( 1 ) THESE are petitions under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, for quashing the judgments of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal (here inalter referred to as the MRAT.) in second appeals from the appellate decisions of the Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the STAT) All these appeals had been filed before the mrat. after 1-4-1971. Except in WP. 585 of 1973 in all the other petitions the respective first appeals had been pending before the STAT. on 1-4-71. The principal ground on which the judgments of the MRAT. have been impugned in these petitions, was that it (the MRAT.) had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide any second appeal presented on or after 1-4-1971 on which date the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1969) (Central act of 1969) (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act) came into force. ( 2 ) MR. M. R. Venkatanarasimhachar learned Counsel for the petitioners in WPs. 977 and 3028 of 1972 and WP. 585 of 1973, addressed the leading arguments for the petitioners. Other learned Counsel for the petitioners adopted his arguments. Mr. P. R. Srirangaiah and Mr. M. Rangaswamy addressed leading arguments for the party respondents and other learned counsel for party respondents adopted their arguments. Before discussing the rival contentions of learned Counsel, I shall set out the relevant statutory provisions. ( 3 ) THE Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was enacted by the Central Legislature. It was extended to the former state of Mysore with effect from 1-4-1951 under Part B States (Laws) act, 1951. The relevant parts of Sec. 64 of the Act, as originally enacted. read as follows :"64. Any person- (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard. The Legislature of the former State of Mysore enacted the Motor vehicles (Mysore Amendment) Act, 1955, (Mysore Act 16 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the Mysore Amendment Act) which received the assent of the President on 15-7-1055. S. 3 of that Act amended S. 64 of the act. S. 64 of the Act was re-numbered as sub-sec. The Legislature of the former State of Mysore enacted the Motor vehicles (Mysore Amendment) Act, 1955, (Mysore Act 16 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the Mysore Amendment Act) which received the assent of the President on 15-7-1055. S. 3 of that Act amended S. 64 of the act. S. 64 of the Act was re-numbered as sub-sec. (1) and a new sub-section, namely, sub-sec. (2), was added by the Mysore Amendment Act. That sub-section read : (2) Any person aggrieved by an appellate order passed under sub-sec. (1) by any authority, other than the State Government, may within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner appeal to the prescribed authority which shall give such person and the authority which passed the said order an opportunity of being heard and pass such orders in reference thereto as it thniks fit. " ( 4 ) UNDER S. 119 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956, S. 64 of the Act, as amended by the Mysore Amendment Act, continued to be in force in the old Mysore Area of the new State of Mysore even after 1-11--1956. For the purpose of these petitions, it is not necessary to trace the history of prescription from time to time, of the authorities to exercise the appellate powers under sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) of Section 64 as amended by the Mysore Amendment Act. Suffice it to state that Rule 178 of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963, made by the Government of mysore, in exerciee of the rule making powers under the Act provided that- (a) an appeal under S. 64 of the Act against an order of the regional Transport Authority or its Secretary, shall lie to the STAT. ; and (b) a second appeal under sub-sec. (2) of S. 64 of the Act, as amended by the Mysore Amendment Act, shall 'lie to the MRAT. Parliament enacted the Amendment Act. S. 23 of the Amendment act amended S. 64 of the Act. By such amendment, S. 64 of the Act was re-numbered as sub-sec. (1) thereof and two sub-sections, namely, sub sec. (2) and sub-sec. (3), were inserted therein. ( 5 ) THE relevant parts of S. 64 of the Act, as it stood after it was amended by the Mysore Amendment Act and as it now stands after it was amended by the Amendment Act, are set out hereunder : sec. (1) thereof and two sub-sections, namely, sub sec. (2) and sub-sec. (3), were inserted therein. ( 5 ) THE relevant parts of S. 64 of the Act, as it stood after it was amended by the Mysore Amendment Act and as it now stands after it was amended by the Amendment Act, are set out hereunder : sec. 64 (l) Any person- (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard. (2) Any person aggrieved by an appellate order passed under sub-sec. (1) by any authority, other than the State government, may wtthin the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner appeal to the prescribed authority which shall give such person and the authority which passed the said order an opportunity of being heard and pass such orders in reference thereto as it thinks fit. Sec. 64. Appeals- (1) Any person- (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (i) '. . . . '. '. . '. '. '. '. '. '. may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the Sta,te Transport appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-sec. (2), who shall after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final (2) The State Government shall cftnstitute for the State a State transport Appellate Tribunal which shall consist of a whole- time judicial officer not below the rank of a District Judge : provided that. . . . . . . . . (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) or sub- sec. (2), every appeal pending at the commencement of the motor Vehicles (Amendment) act, 1969, shall be proceeded with and disposed of as if that act had not been passed. Explanation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sec. 76 of the Amendment Act inserted a new section, S. 135, in the act. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 135 provides for repeal of enactments specified in the Twelfth Schedule to the Act to the extents mentioned therein. Sub- sec. Explanation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sec. 76 of the Amendment Act inserted a new section, S. 135, in the act. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 135 provides for repeal of enactments specified in the Twelfth Schedule to the Act to the extents mentioned therein. Sub- sec. (2) of S. 135 contains saving provisions. The material portion of that sub-section reads : (2) Notwithstanding the repeal of any enactment by this section,- (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . any other thing done or any other action taken under the repealed enactment, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. Sub-sec. (4) of S. 135 makes S. 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 (Central Act 10 of 1897), applicable to such repeal. The Twelfth Schedule to the Act (inserted by S. 76 of the Amendment act), sets out the several enactments repealed and the extents of such repeal. At serial number 20 in that Schedule it is stated that the whole of the Motor Vehicles (Mysore Amendment) Act, 1. 955, (Mysore Act 16 of 1955) has been repealed. ( 6 ) IT is common ground that on 1-4-1971 when the Amendment Act came into force, sub-sec. (3) of Section 84 of the Act, as inserted by the Mysore amendment Act, stood repealed that S. 64 of the Act, as amended by S. 33 of the Amendment Act, does not provide for a second appeal from an appellate decision under that Section (S. 64 of the Act) and that in spite of such repeal, second appeals pending before the MRAT. , on 1-4-1971, can be proceeded with and disposed of by the MRAT. , as if the Amendment Act had not been passed. The controversy between the parties is whether a second appeal lies to the MRAT. on or after 1-4-1971 against a decision of the STAT. , arising out of proceedings under the Act, which had commenced before 1-4.-1s71 or at any rate whether a second appeal lies to the mrat. , against the decision of the STAT. , in an appeal which was pending before the STAT on 1-4-1971. on or after 1-4-1971 against a decision of the STAT. , arising out of proceedings under the Act, which had commenced before 1-4.-1s71 or at any rate whether a second appeal lies to the mrat. , against the decision of the STAT. , in an appeal which was pending before the STAT on 1-4-1971. ( 7 ) THE nature of the right of appeal and the effect of repeal of an enactment which had conferred a right of appeal, have been explained thus by the Supreme Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudry AIR. 1957 SC. 540, 553. (i) The legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding; (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right; (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit; (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right arid such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced; such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal; and (v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. It is common ground that in each of these petitions, the lis had commenced prior to 1-4-1971 (the date on which the Amendment Act came into force) by one of the parties presenting an application before the regional Transport Authority. It is common ground that in each of these petitions, the lis had commenced prior to 1-4-1971 (the date on which the Amendment Act came into force) by one of the parties presenting an application before the regional Transport Authority. In the light of the above enunciation of law by the Supreme Court, it is clear that the right of appeal had accrued to the parties on and from the date the lis commenced by the presentation of such application and that such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the presentation of such application and not by the law prevailing on the date of filing the appeal; that according to the law prevailing on the date of presenting such application (which was prior to 1-4-1971), that such right included the right of second appeal to the mrat. , and that such right was a vested right. The controversy between the parties is as to whether such vested right of second appeal was taken away by the Amendment Act. ( 8 ) THERE is no express provision in the Amendment Act which takes away such vested right of second appeal. The real question is whether such vested right of second appeal is taken away by necessary intendment by any of the provisions of