Judgment :- 1. This appeal by the first defendant in a suit for redemption raises a question of law relating to the interpretation of Explanation II to S.4A(1)(a) of Act I of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969. 2. The plaint schedule properties are 8 in number. Item No.9 in the schedule is a but stated to have been then in existence in item No. 5. While items 1 to 3 paddy fields remained in the possession of the mortgagee under Ext D-1 deed of 1075, these items alone with items 4 to 6 garden lands were demised under Otti Ext. P-2 dated 12-4-1116 (26-11-1940) by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff in favour of the 1st defendant. Thereafter, on 7-3-1124 (23-10-1948), under Ext. P-4 melotti, items 1 to 8 were further demised in favour of the first defendant. 3. In Ext. P-2 there is a recital to the effect that the first defendant might pay a sum of 2450 fanams out of the total mortgage amount of 3500 fanams to the mortgagee under Ext. D-1 and redeem items 1 to 3. Ext. P-1 is the registered deed by which the mortgagee in Ext. D-1 released his right over items 1 to 3 and the 1st defendant obtained possession thereof. The first defendant had since been in possession of the property. By virtue of Ext P-3 gift deed the equity of redemption came to vest in the plaintiff, who has instituted the present suit for redemption and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule properties redeeming the rights of the defendants under Exts. P-2 and P-4. 4. Several contentions have been raised in this second appeal against the concurrent decision of courts below that the plaint schedule properties could be redeemed and recovered by the plaintiff. The two main contentions dow raised by the appellants are: (i) as Ext. D-1 mortgage is of the year 1075, and since then a period of more than 50 years had already lapsed by the time Act 35 of 1969 came into force, by virtue of Exts. P-1 and P-2 the first defendant, being the sucessor-in-interest of the mortgagee under Ext. D-1 mortgage is of the year 1075, and since then a period of more than 50 years had already lapsed by the time Act 35 of 1969 came into force, by virtue of Exts. P-1 and P-2 the first defendant, being the sucessor-in-interest of the mortgagee under Ext. D-1, is entitled to the benefits of 'deemed tenancy' and consequential 'fixity of tenure' and that he is not liable to be evicted in this proceeding; and (ii) is any event, with respect to the garden lands (purayidoms) i. e, items 4 to 8, the question whether there is a lease in favour of the first defendant or only a redeemable mortgage, has not been considered by the court below and therefore it needs further enquiry. 5. The decision on the first point would rest mainly on the interpretation of the expression "predecessor¬in-interest" used in Explanation II to S.4A(1) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969. The Explanation reads as follows: "In computing the period of fifty years referred to in clause (a) or the period of thirty years referred to in clause (c), the period during which the predecessor-in-interest of the mortgages or lessee was or were holding the property shall also be taken into account." It may be noted that S.4A(1)(a) provides that the mortgagee or lessee holding the land comprised in the mortgage for a continuous period of not less than fifty years immediately preceding the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 shall be deemed to be a tenant. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that by redeeming Ext. D-1 otti the appellant had stepped into the shoes of the mortgagee under that deed, and as such, the period during which the mortgagee under Ext. D-1 was holding the property could be tagged on to the period during which the property has been held by virtue of Ext. P-2 otti and Ext. P-1 release deed, and by doing so it could be found that the appellant is eligible for the no fit of "deemed tenancy" as contemplated under S.4A of the Act. In support of this contention reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant on the ruling of a Division Bench of the Madras High Coon reported in Kunjunni Nair v. Ratnan Menon (AIR. In support of this contention reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant on the ruling of a Division Bench of the Madras High Coon reported in Kunjunni Nair v. Ratnan Menon (AIR. 1930 Madras 502 = 1930 Madras Weekly Notes 106) wherein In the context of the interpretation to be given to S.5 of the Malabar Compensation for Tenant's Improvements Act, Kumaraswamy Sastry J. has stated as follow<:-"The expression'predecessor in interest' in S.5 of the Malabar Tenants'. Improvement Act is used not in a strict sense but means a person who claims title from any other by assignment, transfer, gift etc., and in claiming compensation where one kanamdar redeems another the latter should be treated as the 'predecessor in interest' of the former. It is immaterial whether the improvements were made by the kanamdar in possession or by any other person in possession before him and that the previous kanamdar bad or bad not been paid compensation by the subsequent kanamdar." The facts of that case were: The plaintiff was the landlord, the defendant the tenant, and the suit was to redeem the kanom for Rs. 200/- evidenced by Ext. A. The plaintiff gave a kanom to one Subramanya Pattar and the material terms of Ext. A which is the melkanom in favour of the 1st defendant were that the kanom in favour of Subramanya Pattar should be redeemed by the first defendant and that he should pay Rs. 200/- towards the redemption of that kanom As regards the value of improvements which Subramanya Pattar was claiming, the first defendant was to pay for these improvements if necessary. The material clause is "I shall therefore pay up the edukudi amount of Rs. 200/- and also the value of the kuzhikkure (improvements) effected in the Schedule mentioned properties by Subramanya Pattar although there is no necessity to pay the value of the same as they were effected without your permission, the value being paid only to avoid litigation and trouble". Ultimately it happened that Subramanya Pattar did not receive the kanom amount and a suit for redemption became necessary. Decree for redemption also was passed. Instead of claiming value of improvements Subramanya Pattar expressed his choice to remove the improvements. In the end he did not remove the improvements. Ultimately it happened that Subramanya Pattar did not receive the kanom amount and a suit for redemption became necessary. Decree for redemption also was passed. Instead of claiming value of improvements Subramanya Pattar expressed his choice to remove the improvements. In the end he did not remove the improvements. The question was as to who was entitled to the improvements in the property left behind by Subramanya Pattar for which no compensation was paid either by the plaintiff or the defendant. In construing the provisions of S.5, the Division Bench took the view that a liberal interpretation bad to be given and even though the improvement was not effected by the defendant in as much as be bad come into possession of the property redeeming it on behalf of the plaintiff he should be entitled to get the value of improvements. In coming to this conclusion reliance was placed on certain observations contained in Sundara Iyer's Malabar Laws wherein it has been observed as follows: "The words cannot be said to adequately describe the class of persons for whose improvements the tenant in possession is entitled to claim compensation. Unless the word 'predecessor in interest' is understood in a somewhat loose way the section may not include many cases which must obviously have been intended to come within it To cover obvious cases it may be necessary to understand the word 'predecessor in interest', as the derivation of the word suggests as meaning "one that went before him in Interest", some 'tenant' as understood by the Act who preceded him in occupation either immediately or mediately through others without the continuity being broken up by the intervention of the plaintiff". This passage in Sundara Iyer's Malabar Laws and the observation in Kunjunni Nair v. Roman Menon (AIR. 1930 Madras 502) have been relied on by Natesan J. in the case reported in Devaraja v Murugesan (AIR 1967 Madras 293). 7. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, seeks to distinguish the facts of the casein Kunjunni Nair v. Raman Menon (AIR. 1930 Madras 502) and Devaraja v. Murugesan (AIR. (967 Madras 293) and submits that in terms of the provisions contained in Explanation II to S.4A(1) the first defendant in this case will not be entitled to have the period during which the mortgagee under Ext. 1930 Madras 502) and Devaraja v. Murugesan (AIR. (967 Madras 293) and submits that in terms of the provisions contained in Explanation II to S.4A(1) the first defendant in this case will not be entitled to have the period during which the mortgagee under Ext. D-1 was holding the property added to the period during which he was holding the property by virtue of the release deed Ext. P-1 for claiming the continuity of tenancy to be eligible for fixity of tenure as deemed tenant. The word 'predecessor in interest' has been defined in both the Oxford Dictionary and the Webster's Dictionary more or less to mean "a person who has preceded another in a given state, position etc." In Ramanatha Iyer's Law Lexicon the meaning given to the term 'predecessor' is as follows: "One who has preceded another. In the common acceptation ‘predecessor means one who goes before or precedes another in a given state, position or office, and does not necessarily express any relation to the legal privity." In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary the term 'predecessor in title' in terms of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927 in relation to a tenant or landlord is stated to mean "any person through whom the tenant or landlord has derived title, whether by assignment, by will, by intestacy, or by operation of law. The decisions reported in Wilson v Drake (1938 Law Reports Ch. D. 133); Pasmore v. Whitebread & Co. Ltd. (1953 (1) AER. 361=1953 (2) Weekly Law Reports 359); and Williams v Portman (1951 (2) AER. 539) have been cited before me in support of the contention that to claim the benefit arising out of (he continuity of possession gathered by a person characterised to be the 'predecessor in interest' there must be identity of interest between such person and the person claiming such benefit. In Pasmore v Whitebread &. Co Ltd. (1953 (1) AER. 361) the facts were: The tenant of a business premises surrendered his tenancy to the landlords who granted a quarterly tenancy of the premises to a new tenant, to whom the previous tenant sold the goodwill, fixtures and fittings. The landlords subsequently gave the new tenant notice to quit the premises expiring two and a half years after the commencement of bis tenancy of the previous owner of the business. The landlords subsequently gave the new tenant notice to quit the premises expiring two and a half years after the commencement of bis tenancy of the previous owner of the business. On an application by the tenant for compensation for loss of goodwill under S.4 (1) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927, it was held by Denning Q. with whom Morris LI. and Roxburgh J. concurred that "The predecessors in title' of a tenant in S.4 (1) and S.25 (1) of the Landlord end Tenant Act, 1927, meant hit predecessors in title to the premises and not to the business; as the previous owner of the business had not assigned his tenancy to the tenant, be was not his predecessor in title; and, therefore, the business had not been carried on by the tenant or his predecessors in title at the premises for not less than five years, and he was not entitled to compensation under S.4 (1) of the Act;" The object of drawing my attention to the above passage in particular by the learned counsel for the respondents is to stress that the position would have been different had it been that the first defendant had taken an assignment of the interest of the mortgagee under Ext. D-1, and the present suit is one for redemption of not only Exts. P2 and P4 mortgages, but also of Ext. D1 mortgage. I think there is considerable force in this reasoning. The majority decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Mathew v. Ayyappankutty (1962 KLT. 61) also lends support to this argument advanced by the learned counsel Speaking for the majority, in Para.88 of the judgment at page 90, Madhavan Nair J. has observed as follows; "The position may be viewed in another aspect also. When a person sells property to another, depositing a part of the sale consideration with the purchaser to be paid to the mortgagee in discharge of the mortgage, the purchaser is only constituted the agent of the seller to redeem the property with the seller's money. If then the purchaser redeems the properly with such amount and enters possession thereof, it is as if the seller himself redeemed the mortgage and sold the property with possession to the purchaser. If then the purchaser redeems the properly with such amount and enters possession thereof, it is as if the seller himself redeemed the mortgage and sold the property with possession to the purchaser. In the eye of law, the case cannot be different if the mortgagor, instead of selling the property to a third person and depositing with him sufficient amount to discharge the mortgage, sold the equity of redemption to the mortgagee himself. The same principle must apply to both the cases and the same legal consequences must follow," The learned counsel for the appellant argues that by redeeming Ext. Dt mortgage the first defendant stood subrogated to the position of the mortgagee under Ext. D1 and therefore continuity of possession as a mortgagee should be presumed. The argument of the counsel for the respondent is that such an inference cannot be drawn, and strictly speaking S.92 of the Transfer of Property Act would have no application to the facts of the case inasmuch as what the mortgagee under Ext. P2 did was to redeem the property in accordance with the undertaking in Ext. P2. To attract S.92 of the Transfer of Property Act redemption should have been done without reference to any such recitals as contained in Ext. P2 and independent of any direction given by the mortgagor. In support of this contention reliance is placed on the decision of the Gujarat High Court reported in Laxmidas v. Lohma Bai (AIR. 1970 Guj. 73) wherein referring to the application of S.92 it has been observed as follows: "On a plain perusal of these two provisions, one thing becomes clear that S.91 recognises also persons other than the mortgagor having a right to redeem or institute a suit for redemption. The right to redeem a property by a mortgagor is specifically provided in S.60 of the Act. The right of subrogation in S.92 is, however, given to other persons referred to in S.91, and that excludes the mortgagor. That is very significant and a vital distinction in regard to a right of redemption when a claim by principle