Judgment :- 1. Is the Central Plantation Crops Research Institute, Kasaragod, (referred to as 'the Institute' for short) an 'industry' within the meaning of the Industrial Dispute Act? is the question raised in this writ petition. That question was provoked by the decision of the Industrial Tribunal on certain issues regarding the conditions of service of workers under the Institute on a reference made to the Tribunal by the Government. The Tribunal by Ext. P1 award held that the Institute was an'industry'. The Institute has challenged the decision and the award in this writ petition. 2. The Institute was established by the Government of Madras in the year 1916. Its management and administration were taken over in 1947 by the Coconut Committee, a statutory body, established under the Coconut Committee Act, 1944. Later, by notification dated 18 31966, issued under S.17 of the Coconut Committee Act the Committee was dissolved. The Institute, thereafter passed into the control and management of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, a Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act. The object of the Society, as stated in the writ petition, was: "to undertake aid, promote and co-ordinate agricultural (?) animal husbandry, education, research and its application in practice, development and marketing, by all means calculated to increase scientific knowledge of the subjects and to secure its adoption in every day practice." The Institute conducts research on the method of producing and growing the best hybrid varieties of coconut Seedlings, calculated to yield the maximum crop in the minimum period of time, the conditions and environments for their production and growth, and the nursing and attention needed to secure the best result. The result of the research thus conducted by the Institute is disseminated to the public at large, free of cost, by publication in scientific journals, and broadcasts arranged for the purpose. It conducts training courses for the benefit of research scholars in regard to the know-how of producing and breeding the best varieties of coconut seedlings. For the purpose of conducting its studies and research it is necessary for the Institute to till the soil, conduct soil survey, prepare bunds, manure the soil, and to, conduct certain other operations, all of which require the employment of a number of workmen. The seedlings produced as a result of its research and labour, are sold to the public at large at fairly economic prices. The seedlings produced as a result of its research and labour, are sold to the public at large at fairly economic prices. The annual expenditure on the Research Station is stated to be about seven lakhs of rupees, and the annual income from the sale of coconut seedlings, about rupees two lakhs. These facts have been found by the Tribunal, and have not been disputed. The question posed for decision has to be answered in the tight of these facts. 3. It is unnecessary to embark on a historical survey of the evolution of the meaning of the term 'industry,' through the judicial decisions rendered under the industrial law. The same was done by the Supreme Court in The Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union v. The Management of the Gymkhana Club (AIR. 1968 SC. 554). Briefly stated, the position is this. The term'industry' is defined in S.2 0) of the Act as: " "industry" means any business, trade, "undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicrafts or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen." Some of the earlier decisions such as the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case (AIR. 1960 SC. 610) and the Ahamedabad Research Station case (AIR. 1961 SC. 484) had extended the meaning of the term'industry' to activities, which, it might have been difficult to regard as analogous to trade or business, organised on commercial lines. The trend of these rulings was that an activity systematically, or habitually undertaken for the production or distribution of goods or in rendering material service to the community at large, or part of such community, with the help of employees, is an'undertaking'. But in the National Union of Commercial Employees v. Their Workmen (AIR. 1962 SC. 1082) a break from this line of approach was noticed, where it was ruled that a solicitor's firm employing clerks, manual labourers, and even machinery, cannot be regarded as an'industry.' A solicitor's job, it was pointed out, depends on the professional equipment, knowledge and efficiency of the solicitor, and the mere fact that for his own convenience he employs clerks and labourers and machines, would not be decisive for regarding the work carried on as an industry'. This aspect received greater emphasis in the University of Delhi v. Ramanath (AIR. 1964 SC. This aspect received greater emphasis in the University of Delhi v. Ramanath (AIR. 1964 SC. 1873) where it was ruled that the principal activity of the Delhi University was imparting education, and the organisation of labour in certain departments of its activities, such as running a hostel for the students, or providing a canteen, or engaging labourers for providing transport facilities, were all mere minor and inconsequential aspects of the main activity, which should not be allowed to import their industrial colour to the principal activity of the University. After examining these and the other decisions, it was ruled in the Gymkhana Club's case (AIR. 1968 SC.554) that: "25. It is therefore, clear that before the work engaged in can be described as an industry, it must bear the definite character of 'trade' or 'business' or 'manufacture' or 'calling' or must be capable of being described as an undertaking in material goods or material services. Now in the application of the Act, the undertaking may be an enterprise of a private individual or individuals. On the other hand, it may not. It is not necessary that the employer must always be a private individual who carries on the operation with his own capital and with a view to his own profit. The Act in terms contemplates cases of industrial disputes where the Government or a local authority or a public utility service may be the employer." The court proceeded to observe, that in the light of the earlier rulings of the court, the word 'undertaking' must be defined as any business, or any work or project which one engages in, or attempts, as an enterprise analogous to business or trade. The pronouncement in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case (AIR. 1960 S.C. 410) came in for some criticism. 4. In the Cricket Club of India's case (AIR. 1969 S.C. 276) the principles laid down in the Gymkhana Club's case fell for application in regard to the activities of the Cricket Club of India. It was disclosed that the Club had properties worth nearly rupees sixty-seven lakhs, that it used to rent out rooms even to outsiders, and get a fair amount of income therefrom, that it.was earning sizable profits by the sale of tickets for Test Matches and other occasions, and by providing stalls and selling refreshments for spectators on such occasions. It was disclosed that the Club had properties worth nearly rupees sixty-seven lakhs, that it used to rent out rooms even to outsiders, and get a fair amount of income therefrom, that it.was earning sizable profits by the sale of tickets for Test Matches and other occasions, and by providing stalls and selling refreshments for spectators on such occasions. Despite these, and despite evidence that some profit was being made by the Club, it was held that the primary object was the promotion of the game of the cricket, and the rest oft the activities was merely incidental, and therefore the Club cannot be regarded as engaging in an'industry'. In the Safdarjung Hospital's case (AIR. 1970 S.C.1407) a full court of six judges of the Supreme Court not only affirmed the principle in the Gymkhana Club's case but formally overruled the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha's case. We may usefully quote Para.19 Of the judgment, "19. It, therefore, follows that before an industrial dispute can be raised between employers and their employees or between employees and employees in relation to the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, there must be first established a relationship of employers and employees associating together, the former following a trade, business, manufacture, undertaking or calling of employers in the production of material goods and material services and the latter following any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen in aid of the employers' enterprise. It is not necessary that there must be a profit motive but the enterprise must be analogous to trade or business in a commercial sense." The two subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in the Bombay Pinjrapole case (AIR. 1971 S. C. 2422) and the Chamber of Commerce's case (AIR. 1972 S.C. 763) were also cited to us. It is enough to record that irrespective of the conclusion in these cases as to whether the activity carried on, or the institution concerned, was an'industry' or not, the principle in the Madras Gymkhana Club case and the Safdarjung. Hospital case was accepted and affirmed. 5. In the light of the above, we have to consider the question whether the activity of the Institute is an industry. Hospital case was accepted and affirmed. 5. In the light of the above, we have to consider the question whether the activity of the Institute is an industry. We feel that the main activity of the Institute was the promotion and propagation of research in the matter of producing the best varieties of hybrid coconut seedlings and the methods of growing them so as to ensure the maximum production of crop. We feel that the pursuit of this activity was predominantly a process of intellectual research and that the manual labour involved in tilling the soil, preparing the bunds, and in manuring and watering the plants, was merely incidental. The production of seedlings by the Institute and their distribution or sale for value, were again merely incidental to this main activity. We cannot regard the enterprise carried on in the Institute as analogous to trade or business in a commercial sense. Being so, in the light of the principles stated in the Gymkhana Club's case as applied in the subsequent decisions referred to earlier, we are of the opinion that the activities of the Institute cannot be regarded as an'industry'. In the Ahamedabad Research Station case (AIR. 1961 S.C. 434) on which considerable reliance was placed by the Tribunal, the research carried on by the Institute was meant to help the textile industry to capture the market and to yield profit in greater measure, and was carried on by personnel on payment of remuneration; and the result of that research was kept as a strict trade secret, and not disseminated to the public at large. Counsel for the respondent drew our attention to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Chamber of Commerce's case (AIR. 1972 S. C. 763). The decision only affirmed the principle of the Gymkhana Club's case and the Safdarjung Hospital's case and the other decisions. On the application of the said principle, it was found that the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce was carrying on a systematic activity to assist its members and other businessmen and industrialists, and even non-members, by giving them the right of subscribing to their bulletin, taking up their cases, and solving their difficulties and obtaining concessions and facilities for them from the Government. These activities were held to be business activities, and to constitute rendering of material services. These activities were held to be business activities, and to constitute rendering of material services. We are unable to hold that the Institute in the present case was organised on the lines of a trade or business or that its activities partake of business activities or are analogous to trade or commerce. We therefore hold that neither the Institute nor the activities carried on by it, can be regarded as an'industry' within the meaning of the Act. Being of that opinion, we allow this writ petition and quash Ext. P1 award. There will be no order as to costs.