JUDGMENT V. Balakrishnan Eradi, J. 1. The two writ petitioners herein are members of the Board of Directors of the Trivandrum District Co-operative Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Bank), the 1st petitioner being also the President of the Board. They have brought this writ petition seeking to quash the order Ext. P-1, dated the 9th July 1973 passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kerala (2nd respondent) removing the Board of Directors of the Bank and appointing the 3rd respondent as Administrator to manage the affairs of the Bank for a period of six months, in purported exercise of the powers of the 2nd respondent under sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 32 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioners contend that the ground stated in Ext. P-1 in justification of the decision to supersede the Board of Directors are neither factually correct nor legally valid and that the impugned order has been passed by the 2nd respondent mala fide at the instance of a person by name Sreekanteswaram M. Kesavan Nair who has been impleaded as the 4th respondent. It is alleged in the writ petition that the 4th respondent was also a Director of the Bank but had resigned on account of some misunderstanding which is said to have arisen as between himself and the other members of the Board because of the unwillingness of the latter to appoint some nominees of the 4th respondent in the service of the Bank. The further allegation of the petitioners is that the 4th respondent is a close confidant of the Minister for Co-operation and an influential person belonging to the particular political party to which the Minister belongs and to wreak his vengeance against the other members of the Board the 4th respondent approached the Minister for superseding the Board. According to the petitioners, as part of his plan, the 4th respondent got one Velayudha Panicker to file a petition before the Minister making unfounded allegations against the Board of Directors and he also instigated the District Co-operative Bank Employees' Union to start an agitation and stage a strike by the employees with the deliberate object of creating an artificial atmosphere of confusion and chaos so as to provide an excuse for the Department to take action against the Board. Another plea strongly put forward by the petitioners is that there was no emergency justifying the invocation by the 2nd respondent of the power conferred by section 32 (3) of the Act to supersede the Board of Directors without even giving it an opportunity to state its objections and without consulting the Circle Co-operative Union and the State Co-operative Union. A challenge has also been raised by the petitioners against the constitutionality of section 32 (3) of the Act, the contention taken by them being that the said section is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution since it confers a naked and arbitrary power on the Registrar to summarily supersede the committee of the society without any guide-lines being laid down for the exercise of the said discretionary power. 2. A detailed counter-affidavit has been failed in the case by the 2nd respondent setting out the facts and circumstances which led to the passing of the impugned order. It is stated therein that the term of the Board of Directors of the Bank was due to expire in the normal course on 31st August 1973. According to the averments contained in the counter-affidavit, the Board of Directors in willful disobedience of instructions issued by the 2nd respondent in an order dated 30th May 1973 and in an earlier circular dated 3rd January 1973 had created many new supervisory posts and had also hastily taken steps for selecting as many as 40 persons to be appointed as clerks, typists and peons in the Bank. It is said that the implementation of the proposal for appointing those 40 persons would lead to an increase of 40 per cent of existing staff and the resulting addition to the establishment cost of the Bank would cause considerable strain on the Bank's finances which were already in an unsatisfactory state. The counter-affidavit of the 2nd respondent proceeds to state that on 5th July 1973 the Minister for Co-operation forwarded to him for necessary action a petition submitted by one Velayudha Panicker alleging many irregularities in the procedure adopted by the Board of Directors in the matter of making appointments to the service of the Bank and that the 2nd respondent, therefore, directed the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Credit), Trivandrum to enquire into the allegations contained in the petition. In pursuance thereof the Joint Registrar conducted investigation and submitted a report to the 2nd respondent on 9th July 1973. It is said that the enquiry report revealed that the Board of Directors of the Bank had created many new supervisory posts and had already made appointments thereto in disregard of the directions contained in the circular dated 3rd January 1973 issued by the 2nd respondent. It was also disclosed by the report that though the Directors had been granted permission to make appointments only to 17 posts they had with undue haste selected as many as 40 persons as clerks, typists and peons to be appointed in the Bank and that the said appointments were about to be made. The 2nd respondent states that if the Board of Directors was allowed to proceed with appointments of 40 persons irreparable harm and prejudice would be caused to the finance of the Bank and the Bank's interest would be seriously jeopardised. It is further stated by the 2nd respondent that the report of the Joint Registrar revealed that the entire staff of the Bank had struck work on 7th July 1973 in protest against the wholesale appointments proposed to be made by the Board of Directors and that consequent on the strike the affairs of the Bank had come to a standstill. An order had been issued by the 2nd respondent on 6th July 1973 to the President of the Board of Directors staying all proceedings of the Board for making the new appointments but in total disregard and open defiance of the said order the President had hurriedly issued orders of appointments to candidates in order to make it appear that the stay order was incapable of being implemented. It is averred by the 2nd respondent that after bestowing anxious consideration of all the facts and circumstances which had led to a complete stalemate in the functioning of the Bank, he was satisfied that unless immediate action was taken to restore normalcy and to resume the functioning of the Bank it would result in serious and irreparable harm to the Bank's interests and that the matter was of such urgency that it was not possible to wait till the procedure of calling for objections from the Board of Directors or of consultation with the circle union and. the financing bank was gone through. the financing bank was gone through. It is contended that the action taken by him in invoking the powers under section 32 (3) of the Act was fully warranted and legal. 