Sarat Lakshmi Deb v. Sisir Kumar Deb — 1973 DIGILAW 243 (CAL)

JUDGMENT (1.) THE appeal Nos. F. A. 711 of 1965 and F. A. 593 of 1964 are heard together and this judgment governs both of them. (2.) APPEAL No. 711 of 1965 has been filed by the plaintiff (Sm. Sarat Lakehmi deb) against the judgment and decree passed by Shri N. G. Chowdhury, Sub ordinate Judge, 4th Court, Alipore in title Suit No. 29 of 1957 refusing the claim of the plaintiff for declaration of her title in respect of 23rd share of property in suit and for separate possession after partition by metes and bounds of the same. Appeal No. 593 of 1984 is also at the instance of Sarat Lakshmi against the award passed in Land Acquisition case No. 28 of 1961 on reference from the Land Acquisition Collector's Case' no. 593 of 1962 by Shri B. C. Dasgupta, special Land Acquisition Judge on 11. 4. 62. (3.) IT is an unfortunate case in which mother and son have been fighting for more than a decade. (4.) THE facts out of which the appeal no. 711 of 1965 arises may, in short, be stated at the very outset. One Sarat Chandra Deb was the owner of the property in dispute. He was governed by Diabhaga School of hindu Law. He died on 7. 8. 46 leaving the plaintiff Sarat Lakshmi as his widow and two sons-Sisir and Pamir The younger son-Samir died on 15. 4. 48. On the death of Sarat Chandra the property devolved upon his widow Lakshmi and his two sons in 1/3rd share each. On the death of Samir his 1/3rd share was inherited by his mother Lakshmi as he died a bachelor. (5.) ACCORDING to Hindu Law the plaintiff thus got 1/3rd share in the suit property by inheritance from her husband and l/3rd share from her younger son and in consequence became entitled to 2/3rd share in the property in suit. Defendant No. 1 the eldest son Sisir, on the other hand, inherited l/3rd share in those properties. (6.) MOTHER and son fell out and the mother i. e. the plaintiff brought a partition suit in the 1st Court of Subordinate judge at Alipore being Title Suit No. 198 of 1949. The said suit was disposed of in terms of a petition of compromise filed by the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1. (6.) MOTHER and son fell out and the mother i. e. the plaintiff brought a partition suit in the 1st Court of Subordinate judge at Alipore being Title Suit No. 198 of 1949. The said suit was disposed of in terms of a petition of compromise filed by the plaintiff and the defendant no. 1. The compromise petition was filed on 5.2.55 and the final decree was drawn up on 16.5.57. In the Suit No. 29 of 1957 out of which this appeal arises the plaintiff appellant challenged the said compromise decree as a fraudulent one procured by the defendant No. 1 in collusion with her lawyer and behind her back. Her further case was that she was not given any opportunity to understand the terms of the compromise; that the said deed was never read out and explained to her that some blank demi papers were lying with defendant No. 1 and her lawyers which were used by the defendant No. 1 in collusion with her lawyers to make the said compromise; that the said compromise was written on the said blank demi papers signed by her and that the same was filed in court. (7.) THE plaintiff further asserted that when the impugned compromise was filed on 5. 2. 55 she was not governed by the Hindu Succession Act which came into force on 17.6.56. According to her after passing of the Hindu Succession act she became entitled to 2/3rd share in the suit property absolutely as distinct from limited right which she had under the old Hindu Law. (8.) DEFENDANT No. 1 contested the said suit. Defendant No. 2 is the alleged purchaser of some portion of the suit property. The said suit has been contested by the defendant No. 1 only. According to him the decree passed on compromise in Title Suit No. 198 of 1949 was a valid and legal one and that the same was not obtained by him in collusion with others by committing fraud on the plaintiff. He also contended, inter alia, that the said suit is a bar to the present one. He also maintained that the said compromise was entered into by the plaintiff under independent legal advice and that the terms of compromise were settled within knowledge. His further care was that the said compromise was acted upon as the plaintiff who accepted Rs. He also contended, inter alia, that the said suit is a bar to the present one. He also maintained that the said compromise was entered into by the plaintiff under independent legal advice and that the terms of compromise were settled within knowledge. His further care was that the said compromise was acted upon as the plaintiff who accepted Rs. 6000/-from him in terms of the said solenama. In conclusion defendant No 1 prayed for dismissal of the suit brought by the plaintiff. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. Against that judgment and decree this appeal has been sled. Thus the mother is the appellant, defendant No. 1 her son is respondent no. 1 and the purchaser of certain portion of the property has been added as defendant No. 2. That is, in short, the history of that case. (9.) LET us now come to the facts involved in Appeal No. 593 of 1964. It flies in a short compass which may be stated as follows: The 1/5th share of premises No. 12/1/6, Manoharpukur road was acquired by the Government. The said share of the property belonged to Sarat Chandra. The sun of Rs.5702. 72p was awarded as a compensation to be paid to the heirs of Sarat Chandra. The plaintiff claimed 2/3rd share in the said amount allowing the defendant to have the balance in his l/3rd share. In accordance with the share, the plaintiff claimed the sum of Rs. 3801.81p. The said matter was referred by the Land Acquisition Collector to the Special Land-Acquisition Judge at Alipore. That reference was entered at a L. A. Case No. 28 of 1961. Defendant No. 1 contested the claim of the plaintiff in that Land Acquisition Case. The L. A. Collector in order to decide that case mainly relied upon the solenama decree which was passed in partition Suit No. 198 of 1949 of the 1st court of Subordinate Judge at Alipore and held that the defendant No. 1 was to get the entire sum awarded in the said land acquisition case in. terms of that compromise. Against that judgment the plaintiff has preferred the appeal which has been numbered as F. A. 5921 of 1964. According to the plaintiff, the: compromise even if accepted, relates to premises No. 12/1/7 Monohar Pukur road and not to premises No. 12/1/6 of the said road. The land in premises no. terms of that compromise. Against that judgment the plaintiff has preferred the appeal which has been numbered as F. A. 5921 of 1964. According to the plaintiff, the: compromise even if accepted, relates to premises No. 12/1/7 Monohar Pukur road and not to premises No. 12/1/6 of the said road. The land in premises no. 12/1/6 is the subject matter of acquisition in L. A. Case No. 28 of 1961, the compromise even if accepted to be a genuine one and to have been acted. upon by the parties it must relate to premises No. 12/1/7 Manohar Pukur road. Thus it is contested that the compensation for acquisition of premises no. 12/1/6 Manohar Pukur Koad should be allotted and apportioned between the plaintiff and defendant in 2/3rd and l/3rd share respectively. (10.) DEFENDANT No. 1's contention in that land acquisition case was that the compromise was effected in respect of premises No. 121a Manohar Pukur road which subsequently was spate up into two holding i.e. 12/1/7 and 12/1/6 Manohar Pukur Road. According to him, it was not known that the premises no. 121a was so split up into two other holdings. In the plaint of Title Suit no. 198 of 1949 the said premises was described in two lots i.e. Lot No. 2 and lot No. 3. The entire dispute between the parties was settled by the deed of compromise marked Ext. 3. As per term of that compromise the premises in question was allotted to him as such the plaintiff cannot get any share in the compensation money awarded jointly to the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 by the land Acquisition Collector in respect of that property. Defendant No. 1 wanted to support the judgment of Special Land acquisition Judge awarding the entire compensation money of Rs. 3702. 72p to him. The said judgment has been challenged in F. A. No. 593 of 1964. As already indicated both the appeals are being heard analogously as the same question of law and facts are involved in both of them. (11.) FIRSTLY, we shall deal with F. A. No. 711 of 1965. In this appeal the plaintiff appellant challenged the validity of the solenama entered into between parties in Title Suit No. 198 of 1949. As already indicated both the appeals are being heard analogously as the same question of law and facts are involved in both of them. (11.) FIRSTLY, we shall deal with F. A. No. 711 of 1965. In this appeal the plaintiff appellant challenged the validity of the solenama entered into between parties in Title Suit No. 198 of 1949. That was the partition suit filed by the mother i. e. the plaintiff appellant in the First Court of Subordinate judge at Alipore for partition of the property described in three lots. Lot no. 1 is premises No. 114/2/2a, Hazra road, Lot No. 2 is the part of premises no. 121 A, Manohar Pukur Road measuring 12 cottahs and lot No. 3 is 1/5th share of the parties in premises No. 12/a of the said road measuring about 6 cottahs 2 chattaks of land. The said partition suit was compromised between the parties as per terms, evidenced by ext. 3 which is a copy of compromise petition filed by the parties in the court on the 5th February, 1955. To under stand the case of the parties, it is better to state, in brief, the terms of the said compromise. According to the said term the plaintiff was to get exclusive possession and was allowed to enjoy the entire first floor-rooms of premises No. 114/2/2a, Hazra Road including the privy, bath room, verandah, open entrance and two kitchens to be constructed forthwith by the defendant on the said floor as also the existing stair case and the small room on the second floor and the entire roof of the said house. As per term of the said compromise the plaintiff was given the Hindu "widow's estate for her life in that property. (12.) TO allow the plaintiff to have the peaceful enjoyment of that portion, the defendant No. 1 agreed to make certain construction and also certain, additions and alterations and that he undertook to do the same within a certain date. Defendant No. 1, on the other hand, was given the full and absolute right to the entire ground floor rooms including the verandah, privy and bath room and also the inner yard of the said premises. Another important clause was inserted in that compromise petition which is also relevant for our consideration. Defendant No. 1 agreed to make a lump sum payment of Rs. Another important clause was inserted in that compromise petition which is also relevant for our consideration. Defendant No. 1 agreed to make a lump sum payment of Rs. 6000/- to the plaintiff absolutely in lieu of the plaintiff's life estate in 2/3rd share in the land at premises No. 12/1/7, Manohar Pukur Road. He also agreed to make the said payment in certain instalments. On such payment being made it was agreed that the defendant would be entitled to the said land absolutely. That is, in short, the terms of the compromise. (13.) MRS. Nag appearing for the appellant has challenged the said compromise and the decree passed with reference to the same as a fraudulent one. She had at the outset challenged the said compromise decree on the following grounds, namely, (1) that the said compromise was effected without the plaintiff's consent, (2) she was not present in court when the said compromise petition was filed, (3) that the defendant No. 1 in collusion with her lawyer procured her signature on certain blank demi papers, (4) that defendant no. 1 in collusion with her lawyers used those demi papers to make that compromise petition which was filed in court behind her back, (5) that the very look of the compromise petition would indicate that the fraud has been committed, as additions and alterations were made behind the back of the plaintiff and that even some such additions and alterations were made without the signature and counter-signature by the parties concerned or their lawyers. (14.) MRS. Nag, however, while developing the above points frankly conceded that on the face of the materials on record, the validity of the solenama, ext. 3, cannot be challenged. As such she gave up that contention. She confined her argument only on the point that the plaintiff acquired l/3rd share of the properties as the Hindu widow and also 1/3rd share of the same as the heir of her son and thus she got her limited interest in the same. As she had been possessing the properties in dispute in 2/3rd share in the limited interest, after passing of Hindu Succession Act of 1956 which came into force on 17. 6. 56 she should be deemed to have acquired the full right and that she was entitled to have a partition of the same by metes and bounds in her absolute right. Mr. 6. 56 she should be deemed to have acquired the full right and that she was entitled to have a partition of the same by metes and bounds in her absolute right. Mr. Mukherjee, on the other hand, has contended that the consent decree passed in Title Suit No. 198 of 1949 cannot be challenged as fraudent. There are sufficient materials to show that the said compromise was effected through the intervention of the well wishers of the parties and also by the eminent lawyers, who acted on her behalf. It has further been submitted that the said compromise was given effect to and in fact acted upon. Our attention has been drawn to Exts. 2 and 3 the final decree passed in that suit and petition of compromise respectively. Our attention has further been drawn to some part of the case of the plaintiff as made out in the plaint wherein she stated that she came to know about the fraud on 15.4.57 but the materials on record show that she received the sum of Rs. 6000/- as, per terms of the said compromise on 26.4.57. It is however, unfortunate that after the receipt of the said sum the Title Suit No. 29 of 1957 was filed on. 4.5.57 out of which the appeal No. 711 of 1965 has arisen. It has further been submitted that the conduct of the plaintiff in effecting the compromise evidenced by Ext. 3 and in accepting the sum of Rs. 6000/- as per terms of the said compromise would amount to a clear case of waiver of her right if there was any. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that the facts of the case disclosed a case of waiver and not a case of estoppel. He has frankly admitted that the said principle of estoppel is not applicable in the instant case. We think he has very rightly made that submission. Estoppel if established, may assist a person in enforcing a cause of action by preventing another from denying the existence of some facts essential to establish the cause of action or by preventing another from asserting the existence of some fact the existence of which would destroy the cause of action. We think he has very rightly made that submission. Estoppel if established, may assist a person in enforcing a cause of action by preventing another from denying the existence of some facts essential to establish the cause of action or by preventing another from asserting the existence of some fact the existence of which would destroy the cause of action. It is a rule of evidence which comes into operation if (1) a statement of existence of a fact has been made by a. party or some one on his behalf, (2) that the intention that he could act upon the faith of the said statement and (3) and that he, in fact acts upon the faith on the said statement. That is the general principle which is involved in the case of estoppel. On, the other hand, waiver is contractual and may constitute a cause of action. It is an agreement to release or not to assert a right. In the instant case the plaintiff by entering into the compromise evidenced by Ext. 3 agreed not to assert her right in some of the properties and gave up her interest in some property by accepting some money as evidenced by their deed of compromise, Ext. 3. (15.) THE difference between the principle of estoppel and that of waiver has elaborately been dealt with by Mr. Justice Das in the case of (1) Basieshar nath v. Commissioner I. T. reported in A.I.R. (1959) S.C. 149 at p. 172. His lordship observed: "the generally accepted connotation is that to constitute 'waiver' there must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right or the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, or conduct such as warrants, an inference of the relinquisihment of a known right or privilege. Waiver differs from estoppel in the sense that it is contractual and is an agreement to release or not to assert a right, estoppel is a rule of evidence". Mr. Mukherjee relied on the said observation of His Lordship in the" above mentioned case and submitted that Ext. 3 is a document under which the plaintiff agreed to adjust her known rights in the properties in question and also agreed to relinquish some of her rights in those properties which were already known to her. Mr. Mukherjee relied on the said observation of His Lordship in the" above mentioned case and submitted that Ext. 3 is a document under which the plaintiff agreed to adjust her known rights in the properties in question and also agreed to relinquish some of her rights in those properties which were already known to her. Accordingly the appellant must be considered to have waived her right in the properties in question after, of course, receiving some of the properties and money in terms of the said solenama. (16.) HAVING heard learned Advocates of the respective parties and considering the materials on record we agree with the contention of Mr. Mukherjee and hold that the plaintiff's right to re partition the property after setting aside the solenama Ext. 3 is clearly barred by the principle of waiver. Next we shall have to consider whether the present case falls within the ambit of sub-section (1) or sub section (2) of section 14 of the Hindu succession Act, 1956. For the present we shall confine our discussion in the facts of the case which led the plaintiff to file F.A. 711 of 1965. Before we proceed further we want to refer to the provisions of section 14 of the Hindu succession. Act 1956 (hereinafter refer red to as the Act). "14 (1) : Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation :-- In this sub section "property" includes both moveable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such, property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. " (17.) MRS. Nag has contended that the plaintiff got the property and particularly the premises in Hazra Road interms of the said compromise as evidenced by Ext. 3 and that she got possession of the same. Accordingly the plaintiff's right should be determined by the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. The compromise was effected on 5. 2. 55. In terms of the said compromise she admittedly got into possession of the premises situated at Hazra Road in respect of the 1st and 2nd floor. The Hindu Succession Act, on the other hand, came into force on 17. 6. 56. Accordingly she contends that the right, however, limited it might have been ripened to a full fledged ownership after the passing of the said act. Mr. Mukherjee, on the other hand, has contended that the instant case would be governed by the provisions of sub-section (2) of the Act. In support of the contention of the respective parties some decisions have been placed before us. Mrs. Nag has drawn our attention to the case of (5) Smt. Suhag Wanti and another v. Smt. Sadhan (dead) and, others, reported in A. I. R. (1968) Punjab 24 wherein a widow's right was held to have ripened to a full-fledged ownership in the property in suit under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. It was held therein that the right of the widow to retain the house for her residence and maintenance already existed before passing of the decree. It may be noted that a compromise was. effected between the widow and other heirs and reversioners of her husband wherein the widow's right to have residence and maintenance out of her husband's properties was recognised and some specific properties were allotted to her for enjoyment during her life. The said compromise decree was put into execution. It may be noted that a compromise was. effected between the widow and other heirs and reversioners of her husband wherein the widow's right to have residence and maintenance out of her husband's properties was recognised and some specific properties were allotted to her for enjoyment during her life. The said compromise decree was put into execution. His Lordship was pleased to hold that on the fact of the particular case the widow should get the benefit of section 14 (1) of the Act. The same principle has also been laid down in the case of (3) Ram Jag Mistri and others v. Director of Consolidation U-P Luck' now and others reported in A.I.R. (1968) Allahabad 419. In that case also some properties were given to the lady in lieu of her maintenance, past and future in terms of a compromise. It was also provided therein that she should have no right of transfer over the property which was being given to her in lieu of her' maintenance. It was' held that sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act was attracted in that case. The same principle has also been enunciated in the case of (6) Ude Chand and others v. Mst. Rajo reported in A. I. R. (1966)Punjab 329. On the facts of those cases the above findings were arrived at. Mrs. Nag has also drawn our attention to a decision in the case of (7) V. N sarin v. Ajit Kumar Poplai and another reported in A. I. R. (1966) S. C. 432 in order to show that in the case of partition amongst the co-sharers the joint title is transformed by partition into separate title of the individual coparcener in respect of several items of properties allotted to them respectively. On the basis of said decision Mrs. Nag has contended that as the appellant got specific share in the Hazra Road property her title in the same even if it is construed to be widow's estate should be considered to have been enlarged to a full-fledged ownership in the specific portion of the property under the pro visions of section 14 (1) of the said Act. We are, however, not inclined to accept the said contention of Mrs. Nag for the reasons to be stated hereinafter. (18.) MR. Mukherjee, on the other hand, has contended that the interpretation of Ext. We are, however, not inclined to accept the said contention of Mrs. Nag for the reasons to be stated hereinafter. (18.) MR. Mukherjee, on the other hand, has contended that the interpretation of Ext. 3 will decide the point at issue. It has been contended that the mother and son had been quarrelling for sometimes past. The mother brought the Title Suit No. 198 of 1949 for partition of the properties described in the schedule of that case. In that partition suit the parties made settlement of their dispute in terms of Ext. 3, a deed of solftnama which formed part of the final decree passed therein. It is contended that the said compromise was effected by the mother and the son to amicably settle the disputes' with no particular reference to the admitted share of the parties concerned. Ext. 3 clearly shows that the widow was not allotted properties strictly in accordance with 2 3rd share in the same. But it was only arranged in certain way so that the mother i.e. the plaintiff appellant would get certain properties during her life time and some properties i.e. some money was given to her absolutely. That clearly shows that the properties not partitioned between the parties in accordance with their share. No consideration was given to the valuation of the properties before partition was actually effected. Under no circumstance the plaintiff could have received Rs. 6000/- absolutely and not in her limited interest. There is also nothing to show that the plaintiff would have been entitled to get the rooms of the 1st floor and second floor as allotted to her to be enjoyed during her life. From the above fact it has been) submitted that the solenama entered into between the parties can never take place as a deed of partition as is generally understood. (19.) THE question when a mother is given certain properties to enjoy during her life time not in accordance with her share and by partition but by way of amicable arrangement to settle their dispute, came for consideration in the case of "(2) Jaria Devi v. Shvams Undar agarwalla reported in A. I. R. (1959) Cal. 338. It is a Bench decision of this court. 338. It is a Bench decision of this court. It has been held by their Lord ships that when the properties are given to the widow not strictly in accordance with any admitted share but by way of family arrangement expressly stipulating that the widow would have no more than a life interest therein, case would come within the exception under sub section (2) of section 14 and not within general rule enacted in section 14 (1) of the Act. Their Lordships were of the view that the widow's title in those pro parties was really founded on the said deed and not on -any admitted share of inheritance. The wording of section 14 may also be examined in this connection. The explanation attached to section 14 (1) clearly lays down that when a female hindu possesses property by acquiring the same by a partition, same would cease to remain a limited interest but would be enlarged to full-fledged interest given full ownership to the said female after the passing of the said Act In case when the property is not received by the female at a partition in accordance with the share of the parties then in that case the explanation is not attracted. The question of family arrangement came for consideration to different courts from time to time and the same has been recognised in law. The Courts of this country always lean in favour of a transaction relating to any such arrangement which ensure peace and good-will amongst the family members. This does not rest on any special rule of Hindu Law but flow from general principle and policy of law. The rules relating to the validity of such transactions and tests applied in examining them have been repeatedly stated as already mention eel in numerous cases. Accordingly a person can acquire property by a family arrangement made between the interested parties. The said principle as enunciated in the above mentioned decision has not been doubted in any decision of this court. Rather on the contrary it has been followed by some other high Courts in the case of (4) Somthim veerobhadm Rao and another v. Duggirala Lakshmi Devi reported in A. I. R. (1965) Andhra Pradesh 367. Mr. Justice bkbote has followed the principle as enunciated in our court in the above mentioned decision. As already noticed mrs. Rather on the contrary it has been followed by some other high Courts in the case of (4) Somthim veerobhadm Rao and another v. Duggirala Lakshmi Devi reported in A. I. R. (1965) Andhra Pradesh 367. Mr. Justice bkbote has followed the principle as enunciated in our court in the above mentioned decision. As already noticed mrs. Nag referred to certain decisions which we have considered above. These are the decisions in which the properties given to a female in lieu of maintenance were considered. In terms of the explanation of sec. 14 (1) the limited interest is to be enlarged to a full-fledged interest in the case of properties given to a female in lieu of her maintenance. The said principle was accepted in the cases referred to by Mrs. Nag. But the point at issue before us is a different one and it rests en different facts. (20.) IN the instant case it has been established beyond doubt that the properties were allotted to the plaintiff not in accordance with her share in the same. She got Rs. 6000/- in her absolute right in lieu of the properties mentioned in lot No. 2 of schedule 1 of the plaint. She was given the first and second floor of premises No. 114/2/2a Hazra Road with certain other structures to be enjoyed by her as a hindu widow for her life. In the instant case the plaintiff being the widow of sarat Chandra was entitled to get l/3rd share and being the mother of Samir was also entitled to get 1/3rd share left by her son. Thus it is seen that under the provisions1 of Hindu law prior to 1956 she was to hold 1/3rd share as the widow's estate and 1/3rd as the limited owner of the property left by her son. A widow or other limited heir is not a tenant for life but is owner of the property inherited by her subject to certain restrictions on alienation and subject to its devolving upon the next heir of the last full owner upon her