JUDGMENT : B.K. Ray, J. - The sole Defendant has come up with this revision against the decree of the S.C.C. Judge passed against him (Petitioner) for recovery of Rs. 472-50 with future interest towards damages for unauthorised occupation of the suit house belonging to the Plaintiff from 15-11-1969 to 1-10-1970, the date when possession of the suit house was taken by the Plaintiff by evicting the Petitioner. 2. The case of the Plaintiff as stated in the plaint is as follows : The Defendant-Petitioner was a tenant under the Plaintiff in respect of the disputed house on a monthly rental of Rs. 45/-. The Plaintiff thereafter served a notice on the Petitioner determining the contractual tenancy and demanding vacant possession of the disputed house. The Petitioner not having complied with the notice, the Plaintiff filed H.R.C. case No. 5 of 1968 for eviction of the Petitioner and got an order for eviction on 22-9-1969. This order of eviction passed by the House Rent Controller in favour of the Plaintiff was executed in Execution Case No. 178 of 1969 in the Court of the Munsif, Puri and in course of execution, the Plaintiff obtained delivery of possession through Court on 1-10-1970. The Plaintiff thereafter instituted the S.C.C. suit out of which this revision arises claiming compensation of Rs. 642/- from 15-11-1969 till 1-10-1970. Out of this amount, he gave up Rs. 169-50 and claimed the balance of Rs. 472-50 together with future interest. 3. The main defence taken by the Petitioner in the Court below is that the S.C.C. Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for recovery of the aforesaid amount as damages, because the Petitioner continued as a tenant in respect of the disputed house under the Plaintiff till 1-10-1970 when he was evicted therefrom in the execution case referred to in the plaint. 4. The Court below having negatived the defence contention and having decreed the suit the present revision has been filed. 5. Mr. S.C. Mohapatra, learned Counsel for Petitioner urges that tin actually the Petitioner is evicted in execution of the order of the House Rent Controller passed against him for his eviction through Court in execution of the order he (Petitioner) continues to be a tenant and hence the Plaintiff cannot claim damages against him, because an order has been passed for his eviction by the House Rent Controller on 22-9-1969. Secondly, he argues that a suit for damages is not cognizable by a Small Cause Court u/s 15 read with Schedule II, Article 35 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 6. Regarding the first contention, Mr. Mohapatra refers to the definition of ?tenant? given in Section 2(5) of the House Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the ?Act?) which means any person by whom rent is payable for any house including a person who continues in possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than under the provisions of the Act and any person against ?whom a suit for ejectment is pending in a Court of competent jurisdiction but not a person against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made by such a Court. According to him, a person continues to be a tenant in respect of the house until his tenancy is terminated under the provisions of the Act. Mr. Mohapatra then refers to Section 6 of the Act which deals with continuance of tenancy. Under this section, a tenant shall not be liable to be ejected except as provided in Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act, according to Mr. Mohapatra, only contemplates an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house and u/s 15, the order of the Controller made u/s 7 of the Act shall be deemed to be a decree and shall be executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the house is situate. Mr. Mohapatra further draws my attention to Section 14 of the Act which says that all orders passed by the Controller shall, subject to the decision, if any, made in an appeal, be final and shall not be called into question in any Court. It is not disputed that after the order of the House Rent Controller for eviction of the Petitioner, the latter carried an appeal against the order and the said appeal was dismissed on 18-6-1970. According to Mr. Mohapatra, the tenancy created in favour of a tenant is terminated only when he is actually evicted in an execution proceeding as provided u/s 15 of the Act. The order u/s 7 of the House Rent Controller directing the tenant Petitioner to put the landlord in possession of the house does not amount to termination of the tenancy. Mohapatra, the tenancy created in favour of a tenant is terminated only when he is actually evicted in an execution proceeding as provided u/s 15 of the Act. The order u/s 7 of the House Rent Controller directing the tenant Petitioner to put the landlord in possession of the house does not amount to termination of the tenancy. Again, according to him, in view of the provision contained in Section 14 of the Act the moment an appeal is filed? against the original order of the House Rent Controller u/s 7 of the Act, the appeal being a continuation of the original proceeding, the order of the House Rent Controller u/s 7 of the Act ceases to be final till the appeal is disposed of by the appellate Court. In this view, therefore, Mr. Mohapatra contends that the Petitioner was a statutory tenant till he was evicted from the disputed house on 1-10-1970 in execution of the decree. Therefore, a suit for recovery of damages against the Petitioner after the order of the House Rent Controller dated 22-9-1969 till the date of his eviction on 1-10-1970 is not maintainable, because for this period he being a statutory tenant under the Act is only liable to pay rent and not damages. This contention of Mr. Mohapatra, I must say, has absolutely no force. Section 6 of the Act clearly says that a tenant incurs the liability to be ejected from the house as provided u/s 7 of the Act. u/s 7 of the Act, the House Rent Controller is empowered to pass an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house. The moment therefore this order is passed the tenant incurs the liability for eviction and ceases to be a tenant. This order passed by the House Rent Controller u/s 7 of the Act is final and shall not be called into question in any Court. In other words, after the House Rent Controller?s order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, the said order which by the deeming provision u/s 15 of the Act is a decree terminates the statutory tenancy that existed between the land lord and the tenant prior to the order u/s 7 of the Act. In other words, after the House Rent Controller?s order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, the said order which by the deeming provision u/s 15 of the Act is a decree terminates the statutory tenancy that existed between the land lord and the tenant prior to the order u/s 7 of the Act. This order of the House Rent Controller passed against the tenant is final and cannot be questioned in any Court of law. Therefore, a party in whose favour such an order is passed may enforce the order as provided u/s 15 of the Act by executing the same. The executing Court itself has no power to question the finality of the order unless it is shown that the said order has been modified or set aside by the appellate authority as provided under the Act. The provision contained in Section 14 of the Act by no stretch of imagination can be said to mean as contended by Mr. Mohapatra that the moment an appeal is preferred against the original order of the House Rent Controller u/s 7 of the Act, the original order loses its finality and ceases to be executable. In support of his argument Mr. Mohapatra says that in case his contention is not accepted and that in execution of the original order passed by the House Rent Controller u/s 7 of the Act. the tenant is evicted and thereafter the appellate Court sets aside the original order of the House Rent Controller, the tenant will have no relief under the Act. I do not think that such a contention can be upheld. True, the provisions contained in the Act do not provide for such a contingency. Absence of a provision to enable a tenant who has been dispossessed in execution of the order of the House Rent Controller u/s 7 of the Act to recover possession after the order of the House Rent Controller directing eviction is set aside by the appellate authority does not necessarily lead to an inference that the House Rent Controller?s order for eviction ceases to be final the moment an appeal is filed against it. There is no bar under the law for a tenant who has been evicted in execution of the original order passed against him u/s 7 of the Act to sue for recovery of possession in case the original order is set aside by the appellate Court even though the Act does not specifically provide for such a remedy. I would therefore hold that the Petitioner ceased to be a tenant immediately an order for his eviction was passed by the House Rent Controller on 22-9-1969 in spite of the fact that an appeal was preferred against the original order. I do not agree with the contention of Mr. Mohapatra that till the tenant is actually evicted from the house in question in execution of a decree the tenancy continues. In this view, therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the suit for damages as laid by the opp. party in the Court below is maintainable. 7. The second contention raised by Mr. Mohapatra similarly also has no force. He relies upon Article 35 (1) in Schedule II of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act for the contention that the present suit for damages being one for injury to the Plaintiff not specifically provided in the foregoing sub-clauses of the said Article is not cognizable by a small cause Court. Sub-clause (1) of Article 35 in Schedule II of the Small Cause Courts Act says that compensation for injury to the person in a case not provided for in the previous sub-clauses is not cognizable by a small cause Court. The present case is not one for compensation for injury to the person of the opp. party. It is a suit for damages due to unauthorised occupation by the Petitioner of the disputed house belonging to the opp. party. Therefore, it cannot be said that the suit is for compensation for injury to the person of the opp. party. There being no other prohibition for entertaining a suit of the present nature by a small cause Court, it must be held that the suit out of which this revision arises is cognizable by the small cause Court u/s 15(2) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 8. Both the contentions of Mr. Mohapatra thus having failed, the revision is dismissed. In the circumstances there will be no order for costs. Final Result : Dismissed