JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition against an award of the Labour Court. 2. A dispute had arisen with respect to the punishment meted out to Ram Het, Appellant, by the employer. The Labour Court held that the domestic enquiry conducted by the employer was unfair and entered into the merits of the charges framed by the employer against the workman. Ram Het was employed to perform domestic duties at the residence of the Chief Engineer of the Ganesh Flour Mills Co. Ltd. The first charge against him was that he absented from duty on Sundays' falling in January and February 1968. The other two charges were in respect of non-performance of the duties during the course of his employment. 3. The Labour Court held that the second and third charges were, besides being vague, not proved. In respect of these two charges the Labour Court had taken the view that as warning had been given by the employer in respect of the latches, the charges must be deemed to have been condoned and could not therefore form the subject matter of fresh charges. Learned Single Judge did not accept the finding of the Labour Court and directed it to look into these charges also on merits. No ground has been raised in appeal in respect of this finding and direction of the learned single Judge. It must therefore be deemed to have become final. 4. In regard to the first charge, the contention of the Workman was that he was an employee within the meaning of the U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and was accordingly entitled to a weekly holiday and as other workmen enjoyed Sunday as a holiday he was also entitled to it and therefore committed no misconduct by absenting himself on Sundays. The case of the employer, on the other hand, was that Ram Het being employed for domestic work was not an employee within the meaning of the Act and was not entitled to any holiday and in any case, it was the employer's choice to fix the day when he should have a holiday and the employee could not, on hip own volition, take Sunday to be the holiday. The Labour Court accepted the plea raised by the workman and held that there was no misconduct committed by him in absenting from duty on Sundays. The learned single Judge held that the view of the Labour Court was erroneous in law and the workman wan not entitled as of right to take Sunday as a weekly holiday. In appeal before us, learned Counsel for the Appellant has again raised the same contentions. Section 2(6) of the Act defines an employee in these words-- 'Employee' means a person wholly or mainly employee on wages by an employer in, or in connexion with any trade, business or Manufacture carried on in a shop or commercial establishment and includes-- (a) caretaker, mali or a member of the watch and ward; staff; (b) any clerical or other staff of a factory or industrial establishment, which is not covered by the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 Act LXIII of 1948; and (c) any apprentice or a contract or piece rate worker; Learned counsel cell tended that the workman concerned will be an employee within the meaning et Clause (b) of Sub-section (6) of Section 2 or, alternatively, under the main clause of the definition. We are unable to accept tip contention. 5. Looking at the use of the phrase "which is not covered by the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948" in this clause and to the words "to whom the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948...do not apply" in Sub-section (4) of Section 2 and to the definition of factory as given in Sub-section (8) of Section 2, we are unable to accept the contention that the words "which is not covered by the provisions of the Factories Act" in Clause (b) apply only to industrial establishments and not to factories. The Ganesh Flour Mills is admittedly a factory governed by the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948, pence the Appellant cannot be deemed an employee by virtue of Clause (b) of Section 2(b) of be Act. 6. Coming to the main definition in Sub-section (6) of Section 2, we find that before a person can be deemed to be an employee, he must not only be implored in connection with some trade, business or manufacture, but should be employed as such, wholly or mainly, in the trade, business or manufacture which is carried on in a shop or commercial establishment. Learned Counsel contended that the work done by the Appellant was in connection with trade, business and manufacture carried on by the employer and therefore the house where he worked became a commercial establishment The contention is that the definitions of 'commercial establishment' in Sub-section (4) of Section 2 means every place where clerical and other employees of the factory worked and to whom the provisions of the Factories Act did not apply. We think that this is not the correct approach. The premises has to be first a commercial; establishment, before a Workman working therein can be deemed to be an employee within the meaning of the Act. 7. Section 2(4) defines a commercial establishment, the relevant portion whereof runs as under: 'commercial establishment' means any premises, not being the premises of a factory or a shop, wherein any trade, business, manufacture, or any work in connection with, or incidental jot ancillary thereto, is carried on for profit and includes a premises...where the clerical and other establishment of a factory, to whom the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948...do not apply work; 'premises' means a house or building with land appurtenant thereto; In the present case, unless it can be held that the domestic house of the officer of the company was such a premises in which trade, business or manufacture or any work connected with incidental or ancillary thereto was carried on it could not be held to be a commercial establishment. A commercial establishment must be such an accommodation which is either exclusively or at least primarily used for commercial purposes. Premises used exclusively for residential purposes cannot be treated as commercial establishment. If a domestic house of an officer of the company could be held to be a commercial establishment, unreasonable results will follow unless 'artificial meaning is given to various provisions of the Act. Section 5 of the Act, for example provides that No. commercial establishment shall on any day open earlier or close later than such hour as may be prescribed in this behalf. Similarly, Section 8 provides for closed days. Now, a domestic house cannot be closed on any holiday nor can it be made to open or close at a particular hour. Similarly, Section 8 provides for closed days. Now, a domestic house cannot be closed on any holiday nor can it be made to open or close at a particular hour. To obviate this difficulty, learned Counsel for the Appellant contended that these sections be given an interpretation to mean that the house shall remain closed qua the employee and otherwise may remain open. We are unable to give any such interpretation. The sections require the opening and closure of the establishment and the word 'establishment' in these sections must be interpreted to mean the premises. Learned counsel, in support of his contention, relied upon the case of Rogers v. Dodd 1968 LIC 1371. In that case a shop was to remain open for certain hours only. When at a time its door was locked the service was given through a window the interpretation of the words "kept open" was given to mean "kept open to the public". Learned Counsel contends that in the present case, on the basis of analogy, Sections 5 and 8 of the Act should be deemed to refer to premises kept open and closed only to the employee. In our opinion clear words of Sections 5 and 8 can neither be given this interpretation, nor can a domestic house be subjected to such restrictions. 8. Learned Counsel has relied upon decisions in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. Vs. Badri Mali and Others, AIR 1964 SC 737 and Punjab Sugar Mills v. State of U.P. AIR 1960 All 445 for his contention that the Appellant must be deemed to be employed in connection with 'manufacture' within the meaning of Section 2(6) and as such should be treated as an employee. In the former case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the work of 'Malis' in looking after the gardens in the bungalows of officers will be incidental to the main industrial operation and that the work carried on by them was not so remote, indirect or far fetched as not to be incidental to the industrial operation. In the former case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the work of 'Malis' in looking after the gardens in the bungalows of officers will be incidental to the main industrial operation and that the work carried on by them was not so remote, indirect or far fetched as not to be incidental to the industrial operation. In the case of Punjab Sugar Mills (supra) this Court took the view that the phrase "in any industry" was, used in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in a broader sense and the services of domestic servants serving the officers of the industry will fall in the category of peripheral service and the workman would be deemed to be employed in the industry. In both these oases, the Court had to interpret the meaning of the word "workman" appearing in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. In our opinion, the word' industry' has a much wider connotation than the terms "trade, business or manufacture" used in Sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the Act have. 9. Even if it may be possible to hold that the work of a workman performing domestic duties at the residence of an officer of a factory was a work connected with, or incidental or ancillary to trade, business or manufacture carried on by the employer, it will not make the premises used as a residential house a 'commercial establishment' within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act. Where an officer of a factory lets an employee of the factory perform certain domestic chores for the upkeep of the house, cleaning of utensils etc such permissive activity will not be sufficient to convert his domestic establishment into a commercial establishment of the employer and as in our opinion the premises where the employee works must first be a commercial establishment before the workman can be treated as an employee within the meaning of the Act, the Appellant cannot get the benefit of the Act. The judgment of the learned single Judge cannot, therefore, be held to be erroneous in law. 10. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case parties are directed, to bear their own costs.