the Amendment Act. Mr. Venkatanarasirnhachar contended that such necessary intendment can be inferred from sub-sections (1)' and (3) of Section 64 of the Act as amended. Elaborating his contention, Mr. Venkatanarasimhachar submitted that sub-sec. (1) of amended S. 64 of the Act provides that the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal as constituted by subsec. (2) of that Section shall be final and that the necessary implication of giving such finality to the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, is that no further appeal lies from such decision to the MRAT. I find it difficult to accept the above contention of Mr. Venkatanarasimhachar. That the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal shall be final, is only the necessary consequence of abolishing second appeals by the Amendment Act. The provision in amended S. 64 of the act that there shall be only one appeal to the State Transport Appellate tribunal whose decision should be final, does not necessarily take away the vested right of second appeal to the MRAT. prevailing on the date the Amendment Act came into force. The provision in amended S. 64 of the act that there shall be only one appeal to the State Transport Appellate tribunal whose decision should be final, does not necessarily take away the vested right of second appeal to the MRAT. prevailing on the date the Amendment Act came into force. ( 9 ) MORE substantial is the contention of Mr. Venkatanarasimhachar based on sub-sec. (3) of amended S. 64 of the Act. The npn-obstante clause in that sub-section provides that notwithstanding anything contained in subsec. (1) or sub-sec. (2) of that Section, every appeal pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act, shall be proceeded with and disposed of as if that Act had not been passed. Mr. Venkatanarasimhachar pointed out that sub-sec. (3) refers only to appeals pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act, and does not refer to appeals filed subsequent to the commencement of the Amendment Act though arising out of proceedings pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act. Mr. Venkatanarasimhachar argued that when sub-sec. (3) saves only the appeals pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act, the necessary implication is that appeals other than those pending at the commencement of that Act, are not saved even though they may arise out of proceedings under the Act pending at the commencement of the Amendment act. ( 10 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Rangaswamy contended that the scope of sub-sec. (3) of amended S. 64 of the Act is to enable the various appellate authorities constituted prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act to proceed with and to dispose of appeals pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act even though such appellate authorities were not constituted in accordance with sub-sec. (1) of that Section. Elaborating this contention, Mr. Rangaswamy submitted that though in Mysore State even before the commencement of the Amendment Act the State Transport appellate Tribunal was presided by a whole-time judicial officer of the rank of District Judge, in many States the appellate authorities were not so constituted. Mr. Rangaswamy said that but for sub-sec. (1) of that Section. Elaborating this contention, Mr. Rangaswamy submitted that though in Mysore State even before the commencement of the Amendment Act the State Transport appellate Tribunal was presided by a whole-time judicial officer of the rank of District Judge, in many States the appellate authorities were not so constituted. Mr. Rangaswamy said that but for sub-sec. (3) such of those appellate authorities which were constituted prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act and which did not consist of a whole time judicial officer not below the rank of the District Judge, could not have proceeded to hear and dispose of the appeals pending before them at the commencement of the Amendment Act. ( 11 ) MR. Rangaswamy is right in his submission that sub-sec. (3) of amended s. 64 of the Act enables the appellate authorities constituted before the commencement of the Amendment Act to proceed with and dispose of pending appeals irrespective of such appellate authorities conforming or not conforming to the pattern stated in sub-sec. (2) But, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Rangaswamy that sub-sec. (3) is only for such limited purpose, i. e. , enabling appellate authorities not constituted in accordance with sub-sec. (2) of amended S. 64 to proceed with and dispose of the appeals pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act. The scope of sub-sec. (3) is much wider. It provides for over-riding the finality given under sub-sec. (1) of that Section to the decisions of the state Transport Appellate Tribunal where second appeals therefrom were pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act. But for sub sec. (3) , a doubt might have arisen whether second appeals under subsec. (2) of S. 64 of the Act as amended by the Mysore Amendment Act, pending before the MRAT. at the commencement of the Amendment act could have been proceeded with and disposed of Sub-sec. (3) puts it beyond doubt that notwithstanding the finality given under sub-sec. (1) of amended S. 64 to the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, second appeals pending before the MRAT. at the commencement of the amendment Act should be proceeded with and disposed of as if the Amendment act (which repealed various enactments like the Mysore Amendment act which provided for second appeals under S. 64) had not been passed. ( 12 ) WHEN sub-sec. at the commencement of the amendment Act should be proceeded with and disposed of as if the Amendment act (which repealed various enactments like the Mysore Amendment act which provided for second appeals under S. 64) had not been passed. ( 12 ) WHEN sub-sec. (3) provides that appeals pending at the commencement at the Amendmnt Act, shall be proceeded with and disposed of as if the Amendment Act has not been passed, it follows by necessary implication that appeals other than those pending at the commencement of the amendment Act should be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act. If the intention of Parliament was to save all vested rights of appeals prevailing at the commecement of the Amendment Act, it is reasonable to expect that sub-sec. (3) would have referred to not only appeals pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act but also appeals arising out of proceedigs pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act. ( 13 ) THE absence of reference in sub-section (3) to appeals arising out of pending proceedings and mention of only appeals pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act, is significant. Hence, Mr. Venkatanarasimhachar is right, in my opinion, in his contention that sub-sec. (3) of amended S. 64 shows a necessary intendment to take away the vested rights of appeals which are inconsistent with the scheme of amended s. 64, except in regard to appeals pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act. A second appeal to the MRAT. , from an appellate decision of the stat. is clearly inconsistent with the scheme of amended S. 64 of the act. What sub-sec. (3) of that Section saves are only appeals pending at the commencement of the Amended Act. A second appeal filed after the commencement of the Amended Act is not saved by sub-sec. (3 ). Hence, no second appeal could be filed after the commencement of the Amended act, nor could the MRAT. entertain any second appeal on or after 1-4-71. However, Mr. Rangaswamy and Mr. Shanthamallappa contended that the words 'every appeal occurring in sub-sec. (3) of amended S. 64, are wide enough to include not only a second appeal but also a first appeal, that as sub-sec. entertain any second appeal on or after 1-4-71. However, Mr. Rangaswamy and Mr. Shanthamallappa contended that the words 'every appeal occurring in sub-sec. (3) of amended S. 64, are wide enough to include not only a second appeal but also a first appeal, that as sub-sec. (3) provides that every appeal pending at the commencement of the Amended Act shall be proceeded with and disposed of as if the Amendment Act had not been passed, a first appeal pending before the STAT. at the commencement of the Act, carries with it a right of further appeal to the MRAT. as if the Amendment Act had not been passed. Mr. Rangaswamy and Mr. Shanthamallappa are right in saying that the expression every appeal in sub-section (3) of amended S. 64 includes both a first appeal and a second appeal and that even a first appeal pending at the commencement of the Amendment Act should be disposed of as if the Amendment Act had not been passed. That such pending first appeal should be disposed of as if the Amendment Act had not been passed, does not, in my opinion, lead to the consequence that after the disposal of such first appeal all further steps or proceedings can be taken as if the Amendment Act had not been passed. What sub-sec. (3) saves are only pending appeals and not appeals after disposal of such pending appeals. ( 14 ) I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Rangaswamy and Mr shanthamallappa that in petitions other than WP. 585 of 1973, because the first appeals were pending before the STAT. on 1-4-1971, second appeals from the decisions therein could be filed on or after 1-4-1971 and the MRAT. could entertain and decide such appeals, as if the Amendment act had not been passed. As stated earlier, the impugned judgments of the MRAT. were all rendered in second appeals filed after the commencement of the Amendment act (1-4-1971 ). Such second appeals were incompetent and the mrat. had no jurisdiction to entertain them and to decide them. In the result I allow these petitions and quash the judgments of the mrat. in all these petitions. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, this order quashing of the judgments of the MRAT. should not be understood as precluding the parties aggrieved by the judgments of the STAT. under appeal before the MRAT. In the result I allow these petitions and quash the judgments of the mrat. in all these petitions. ( 15 ) HOWEVER, this order quashing of the judgments of the MRAT. should not be understood as precluding the parties aggrieved by the judgments of the STAT. under appeal before the MRAT. from seeking such other remedies as may be open to them in law. As the questions arising in these petitions are not free from difficulty, there will be no order as to costs in these petitions. --- *** --- .