death. But whole estate is for the time being, vested in her and she represents it completely. The estate taken by hindu widow as heir to her husband holds the same as widow's estate. Any female inheriting any property from a male, also inherits the same in a limited interest. But whole estate is for the time being, vested in her and she represents it completely. The estate taken by hindu widow as heir to her husband holds the same as widow's estate. Any female inheriting any property from a male, also inherits the same in a limited interest. It is well known that the right and liabilities of a female heir is similar to that of widow haying widow's estate. Normally a widow or other limited heir has absolute power of disposal of the income of the property inherited by her and under certain special circumstance she could also dispose of the property binding the reversioners. In the instant case Mrs. Nag drew our attention to the fact that the plaintiff was given the Hindu widow's estate in the property to be enjoyed by her. According to her there was no restriction as contemplated under sub section (2) of the said Act and as such the said provision is not attracted in the instant case and so the property possessed of by the plaintiff as having the widow's estate therein must be considered to have vested in absolute. Mr. Mukherjee, on the other hand, has drawn our attention to the fact that the said interpretation of the words 'widow's estate' as given by Mrs. Nag cannot be accepted as according to him she completely overlooked the term 'for her life' which followed the words 'hindu 'widow's estate' as is found in Ext. 3. That according to him, has correctively changed the incident of the right which the plaintiff was given. It has been submitted that the words for her life' have restricted the plaintiff not to sell the property beyond her life. That is a restriction which is imposed on the night of a Hindu widow or a limited owner to deal with the same. The said restriction imposed not to sell the property or transfer the same even for legal necessity. It is very relevant for title purpose of this case. We Accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee on that the score and we hold that by means of family arrangement as evidenced by Ext. 3 the plaintiff was given certain properties to be enjoyed by her during her life time with certain restrictions to curb the right of a widow or a limited estate holder. We Accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee on that the score and we hold that by means of family arrangement as evidenced by Ext. 3 the plaintiff was given certain properties to be enjoyed by her during her life time with certain restrictions to curb the right of a widow or a limited estate holder. That is a restriction which is imposed on the plaintiff in the matter of her enjoyment of the property in suit. As already noticed the plaintiff acquired the said right to enjoy the said property in terms of the provisions as laid down in sub-section (2) by means of a deed which may be termed as a deed of family arrangement. For the reasons stated the case comes clearly under sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act and accordingly we uphold the finding of the Subordinate Judge in that respect. We shall now deal with F. A. No. 593 of 1964. This appeal frits out of the judgment and decree passed by Shri b. C. Das Gupta, Special L. A. Judge in l. A. Case No. 28 of 1961 wherein the learned L. A. Judge held that the plaintiff had no share in the compensation money in respect of premises No. 12/1/6 in serial no. 2 (e) II of the award in L. A. Case no. C7j6 of 1967. By the order of I.A. Judge the entire compensation money of Rs. 5702. 79p was given to the defendant Sisir. Against that decision the appeal under reference has been filed. The land of premises No. 12 116 monohar Pukur Road was acquired by notification No. 12262 L. A. dated 1.8.54 published in the Calcutta Gazette at page 2877-78 Part I on 26.8.54. The relevant declaration was 1961s L.A. dated 14.11.56. It was published in the Calcutta Gazette on 29.11.56 at 4305 part I. The possession of the acquired land was taken by the Government on 6.4.60. (21.) BEFORE L. A. Collector the dispute arose whether the entire compensation of Rs. 5702. 72p would be given to the defendant Sisir or 2/3rd of the same would be given to the plaintiff sarat Lakshmi. The learned Special I.A. Judge on the basis of the solenama eoct. 3 a copy of which was produced before him, came to the finding that the plaintiff agreed to foregut her right to the property acquired in lieu of Rs. The learned Special I.A. Judge on the basis of the solenama eoct. 3 a copy of which was produced before him, came to the finding that the plaintiff agreed to foregut her right to the property acquired in lieu of Rs. 6000/-Char attention has been down to the plaint which was filed in Title Suit No. 29 of 1957 and to the decree passed in title Suit No. 198 of 1949, which incorporated the solenama, Ext. 6. The schedule of the property in the plaint of that suit consisted of three lots-lot no. 1 referring to premises No. 114j2j2a hazra Road, Lot No. 2 referring to premises No. 12a, Manohar Pukur road measuring about 12 cottahs and lot No. 3 referring to a premises where in the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 had l/5th share in premises No. 12a manohar Pukur Road measuring 6 cottahs1 2 chattaks. In paragraph 7 of the said compromise the premises No. 12/1/7, Manohar Pukur Road was taken into account and the compromise was effected in respect of the said premises. The plaintiff was given Rs, 6000/- in lieu of which it was agreed that defendant No. 1 would get the said property absolutely. It was agreed between the parties that the plaintiff would get the said sum of Rs. 6000/- absolutely and not as a widow of Sarat or mother of samir. In the said Solenama there is no reference to the premises No. 12/1/6 manohar Pukur Road. In the suit filed for setting aside the solenama in Title suit No. 29 of 1957 the plaintiff has referred to premises No. 12/1/ 7 Manohar pukur Road without mentioning any thing about premises No. 121116 of the said Road. When the solenama was filed the holding No. 12a was split up into two holdings 12/1/7 and 12/1/6 manohar Pukur Road. On the date when the solenama was entered into those split up two other holdings must have been known to the parties and accordingly in paragraph 7 of the petition of compromise reference has been given to premises No. 12/1/7 Manohar pukur Road instead of giving any reference to premises No. 12/a Mcnohar pukur Road. Whatever might be the evidence of the witnesses examined in this case we are satisfied that there was no ambiguity as to the existence of two premises at a time when the said compromise was effected. Whatever might be the evidence of the witnesses examined in this case we are satisfied that there was no ambiguity as to the existence of two premises at a time when the said compromise was effected. Accordingly the said compromise1 related to premises no. 12/1/7 and not to 12/1/6 Manohar pukur Road. Before the Hindu Succession Act came into force on 17. 6. 56 the plaintiff was admittedly in joint possesision of premises No. 12/1/6 Manohar pukur Road and that she was possessing the same in her limited interest. Though notification for acquisition was issued in the year 1954 possession in the acquired property was taken on 6. 4. 60 As such as per provisions of section 16 of the land Acquisition Act 1894 ;he acquired land vested absolutely in the State govt. free from all in cumbrances from the date of taking such possession. Thus it is seen that on the date the hindu Succession Act came into operation the property in question was possessed by the plaintiff as a limited owner and accordingly the said right was ripened to a full fledged owner ship or in other words the limited interest of the plaintiff in the property in question was enlarged to a full ownership. In that view of the matter she is entitled to get the sum of Rs. 3801. 81 in her 2/3rd share of the money lying in deposit with L. A. Collector on account of acquisition of the premises No. 1211)6, Manchar Pukur road and that she having limited interest in the property, on the date when it was acquired and she having been in possession of the property on 17. 6. 56 when the Hindu Succession Act came into force the provision of section 14 (1)of the Act would come into play and. that she will get the said sum in her full right. (22.) IN this view of the matter we do not agree with the finding arrived at by the L. A. Judge on that score and accordingly the said judgment and decree is liable to be set aside. In the result, for the reasons stated First Appeal No. 711 of 1965 is dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate judge is hereby upheld. (23.) FOR the reasons stated we set aside the judgment and decree passed by learned L. A. Judge in L. A. Case no. In the result, for the reasons stated First Appeal No. 711 of 1965 is dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate judge is hereby upheld. (23.) FOR the reasons stated we set aside the judgment and decree passed by learned L. A. Judge in L. A. Case no. 28 of 1961 and we allow F. A. No. 593 of 1964 and direct that the plaintiff Smt. Sarat Lakshmi Deb do get a sum of Rs. 3801.89p out of the compensation money of Rs. 5702. 72p in her absolute right and that the balance of the same be paid to the defendant No. 1 Sisir. As the case is being fought between the mother and the son and as the success is a divided one we direct the parties to bear their respective costs in each of the cases.