1971 (2) SCC 452 ; (1972 Lab IC 295). In paragraph 35 of the judgment this is what their Lordships have observed: "No doubt the term 'merit' is not capable of an easy definition, but it can be safely said that merit is a sum total of various qualities and attributes of an employee such as his academic qualifications, his distinction in the University, his character, integrity, devotion to duty and the manner in which he discharges his official duties. Allied to this may be various other matters or factors such as his punctuality in work, quality and outturn of work done by him and the manner of his dealings with his superiors and subordinate officers and the general public and his rank in the service. We are only indicating some of the broad aspects that may be taken into account in assessing the merits of an officer." 10. Moreover, the rules do not prescribe any such procedure for selection by awarding separate marks under different heads and if the committee had adopted any such procedure, its correctness would have been open to serious doubts. Marking system for the evaluation of merit was introduced by the Rajasthan Government by means of a circular letter issued for the guidance of the selection committee. Marking system for the evaluation of merit was introduced by the Rajasthan Government by means of a circular letter issued for the guidance of the selection committee. It was struck down by the Supreme Court in the case of 1972 Lab IC 295 (SC) (supra) on the ground that marking system was so rigid as to interfere with the discretion of the selection committee. 11. The case of A. Perikaruppan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1971 SC 2303 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner also affords no assistance to the petitioner. That decision does not lay down that various attributes or factors of merit should be divided into water-tight compartments and separate marks should be awarded under different heads. 12. It was then contended that the selection committee had not taken into consideration the petitioner's seniority and experience. So far as the seniority is concerned, the same is an irrelevant consideration which the committee could not have taken into consideration and so far as experience is concerned, I have no doubt in mind that the selection committee must have taken into consideration the petitioner's experience while judging his merits. It is not possible for this Court to substitute its opinion for the opinion of the selection committee on consideration of the petitioner's record of service etc. 13. It was then contended on behalf of the petitioner that he having already crossed the efficiency bar twice, was amply qualified to be selected for appointment, because qualifications which are necessary for crossing the efficiency bar are the same as for promotion. In my opinion the mere fact that the petitioner had crossed the efficiency bar twice does not qualify him for selection, otherwise there was no need for appointing a selection committee. The fact of the petitioner crossing the efficiency bar would be contained in the record of his service and when the record was considered as a whole, it cannot be said that this aspect had been left out by the committee. 14. As regards the allegation of bias, it has been alleged that the petitioner had incurred the displeasure of the Inspector-General of Police, Sri Jia Ram, who was one of the Members of the selection committee and was a friend of the Chief Secretary, who was another Member of the Committee. 14. As regards the allegation of bias, it has been alleged that the petitioner had incurred the displeasure of the Inspector-General of Police, Sri Jia Ram, who was one of the Members of the selection committee and was a friend of the Chief Secretary, who was another Member of the Committee. Neither Sri Jia Ram, nor Sri B. B Lal, the then Chief Secretary, have been made parties to this petition and as such they had no opportunity to reply to the allegations of the petitioner. In the circumstances this plea of the petitioner cannot be entertained. Writ No. 742 of 1971: 15. In this case the petitioner was also considered to be over-age for appointment. The argument is that for purposes of promotion his age should have been taken into consideration when he was first appointed to officiate and not when the selection committee met in the year 1969. I have not been able to understand the basis for such an argument. The age of a person has to be considered at the time when he is considered for appointment to a higher post and not when he was appointed to officiate in that post. There is no merit in this contention either. 16. In the result this and the connected petitions fail and are dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs.