JUDGMENT Sen, J. This appeal is directed against the order discharging the rule obtained by the appellant and dismissing his petition under Article 226 in which the appellant challenged the validity of the order dismissing him from service. The facts of the case may be briefly indicated. 2. On the 13th of September, 1955 the appellant was employed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range II, Calcutta, as a peon in the office of the Income Tax Officer, District III (2), Calcutta at No. 3, Government Place, Calcutta. On the 23rd May, 1959 by direct appointment the appellant was appointed as Notice Server by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range II, Calcutta and posted in the office of the Income Tax Officer, District III (2), Calcutta at No. 4, Hastings Street. The appellant was transferred from the office of the Income Tax Officer, District 24-Parganas. In the said office although the appellant was posted as a Notice Server he was given the job of a peon in the issue section and the appellant protested against the same. The appellant has alleged that between the 3rd of March, 1964 and 17th of March, 1964 he was seriously ill. The appellant was granted earned leave for this period and the leave of the appellant was extended upto 2nd of April, 1964. It may be noted that the appellant had earlier made representations between the 28th of January, 1964 and 2nd of February, 1964 for retransfer to another office at Calcutta on the ground of his illness. On the 7th March, 1964 the appellant was directed by the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, District 24 Parganas to return the log-book and diary maintained by him in the usual course of his duties and the appellant was further directed to report himself to the Staff Surgeon, Fort William for medical examination. It may be noticed that all the 7th of March, 1964 the appellant was on leave, though this leave was granted subsequently on the 17th of March, 1964. On the 18th March, 1964 the appellant delivered the diary and the un-served, Income Tax Notices to the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, through one Monaranjan Das, a peon attached to the office of the Income Tax Officer, District III (2) and the same were received by the Supervisor Sri S.M. Faridar. On the 18th March, 1964 the appellant delivered the diary and the un-served, Income Tax Notices to the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, through one Monaranjan Das, a peon attached to the office of the Income Tax Officer, District III (2) and the same were received by the Supervisor Sri S.M. Faridar. It appears that on the 18th of March the appellant continued to be en love as his leave was extended upto the 2nd of April, 1964. On the 23rd of March, 1964 the appellant requested the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, 24 Parganas for taking necessary action for payment of appellant's medical bills. This request was also made while the appellant continued to be on leave and the appellant joined his duties on the 3rd of April, 1964, on the expiry of the period of his leave. On the 20th of June, 1964 the Supervisor Sri S.M. Faridar by a note informed the Income Tax Officer that some papers concerning the scrutiny report relating to T.A. Bills were missing and the had been taken away by the appellant. On the 24th of June, 1964 the Income Tax Officer, 24 Parganas informed the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range VI, Calcutta at as the scrutiny papers belonged to the appellant, no one else would be interested in the same and that the Income Tax Officer felt that the appellant was responsible for the disappearance of the said papers. On the 4th of July, 1964 the appellant again requested the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range VI, Calcutta for payment of tile outstanding travelling allowances and requested for the grant of Rs. 100/- as advance T.A. to meet the travelling expenses. Nothing, however, was paid to the appellant and the appellant was asked and ordered to serve notices at places like Bongaon, Basirhat, Hasnabad, Hingulgung, Diamond Harbour and Kakdwip. In his letter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner the appellant had also made certain grievances against the Income Tax Officer and had asked the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to investigate into the matter. On the 7th of July, 1964 the appellant was informed that the papers concerning the appellant's T.A. Bills had disappeared from the custody of the Supervisor in the month of June, 1964 and the appellant was asked to make a verbal statement regarding the said disappearance and the appellant made a statement. On the 7th of July, 1964 the appellant was informed that the papers concerning the appellant's T.A. Bills had disappeared from the custody of the Supervisor in the month of June, 1964 and the appellant was asked to make a verbal statement regarding the said disappearance and the appellant made a statement. On the 9th of July, 1964 the appellant was asked by the Supervisor to sign a type-written paper alleged to contain the statement of the appellant. The appellant, however, did not agree to sign the statement without first verifying the same. On the 13th of July, 1964 the Income Tax Officer sent a copy of a note dated 26.6.64 of the Supervisor Sri S.M. Faridar to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the Income Tax Officer further, informed the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner that the appellant held refused to sign the statement. In his letter of the 13th of July, 1964 forwarding the note of Sri S.M. Faridar, the Income Tax Officer has further mentioned that he felt that the appellant was responsible for stealing the papers as the appellant was in the habit of peeping into the paper on the Supervisor's table for the last few months. It may be noted that this letter of the 13th of July, 1964 did not form a part of the records before the learned trial Judge and has been included in a supplementary Paper Book which has been filed by the appellant in the present appeal. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that while preparing the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which was presented in Court and was considered by the learned trial Judge, the appellant because of paucity of funds and the urgency of the matter could not include various important and relevant documents in the said petition, but as this is a writ proceeding in which a Writ in the nature of Certiorari has also been claimed this Court can look into all relevant documents and papers and the entire records of the proceeding. In the supplementary Paper Book prepared and filed by the appellant there are various documents which have been referred to in the petition, but which were not made annexures to the petition; and there are again certain documents for the Revenue has rightly pointed out that this letter of the 13th of July, 1964 has nowhere been referred to in the petition by the appellant. On the 18th of July, 1964 the appellant was called upon by the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, District 24-Parganas to show cause within three days from the date of the letter as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for causing disappearance of papers and for refusing to sign the statement. On the 31st of July, 1964 the appellant replied to the said show cause notice and denied the charges levelled therein, On the 4th of August, 1964 it appears that the Income Tax Officer made a complaint against the appellant's statement that T.A. Bills for October, November and December, 1963 which were submitted on 19.6.64 and were sent to the office of the Accountant General, West Bengal on 19.9.64 were returned to the appellant who 'received' them by signing the Bill Register but later on it was discovered by the Supervisor that the word 'received' was changed into 'returned' and written acknowledgement was scored out. The Income Tax Officer also stated that scoring out of acknowledgment indicated that the bills were resubmitted when in fact they were not. It is to be noted that this letter of the 4th of August, 1964, which appears at page 10 of the supplementary Paper Book was not mentioned or referred to in the petition filed by the appellant. A-Ward, District 24-Parganas asked in writing for an explanation from the appellant concerning the T.A. Bills and alleged that certain bills were not returned by the appellant to the office and it was further alleged that the appellant had changed the word 'received' into 'returned' in the Bill Register. 3. On the 7th of August, 1964 the appellant by a letter was suspended by the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, District 24-Parganas on the charge, inter alia, of (1) causing disappearance of papers and (2) alleged manipulation and interpolation of the Bill Register and also offering (3) threat to the Supervisory Staff. 3. On the 7th of August, 1964 the appellant by a letter was suspended by the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, District 24-Parganas on the charge, inter alia, of (1) causing disappearance of papers and (2) alleged manipulation and interpolation of the Bill Register and also offering (3) threat to the Supervisory Staff. On the very same day, namely, the 7th of August, the appellant by a letter informed the said Income Tax Officer that the purported suspension was prima facie bad in law on the ground that the said Officer had no authority to inflict the said punishment. On the 17th of August, 1964, the said order of suspension issued by the said Income Tax Officer was cancelled but on the same day an order of suspension was made by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in exercise of his powers under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 and it was stated that disciplinary action was contemplated against the appellant. On the 13th of November, 1964 the appellant was charge-sheeted on various grounds by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. There were 7 items of charges against the appellant and the said charges were ;- Charge No. I. "Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server, attached to the Income Tax Officer, District 24-Pargarias, Calcutta, now under suspension, while functioning as Notice Server attached to the said office during the period from October, 1963 to August, 1964, has been found grossly negligent, utterly careless and thoroughly irregular in the discharge of his duties by not serving the notices given to him for service on the assessee as was required of him. Charge No. II. Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, while functioning as notice server in the aforementioned Income Tax Office, during the period from October, 1963 to August, 1964, absented himself from duty without prior permission of the authority or authorities authorised to sanction leave to him, applied for extension of leave even when the exigencies of the official duties did not permit such extension and when he had no leave to his credit and has overstayed after the expiry of the leave granted to him thereby contravening office discipline. Charge No. III. Charge No. III. Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server, attached to the said Income Tax Office (now under suspension) had fraudulently removed or caused to disappear certain papers and documents from the table of the Supervisor of the Income Tax Office, District 24-Parganas, on or about 20.6.64 with ulterior motives of preventing further enquiry into the genuineness or otherwise of the T.A. Bills submitted by him in the months of October, November and December, 1963. Charge No. IV Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server, attached to the said Income Tax Office, 24-Parganas (now under suspension) contravened willfully office discipline and accepted legal procedure by refusing to sign a statement made by him before the Income Tax Officer, 24-Parganas, during the course of an enquiry made by the latter into the circumstances under which the papers mentioned in Charge No. III came to disappear. Charge No. V Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server, attached to the said Income Tax Office, Dist. 24-Parganas (now under suspension) fraudulently got hold of the Bills Register maintained in the Income Tax Office, District 24-Parganas and tampered with the original entries made therein between 29.6.64 and 4.8.64 with ulterior motives of preventing the further enquiry into the genuineness or otherwise of the T.A. Bills submitted by him. Charge No. VI Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server, attached to the said Income Tax Office, District 24-Parganas (now under suspension) had preferred fraudulent T.A. claims in respect of journies allegedly undertaken by him for effecting service of notice during the months of October, November and December, 1963, thereby attempting to defraud the State ex-chequer. Charge No. VII Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server, attached to the Income Tax Office, Dist. 24-Parganas (now under suspension) had become violent and had threatened dire consequences to the Supervisory Staff of District 24-Parganas for having brought the facts of the interpolation of the entries in the Bill Register to the notice of the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, 24-Parganas, thereby seriously under-mining office discipline and preventing a full and impartial enquiry being made unto the circumstances leading to the incident". 4. The appellant asked for inspection of various documents. 4. The appellant asked for inspection of various documents. On the 12th of March, 1965 the appellant was informed that he should contact Shri P.T. Rao, Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, District 24 Parganas on any day in the second week and the said Officer would place relevant documents and registers before the appellant for inspection and in the said letter it was also stated that as the Income Tax Officer was busy, it would not be possible on the part of the Income Tax Officer to supply the documents required for the appellant's inspection. On the 18th of December, 1964 the appellant had informed the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner that Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee who was at that point of time a Government servant, would assist the appellant in the matter of inspection of additional documents. Various correspondence followed between the appellant and the authorities with regard to inspection of documents. On the 10th of June, 1966 the appellant wag asked to submit the list of his witnesses and his documents. It appears that boy his letter dated 14th of July, 1966 addressed to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner the appellant furnished a provisional list of defence witnesses. It is, however, to be noted that this letter of the 14th of July, 1966 which appears at page 12 of the supplementary Paper Book was not included in or referred to in the writ petition in the Trial Court. On the 22nd of July, 1966 the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner appointed one Sri M. Sarkar, who happened to be the Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Special Survey Circle VIII as the Enquiry Officer for the purpose of holding an enquiry into the alleged charges against the appellant. It may incidentally be noted that although the order of suspension contemplated enquiry against the appellant and the appellant was charge-sheeted on the 13th of November, 1964 the Officer to hold the enquiry was appointed nearly about one year and nine months thereafter. The appellant boy his letter dated 8th of September, 1966 addressed to the Enquiry Officer, made variour grievances and protests and then stated- "However, without prejudice to my submissions as above and keeping in view the same, I now state as follows :- I. That I deny and do not admit the charges and allegations framed, put forward or brought against me or any part thereof. II. II. That I desire and want to be heard in person being duly assisted by a Government servant of my choice as permissible under Rule 14(8) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, such Government servant, being Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee, Inspector of Income Tax presently attached as such to the Income Tax Office, Project Circle, Calcutta. III. That I want to inspect and get copies of all the documents that the Disciplinary Authority has proposed to rely upon. IV. That I want to cross-examine the "witnesses on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority" at the hearing and just now to get a list showing names of all such witnesses. V. That I want copies of the statements, if any, made by the "witnesses on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority". VI. That a provisional list of defence witnesses has already been furnished by me to the Disciplinary Authority in my letter dated 14.7.66 received by him on 15.7.66. I reserve my right to produce or cause to be produced such witnesses at the appropriate stage with right to add or drop some persons as may be deemed desirable, fit and proper depending on the exigencies of circumstances. VII. That as to the list of documents to be relied upon me, I only say for the present that any or all the pieces of correspondence passing between myself on the one hand and i) ITO, 'A' Ward, Dist. 24-Parganas, Calcutta; ii) IAC, Range VI, Calcutta and iii) Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal; on the other inclusive of letters addressed by name or confidentially and irrespective of whether the subject-matter is confidential or not may be relied upon or made use of by me. VIII. That I express my wonder and surprise to see that Shri P.S. Rao one time ITO, Award, 24-Parganas and Shri Satish Chandra Ghosh, one time Head Clerk of Income Tax Office, 24-Parganas have not been named as "witnesses on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority". IX. That my "First Diary" as Notice Server attached to the Income Tax Office, Dist. 24 Parganas has been deliberately withheld from me with the ulterior motive of, inter alia, depriving me of and denying me a reasonable opportunity of self-defence or of preparing and submitting written statement of my defence or of presenting my defence effectively and properly. IX. That my "First Diary" as Notice Server attached to the Income Tax Office, Dist. 24 Parganas has been deliberately withheld from me with the ulterior motive of, inter alia, depriving me of and denying me a reasonable opportunity of self-defence or of preparing and submitting written statement of my defence or of presenting my defence effectively and properly. The said "First Diary", whose relevance in the matter is, I think, unquestionable, was taken charge of by Shri S.M. Faridar, the then Supervisor of Income Tax Office, Dist. 24-Parganas on 18.3.64 and never returned to me thereafter despite repeated requests, reminders and demand from my side. The said "First Diary" being very much relevant to the issue and being not in my possession, but in the possession of the Government, I would request and desire you to issue a requisition for the discovery and production thereof as, early as possible.” 5. On the 9th November, 1966 the Enquiry Officer informed the appellant that the prosecution witnesses would be examined on the 6th of December, 1966. On the 1st December, 1966 the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner sent to the appellant a revised list of documents and witnesses in substitution of the previous list dated the 28th of May, 1966, and this revised list was received by the appellant on the 3rd of December, 1966. On the 6th of December; 1966 the appellant by a letter informed the Enquiry Officer that he had been furnished with a revised list of documents and witnesses which were required to be considered thoroughly. The appellant by his letter of the 6th of January, 1961 addressed to the Enquiry Officer asked for personal bearing and for being allowed to be assisted by Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee before the said Enquiry Officer. The said Madhusudhan Mukherjee at the material time was an Inspector in the Department, and as such a Government servant, and the said Madhusudhan Mukherjee had assisted the appellant at the time of Inspection of the documents and was conversant with the facts of the case. It appears that there was some correspondence between the appellant, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the Enquiry Officer and in course of such correspondence the appellant had asked for an opportunity to submit a written statement on the basis of the revised list in accordance with the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. It appears that there was some correspondence between the appellant, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the Enquiry Officer and in course of such correspondence the appellant had asked for an opportunity to submit a written statement on the basis of the revised list in accordance with the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Between the 5th of June, 1967 and 14th of June, 1967, two witnesses, namely, Sri S. Mukherjee and Sri Paritosh Banerjee were examined on behalf of the prosecution before the Enquiry Officer. On the 11th of September, 1967 Sri S.C. Ghose, another witness of the prosecution was examined before the Enquiry Officer. At the time of examination of the said three witnesses on behalf of the Department the appellant attended before the Enquiry Officer and Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee was present with him and was assisting the appellant. Madhusudhan Mukherjee was entitled to represent the appellant before the enquiry Officer upto this stage in his capacity as a Government servant and he was in fact assisting the appellant and was participating in the enquiry before the Enquiry Officer with the appellant during the entire period the witness on behalf of the prosecution were examined. It appears that no date was fixed for the next date of enquiry after the examination of Sri S.C. Ghose on the 11th of September, 1967 and it further appears that after Sri S.C. Ghose had been examined on behalf of the Department there were no further witnesses to be examined on behalf of the prosecution and witnesses produced on behalf of the prosecution were to be cross-examined by the appellant. Madhusudhan Mukherjee who, as Government servant had been assisting the appellant in the enquiry proceeding before the Enquiry Officer and had participated in the enquiry till witness, namely, Sri S.C. Ghosh was over, resigned from Government service on the 1st of October, 1967 and took up legal practice. By virtue of his resigning from Government service Madhusudhan Mukherjee became disqualified of right as a Government servant, but Madhusudhan Mukherjee could still have representated the appellant and assisted him in the enquiry proceeding in his capacity as a lawyer with the permission of the Disciplinary Authority. By virtue of his resigning from Government service Madhusudhan Mukherjee became disqualified of right as a Government servant, but Madhusudhan Mukherjee could still have representated the appellant and assisted him in the enquiry proceeding in his capacity as a lawyer with the permission of the Disciplinary Authority. In accordance with the provisions contained in Rule 14(8) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules), the appellant made representations to the Disciplinary Authority for getting the necessary permission forgetting the assistance and services of Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee and the appellant in his petition dated 30.10.67 presented to the Enquiry Officer prayed that his tease should not be fixed up till his representations to the Disciplinary Authority for allowing Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee to continue to assist him were disposed of. The Enquiry Officer by his memo dated 8.11.61 informed the appellant that he should have made arrangements for obtaining necessary permission of Madhusudhan Mukherjee or any other Government servant to assist him earlier as Madhusudhan Mukherjee had resigned on 1.10.67, and the Enquiry Officer fixed the date for Cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses on 25.11.67. The Enquiry Officer, however, was transferred to Hundi Circle, Calcutta in the meanwhile and he re-fixed the date for hearing by his memo dated 4.4.68 on 27.4.68 for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. The appellant prayed for an adjournment on that date on the ground that the case should be adjourned till the appellant's representation before the Disciplinary Authority for obtaining necessary permission for getting the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee was disposed of. On the 23rd of May, 1968, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner which was the Disciplinary Authority refused the appellant's said the prayer for being assisted by Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee in the enquiry on the ground that Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee ceased to be a Government servant. It may be noticed that this refusal came nearly a month after the date fixed for hearing by the Enquiry Officer. On the 30th of May, the appellant made a further representation to the Disciplinary Authority for obtaining the necessary permission of getting the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee and the appellant requested the Enquiry Officer not to fix the date for hearing till the disposal of his application. On the 30th of May, the appellant made a further representation to the Disciplinary Authority for obtaining the necessary permission of getting the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee and the appellant requested the Enquiry Officer not to fix the date for hearing till the disposal of his application. On the 25th of July, 1968, the Enquiry Officer fixed the 9th of August, 1968 as the date for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and for furnishing the list of defence witnesses. On the 5th of August, 1968 the appellant sent another representation to the Disciplinary Authority asking for permission to have the assistance of Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. It appears that on the 8th of August, 1968 the appellant sent a letter to the Enquiry Officer informing him that he would let the Enquiry Officer know the present postings of the witnesses mentioned in his list of witnesses shortly and the appellant asked for an adjournment of the case for one month in view of the further representation made by him to the Disciplinary Authority and also in view of his wife's illness. It may be noted that this letter which appears at page 15 of the supplementary Paper Book was not annexed to or referred to in the petition. It further appears that the Enquiry Officer by his letter dated 16th of August, 1968 refused to entertain the said prayer of the appellant for adjournment for another month. The said letter of the Enquiry Officer which is at page 16 of the supplementary Paper Book reads as follows :- "Memorandum No. HLC/G/Con/291 Dated the 16th August, 1968. Sub- : Disciplinary Proceedings against Sri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server (under suspension.) 6. It appears that IAC, Range VI Calcutta & Disciplinary Authority in his Memorandum No. 156/IV-P/45 (sub file) dated 9.8.68 addressed to Sri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee refused once again to reconsider his prayer for permission to continue to take the assistance of Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee who left Government service and is at present; a legal practitioner. The said Sri Mukherjee left Government services far back as in October, 1967. But even now, he has not been able to secure the service of another Government servant to represent his case. The said Sri Mukherjee left Government services far back as in October, 1967. But even now, he has not been able to secure the service of another Government servant to represent his case. Instead, he has been sending representation after representation to the Disciplinary Authority with the same request of permitting him to take the help of Sri Mukherjee, who is no longer in Government service, every time I have been fixing his case for examination and cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. The Disciplinary Authority, in his turn, turned down his requests one after another. It appears, therefore, that Sri Chatterjee is not at all serious or interested in proceeding with his case. 7. In the circumstances, I am unable to entertain his petition dated 8th August, 1968 for yet another adjournment for a month". On the 23rd of August, 1968 the appellant forwarded a list of witnesses to the Enquiry Officer. This list appears at page 14 of the "Supplementary Paper Book. Thereafter without any further hearing the Enquiry Officer proceeded to make his report on the 17th of October, 1968. The Enquiry Officer in his report observed :- "In the circumstances, when Sri Chatterjee's representation after representation was turned down by IAC, Range VI Calcutta, he was given and final opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on 9.8.68. But instead of availing himself of the same, he filed yet another representation to IAC, Range VI, Calcutta on 5.8.68 knowing its fate fully and sent me a petition on 8.8.68, praying for a month's adjournment. By his Memo No. 156/IV-P/45 (Sub file) dated 9.8.68 Sri Chatterjee was informed by IAC, Range VI, Calcutta that his petition was filed as he was filed as he was unable to reconsider the case. In view of the above facts I have no other alternative than to refuse further adjournment of the case and Sri Chatterjee was informed accordingly in my Memo No. HC/G/Con/291 dated 16.8.68. The entire sequence of events have been narrated in order to bring out the fact that the delinquent officer did not appear to be very serious, in defending his case specially after the examination of prosecution witnesses was concluded by the Presenting Officer on 11.9.67. The entire sequence of events have been narrated in order to bring out the fact that the delinquent officer did not appear to be very serious, in defending his case specially after the examination of prosecution witnesses was concluded by the Presenting Officer on 11.9.67. It will be seen that from 11.9.67 to 9.8.68 the case was fixed by me for several times in order that Sri Chatterjee might cross-examine the prosecution witnesses already examined by the Presenting Officer but he failed to avail himself of the opportunity. Every time the case was fixed Sri Chatterjee was found making representation to IAC, Range-VI, Calcutta with the same requests of permitting Sri M. Mukherjee who left Government service on 1.10.67 to continue to assist him. Although his representation one after another, was turned down by IAC, Range VI, Calcutta. He pursued the same delatory tactics without caring to seek permission for another Government servant to assist him. This being the position I come to the conclusion that no useful purpose would be served by dragging on the case further and the last petition dated 8.8.68 of Sri Chatterjee praying for a month's adjournment was therefore rejected by me". 8. The Enquiry Officer found that all the charges against the appellant except Charge No. 7 had been established. On the 27th of January, 1969 on the basis of the said report a memorandum was served on the appellant by the respondent No. 4, the appropriate authority, to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The copy of the report was received by the appellant on the 29th of January, 1969 and the appellant by his letter dated 10th of February, 1969 to the respondent No. 4 asked for an extension of time till the 13th of March, 1969 for submitting his representations to the said show cause notice and the appellant in the said letter further stated that unless the appellant was given an opportunity of having access to the records of evidence in course of enquiry by the Enquiry Officer the appellant would not be in a position to reply. The respondent No. 4 by his letter dated 11th February, 1969 asked the appellant of submit his representations by the 27th of February, 1969. The respondent No. 4 by his letter dated 11th February, 1969 asked the appellant of submit his representations by the 27th of February, 1969. On the 7th of March, 1969, the appellant wrote to the respondent No. 4 that unless the appellant was given opportunity of having access to the records of evidence of the purported enquiry he would not be in a position to reply and he asked for an extension to file his representations. On the 13th of March, 1969 the appellant sent a further letter asking for extension of time. On the 14th of March, 1969, the appellant received an order dated 10th of March, 1969 made by the respondent No. 4 removing the appellant from service. On the 28th of April, 1969 the appellant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority against the said order in accordance with the provisions contained in the said Rules. On the 16th of September, 1969 the respondent No. 1, the Appellate Authority dismissed the said appeal of the appellant. The order of the Appellate Authority reads as follows :- Office of the Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal-I. P-7, Chowringhee Square, Calcutta 1 Regtd. with A/D Dated the 16th October, 1969. No. C/11524 ORDER Re: Appeal petition dated 28.4.69 of Shri Rabindranath Chatterjee, ex-Notice Server against the order dated 10.3.69 under the C.C.S. (C.C. & A) Rules, 1965 of IAC, Range XI, Calcutta. This is an appeal by Shri Rabindranath Chatterjee, ex-Notice Server under Rule 23 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, against the Order No. R-XXI/66/IW-45 (sub file) dated 10.3.69 under the said Rule, passed by the Inspecting Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax, Range XXI. 2. I have gone through the relevant records of the case, According to the Inquiry Officer who was appointed to enquiry into charges framed against Shri Chatterjee the Charge Nos. 1 to 6 against him (Shri Chatterjee) have been proved. The Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax has passed the order dated 10.3.69 after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the order passed by the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax, Rang-XXI, Calcutta is quite justified and in accordance with the Rules. I decline to interfere with this order of the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax. 3. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the order passed by the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax, Rang-XXI, Calcutta is quite justified and in accordance with the Rules. I decline to interfere with this order of the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax. 4. In the result, the appeal is rejected. The appellant thereafter moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the order of his dismissal and for quashing the same. On the 2nd February, 1970 on the writ petition filed by the appellant this Court issue a rule. The petition came up for final disposal before Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. in January, 1971 and after the matter was heard the learned Judge was please to reserve his judgment. The learned Judge delivered his judgment on the 3rd of March, 1971 and the learned Judge discharged the rule and dismissed the petition. The main grievance of the appellant in the writ petition before the learned trial Judge was that the order of dismissal has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice and in disregard of the provisions contained in the rules and was, therefore, bad and illegal. It appears that before the trial court the following contentions were raised on behalf of the appellant – 1) The documents had not been applied to the appellant. 2) The Enquiry Officer and the Adjudicating Authority had indicated bias and prejudice against the petitioner. 3) Refusal of permission to the appellant to get the assistance of Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. 4) Not calling certain witnesses. 5) No proper opportunity given to the appellant to cross-examine witnesses. 6) Findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse. 7) Not supplying the appellant with copies of the depositions. 9. The learned Judge for reasons stated in his judgment did not accept any of the aforesaid contentions. Against the decisions of the learned trial Judge the appellant has filed this appeal in forma pauperis. 10. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee and Mr. S.C. Ukil, two members of the Bar have, however, assisted the appellant in the appeal and have argued the appeal on behalf of the appellant. 11. Mr. Against the decisions of the learned trial Judge the appellant has filed this appeal in forma pauperis. 10. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee and Mr. S.C. Ukil, two members of the Bar have, however, assisted the appellant in the appeal and have argued the appeal on behalf of the appellant. 11. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, learned Counsel, arguing on behalf of the appellant has contended before us that in the instant case the order of dismissal of the appellant is clearly bad, as the said order has been made in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice and of the provisions contained in the Rules. It is the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that no real and effective opportunity wag given to the appellant to defend himself in the enquiry proceeding. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that the enquiry was held in clear violation of the principles; of natural justice and in disregard of the provisions contained in Rules and the Enquiry Officer made the report without giving the appellant any opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses produced on behalf of the Department and without giving the appellant any opportunity of stating his own case and producing his own witnesses in terms of the provisions contained in Rules 14(16) and (17). The said Rules are in the following terms :- “14(16) When the case for the Disciplinary Authority is closed the Government servant shall be required to state his defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded and the Govt. servant shall be required to sign the record. In either case, a copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer, if any, attended. (17) The evidence on behalf of the Government servant shall then be produced. The Govt. servant may examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers. The witnesses produced by the Government shall then be examined and shall be liable to cross-examination, reexamination and examination by the Inquiry Officer according to the provisions applicable to the witnesses for the Disciplinary Authority." 12. Mr. The Govt. servant may examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers. The witnesses produced by the Government shall then be examined and shall be liable to cross-examination, reexamination and examination by the Inquiry Officer according to the provisions applicable to the witnesses for the Disciplinary Authority." 12. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that the appellant by his letter dated 8th of August, 1968 had asked for an adjournment of the hearing fixed on the 9th of August, 1968 for one month and the Enquiry Officer by his letter dated 16th of August, 1968 had informed the appellant that his prayer for adjournment for one month was refused; but the Enquiry Officer did not fix any date for the hearing and did not also mention that he was treating the enquiry as closed. Mr. Chatterjee argues that even if the Enquiry Officer did not entertain the prayer for adjournment and wanted to proceed ex parte on the ground that the appellant had not attended on the 9th of August, the Enquiry Officer should have fixed a peremptory date and should have given a notice to the appellant to the effect that the Enquiry Officer would proceed with the enquiry ex parte if the appellant did not turn up on the date fixed. Mr. Chatterjee further argues that even if it be considered that the Enquiry Officer could proceed ex parte on the 9th of August, 1968 without giving the appellant a notice to that effect, the Enquiry Officer could not treat the enquiry as closed on the 9th of August, 1968 without complying with the requirements laid down in Rule 14(16). It is the argument of Mr. Chatterjee that without giving special notice to the appellant that he would proceed with the enquiry ex parte the Enquiry Officer was not competent to proceed ex parte and in any event on the 9th of August he was certainly not competent to treat the entire enquiry as closed and at the most on that date because of his refuse to grant the adjournment, which order came very much later, the Enquiry Officer might have treated the case of the prosecution as closed for want of cross-examination of the said witnesses by the appellant on that date. It was, however, obligatory on the part of the Enquiry Officer, argues Mr. It was, however, obligatory on the part of the Enquiry Officer, argues Mr. Chatterjee, under Rule 14(16) to call upon the appellant to state his defence in terms of the said Rule. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that in the instant case the view expressed by the Enquiry Officer in his report that the appellant was not serious is clearly unjustified and shows bias. It is the argument of Mr. Chatterjee that the appellant’s job, his career and his very livelihood were at stake and the appellant had from the very beginning participated and taken effective steps for vindicating his position. The appellant, undoubtedly, according to Mr. Chatterjee, had felt aggrieved and dismayed by the refusal of the Disciplinary Authority to permit Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist him and the appellant, undoubtedly, was making representations to have the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee, as the appellant rightly felt that without the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee the appellant would not be in a position to defend himself properly. Mr. Chatterjee points out that even after the letter of the 16th of August, 1968 addressed by the Enquiry Officer refusing to grant the adjournment, the appellant by his letter dated 23rd August, 1968 had forwarded a list of his witnesses to the Enquiry Officer with their designations and postings. This act of the appellant submits Mr. Chatterjee, clearly indicates that the appellant was very serious about the enquiry. Mr. Chatterjee also comments that in the letter of the 16th of August, 1968 the Enquiry Officer had only mentioned that the prayer for adjournment for one month was refused and in the said letter of Enquiry Officer did not choose to say that he did not allow any adjournment at all and that he was treating the enquiry as closed for default on the part of the appellant to be present on the 9th of August, 1968, Mr. Chatterjee submits that the Enquiry Officer has, therefore, clearly acted in violation of the Rules and in violation of the principles of natural justice by making his report without fixing a date for hearing and without calling upon the appellant to state his defence. It is the submission of Mr. Chatterjee submits that the Enquiry Officer has, therefore, clearly acted in violation of the Rules and in violation of the principles of natural justice by making his report without fixing a date for hearing and without calling upon the appellant to state his defence. It is the submission of Mr. Chatterjee that the appellant has really been deprived of the opportunity of defending himself and contesting the ease of the prosecution by the arbitrary, unreasonable and illegal act of the Enquiry Officer in treating the enquiry as closed without any intimation to the appellant and without fixing a date for further hearing and Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that the Enquiry Officer has mis-conducted the proceeding and has shown bias by treating the enquiry as closed without any notice to the appellant that the enquiry would be proceeded ex parte in the event the appellant failed in attend. Mr. Chatterjee has next contended that the refusal to continue the service of Madhusudhan Mukherjee in the facts of the instant case amounted to denial of opportunity and violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that the appellant had repeatedly asked for necessary permission for obtaining the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee who had been assisting him in the enquiry proceeding as a Government servant before resigning and taking up legal practice. The refusal on the part of the authorities was clearly unjustified arbitrary and against all principles of law and justice. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that the appellant was a poor process server who did not have any proper education and the charges against the appellant were all very serious; and it was indeed impossible for the appellant to defend himself without proper assistance and the appellant had made it clear to the authority concerned that he was not in a position to get the assistance of any other Government servant and without the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee it would be almost impossible for him to defend himself. Mr. Chatterjee has drawn our attention to Rule 14(8) which reads :- “The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority is a legal practitioner, or, the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits”. Mr. Mr. Chatterjee has contended that having regard to the circumstances of the case it was the clear duty of the Disciplinary Authority to give the necessary permission to the appellant for getting the benefit of the assistance of Madhusudan Mukherjee. Mr. Chatterjee, in this connection, has referred to the decision of a Special Bench of this Court in the case of (1) Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1961 Cal 1 and also to the decision of the Supreme in the case of (2) C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin reported in AIR 1972 SC 2178 . Relying on the principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that as in the instant case the charges against the appellant which included charges of fraud, fabrication, mainipulation and removal of documents, were all very serious and as the appellant was a person of very poor education and the prosecution was being conducted by an Income Tax Officer, experienced in deciding cases relating to assessments, the Disciplinary Authority taking into consideration these facts should have allowed the appellant the benefit of assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee. Mr. Chatterjee further contends that apart from these broad principles governing the exercise of discretion in relation to the grant of permission for engaging lawyers, which, according to Mr. Chatterjee, are also satisfied in the instant case, there is an additional special feature which the Department should have considered, and taking that fact into consideration, the authority should have granted the necessary permission to the appellant to have the assistance of Mudhusudhan Mukherjee, if real and effective opportunity were indeed intended to be given to the appellant to defend himself before the Enquiry Officer. This special feature, according to Mr. Chatterjee, is that in the instant case the appellant was in fact being represented and assisted by Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee who had been attending the enquiry proceeding as Government servant during the period when all the prosecution witnesses were examined and Mr. Mukherjee would, therefore, be the most competent person to do the cross-examination of the said witnesses and cross-examination by any other Government servant apart from the fact that no other Government servant, was available, could not do proper justice to the case. It is Mr. Chatterjee's contention that denial of the benefit to the appellant of the assistance of Mr. Mukherjee would, therefore, be the most competent person to do the cross-examination of the said witnesses and cross-examination by any other Government servant apart from the fact that no other Government servant, was available, could not do proper justice to the case. It is Mr. Chatterjee's contention that denial of the benefit to the appellant of the assistance of Mr. Madhusdhan Mukherjee in the midst of the enquiry proceeding on the plea of refusing to give him the permission which became necessary because of Madhusudhan Mukherjee's resigning from Government service and becoming a legal practitioner, clearly amounted to a denial of opportunity to the appellant to defend himself effectively and amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice. 13. Mr. Chatterjee has next contended that there is also a violation of the principles of natural justice and of the Rules in course of the proceeding by refusing to give inspection of the documents to the appellant, by refusing to give inspection of the further documents disclosed in the revised list of documents by letter dated 1.12.66 and by refusing to give the appellant the opportunity of filing a fresh written statement after the filing of the list of revised documents. In this connection of Mr. Chatterjee has drawn our attention to Rule 14(3), (4) and (11) of the Rules Mr. Chatterjee has further contended that the appellate order is clearly bad as in the said order no reasons are indicated. Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that it is a clear duty of every Appellate Authority whose order is liable to further challenge to state the reasons for the order and any such order by any Appellate Authority without any reasons in support thereof is clearly bad and cannot be sustained. In support of this argument Mr. Chatterjee has relied on the following decisions :- In the cases of (3) M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in AIR 1972 SC 1302 .; (4) State of Gujrat v. Krishna Cinema and Ors., reported in AIR 1971 SC 1950; (5) M/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. The Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1971 SC 862 ; (6) Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai, Conciliation Officer and Anr., reported in AIR 1970 Gujarat l. 14. Mr. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that apart from this broad principle enunciated for furthering the ends of justice, the Rules framed with regard to consideration and disposal of appeal specifically provide that the Appellate Authority must consider certain matters before passing any order. Mr. Chatterjee has drawn our attention to Rule 27, sub-rule (2) of the Rules and the said Rule is in the following terms :- "27(2) in case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said Rule, the Appellate Authority shall consider. a) Whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with, and if not, whether such compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice. b) Whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are warranted by the evidence on the record ; and c) Whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe; and pass orders- i) confirming enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty; or ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case." 15. Mr. Chatterjee has argued that the Appellate Authority has made the order in utter disregard of these provisions. Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that though this point has not been taken in the petition and has not been urged in the Court below this point is purely a point of law and he is, therefore, entitled to urge this point before the Appellate Court. According to Mr. Chatterjee no investigation as to facts is necessary and this question has to be decided on a construction of the order of the Appellate Authority which has been annexed to the petition and which has been challenged in the present proceeding. 16. Mr. Chatterjee has also argued that the charge sheet submitted by the Disciplinary Authority is illegal. He has commented that the allegations made in support of the charges by the Disciplinary Authority clearly indicate that the Disciplinary Authority had really made up its mind and the enquiry was intended to be a mere formality. Mr. 16. Mr. Chatterjee has also argued that the charge sheet submitted by the Disciplinary Authority is illegal. He has commented that the allegations made in support of the charges by the Disciplinary Authority clearly indicate that the Disciplinary Authority had really made up its mind and the enquiry was intended to be a mere formality. Mr. Chatterjee has commented that the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated the facts and circumstances of the case and has failed to apply the principles of law correctly to the facts and circumstances of this case. He submits that the order of the learned trial Judge should be set aside and the petition of the appellant under Article 226 should be allowed. 17. Mr. D.K. Sen, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Department has submitted that the decision of the learned trial Judge is right and he has contended that in the instant case there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice or of the statutory provisions. Mr. Sen has drawn our attention to the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer and he has argued that in the facts of the instant case the Enquiry Officer was perfectly justified in his conclusion that the appellant did not appear to be very serious in defending his case and in the view of the matter the Enquiry Officer was clearly within his right to refuse the adjournment asked for and to treat the enquiry as closed. It is the argument of Mr. Sen that the facts and circumstances of the case, clearly indicate that the appellant was trying to delay the enquiry proceeding by asking for an adjournment every time the case was fixed for hearing on the ground that he needed the assistance of Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. Mr. Sen argues that it was made abundantly clear to the appellant by the Disciplinary Authority that the Disciplinary Authority would not grant permission to the appellant to engage Madhusudhan Mukherjee, but the appellant went on filing petition after petition asking for permission from the Disciplinary Authority to have the services of Madhusudhan Mukherjee and the