JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The Petitioner has been convicted u/s 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (Act 37/54), as amended by Act 49 of 1964, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), and sentenced to R.I. for one year. 2. The Petitioner has a grocery shop within Baripada Municipality. On 30th of December, 1970, the Health Officer of the Municipality (p.w. 1) purchased under receipt (ext. 3) a sample of Jira (cumin seeds) on cash payment in the presence of the Sanitary Inspector (p.w. 2) and another witness (p.w. 3). The sample was sent to the Public Analyst who found the Jira to be adulterated. His report is ext. 4. 3. Petitioner's defence was that the Jira was not meant for sale for human consumption. It was kept in a separate bag and Jira meant for sale was in a different bag. At the time of taking the sample the Petitioner made such a protest. 4. On discussion of evidence, both the Courts below came to the conclusion that the Jira of which sample was taken had been kept in the shop by the Petitioner for sal for human consumption. The evidence of p.w. 3 that the Petitioner made a statement at the time of seizure that it was not meant for human consumption was not accepted. Such a suggestion was not made to p.ws. 1 and 2 and the Courts below discarded the testimony of p.w. 3. They attached importance to the fact that the sample was purchased on payment and the Petitioner granted the receipt (ext. 3) on acceptance of price. Rightly the learned Courts below held that the sale was not under protest. The finding that the Jira was kept in the shop for human consumption is supported by evidence, and cannot be discarded. That apart, 'sale' has been defined in Section 2(xiii) of the Act as follows: "sale"with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means the sale of any article of food, whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption or use, or for analysis, and includes an agreement for sale, an offer for sale, the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such article, and includes also an attempt to sell any such article. Thus, sale of any article of food even for analysis constitutes a sale under the Act. The matter is concluded by Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel and Another Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Another, : See paragraph 18. The contention that the Jira was not for sale for human consumption has no substance. 5. The words 'adulterated' and 'food' in Section 2(i) and (v) have been defined thus: 2. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires: (i) 'adulterated' an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated **** (1) if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities which are in excess of the prescribed limits of variability. ** ** (v) 'food' means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and includes: (a) any article which ordinarily enters into, or is used in the composition or preparation of human food, and (b) any flavouring matter or condiments. Jira ordinarily enters into the preparation of human food. So it comes within the definition of 'food'. Rule 5 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, lays down that standards of quality of the various articles of food specified in Appendix B to these rules are as defined in that appendix. Appendix B.A. 05.01 is as follows: Caraway (Siah Jira) whole means the dried seed of the plant Carum carvi L. Extraneous matter including foreign edible seeds, chaff, stem, straw, dust, dirt, stones and lumps of earth shall not exceed 5 per cent by weight. The report of the Public Analyst, ext. 4 shows that the sample contained 5.7% extraneous matter and 17.4% of foreign seeds. Thus the Jira seized in the sample was adulterated food. Thus the conviction is well-founded. 6. Mr. Sahu contends that a lenient sentence of fine only should be imposed in the facts and circumstances of this case. The case was initially heard by me. Several single Judge decisions of this Court were brought to my notice showing conflict of views. In some cases only a sentence of fine was imposed. To resolve the conflict the case was referred to a Division Bench, and this is how the case has come before us. 7. Section 7(i) is the substantive provision prohibiting sale of adulterated food. The section, so far as relevant, runs thus: 7. In some cases only a sentence of fine was imposed. To resolve the conflict the case was referred to a Division Bench, and this is how the case has come before us. 7. Section 7(i) is the substantive provision prohibiting sale of adulterated food. The section, so far as relevant, runs thus: 7. Prohibition of manufacture, sale etc., of certain articles of food. No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute: (i) any adulterated food. Section 16(1)(a)(i) is the Penal section. So far as material it enacts as follows: 16 Penalties : (1) If any person (a) whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf imports into India or manufactures for sale or store, sell or distributes any article of food (i) which is adulterated or misbranded or the sale of which is prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of public health; xxx he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of Section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six month, but which may extend to six years, and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees: Provided that: (i) if the offence is under Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) and is with respect to an article of food which is adulterated under Sub-clause (1) of Clause (i) of Section 2 or misbranded under Sub-clause (k) of Clause (ix) of that section; xxx the Court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or of fine of less than one thousand rupees or of both imprisonment for a term of less than six months and fine of less than one thousand rupees. 8. Before examining the various authorities cited before us, we would make an elementary analysis as to whether a sentence of fine only can be imposed by virtue of the proviso to Section 16(1). It would appear from the substantive part of the section that sentences, both of imprisonment and fine, are compulsory. The maximum sentence of imprisonment may extend to six years while the minimum cannot be less than six months. It would appear from the substantive part of the section that sentences, both of imprisonment and fine, are compulsory. The maximum sentence of imprisonment may extend to six years while the minimum cannot be less than six months. The minimum sentence of fine would not be less than one thousand rupees. As has been already analysed, in this case the offence is in respect of adulterated food which comes squarely within the definition of Section 2(i)(1) Proviso (i) has full application to this case. If the proviso applies, the Court may for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or a fine less than one thousand rupees or of both imprisonment for a term of less than six months and a fine of less than one thousand rupees. Assuming there are adequate and special reasons for imposing a lesser sentence, the question for consideration is whether both imprisonment and fine shall be imposed or anyone of them can be imposed without imposing the other. 