VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff in Spl. S. No. 22 of 1963 on the file of the Civil Judge, hubli, is the appellant in this appeal. The said suit was instituted for damages amounting to Rs. 75,000 against the defendants for the physical injuries caused to the plaintiff on account of the motor car belonging to defendant 1 being driven rashly and negligently. Defendant 2 is the insurer ot the motor car. The case of the plaintiff as disclosed in the plaint is that on 29-6-1962 at about 11-00 a. m. the plaintiff was travelling in the car MYW 1384 along poona-Bangalore Road from Hubli at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour. ( 2 ) THE road in question is a National High Way. When the said car had travelled about six miles from Hubli, the car bearing number MYX 582 belonging to defendant 1 came from the opposite direction and it was being driven at a high speed at that time. On account of the negligence of the driver of the Car MYX 582, who was working in the course of the employment of defendant 1, there was a collision between the said car and the car in which the plaintiff was travelling. As a consequence of such collision, the plaintiff suffered injuries on his left leg, which resulted in the fracture of the left thigh bone of the plaintiff. On the basis of the above allegations, the plaintiff instituted the suit. ( 3 ) IT is unnecessary in this case to refer to all the 'allegations raised by the defendants in their written statements for the purpose of this appeal. The only contention which requires to be noticed is that the suit was barred by limitation. ( 4 ) THE facts bearing on the question whether the suit was barred by limitation or not are these: In the certificate of registration issued by the concerned authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, the name of the owner of the car MYX 582 was shown as ' Shri Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala, 448, Guruwar Peth, Nippani, District Belgaum' (vide Ex. 123 ). After the incident took place, the plaintiff caused a notice to be issued to ' Shri veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala' on 31-1-1963 claiming damages for the injury caused by the car referred to above (vide Ex. 124 ). 123 ). After the incident took place, the plaintiff caused a notice to be issued to ' Shri veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala' on 31-1-1963 claiming damages for the injury caused by the car referred to above (vide Ex. 124 ). The said notice was received by the addressee as per postal acknowledgement produced in the case. A subsequent notice issued to the very same addressee, was refused. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted the suit on 26-6-1963. In the cause title of the plaint, the name of defendant 1 was shown as ' Veerappa rudrappa Kothiwala'. In para 2 of the plaint, the description of defendant 1 was given as follows: " That the 1st defendant is the Proprietor of the concern called Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala, Tobacco merchants and Commission Agents, Nippani, Belgaum District, Mysore state. That is the address of the 1st defendant for service of processes and notices as well". When the Process Server of the Court went to the address of defendant 1 given in the plaint, he was informed that a certain, veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala who was carrying on business there was dead several years prior to that date. After looking into the said endorsement, the plaintiff made an application before the trial Court to amend the description of defendant 1 on 28-10-1963. It was mentioned in the affidavit filed in support of the application that the description of defendant 1 had been given on the basis of the particulars available with the registering authority of the motor vehicle in question and that it was necessary to correct the description of defendant 1 in view of the endorsement made by the process server on the summons issued to defendant 1. ( 5 ) THE amendment prayed for was allowed. Consequently, the plaint came to be amended by adding 'messers' before 'veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala' and 'firm of Tobacco Merchants and Commission Agents 448, Guruwarpeth, nippani, District Belgaum' after 'vcerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala' in the cause title. The description of defendant 1 given in para 2 earlier was deleted. In its place the plaintiff was permitted to substitute the following:" That the 1st defendant is the partnership firm in the name and style of Messers Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala, Tobacco Merchants and commission Agents, Nippani, 448, Guruwarpeth, Nippani, District Bel- gaum ''. After the amendment was effected on 29-10-1963, summons was issued again to defendant 1. In its place the plaintiff was permitted to substitute the following:" That the 1st defendant is the partnership firm in the name and style of Messers Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala, Tobacco Merchants and commission Agents, Nippani, 448, Guruwarpeth, Nippani, District Bel- gaum ''. After the amendment was effected on 29-10-1963, summons was issued again to defendant 1. Defendant 1 filed his written statement on 5-6-1964. In that written statement there was no plea with regard to the queetion of limitation. But by an order which was passed on 13-1-1965, defendant 1 was permitted to raise a plea in the written statement in para 2 (a) that the suit was barred by limitation in view of the provisions of S. 22 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The contention of defendant 1 was that since the firm of M|s. Veerappa rudrappa Kothiwala had been impleaded as a defendant for the first time in October 1963 by which time the suit had become barred by time, the suit against defendant 1 was barred by time in view of the provisions of s. 22 of the Act. Defendant 2 was also permitted to amend its written statement on the same lines. ( 6 ) THE trial Court framed the necessary issues on the basis of the pleadings and tried the suit. Although it recorded evidence on all issues, the trial Court proceeded to dispose of the suit only on the basis of its findings or additional issues Nos. 1 to 4 substantially relating to the question1 of limitation. It found that the amendment of the plaint on 29-10-1963 amounted to a substitution of a new defendant in the place of defendant 1 already on record and that the suit as against defendant 1 after amendment , was, therefore, barred by time because the application for amendment had been made after the period of limitation was over. The Court below was also of the opinion that the suit against the original defendant 1 was bad as he was dead on the date of the suit. In view of the above findings the trial Court, proceeded to dismiss the suit without recording its findings on other issues. Aggrieved by the decree passed by the Court below, the plaintiff has filed this appeal. In view of the above findings the trial Court, proceeded to dismiss the suit without recording its findings on other issues. Aggrieved by the decree passed by the Court below, the plaintiff has filed this appeal. ( 7 ) IN this appeal two points arise for consideration- (1) whether the suit should be dismissed on the ground that a new defendant was substituted or added after the period of limitation was over, and (2) whether the suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it had been instituted against a party who was not in existence on the date of the suit. The first question depends upon the interpretation of sub-sec. (1) of s. 22 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It reads thus:" Where after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. "sri Tukaram Pai, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff, argued that on a fair and reasonable construction of S. 22 (1), it was clear that the said provision was inapplicable to a case where a party to a suit, was wrongly described at the time of institution of the suit. In other words, his contention was that if there was a mere mis-description of a party in the plaint when the suit was instituted, any amendment sought by the plaintiff to correct such misdescription and to furnish the correct description of snch party would not amount to addition or substitution of a new party. Such amendment, although it may not squarely fall either under Or. 1, rule 10 or under Or. 6, Rule 17 CPC. , would fail within S. 153 of CPC which authorises a Court at any time and on such terms as to costs or otherwise -as it may think fit, to permit an amendment of any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit and that the Court has a duty under s. 153 to allow all necessary amendments for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceeding. In support of his submission, Sri Pai relied upon a decision of the High Court of Madras, rendered by Rajamannar, CJ. and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J, in Mura Mohiddeen v. V. O. A. Mahomed , AIR. 1955 Mad. 294. In support of his submission, Sri Pai relied upon a decision of the High Court of Madras, rendered by Rajamannar, CJ. and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J, in Mura Mohiddeen v. V. O. A. Mahomed , AIR. 1955 Mad. 294. The facts of that case are briefly these: the plaintiffs who were partners of a firm which was carrying on business in Burma under the trade name of ' V. O. A. Alliar and Sons', instituted a suit in India, for recovery of a certain sum in the name of the firm. The defendants contended that the suit was not maintainable as a foreign firm was not authorised under the provisions of Rule 1 of Order 30, cpc to institute a suit in the name of the firm and that because the names of the individual partners of the plaintiffs-firm had not been shown as plaintiffs in the plaint, the suit was liable to be dismissed. On an application! made to the Court for amending the plaint by substitution of the names of partners of the firm, the three partners of the firm were permitted to be brought on record in place of the plaintiff -firm. By the time the said application was made, the period prescribed for instituting the suit, had elapsed. Still, the trial Court found that there was no infirmity in the suit; and decreed the suit. In the appeal filed against the decree before the district Court, the decree passed by the trial Court, was set aside on the ground that S. 22 (1) of the Limitation Act, was attracted to the case and that what had been done by the application which was made after the suit became barred by time, was substitution of new parties as the plaintiffs in the suit. The plaintiffs took up the matter in appeal before the high Court of Madras. Balakrishna Aiyar, J. , reversed the judgment of the District Court and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiffs. He also granted leave to appeal from his decree under the Letters Patent to a Division Bench of that Court. The plaintiffs took up the matter in appeal before the high Court of Madras. Balakrishna Aiyar, J. , reversed the judgment of the District Court and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiffs. He also granted leave to appeal from his decree under the Letters Patent to a Division Bench of that Court. When the matter came up before tha division Bench, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. , observed in the course of his judgment as follows :" If however imperfectly and incorrectly a party is designated in a plaint the correction of the error is not the addition or substitution of a party but merely clarifies and makes apparent what was previously shrouded in obscurity by reason of the error or mistake. The question in such a, case is one of intention of the, party and if the Court is able to discover the person or persons intended to sue or to be sued a mere misdescription of such a party'can always be corrected provided the mistake was bona fide, vide Or. 1, Rule 10, CPC. Such an amendment does not involve the addition of a party so as to attract s. 22 (1), Limitation Act. Suits by or on- behalf of dead persons stand ir. a different category. The principle that a misdescription could be corrected by amendment could not obviously be applied to such a case but this is far from saying that merely because the law does not recognise the firm as being a legal entity, the firm name could not indicate or'designate the individuals composing the firm. To sum up, the situation is analogous to a case where an individual who has an alias or an abbreviated name by which he is sometimes called initially described himself in that name but subsequently applies to have it rectified so as to describe in the manner in whil he is most usually known. There cannot be any doubt that by the correction in the name, a new plaintiff is not added so as to attract Section 22 (1) Limitation Act. A trade name either of a person or a group of individuals carrying on business in partnership is in truth an alias ior the person or the group". ( 8 ) THE learned Judges who decided the above case, did not agree with the observations of Blackwell, J. in Venkatesh Oil Mill and Co. v. Velmahomed, air. A trade name either of a person or a group of individuals carrying on business in partnership is in truth an alias ior the person or the group". ( 8 ) THE learned Judges who decided the above case, did not agree with the observations of Blackwell, J. in Venkatesh Oil Mill and Co. v. Velmahomed, air. 1928 Bom. 191. ir which a similar amendment had been held to be hit by provisions of S. 22 (1 ). The decision of the High Court of Madras in Mohideen's case (1) was considered by the Supreme Court in Purushottam Umedhbai and co. v. Manilal and Sons, AIR. 1961 SC. 325. and the passages from that decision extracted above-, were quoted with approval. The facts before the Supreme Court in Purushottam's case (3) were more or less similar to the facts of the madras case. It was observed by the Supreme Court that if under some mis apprehension, persons doing business as partners outside India, filed a plaint in the name of their firm, they were only misdescribing themselves as the suit instituted was by. them, they being known collectively as a firm. The plaint in the name of a firm could not by itself be considered as a nullity. The Supreme Court was of the view that the plaint by all the partners of the firm with a defective description of themselves, was capable of being remedied. It was held that in such circumstances,, a civil Court could permit under the provisions of S. 153 CPC an amendment of the plaint to enable a proper description of the plaintiffs to appear in it in order to assist the Court to decide the case between the parties. Reliance was next placed on a decision in Motilal Jaseaj v. Chandmal hindumal , AIR. 1924 Bom. 155. ( 9 ) IN that case, the plaintiff wished to sue the defendant a firm of 'manmal Chandmal'. The description of the defendant originally given was 'chandmal Hindumal' as manager and owner of the shop 'manmal chandmal'. Chandmal had died even before the suit was instituted. An application to brjng his heirs on record, was made after the institution of the suit. That application was granted. But the suit was dismissed on the preliminary ground that the heirs had been brought on record after the suit had become barred by time. Chandmal had died even before the suit was instituted. An application to brjng his heirs on record, was made after the institution of the suit. That application was granted. But the suit was dismissed on the preliminary ground that the heirs had been brought on record after the suit had become barred by time. When the matter reached the High Court ultimately it was held that though not in form but in substance, the plaintiff had instituted a suit against the said firm Manmal Chandmal, but that there was a misdescription of the defendant in the plaint which was capable of being corrected even though the period prescribed for the institution of suit had elapsed. ( 10 ) IN Bishamberdas Bodhraj v. Brijlal Arora AIR. 1931 Bom. 590. , it was held that S. 22 applied only to a case where new parties are added but not to a case where there was mere misdescription of a party already impleaded. Sri Bopanna, learned Counsel for the respondent drew our attention to a decision of the High Court of Bombay in New East India Press co. , ltd. v. Rameshvar Nandlal ,34 Bom. L. R. 1410. in which the amendment of the name of the defendant which originally stood as "rameshvar Nandlal of Sujaipur, hindu inhabitant merchant residing at Sujalpur, Central Provinces", into "rameshwar Nandlal, a firm carrying on business at Sujalpur, Central provinces" after the suit had become barred by time, was held to be hit by Section 22 of the Limitation Act. A reading of the above decision shows that it is contrary to the view expressed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Motilal jasaraj's case (4), to which the learned Judge who decided this case, was also a party. In 'firm Seth Hiralal Mazarilal v. Jagannath, AIR. 1957 Raj. 298 tulsidas Mulji v Ebrahimjee, AIR. 1960. Ker. 75. and Governor General in Council v. Gujarathi Sankarappa,air. 1953 Mad. 838. the principle enunciated in Mohideen's cose (1) has been followed. In 'firm Seth Hiralal Mazarilal v. Jagannath, AIR. 1957 Raj. 298 tulsidas Mulji v Ebrahimjee, AIR. 1960. Ker. 75. and Governor General in Council v. Gujarathi Sankarappa,air. 1953 Mad. 838. the principle enunciated in Mohideen's cose (1) has been followed. From the foregoing, it is clear that if on the assessment of the material placed before the Court, it is possible to conclude that in a given case there has been only a correction of a misdescription of a defendant and not an addition or substitution of a new defendant in the place of a defendant who was already on record, the case would fall outside the scope of s. 22 of the Limitation Act. As stated by the High Court of Madras in mohideen's case (1), it is necessary to determine in this case whether the plaintiff intended to sue originally a party who was different from the party which was substituted or added at a later stage. On the above question some evidence has been recorded before the trial Court. ( 11 ) THE plaintiff who has been examined as a witness has stated that he intended to sue the owner of the vehicle who was responsible for the incident in question and he found out the name of the owner from the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, with the assistance of some person. In the registration certificate (vide Ex. 123) as already mentioned by us, the owner's name had been shown as 'sri Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala'. The said car had been insured with defendant 2 as per its policy (vide Ex. 133) and in that policy, the name of the insured had been shown as 'sri S. R. Kothiwala. partner; M|s. V. R. Kothiwala,' Nippani, District Belgaum'. One of the partners of the firm of Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala has been examined in the suit as DW. 4. He has admitted that the car in question' belonged to the firm 'veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala', that it was being used for the purpose of the said firm and that even the compensation paid in respect of the said vehicle by the second defendant for the damage sustained by the car had been credited to the account of the firm. 4. He has admitted that the car in question' belonged to the firm 'veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala', that it was being used for the purpose of the said firm and that even the compensation paid in respect of the said vehicle by the second defendant for the damage sustained by the car had been credited to the account of the firm. Whereas the case of the plaintiff is that he had described 'veerappa Rudrappa kothiwala' as a proprietary concern on account of the presence of the prefix 'sri' in the registration certificate of the car, the first defendant would have it that 'veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala' mentioned as a defendant in the cause title of the plaint refers to a certain individual Veer rappa Rudrappa Kothiwala who had died very many years prior to the institution of the suit. We have to examine in the light of the evidence on record and the probabilities of the case whether the plaintiff intended to sue the person or entity whose name, appeared in the registration certificate of the car and who actually owned the car or whether he intended to sue a person who had died very many years prior to the institution of the suit, at the first instance. It is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff had ever known that there was such an individual called veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala and that he had died several years ago. There was no transaction between the plaintiff and that person and there was no occasion for the plaintiff to ever think of suing him for damages for the injuries sustained by-him on 29-6-1962. It is reasonable to hold that the plaintiff intended in the instant case to sue only that person or entity who was the owner of the car and that misdescription in paragraph 2 of the plaint that Veer'appa Rudrappa Kothiwala was a proprietary concern owned by Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala or that Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala was carrying on business in that name and style, was only the result of the presence of the prefix 'sri' which would indicate that the name which follows, refers to an individual. ( 12 ) WE therefore accept the submission made on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff 'intended to sue Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala carrying on business at 448, Guruvarpeth, Nippani, district, Belgaum. ( 12 ) WE therefore accept the submission made on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff 'intended to sue Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala carrying on business at 448, Guruvarpeth, Nippani, district, Belgaum. There is no dispute that Veerappa rudrappa Kothiwala is carrying on business at that place. But the only difference is that Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala is not an individual but a firm. It is therefore clear that the description of the first defendant given in paragraph 2 of the plaint was only a misdescription of an entity existing on the date of the suit. It is very difficult to agree with the conclusion of the Court below that the suit had been originally filed against a dead person Veerappa Rudrappa Kothiwala and that it was later on amended into a suit against a firm Veerappa. Rudrappa Kothiwala. Sri Bopanna, learned Counsel for the defendants placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Rajendra Nath Tikku v. The Royal calcutta Turf Club, AIR. 1964 Cal. 57. in support of his contention that a suit of this nature was not maintainable. We do not agree with the above submission. ( 13 ) IN that decision, the High Court of Calcutta, was concerned with a case in which the defendant was an unincorporated club but not a firm. The provisions of Or. 30 CPC are not applicable to an unincorporated club. We are concerned in the present case with a firm and not with an unincorporated rlub. Hence the above decision is of no avail to the defendants. Sri Bopanna lastly relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in ramaprasad Dagaduram v. Vijaykumar Motilal Hirakhanwala, AIR. 1967 SC. 278. . The facts of that case are these-One Vijayakumar claiming himself to be an adopted son of a, person, instituted a suit to enforce a mortgage which had come into existence in favour of his alleged adoptive mother after her death. The defendant among other pleas, denied the adoption of the plaintiff. The trial Court held that the plaintiff was not the adopted son of the mortgagee and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff filed an appeal before the High Court of Bombay against the decree of the trial Court. The defendant among other pleas, denied the adoption of the plaintiff. The trial Court held that the plaintiff was not the adopted son of the mortgagee and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff filed an appeal before the High Court of Bombay against the decree of the trial Court. During the pendency of that appeal and after the period of limitation to file the suit had elapsed, an application was made to implead three daughters of the alleged adoptive mother, by name Rajkumari, Premkumari and Mahabalkumari, to the suit. The application was granted. Mahabalkumari was added as the appellant and Rajkumari and Premkumari were impleaded as respondents. The appeal was thereafter heard by the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and passed a preliminary decree for foreclosure in favour of Mahabalkumari, Rajkumari and Premkumari without going into the question of adoption of Vijaykumar. Aggrieved by the decree passed by the High Court of Bombay, the defendant mortgagor filed the above appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the procedure followed by the High Court of Bombay, was contrary to the provisions of S. 22 (1) of the Limitation Act, as the case was not one of misdescription but was a case of addition of new parties after the suit had become barred by time. The appeal was therefore allowed and the decree of the High Court of Bombay, was set aside. We do not find that the above decision has any bearing on the present case. In the case before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff had sought to implead new parties- after the suit had become barred by time and tho case was not one of misdescription of an existing 'party. We feel that the facts of this case are fully, covered by the opinion of thy Madras High Court in Mohideen's case (1) and hold that the suit is not barred by time. The finding of the Court below that the suit had been originally instituted against a dead person, also has to be set aside for the reasons already given above. The findings on Additional Issues 1 to 3 are set aside. Additional Issue No. 4 does not survive. The decree passed by the Court below has therefore to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. The findings on Additional Issues 1 to 3 are set aside. Additional Issue No. 4 does not survive. The decree passed by the Court below has therefore to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. ( 14 ) BEFORE parting with the cast, we have to observe that the practice in, the disposal of the suits in the manner in which the trial Court has done in this case, is a, highly undesirable one and has to be deprecated. In this case the trial Court had recorded the evidence on all issues and heard the arguments of the parties. Merely because it came to the conclusion that the suit was liable to be -dismissed in view of its findings on the issues referred to above, it should not have omitted to record its findings on other issues. It is on account of the error committed by the Court below, we are compelled to remand this suit which was instituted in the year 1963, once again for fresh disposal. It is hoped that the subordinate Courts in the State, would not adopt the same kind of practice which the trial Court in this case has followed. Since the Court below has not recorded its findings on other issues, we remand the case to it for recording its findings on those issues and for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment. The appeal is allowed with costs. The institution fee paid on' the memorandum of appeal shall be refunded to the appellant. ( 15 ) THE trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit within 30-11-1973. The records in this case shall be returned to the lower Court within two weeks. The parties are directed to appear before the Court below on 9th of October 1973. --- *** --- .