of subrogation is made, for such a right is denied and cannot be bad to the mortgagor to set at naught bis own deeds passed and defeat the in claims of priority. That is very significant and a vital distinction in regard to a right of redemption when a claim by principle of subrogation is made, for such a right is denied and cannot be bad to the mortgagor to set at naught bis own deeds passed and defeat the in claims of priority. In other words, it is clear that the first paragraph of S.92 allows persons referred to in S.92 and co-mortgagors to get that right of subrogation, an in no case to a mortgagor. The words in brackets 'other than a mortgagor' therefore restrict such a right or benefit 'to such persons or co-mortgagors. Now it is easy to think that when a mortgagor is excluded from that section, any person on his account or on his behalf or who acts in terms of agreement with him would also be excluded. The intention of the legislature could not be otherwise. If a mortgagor is excluded, all such persons getting right through him or acting on his account, either as an agent or representative, or under any such covenant remain also excluded Otherwise the mortgagor can creep in by such a method and defeat the rights of mortgagees created by him which in law he cannot be allowed to do unless the case is covered by the clear position arising out of S.92." In the instant case what was done by the appellant, as has already been stated, was to redeem Ext. D-1 mortgage in pursuance of the direction given by the mortgagor in Ext. P-2, with the money reserved with him out of the amount secured by Ext, P-2. It cannot be construed, in terms of the provisions contained in S.92 of the Transfer of Property Act, to be an act by which he was entitled to get himself subrogated to the position of the mortgagee under Ext. D-1. Considering the recital in Ext. P-2 and the conduct of the parties, even giving a liberal interpretation to Explanation II to S.4A (1), I thick, there is no justification for taking the view that the first defendant is a mortgagee who had been holding the property for more than 50 years on the date of the coming into force of Act 35 of 1969. It would also be just and equitable to conclude that Ext. P-1 evidences an extinguishment of the mortgage under Ext. It would also be just and equitable to conclude that Ext. P-1 evidences an extinguishment of the mortgage under Ext. D-1 and that it enures to the benefit of the mortgagor alone, as it was done with his money a ad under his direction in terms of Ext. P-2, and the first defendant who secured the release of the property from the prior mortgagee as an agent of the mortgagor is not entitled to claim that his possession of the property is in con-tinuation of that of the prior mortgagee, and to invoke S 4A (1) for establishing the status of adeemed tenant with the aid of Explanation II to S.4A (1). 8. However, I think an opportunity should be given to the appellant to contest the points with respect to items 7 and 8 which are the two items covered by Ext. P-4 otti-kuzhikanom, but not by Ext. D-1 or Ext. P-2, the earlier documents. The learned counsel submits that the courts below have not considered as to whether Ext. P-4 really evidences a lease or only a mortgage and that the guide-line given in the decisions of this Court in C. Kochuvarghese v. Narayani Amma (AIR. 1970 Kerala 267) and Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (1971 KLT. 216) has not been followed by the courts below. While I do not pronounce anything on the merit of the contentions of the respective parties on this question inasmuch as this question has not been gone into by the courts below, I think the proper course should be to remit the matter to the trial court for a proper consideration of this contention with respect to items 7 and 8 As far as the decision of the court below with respect to items 1 to 6 is concerned, it is confirmed. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant wants to raise contentions seeking relief under S.7 and 78 of. Act 1 of 1964. This contention has not been raised till now, and as such, at this stage, it need not be gone into by this Court. If so advised, be may agitate that point in other appropriate proceedings. The second appeal is allowed only to the extent of remitting the matter to the trial court for consideration of the question whether Ext. This contention has not been raised till now, and as such, at this stage, it need not be gone into by this Court. If so advised, be may agitate that point in other appropriate proceedings. The second appeal is allowed only to the extent of remitting the matter to the trial court for consideration of the question whether Ext. P-4 evidences a lease or a mortgage in respect of items 7 and 8 and for a fresh disposal in the light of the finding that may be reached on that question; in all other respects the second appeal shall stand dismissed, and the decrees of the courts below with respect to items 1 to 6 are hereby confirmed. There will be no order as to costs in this second appeal.