3. The allegation that Ext. P-1 was issued mala fide has been strongly refuted in the counter-affidavit of the 2nd respondent and it has been submitted by him that the impugned action was taken in good faith for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of the Bank. 4. The Minister in charge of Co-operation has filed a counter-affidavit wherein he has categorically denied the petitioner's allegation that the 4th respondent is a "confidant" of the Minister and that he had approached him for superseding the Bank. The Minister has stated that he had received a petition from one Shri Velayudha Panicker complaining certain malpractices on the part of the President and the other Directors of the Bank and he had only forwarded the said complaint to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies for necessary action and report. The allegations in ground C of the original petition connecting the 4th respondent and the Minister and the suggestion that the impugned action was taken at the instigation of the 4th respondent have been specifically and strongly denied in the Minister's counter-affidavit. 5. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner put forward a contention, though faintly, that section 32 (3) of the Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution since it confers an arbitrary and uncanalised power on the Registrar to supersede a committee of a society even without giving an opportunity to the committee to state its objections. I see no force in this contention. The legislature while conferring the power on the Registrar under section 32 (3) has taken due care to provide necessary guide-lines by laying it down that the said power shall be exercised only in cases where the Registrar is of the opinion that the circumstances of the case are such that it is not reasonably practicable to give an opportunity to the committee to state its objections. It cannot, therefore be said that an arbitrary and uncanalised power has been conferred by the section. It cannot, therefore be said that an arbitrary and uncanalised power has been conferred by the section. No doubt the decision as to whether the power is to be exercised or not has been left to the subjective opinion of the Registrar but it has to be remembered that the power under the section is intended to be used in cases of extreme urgency and necessarily some officer has to be invested with authority to take a decision as to whether there are circumstances warranting the exercise of the power and the legislature having chosen to confer the said power on a responsible officer, namely the Registrar it cannot be said that section 32 (3) suffers from the vice of arbitrariness. 6. It is now well-established that it is open to the legislature to lay down the particular procedure to be followed in the matter of the exercise of a power conferred by the statute and the rules of natural justice will have application only subject to such special provision made by the legislature. The provision in a statute which empowers an emergent action to be taken in public interest without giving a notice or hearing to a private party who may be affected thereby is not liable to be struck down by the court on the ground that the principles of natural justice are violated. The petitioner's attack against section 32 (3) of the Act is therefore overruled. 7. Excepting for the vague averments made by the petitioner in the original petition and the supporting affidavit suggesting that the impugned order has been passed at the instance of the 4th respondent no material whatever has been produced by the petitioner to corroborate the said plea of mala fides. The 2nd respondent has sworn in his counter-affidavit that the order Ext. P-1 was passed by him bona fide on his being satisfied that the action had to be taken urgently in the interests of the Bank and that in taking the said decision he was not acting under the instigation of any one. The files of the 2nd respondent have been produced before me by the learned Government Pleader. There is also the counter-affidavit filed by the Minister wherein he has sworn that the 4th respondent had not approached him for superseding the Board of Directors of the Bank. The files of the 2nd respondent have been produced before me by the learned Government Pleader. There is also the counter-affidavit filed by the Minister wherein he has sworn that the 4th respondent had not approached him for superseding the Board of Directors of the Bank. I have carefully gone through the files and there is nothing contained therein to indicate that in taking the impugned action the 2nd respondent was acting otherwise than on the basis of his own satisfaction arrived at in good faith that it was necessary to take the action against the Board of Directors for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the Bank. I have no hesitation to accept as true the statements contained in the counter-affidavits filed by the Minister and by the 2nd respondent and to hold that the plea of mala fides put forward by the petitioner is devoid of any foundation. 8. I shall now proceed to consider the petitioner's further contention that there was absolutely no fact or circumstance warranting the invocation of the 2nd respondent's powers under section 32 (3) of the Act at the time when the impugned order was passed. Section 32 so far as it is relevant for our present purpose is in the following terms: " 32. Supersession of Committee.-(1) If the Registrar is satisfied that the committee of any society persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by this Act or the rules or the bye-laws or commits any act which is prejudicial to the interests of the society or willfully disobeys or willfully fails to comply with any lawful order or direction issued under this Act or the rules, the Registrar may, after giving the committee an opportunity to state its objections, if any, by order in writing remove the committee and (a) appoint a new committee consisting of nor more than three members of the society in its place ; or (b) appoint one or more administrator or administrators who need not be a member or members of the society, to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding one year as may be specified in the order, which period may, at the discretion of the Registrar, be extended from time to time, so however that the aggregate period does not exceed two years. (2)The Registrar shall consult the financing bank and Circle Co-operative Union or State Co-operative Union as the case may be before passing an order under sub-section (1). (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) it shall not be necessary to give an opportunity to the committee to state its objections and to consult the Unions and financing banks, in cases where the Registrar is of the opinion that it is not reasonably practicable to do so, subject however to the condition that in such cases the period of supersession shall generally be for six months and in case a new committee cannot be constituted or enter upon office in accordance with the bye-laws of the society within the period of super-session the period may be extended for a further period not exceeding six months (a) in the case of a co-operative society only after consulting the Circle Co-operative Union concerned; and (b) in the case of an apex society or a central society only after consulting the State Co-operative Union." The Registrar is empowered under sub-section (1) to remove the committee of a society in case he is satisfied that the committee has been guilty of one or other of the acts of commission or omission made mention of in sub-section (1). Such action is, however, to be taken ordinarily only after giving the committee an opportunity to state its objections and after consulting the financing bank and the circle cooperative union or the State Co-operative Union, as the case may be. But, it is provided under sub-section (3) that it shall not be necessary to give an opportunity to the committee to state its objections or to consult the Unions and the financing banks in cases where the Registrar is of the opinion that it is not reasonably practicable to do so. The attack made by the petitioner against the order Ext. P-1 is two-fold. Firstly, it is argued that there were no grounds at all on the basis of which the Registrar could have arrived at a reasonable satisfaction either that the Board of Directors of the Bank had been guilty of negligence in the performance of its duties or that they had committed any act prejudicial to the interests of the Bank or had wilfully disobeyed or failed to comply with any lawful order or direction issued under the Act or the rules. Secondly, it is argued that in any event the invocation of the power under sub-section (3) was totally unwarranted and that there were no circumstances relating to the administration or working of the Bank which could have reasonably led the Registrar to form an honest opinion that it was not reasonably practicable to give an opportunity to the committee to state its objections before taking action for its supersession. 9. Since the legislature has empowered the Registrar to exercise the power of supersession on the basis of his satisfaction regarding the existence or otherwise of the circumstances referred to in the section the scope of enquiry by the court into the validity of such an action taken under the aforesaid section is very limited. The court will not function as an appellate authority and investigate into the sufficiency of the materials or reasonableness of the grounds on which the Registrar has arrived at the satisfaction referred to in sub-section (1). If the contention is that the Registrar never applied his mind and therefore he could not have been satisfied, the court can enter into that question, the ingredient of satisfaction being a condition precedent to the exercise of the power notwithstanding the satisfaction being subjective. Similarly, if the power conferred by the statute is exercised for a purpose or with an intention beyond the scope and contemplation of the instrument creating it the action is liable to be interfered with on the ground that it constitutes fraud on the power granted by the statute. The order of the statutory authority can also be challenged if it is shown that the action was taken on grounds totally irrelevant to the purpose and intention of the statute or that the grounds stated by the authority are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation. 10. Judged in the light of the above principles I do not find it possible to hold that the action of the 2nd respondent in passing the impugned order Ext. P-1 by invoking the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 32 is either ultra vires or illegal. I have already observed that the plea of mala fides put forward by the petitioner has not been established. P-1 by invoking the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 32 is either ultra vires or illegal. I have already observed that the plea of mala fides put forward by the petitioner has not been established. The files produced by the Government Pleader appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 contain the enquiry report submitted to the Registrar by the Joint Registrar (Credit) who had been deputed by the 2nd respondent to conduct an investigation into the complaint petition filed by Sri Velayudha Panicker and also the representations received by the 2nd respondent from the Trivandrum District Co-operative Bank Employees' Union. It is also seen from the averments contained in the counter-affidavit, supported as they are by the facts stated in the enquiry report of the Joint Registrar, that the Board of Directors of the Bank, whose term was to expire on 31st August 1973, was taking action in great and unseemly haste to make a large number of appointments into the Bank's service in spite of clear instructions having been issued by the Registrar that appointments should be made only to the absolute minimum number of posts required by adopting the staff pattern laid down in a communication issued by the 2nd respondent on 30th May 1973. Significantly, the Bank had requested the 2nd respondent on 24th May 1973 for permission to make appointments to only 17 posts. It was while granting the said request, by the letter dated 30th May 1973 that the Bank was instructed by the 2nd respondent to make appointments only to such number of posts as were required on the basis of the norms suggested in the said letter. It would appear that in complete disregard of such instructions the Board of Directors set about to make large scale recruitment of about 40 candidates besides creating a number or new supervisory posts in the cadre of Deputy General Manager, Inspector of Branches, etc. and promoting a number of existing incumbents to those posts. The appointments, which were about to be made by the Board of Directors to the Bank and which were as many as 40 in number, would have led to an increase of 40 per cent of the existing staff. and promoting a number of existing incumbents to those posts. The appointments, which were about to be made by the Board of Directors to the Bank and which were as many as 40 in number, would have led to an increase of 40 per cent of the existing staff. On the 2nd respondent coming to know about the Board's move to make the appointments from the petitions filed by Shri Velayudha Panicker and by the Trivandrum -District Co-operative Bank Employees' Union, all further steps in that regard were stayed by the 2nd respondent as per an order dated 6th July 1973 and the said order was served on the General Manager at 5.10 p.m. on the same day. It is stated by the Joint Registrar in his report that, as a matter of fact, none of the candidates proposed to be appointed had joined duty in the Bank by that time. However, the President of the Bank refused to implement the order of stay on the ground that the candidates had already taken charge. It was, therefore, clear that the Board of Directors was bent upon carrying out their proposal for making the new appointments in defiance of the specific directions given by the Registrar to the contrary. On 7th July 1973 an agitation was started by the existing employees of the Bank who went on strike protesting against the action of the Board of Directors in making the new recruitment of 40 persons. The employees had declared that they would not resume their work until the Board reversed its decision for making the wholesale appointments. The 8th July 1973 was a Sunday. The strike of the employees continued on the 9th July also and the working of the Bank was completely paralysed. According to the report of the Joint Registrar he had contacted some of the Directors including the President and they did not show any change in their attitude and were not prepared to comply with the directions given by the Registrar for holding up the appointments. Since the Bank is the central financing agency for the agricultural credit societies in the whole district, the Joint Registrar stated in his report that the continuance of the existing situation which had resulted in the work of the Bank coming to a complete standstill would seriously jeopardise the entire credit structure of the District. Since the Bank is the central financing agency for the agricultural credit societies in the whole district, the Joint Registrar stated in his report that the continuance of the existing situation which had resulted in the work of the Bank coming to a complete standstill would seriously jeopardise the entire credit structure of the District. He therefore recommended that in order to avoid the stalemate and to revive the institution, immediate action may be taken under section 32 (1) read with section 32 (3) of the Act. It was on the basis of the facts so disclosed by the said report of the Joint Registrar and in the light of the other circumstances relating to the failure on the part of the Directors to comply with the directions issued by him that the 2nd respondent formed the opinion that urgent action was required to be taken under section 32 (1) of the Act in the interests of the Bank and that the matter could not wait till the procedure of issuing notices to the Directors and hearing their objections was gone through. I am not prepared to hold that this opinion formed by the 2nd respondent can be characterised as either arbitrary or perverse. The question whether on the same materials this court will form the same opinion is of no relevance at all. If the authority invested with the power under the statute has acted in good faith and formed an opinion, which cannot be characterised as a conclusion incapable of being reached by any person acting reasonably on the basis of those materials, the court will not be justified interfering with the action taken by the statutory authority. Having given my anxious consideration to the case I do not find it possible to hold that the 2nd respondent has acted on any extraneous considerations or irrelevant grounds either in arriving at the requisite satisfaction under section 33 (1) that circumstances existed warranting the supersession of the Board or in forming the opinion that such action had to be taken urgently under section 32 (3); nor can it be said that the satisfaction or opinion arrived at by the 2nd respondent is arbitrary or perverse. There is, therefore, no scope at all for any interference by this court with the impugned order Ext. P-1. 11. The original petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There is, therefore, no scope at all for any interference by this court with the impugned order Ext. P-1. 11. The original petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs.