JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The Petitioner has been convicted u/s 304-A, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to R.I. for six months, and to pay a fine of Rs. One thousand; in default, to undergo R.I. for two months more. Though he was convicted u/s 279, Indian Penal Code no separate sentence was imposed. 2. Prosecution case is that on 23rd February 1970, at about 9 a.m. a public service bus proceeding towards Keonjhar, was standing on the road-side near Sana Masinabila while the Petitioner was driving a jeep, ORJ 1059, coming from the side of Keonjhar. After the jeep crossed the bus, it struck against two boys one after the other. One died on the spot and the other in the hospital. 3. The defence was that the Petitioner was driving the jeep at a reasonable speed after blowing the horn. Though the accident happened due to the jeep, he does not know as to how did it happen. 4. The learned Sessions Judge after a thorough analysis of the evidence came to the conclusion that the Petitioner was driving the jeep at a reasonable speed and was blowing the horn. He accordingly held that the Petitioner?s driving was not rash. From the fact that the two boys were lying at a distance of 25' from each other after the accident, he came to the conclusion that the jeep was being driven negligently. 5. The finding that the jeep was being driven at a reasonable speed and the Petitioner was blowing the horn is not rightly assailed before me. The short question for consideration is whether the Petitioner was driving the jeep negligently. 6. It need hardly be stated that if the Petitioner?s explanation may reasonably be true, he is entitled to an acquittal, even though he does not establish his case beyond reasonable doubt. The onus on the accused is not as heavy as it is on the prosecution. The prosecution has to establish its case, in a criminal trial, beyond reasonable doubt, while the onus on the accused is discharged on the theory of balance of probabilities as in a civil suit. If the accused?s version may reasonably be true no conviction can lie. 7. The undisputed facts in this case are that the public bus was standing on the road. If the accused?s version may reasonably be true no conviction can lie. 7. The undisputed facts in this case are that the public bus was standing on the road. The jeep crossed the bus at a reasonable speed and after blowing the horn to make everybody cautious. There is evidence that in front of the jeep the road was clear. But the fact remains that the two boys were struck against by the jeep. One probable theory by which the Petitioner could have been entitled to acquittal is the defence that while the jeep was being driven at a reasonable speed, the two deceased boys all of a sudden crossed the road in front of the jeep when the Petitioner could not exercise proper control to stop its motion. Unfortunately, this defence has not been taken. On the other hand, the Petitioner?s plea is that he does not know how did the accident occurred. In the absence of any plea on the part of the defence, it is not possible for the Court to guess a defence which would be consistent with the innocence of the accused . Had the Petitioner taken that defence, there would have been no evidence for the prosecution to counteract it. In the absence of positive defence, a lacuna remains and the only irresistible conclusion would be that the Petitioner caused the accident by negligent driving. It is a matter of regret that the defence lawyer at the trial conducted the case without much devotion to the principles of criminal law. 8. The next question for consideration is whether the sentence is heavy. Though the Petitioner did not take the defence whereby he could have been acquitted, it appears that possibly he had not a clear view of the two deceased boys as they were on the roadside. In the circumstances, the sentence of six months? R.I. is reduced to three months? R.I. The sentence of fine is set aside. Subject to the aforesaid modification in the sentence, the criminal revision is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed