JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - Finding a conflict of opinion between Lunkush and Others Vs. Rajendra Sahai, AIR 1950 All 528 and Rasul Ahmad v. Beni Prasad 1965 ALJ 70 a learned single Judge has referred this case to a larger Bench. That is how the matter has been placed before us. 2. The Union of India (Respondent No. 4) instituted a suit u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act against the Petitioner's lather for his ejectment from the plot in dispute and for damages. The Plaintiff's case was that this plot had been acquired by the Govt. of India in 1942. The Defendant had illegally occupied it in 1376 F. The defence was that the suit was not maintainable u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, that it was barred by limitation and also that it was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 3. The SDO repelled the various pleas in bar and d creed the suit. This decree was upheld in appeal as well as in second appeal. Aggrieved the Petitioners have come to his Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution and have reiterated the same pleas before us. In regard to the maintainability of the suit u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act learned Counsel for the Petitioners invited our attention to a decision of a Jingle Judge in Lunkush v. Rajendra Sahai (supra). In that case a suit for ejectment from a grove land was filed in t le civil court prior to 1947. It was argued that the civil court had no jurisdiction. It was held that Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was not applicable to grove land. The reasons being firstly, that although the section speaks of 'land' which includes a 'grove-land' it speaks of land to which a person can be admitted as a 'tenant' which expression does not include a grove holder and secondly, that on the expiry of the period of limitation, the person in possession becomes a hereditary tenant and no person can become a hereditary tenant of a grove land. 4. In Baba Mahadeo Das Vs. Satyandra Kumar and Others, AIR 1953 All 85 a Full Bench was concerned with the, question as to whether Section 183 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was applicable to trove land. 4. In Baba Mahadeo Das Vs. Satyandra Kumar and Others, AIR 1953 All 85 a Full Bench was concerned with the, question as to whether Section 183 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was applicable to trove land. The Full Bench held that the decision in D.N. Rege v. Kazi Muhammad Haider 1949 ALJ 369 was distinguishable on facts. The Bench went an to make the following obiter observations: Section 180 applies to 'land' to which some body could be admitted as a tenant and which land becomes the hereditary tenancy of the trespasser if he was claiming as tenant, or which becomes khudkasht land if the Defendant was a co-sharer and was claiming the land as his khudkasht. Although 'land' as defined in the U.P. Tenancy Act includes grove-land, yet the definition is subject to the exception 'unless the contrary appears'. The contrary appears from the context in which the word 'land' is used in Section 180. A grove-holder is tot a tenant under the Tenancy Act except for certain purposes and a trespasser of grove-land cannot become a hereditary tenant or a khudkasht-holder. It follows that the word 'land' used in Section 180 is confined to agricultural land. In the case before the Full Bench the suit was filed in 1946. Prior to its amendment by UP Act No. 10 of 1947 Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy, Act provided for a suit for ejectment at the instance of a person entitled to admit him as tenant. The condition precedent to the applicability of the section was that the Plaintiff should be a person entitled to admit the Defendant as a tenant. The section was inapplicable to those class of cases where the Plaintiff by reason of his status was not entitles to admit the Defendant as tenant, for instance a grove-holder, sub-tenant, or non-occupancy tenant etc. Sub-section (2) of Section 180 provides: (2) If no suit is brought under this section, or if a decree obtained under this section is not executed, the person in possession shall, on the expiry pf the period of limitation prescribed for such, a suit, become a hereditary tenant of such plot or plots. By the Amending Act 10 of 197 the phrase 'person entitled to admit, him as tenant' was repealed and substituted by the phrase 'person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot'. By the Amending Act 10 of 197 the phrase 'person entitled to admit, him as tenant' was repealed and substituted by the phrase 'person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot'. It was no longer necessary that the Plaintiff should be in a position to admit the Defendant as the tenant. It was now sufficient; if he could permit him to occupy the plot. Obviously the ambit of Section 180 was considerably widened. Sub-section (2) was also amended and the following proviso was added: Provided that where the person in possession cannot be admitted to, such plot except as sub-tenant by the, person entitled to admit, the provisions of his sub-section shall Act apply until the interest of the person so entitled, to admit is extinguished in such plot u/s 45(f). After, the addition of the proviso to Sub-section (2) a suit u/s 180 would be maintained even if the consequence mentioned in Sub-section (2) did not accrue in cases where the proviso becomes applicable, It cannot hence be said that Sub-section (2) any longer laid down a condition precedent to the maintainability of a suit u/s 180 in the sense that, such a suit will not be competent if the Defendant could not become a hereditary tenant or a khudkasht holder. After the amendment of 1947 the only condition precedent to the maintainability of a suit u/s 180 is that the Plaintiff should be entitled to admit the Defendant to occupy the plot. So even if prior to 1947 a suit u/s 180 may not have been maintainable in relation to grove land, such a suit was competent after the amendment. The decisions in Lunkush v. Rajendra Sahai (supra) and Mahadeo Das v. Satyendra Kumar (supra) related to Section 180 as it was prior to its amendment in 1947. Those decisions are not helpful in construing the section after it had been amended in 1947. 5. This matter came up for consideration in Rasul Ahmed v. Beni Prasad (supra). It was noticed that in some cases prior to the amendment of Section 180 by U.P. Act No. 10 of 1947 Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act were read together for deciding who were competent to she, but that was because of the difficulty created by the words used in the section as it stood before the amendment. Sub-section (2) of Section 180 was, however, never regarded as curtailing the scope of Sub-section (1) in regard of the kind of land in respect of which a suit could be brought under it. The scope of Sub-section (1) of Section 180 cannot be restricted by Sub-section (2) and it is not possible to construe Sub-section (1) of Section 180 as limited to suits for that kind of land only in respect of which the consequences mentioned in Sub-section (2) of the section may ensue. 6. Our attention was invited to a Division Bench decision in Mahabir Prasad v. Smt. Bhaggoo 1965 AWR 461 . In that case a suit for ejectment was filed in the civil court in relation to an enclosed piece of land, having on it three residential apartments, servant's quarters and a well. Para 2 of the decision indicates that the suit was filed in 1946 i.e. prior to the amending Act of 1947. It was argued that the suit was not maintainable in the civil court because it lay in the revenue court u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The Bench held that the land with buildings on it was not land as defined in the tenancy Act. It, however, went on to make obiter observation that there was good authority for the proposition that land to which somebody cannot be admitted as a tenant, even though used for the purpose of a grove, would not be land within the meaning of Section 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. These observations show that the Bench was considering Section 180 as it stood prior to its amendment. But after 1947 even if the land in dispute may be of a nature that hereditary tenancy right cannot accrue in it yet the suit for ejectment was maintainable u/s 180, U.P. Tenancy Act. The present suit was maintainable u/s 180. 7. It was then urged that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 8. Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is in two parts. The present suit was maintainable u/s 180. 7. It was then urged that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 8. Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is in two parts. The opening part provides that the declaration and adjudication of rights if tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area for which a notification has been issued Under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 as well as adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. By the second part it bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts from entertaining any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act. Section 3(11) defines a 'tenure holder' as meaning a bhumidhar, sirdar of the land concerned and includes an asami. Section 3(2-A) defines the 'consolidation area' as the area in respect of which a notification u/s 4 has been issued, except such portions thereof to which the provisions of the UPZA and LR Act, 1950 do not apply. Thus the definition of a tenure holder as well as consolidation area suggests that land to which U.P. tenancy Act applies with the result that the persons who have rights like occupancy and hereditary tenants etc. recognised by the U.P. tenancy Act, are outside the purview of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In regard to declaration or adjudication of rights Section 9 of the Act is the only provision for raising disputes as to rights in respect of land. It contemplates adjudication of rights of tenure holders only at the instance either of the tenure-holder or any other person interested. Consolidation authorities have not been empowered to adjudicate rights of persons who are not tenure holders as defined by the Act. In relation to rights in land, the bar created by Section 49 can extend to suits which relates to declaration Or adjudication of rights of tenure holders, that is to say, of bhumidhar, sirdar or asami. It does not bar suits relating to declaration or adjudication of rights of persons governed by the U.P. Tenancy Act. This question came up for consideration in Badri Dube v. The Commr. It does not bar suits relating to declaration or adjudication of rights of persons governed by the U.P. Tenancy Act. This question came up for consideration in Badri Dube v. The Commr. 1969 AWR 317. The learned Single Judge after an elaborate discussion of various aspects held that the Consolidation of Holdings Act, applies only to such areas where the UPZA and LR Act is in force. We are in agreement with this view. The second point urged in support of the writ petition is without merit. 9. The next point urged by learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that the suit was barred by] limitation. The trial court held that the period of 30 years' limitation will apply. The lower appellate court, however, reversed this view. It held that the special rule for limitation as provided u/s 190(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act would be applicable. On foots it was found that the Defendant trespassed on the land in dispute within two years of the constitution of the suit and so the suit was not barred by limitation. For the Petitioner it was urged that the lower appellate court did not consider the effect of proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act where it was found that the Defendant had been in posses ion for a much longer period. The land in dispute was governed by the U.P. Tenancy Act. The U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was not applicable to it. As already seen the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is not applicable to lands governed by the U.P. Tenancy Aft. That being so the authorities under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act had no jurisdiction whatever to undertake the adjudication or declaration of rights with respect to such land; findings if any arrived at by the consolidation authorities being without jurisdiction wire entirely void. The lower appellate court did not commit any error of law in ignoring such void proceedings. The finding of fact that the Defendant trespassed on the land within two years of the institution of the suit does not disclose any manifest error of law. 10. The various points urged in support of the writ Petition having failed, the sane is dismissed with costs.