JUDGMENT J. NARAIN, J. 1. This is an application for quashing the order dated the 1st of September, 1972 passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Dinapur by which he has converted a proceeding under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') between the parties to one under section 145 of the Code and has also passed an order of attachment of the subject of dispute. 2. The petitioner Siya Saran Prasad Singh and opposite party No.2 Radhika Raman Prasad Singh are the sons of Ganga Prasad Singh by his one wife and opposite party no. 1 Jagdish Saran Prasad Singh is his son by the other wife. On the 29th of July 1972, Jagdish Saran Singh (Opposite Party No.1) made an application to the Sarpanch Rampurnagwar Gram Panchayat alleging that he has lands in villages Kalupur and Nirakhpur but the petitioner Siya Saran Singh has been forcibly obstructing his cultivation and as such there is an apprehension of the breach of the peace. On this petition the Sarpanch made a local inspection and served a notice upon the parties that for a period of 30 days they must maintain peace. Thereafter Sarpanch forwarded the petition that had been filed before him and his ordersheet to the Sub-divisional Magistrate Dinapur suggesting that a proceeding under section 144 of the Code be started in respect of the lands of both the villagers. On this the Sub-divisional Magistrate by his order dated the 31st of July, 1972 started a proceeding under section 144 of the Code in respect of the lands situated in villages Kalupur and Nirakhpur and asked the parties to show cause. The parties showed cause and by the impugned order the Sub-divisional Magistrate converted the proceeding under section 144 into one under section 145 of the Code and also passed an order of attachment. 3. Mr. Jugal Kishore Prasad on behalf of the petitioner has attacked the order on two grounds. The first is that the order passed under section 144 or 145 of the Code by the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate is erroneous in law since under the provisions of section 64 (2) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) all that the Sub-divisional Magistrate could do was either to confirm the order passed by the Sarpanch or to discharge it after hearing the parties to the dispute. The second point urged by the learned counsel is that in the circumstances of the case the proceeding under section 145 of the Code is unwarranted and improper. 4. No doubt under sub-section (2) of section 64 of the Act, the Sub-divisional Magistrate has either to confirm the order or to discharge the order passed by the Sarpanch but the point to be seen is whether the Sarpanch bad, submitted the proceeding of the case under section 64 of the Act or not. It is common ground that the territorial jurisdiction of the Sarpanch extends over village Kalupur only and that is why the notice that he had issued to the parties related to the land of Kalupur only. To my mind, the action of the Sarpanch in forwarding the ordersheet of the case and the other petitions to the Sub-divisional Magistrate cannot be interpreted to be one under section 64 (2) of the Act. It is clear that the Sarpanch did not take action under sub-section (2) of section 64 of the Act, rather he took a different action altogether. He hold a local inspection and made recommendation to the Sub-divisional Magistrate that action against the parties be taken under section 144 of the Code. Therefore, initiation of the proceeding under section 144 of the Code by the Sub-divisional Magistrate cannot be held to be in violation of Sub-section (2) of section 64 of the Act. Provisions of section 144 of the Code do not spell out the sources from which information regarding apprehension of the breach of the peace must reach the Sub-divisional Magistrate before he can take action. Therefore, on the report sent by the Sarpanch the Sub-divisional Magistrate was quite competent to initiate the proceeding under section 144 of the Code. Moreover, in the impugned order he has given sufficient reason why he converted the proceeding into one under section 145 of the Code. He has clearly mentioned that both the parties to the proceeding claimed their respective possession over the subject of dispute and the matter cannot be decided finally unless recourse is taken to the provisions of section 145 of the Code. Moreover it has been laid down by the Supreme Court in B.H. Bhutani vs. Miss. He has clearly mentioned that both the parties to the proceeding claimed their respective possession over the subject of dispute and the matter cannot be decided finally unless recourse is taken to the provisions of section 145 of the Code. Moreover it has been laid down by the Supreme Court in B.H. Bhutani vs. Miss. Mani-J-Desai, AIR 1968 SC 1444 that – "The High Court in the exercise of its revisiona1 jurisdiction would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate." Therefore, if on the materials that were available before the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate, he felt satisfied that circumstances warranted a proceeding under section 145 of the Code, his order is no open to challenge. In this view of the matter, I do not find any substance in the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. 5. Now, whether regard being had to the facts and circumstances of the case, the proceeding under section 145 is proper and should be allowed to continue or not. In this connection, it will be noticed that Jagdish Saran Prasad Singh, opposite party no. 1 has already filed a title suit in November, 1970 in the Subordinate Judge's court at Patna against the petitioner and others claiming partition of his share. Therein he had stated that after the death of his father Ganga Prasad Singh, the petitioner Siya Saran Prasad Singh has become practically the Karta of the family and has been managing the affairs of the family. The point for consideration is whether during the pendency of a title suit with such an allegation, proceeding under section 145 is proper. Mr. Radha Prasad Singh on behalf of opposite party no. 1 has relied upon the case of Raghubans Singh vs. Mahabir Singh, 1970 BLJR 358 to support his contention that there is no bar in law for a proceeding under section 145 when a suit in respect of the same property is also pending in Civil Court. He also referred to the case of Nata Padhan vs. Banchha Baral, AIR 1968 Ori. 36 which says that – "The proceeding or the order of the Magistrate though inexpedient are not without jurisdiction." 6. In my opinion also, initiation of the proceeding under section 145 of the Code cannot be held to be beyond jurisdiction of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate. 36 which says that – "The proceeding or the order of the Magistrate though inexpedient are not without jurisdiction." 6. In my opinion also, initiation of the proceeding under section 145 of the Code cannot be held to be beyond jurisdiction of the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate. The significant point however, to be noticed is whether it is expedient to allow the proceeding under section 145 of the Code to continue. Mr. Radha Prasad Singh has maintained that even on the facts of the case, proceeding under section 145 would be quite proper and for this he has relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Mosammat Sudamawati Kuer vs. Ramchander Singh, AIR 1963 Pat 320 . The facts of the above decision are, however, distinguishable. It was laid down there that – "a case in which party claims exclusive possession but another party claims to be in joint possession with other party is no less a question of dispute of actual possession than if each party claimed exclusive possession of the entire area and therefore, the question falls within the purview of section 145." In the instant case the plaint of the title suit filed by the opposite party itself negatives such a case. Therefore, this Bench decision cannot be of avail to opposite party no. 1. 7. Answer to the question canvassed will be clear if the primary object for initiating a proceeding under section 145 of the Code is kept in view. The primary object is to prevent breach of the peace and the proceeding under section 145 is just a summary enquiry to ascertain which of the rival parties is in actual possession of the subject of dispute and to see that the possession of the party declared to be in possession is maintained till the matter is finally decided by the Civil Court. Clearly, therefore, when the parties have already approached the Civil Court for the proper relief, proceeding under section 145 of the Code will not only be meaningless but futile. The parties can legitimately obtain from the Civil Court an order of injunction or get a receiver appointed and that will effectively serve the interim purpose. Clearly, therefore, when the parties have already approached the Civil Court for the proper relief, proceeding under section 145 of the Code will not only be meaningless but futile. The parties can legitimately obtain from the Civil Court an order of injunction or get a receiver appointed and that will effectively serve the interim purpose. 8 The view expressed above finds support from the decision of this court in Kamo Sharma and others vs. Jagdambi Mahto 1968 PLJR 427 and in Jalim Mian vs. Raghunath Prasad 1973 PLJR 69 from the observation of Narshimhan C.J. mentioned therein. 9. For the above reasons the proceeding under section 145 of the Code cannot be allowed to continue and it is, accordingly, quashed. 10. In the result the application is allowed. Application allowed.