9. The main part of the section is conjunctive while the proviso uses the word 'or' in the first two clauses. It is now well-settled that the proviso has to be considered in relation to the main enactment and should not be allowed to completely take away the effect of the enactment itself. In the main part the sentence intended to be imposed is of conjunctive nature and that is not be defeated by providing a disjunctive punishment in the proviso. A superficial reading of the proviso would convey the impression that the punishment is disjunctive. The proviso consists of three types of cases, if other conditions relating to existence of adequate and special reasons are fulfilled. Those three cases are: (i) the Court may impose imprisonment for a term of less than six months and a fine of one thousand rupees; (ii) or it may impose an imprisonment of six months and a fine of less than one thousand rupees; or (iii) it may impose a sentence both of imprisonment for a term of less than six months and a fine of less than one thousand rupees. 10. Mr. Sahu suggests that on the aforesaid construction, the first two clauses are redundant. This is not correct. 10. Mr. Sahu suggests that on the aforesaid construction, the first two clauses are redundant. This is not correct. On the other hand, if the Petitioner's construction is accepted, the Court would be incompetent to impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months and a fine of rupees one thousand, or a sentence of fine of less than rupees one thousand and imprisonment for a term of six months as the last clause in the proviso authorises the Court to impose a sentence of both imprisonment for a term less than six months and a fine less than rupees one thousand. 11. In The Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore, Travancore-cochin and Coorg, Bangalore Vs. The Indo Mercantile Bank Limited, their Lordships observed thus: The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were from the main enactment a portion, which but for the proviso, would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of the proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment. It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. On the aforesaid analysis, we are clearly of opinion that even under the proviso the sentences of imprisonment and fine are compulsory. The proviso only makes provision for reduction of sentence for adequate and special reasons. It does not, however, make the sentences disjunctive. The conjunctive character of the sentences prescribed in the substantive part of the section remains unaffected. 12. This view has been taken by a Division Bench in City Corporation of Trivandrum Vs. K.J. Mathew Onkar Nath Sidhauli alias Narain and Kailash Vs. The State of U.P. and by Patra, J. in State of Orissa v. Hadibandhu Das 1972 (I) C.W.R. 307. These decisions lay down the law correctly. 13. In Rajendra Prasad v. State 1971 (I) C.W.R. 62, the lower appellate Court had set aside the sentence of imprisonment and imposed only a sentence of fine R.N. Misra, J. further reduced the sentence of fine. These decisions lay down the law correctly. 13. In Rajendra Prasad v. State 1971 (I) C.W.R. 62, the lower appellate Court had set aside the sentence of imprisonment and imposed only a sentence of fine R.N. Misra, J. further reduced the sentence of fine. Notice of enhancement should have been issued in that case and sentences of both imprisonment and fine should have been imposed. Construction of the proviso was not raised and discussed in that case. In Bata Behera v. Puri Municipality 1973 (1) C.W.R. 744, the lower appellate Court had imposed a sentence of six months' R.I. and a fine of rupees one thousand. Panda, J. set aside the sentence of imprisonment. The accused was thus imposed with a sentence of fine only. In this case also the legality of imposition of sentence of fine only was not canvassed or decided. 14. Rajendra Prasad v. State 1971 (I) C.W.R. 62, and Bata Behera v. Puri Municipality 1973 (1) C.W.R. 744, were wrongly decided in the matter of imposition of sentence of fine only. Doubtless in both the cases the scope and ambit of the proviso were not considered. All the same these decisions are likely to be cited in the lower Courts in support of the contention that sentence of fine only can be imposed u/s 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. These decisions do not lay down good law in so far as they impose sentence of fine only, and are hereby overruled to that limited extent. The only other decision referred to is Abdul Satar v. State 33 (1967) C.L.T. 821. That was a case of conviction u/s 16(1)(a)(i) as it stood prior to the amendment. It was a first offence and as was provided then in respect of the first offence a sentence of fine only could be imposed. That case was correctly decided, but is not applicable to the facts arising subsequent to the amendment by Act 49/64. 15. The last question for consideration is whether there is any adequate and special reasons for the Petitioner to reduce the sentence under the proviso. Nothing substantial could be brought to our notice by Mr. Sahu. The sentence was reduced under the proviso for adequate and special reasons in Jagadish Prasad v. State of West Bengal AIR 1972 S.S. 2.044. No such circumstances were brought to our notice. 16. Nothing substantial could be brought to our notice by Mr. Sahu. The sentence was reduced under the proviso for adequate and special reasons in Jagadish Prasad v. State of West Bengal AIR 1972 S.S. 2.044. No such circumstances were brought to our notice. 16. In this case a sentence of imprisonment for one year has been imposed by the Courts below. They are clearly wrong in not imposing a sentence of fine in addition to the sentence of imprisonment. We set aside the sentence of one year and reduce it to six months' R.I. and in addition impose a sentence of fine of rupees one thousand; in default the Petitioner to undergo a further sentence of six months' R.I. Subject to the aforesaid modification on the question of sentence, the revision is dismissed. B.K. Ray J. 17. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed