JUDGMENT : Narain, J. 1. By this petition the petitioners seek to quash a criminal proceeding which is pending against them and to quash the charges under Section: 109, 147, 148, 353 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code that have been framed against the petitioners. 2. With respect to plot no. 1172, khata no. 551 situate in village Chandanpati, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Darbhanga, drew up a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an the 14th of March, 1967, and asked the petitioners on one side and Md. Mustafa on the other to abstain from going over the land in dispute and restrained them from doing any act which may lead to breach of the peace. On the 18th of March, 1967, he asked the Mukhiya af the Gram Panchayat concerned to get the crop harvested. On the 20th of March 1967 the petitioners, however, harvested and took away the crop. As directed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, on the 31st of March, 1967, the Chief Officer of the Gram Panchayat filed a complaint petition against the petitioners for offences under different sections of the Indian Penal Code. Cognizance was taken and the case was transferred to. Shri R.K. Sharma, Munsif Magistrate (first class, Darbhanga for trial. After examination of some witnesses the learned Munsif-Magistrate has framed charges under Sections 109, 147, 148, 353 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. It has been vehemently argued by Mr. Naseem Ahmad far the petitioners that the whole criminal prosecution is an abuse of the process of the court and that the charges as framed cannot be sustained in law. The learned - counsel particularly invited my attention to the case of (1) Mahendra Prasad Singh and others V. State of Bihar and another (A.I. R. 1970 Patna 102) and an its basis argued that no. charge under Section 379 of the Code could be framed an the facts of the case. It was held in the above case that "the complainant could not be said to be in possession of the land in view of the prohibitory ORDER :and therefore, the charge of that was not maintainable." In all fairness Mr. Ahmad also referred to the case of (2) Gokhul Singh V. Jagdish Singh (1963 B. L. J. R. 211) where a contrary opinion has been expressed. Ahmad also referred to the case of (2) Gokhul Singh V. Jagdish Singh (1963 B. L. J. R. 211) where a contrary opinion has been expressed. It was held in that case that "there is a difference between an ORDER :under Section 144 and an ORDER :of attachment under Section• 145(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 144 a Magistrate merely directs a person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain ORDER :with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management. (He does not by that ORDER :disturb the possession of the party who is in possession nor does he put a property which may be in dispute in possession of the court. An ORDER :of attachment, on the other hand has the effect of putting the property in the custody and possession of the court. A party who may have been in possession before the ORDER :of attachment is deprived of possession. When there is an ORDER :under Section 144 prohibiting parties from going upon the disputed land, and a person dishonestly cuts and removes crops from that land he dishonestly takes the crops out of the possession of the party who may be held to have been in possession and to have grown the crops before the ORDER :under Section 144 was passed." But the learned counsel submitted that on the facts of the present case the ratio of the above decision is not attracted. In the instant Case the complaint has been filed by the Chief Officer of the Gram Panchayat. In case the proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is decided against the petitioners, clearly the Chief Officer will not be deemed to be in possession of the disputed land. Therefore, the crop cannot be held to have been dishonestly removed from the possession of the Chief Officer. That being so, I agree with the contention of the learned counsel that no offence under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code is made out and that being so, the charge for this offence cannot be allowed to stand. I may, however, mention at this stage that the proceeding under Section 144 of the Code, of Criminal Procedure itself was dropped by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate. 4. I may, however, mention at this stage that the proceeding under Section 144 of the Code, of Criminal Procedure itself was dropped by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate. 4. The common object for the charges under Sections 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code is said to be to assault Baidya Nath Paswan and to commit theft. It will be noticed that there is no charge for assault and the common object in respect of theft of crop has failed. That being so, charges under Sections 147 and 148 also must consequently be quashed. 5. Now as to the offence under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with assault or use of Criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of his duties learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Sub-divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to depute the Mukhiya or for the matter or that the Chief officer to get crop harvested. There is substance in this contention. The powers of a Magistrate under Section 144 extend to a direction in the proper circumstances to any person to abstain from a certain act to take certain ORDER :with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management. Here the crop or the land was not in possession of the Mukhiya or the Chief Officer. That being so, the learned Magistrate had no authority to put the Mukhiya or the Chief Officer in possession of the disputed land and to direct him to harvest the crop. I am supported in the view that I have taken by a decision of this court in (3) Rupan Singh and others V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1944 Patna, 213) Once the ORDER :directing the Mukhiya or for the matter of that the Chief Officer to get the crop harvested be held to be without jurisdiction manifestly, charge under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code must fail because what they did they cannot be held to be doing in discharge of their duty. 6. Since no offence has been held to have been committed under Section 353 of the Indian Panel Code as such, commission of offence under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code does not arise. 7. For the reasons given above• the criminal prosecution pending against the petitioners and the charges framed against them are quashed and the application is allowed. Application allowed