Judgment Nand Lall Untwalia, C. J. 1. This is a reference under Sec.25 (1) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) made by the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar. It has referred the following question of law for determination by this court: whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the transaction under consideration constitutes a sale and is liable to be assessed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956? 2. The facts of the case may be largely taken from the statement of the case prepared by the Tribunal and they are these: The period in question is 1st July, 1957, to 30th June, 1959, governed by the 1947 Act. The assessee-company supplied beryl and columbite minerals which are said to be used in atomic energy plants by the Government of India. The supply at the relevant time was controlled under the Atomic Energy Act, 1948. Various orders were issued by the Atomic Energy Department of the Government of India from time to time under the said Act. The assessee was assessed under Sec.13 (5) of the Act, originally, to pay Central sales tax on the turnover of the above two minerals. It went up in appeal. The appellate authority found that there was no proper investigation in this case and so it remanded it to the assessing officer to find out whether there was a valid acquisition order under the Central Act of 1948 in respect of the supply made by the assessee. After the remand, the assessing officer, on examination of the papers produced by the assessee, came to the conclusion that it had failed to prove that the prescribed substance was supplied to the Government against any acquisition order. The assessing authority held again that the transactions amounted to sales within the meaning of the Central Act and was chargeable to sales tax under it. The appeal filed by the assessee as also the first revision failed. The matter was taken up in second revision before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also dismissed the revision, holding that the transactions in question were sales. On being asked to refer a case to this court, it has done so under Sec.25 (1) of the Act. 3. A few more facts may be stated from the assessment order passed after remand and from the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal also dismissed the revision, holding that the transactions in question were sales. On being asked to refer a case to this court, it has done so under Sec.25 (1) of the Act. 3. A few more facts may be stated from the assessment order passed after remand and from the order of the Tribunal. In the former, it is recorded that the dealer did not produce any vaild acquisition order, but it produced a copy of the agreement dated 15th October, 1958, entered into between the assessee-company and the Atomic Energy Department of the Government of India. In this agreement the dealer has been described as the seller and the Atomic Energy Department as the buyer. It is also mentioned in it that the seller has agreed to sell the stock of columbite tantalite ores of certain specification on certain terms agreed to between the dealer and the buyer. Clause 5 of the agreement contemplated certain conditions for acceptance or rejection of the beryl ore supplied by the dealer. Clause 7 provided that the purchaser should have the right to reject the whole consignment and return it to the seller at its cost and recover the expenses incurred by the purchaser from the seller. One of the provisions in the agreement was that if the seller did not perform and discharge its obligation to the satisfaction of the purchaser or if the former did not supply any materials for a continuous period of six months, the latter was to be at liberty to terminate the agreement without any notice to the seller. 4. Coming to the Tribunals order, I find that on behalf of the assessee reliance was placed upon a true copy of a certificate dated 27th March, 1963, signed by the Administrative and Accounts Officer, Atomic Minerals Division, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India. Although this was a document of a much later date than the period of assessment in question, recitals have been referred to by the Tribunal and after considering them the Tribunal has maintained the view of the departmental authority that the transactions in question were sales chargeable to Central sales tax. The provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948, have also been referred to by the Tribunal. 5. In the certificate dated 27th March, 1963, it is recited that beryl, columbite, etc. The provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948, have also been referred to by the Tribunal. 5. In the certificate dated 27th March, 1963, it is recited that beryl, columbite, etc. , are under the direct control of the Government of India; their extraction, storage and supply are controlled by the Government under the Atomic Energy Act. It also recited that the Department of Atomic Energy is the sole purchaser of the minerals aforesaid and the suppliers are not allowed to sell them to anybody else without the permission of the Central Government. 6. It would thus be seen that on the facts found and relied on by the Tribunal to an appreciable extent freedom of contract was controlled. Many kinds of freedom which were available to a contracting party in the nineteenth century during the laissez-faire theory were not available and were curtailed as new theories of social justice and social philosophy advanced. The principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the various decisions, some of which will be adverted to hereinafter in this judgment show that if a persons property is compulsorily acquired or the purported sale is as a result of compulsion brought about by the law leaving no field or element of a volition or consensus of agreement between the parties, then the transaction is not a sale within the meaning of the Act or the Central Sales Tax Act. But merely truncating the field of freedom leaving still a considerable ground for operation of the volition and exercise of ones power to agree or not to agree cannot take away the transaction from the realm of sale and save it from the charge of sales tax. The freedom to sell a commodity at a price dictated by the seller or to a person whomsoever he likes to sell, the manner of production, distribution and the quantities to be sold at a time are the various matters which are subjected to controlled restrictions by the law. Merely because of restrictions it is difficult to say that the transaction loses its character of being a sale. 7. Under Sec.2 of Act 29 of 1948, a declaration as to expediency of the Central Governments control in relation to any industry connected with the production or use of the atomic energy or any mineral which may be used for its production, has been made. 7. Under Sec.2 of Act 29 of 1948, a declaration as to expediency of the Central Governments control in relation to any industry connected with the production or use of the atomic energy or any mineral which may be used for its production, has been made. With regard to the atomic energy general powers have been conferred on the Central Government including the power to obtain information of materials, plant and processes under Sec.5. Power of entry and inspection and power to do work for the purpose of discovering minerals have been conferred under Sections 6 and 7. Sec.8 provides for compulsory acquisition of prescribed substances, stock of minerals and plant, and Sec.9 makes provision of compulsory acquisition of certain other rights. In the instant case, no material could be placed by the assessee to show that there was any compulsory acquisition of the prescribed substances under Sec.8 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948. A forced sale may be equated with and placed on the same footing as a compulsory acquisition. In Teknarayan Mahesh Prasad V/s. The State of Bihar A. I. R.1972 Pat.250, I had said in paragraph 6: it is difficult to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioners on the basis of the well-known decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper V/s. Union of India A. I. R.1970 S. C.564, popularly known as the Bank Nationalisation case, that the principles engrafted in subsection (3b) for fixation of the price in case of a forced sale, which may be tantamount to compulsory acquisition of the foodstuffs, are irrelevant or are no principles in law so as to enable this court to strike down the provision of law as being violative of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. " In paragraph 10 after referring to Coopers case A. I. R.1970 S. C.564, again I said: "in my opinion, therefore, it is a case of fixation of the amount of compensation which may be said to be inadequate, but the law cannot be declared to be invalid merely on that ground. 8. The various clauses of the agreement referred to in the assessment order clearly show that a good deal of field was left to be covered by the agreement between the parties. 8. The various clauses of the agreement referred to in the assessment order clearly show that a good deal of field was left to be covered by the agreement between the parties. In accordance with the recitals in the certificate the compulsion on the assessee was to supply the materials to the Atomic Energy Department of the Government of India and not to anybody else unless permitted by the Government. The prescribed substances were under the direct control of the Government of India. Their extraction, storage and supply were also controlled. Although as to price it is not recorded in any of the orders that it was fixed, I shall assume in favour of the assessee that the price must have been fixed because such materials could not be allowed to be supplied to the Government at prices to be dictated by the mine-owner. It is, therefore, clear that to an appreciable extent the freedom of contract had been curtailed. Yet, it was open to the assessee-company not to enter into a transaction of sale at all with the Government of India. It could have refused to extract the prescribed materials and supply them to the Government of India. There is nothing to indicate that the supply was under any control order, direction or law which did not leave any such volition to the supplier. It may well be that on the assessees refusal to supply the prescribed substances lying in its stock, power under Sec.8 of the Atomic Energy Act could have been exercised and then acquisition of the substances would have been beyond the pale of the term "sale". But until and unless that contingency arose the supply was all willing and in exercise of free volition. No threat of acquisition appears to have been ever given nor any provision of law could be brought to our notice that if the assessee failed to supply the prescribed substances to the Government, it would have been liable to be prosecuted or penalised. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that the transactions in question were sales within the meaning of the Act and the Central Sales Tax Act and have been rightly treated to be so chargeable to Central sales tax. 9. There are various decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that the transactions in question were sales within the meaning of the Act and the Central Sales Tax Act and have been rightly treated to be so chargeable to Central sales tax. 9. There are various decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. , New India Sugar Mills Ltd. V/s. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar [l963] 14 S. T. C.316 (S. C. ). Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd. V/s. State of Madras [1968] 21 S. T. C.138 (S. C.), Chittar Mal Narain Das V/s. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. [19701 26 S. T. C.344 (S. C.), and all have been reviewed by a Bench of seven learned Judges including the learned Chief Justice, in the case of Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. V/s. State of Mysore [1972] 29 S. T. C.246 (S. C. ). Argument similar to the one advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee was advanced before the Supreme Court and has been noticed at pages 251 and 252. The reply of the counsel for the State has been put down at page 253. Thereafter, on a review of various authorities it has been laid down at page 261: these decisions establish that statutory orders regulating the supply and distribution of goods by and between the parties under Control Orders in a State do not absolutely impinge on the freedom to enter into contract. Legislative measures or statutory provisions fixing the price, delivery, supply, restricting areas for transactions are all within the realm of planning economic needs ensuring production and distribution of essential commodities and basic necessities of community. The recent trends in these legal rules delimit the variety of structure of rights and duties which individuals may create by such acts and transactions. The complexity of modern activities and the consequent difficulty of providing for every eventuality have shaken fervour for freedom of contract as there was during the nineteenth century. The economic environment has changed. The individual freedom is to be reconciled with adequate performance by the Government of its functions in a highly organised society. The complexity of modern activities and the consequent difficulty of providing for every eventuality have shaken fervour for freedom of contract as there was during the nineteenth century. The economic environment has changed. The individual freedom is to be reconciled with adequate performance by the Government of its functions in a highly organised society. Delimiting areas for transactions or parties or denoting price for transactions are all within the area of individual freedom of contract with limited choice by reason of ensuring the greatest good for the greatest number by achieving proper supply at standard or fair price to eliminate the evils of hoarding and scarcity on the one hand and availability on the other. 10. A passage from the minority judgment of Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was), in the case of New India Sugar Mills Ltd. [1963] 14 S. T. C.316 (S. C.), has been quoted at page 255. This case was considered by the Supreme Court in Andhra Sugars Ltd. V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh [1968] 21 S. T. C.212 (S. C.), Bachawat, J. , speaking for the court, had said that "the decision in the New India Sugar Mills Ltd. [1963] 14 S. T. C.316 (S. C.), was not to be treated as an authority for the proposition that there can be no contract of sale under compulsion of a statute". Most of the elements in the case of Solar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. [1972] 29 S. T. C, 246 (S. C.), which have been noticed in the last paragraph at page 261 are common in the present case. I have, therefore, no difficulty in holding that it is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Salar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. [1972] 29 S. T. C, 246 (S. C.), 11. Our attention was drawn to a later decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu V/s. Cement Distributors (P.) Ltd. [1973] 31 S. T. C.309 (S. C. ). This is a judgment of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court. It has followed the earlier two decisions reported in New India Sugar Mills Ltd. V/s. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar [1963] 14 S. T. C.316 (S. C.), and Chittar Mal Narain Das V/s. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1970] 26 S. T. C.344 (S. C. ). This is a judgment of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court. It has followed the earlier two decisions reported in New India Sugar Mills Ltd. V/s. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar [1963] 14 S. T. C.316 (S. C.), and Chittar Mal Narain Das V/s. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1970] 26 S. T. C.344 (S. C. ). Perhaps, on the facts of that case, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Solar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. [1972] 29 S. T. C, 246 (S. C.), was thought not quite apposite either to be cited at the Bar or to be noticed in the judgment. The supply of cement was absolutely controlled. The cement had to be supplied in gunny bags the price of which was also fixed. In such a situation, it was held by the Supreme Court that the producers of cement who supplied it to the State Trading Corporation or its agents in gunny bags in pursuance of the directions given by the Government were not liable to pay sales tax on the turnover relating to the price of the gunny bags. In my opinion, the case of Cement Distributors (P.) Ltd. [1973] 31 S. T. C.309 (S. C.), falls in line with those cases where either no field is left for operation of acts of volition in the matter of transactions or the field left is too small to permit the transactions to remain within the ambit of sale. 12. For the reasons stated above, the question of law referred to this court is answered in the affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. It is held that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the transactions under consideration constituted sales and were liable to be assessed under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs.100 only.