appellant went on asking for adjournment on the same ground. Mr. Mr. Sen has argued that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the Disciplinary Authority had decided not to permit Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist the appellant and the appellant was not going to participate in the enquiry without the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee and was applying for an adjournment of the hearing of the enquiry on that ground. Mr. Sen comments that reasonable adjournments had been granted to the appellant to defend himself in the enquiry proceeding but as ultimately the Enquiry Officer very properly came to the conclusion that the appellant was not serious in defending himself without the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee, the Enquiry Officer had naturally to proceed with the enquiry and as the case of the prosecution had been concluded, he had necessarily to treat the enquiry as closed. Mr. Sen submits that in that view of the matter there can be no question of complying with Rules 14(16) and (17) of the Rules. According to Mr. Sen, the said Rules can only apply when the Government servant participates in the enquiry proceeding. Mr. Sen has also drawn our attention to the findings of the Enquiry Officer in the report that the appellant has not filed any list of witnesses. Mr. Sen has argued that these findings of the Enquiry Officer in the report, namely, that the appellant was not serious in defending himself and that he has not submitted any list of witnesses should be accepted by this Court and this Court in this jurisdiction should not seek to interfere with the said findings of the Enquiry Officer but should proceed on the basis that the said findings are correct. Mr. Sen submits that the findings of an Enquiry Officer in the report should normally be accepted by the Court in exercising the writ jurisdiction and in support of this submission Mr. Sen has relied on the following decisions: - In the cases (7) State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. S. Sree Ranga Rao, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1923 : (8) Khem Chand v. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1958 SC 300 ; (9) Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Ors,. reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 . Mr. v. S. Sree Ranga Rao, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1923 : (8) Khem Chand v. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1958 SC 300 ; (9) Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Ors,. reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 . Mr. Sen has next contended that refusal to permit Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist the appellant in the enquiry cannot be considered to be any ground for interference by this Court and the said refusal does not in any event, in the facts and circumstances of the case, amount to any denial of natural justice or of any reasonable opportunity to the appellant to defend himself. Mr. Sen, argues that in the matter of granting the permission the Disciplinary Authority has a discretion and it is entirely for the Disciplinary Authority on a consideration of the relevant materials to grant such permission or to refuse such permission. Mr. Sen argues that on a consideration of all the relevant facts the Disciplinary Authority has refused to grant the necessary permission and has exercised its discretion accordingly in accordance with the provisions contained in Rule 14(8) of the Rules. Mr. Sen argues that the Disciplinary Authority has, therefore, clearly acted in accordance with the provisions contained in the Rule and the exercise of the discretion by the Disciplinary Authority is conformity with the rule cannot be any ground for interference by this Court, even if the discretion be held by this Court not to have been properly exercised. Mr. Sen, however, has argued that the Disciplinary Authority has exercised its discretion properly in refusing to grant the necessary permission. Mr. Sen has drawn our attention to the charges levelled against the appellant and he has contended that the charges are all simple charges based on facts and it was not necessary for the appellant to have the services of any lawyer to defend himself against the said charges. Mr. Sen points out that the Disciplinary Authority asked the defendant to have the service of any other Government servant if the appellants desired. Mr. Sen has contended this aspect and the decisions cited on this question, and on a consideration of the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant and the decisions relied upon, the learned trial Judge has rightly rejected this contention and this Court should not interfere with the decision of the learned trial Judge. 18. Mr. Mr. Sen has contended this aspect and the decisions cited on this question, and on a consideration of the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant and the decisions relied upon, the learned trial Judge has rightly rejected this contention and this Court should not interfere with the decision of the learned trial Judge. 18. Mr. Sen has next contended that it is not open to the appellant to raise the contention at this stage that the order of the Appellate Authority is bad and illegal as the said order is not a speaking order. Mr. Sen argues that it is an absolutely new point and the appellant should not be allowed to urge this new point at this stage. Mr. Sen contends that the point raised is not a pure point of law and it requires consideration of various facts and it is Mr. Sen's contention that even if it be held that this point is a pure point of law the appellant should not be allowed to urge this new point at this stage. Mr. Sen, in this connection, has drawn our attention to the following cases :- (10) The University of Mysore & Anr. v. C. D. Govinda Rao & Anr., reported in AIR 1965 SC 491 ; (11) The Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf), Delhi & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1965 SC 1167 ; (12) Sarju Prosad Saha v. The State of U.P. & Ors., reported in AIR 1965 SC 1763 . Mr. Sen has further contended that even if the appellant be permitted to raise this new contention at this stage, the said contention should not be accepted, as the order of the Appellate Authority in the instant case, though not very happily framed, is indeed a speaking order and the said order substantially meets the requirements of Rule 27, sub-rule (2) of the Rules, drawing our attention to the said order Mr. Sen has commented that the order of the Appellate Authority is an order of affirmation; and in the said order the Appellate Authority has mentioned that he has 'gone through the relevant records of the case' and that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax has passed the order dated 10.3.69 after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Mr. Sen has drawn our attention to the order passed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax and has pointed out that the said order is a reasoned order and in the said order the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner has held that all the rules have been complied with. Mr. Sen, therefore, submits that this order of the Appellate Authority which affirms the order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner really accepts all the findings of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Authority has not considered it necessary to repeat the same in his order as he agrees with the order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Mr. Sen, in this connection, has relied on the following decisions of (13) The Union of India & Ors. v. K. Rajappa Menon, reported in AIR 1970 SC 748 ; (14) Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1966 SC 671 ; (15) Bhagat Raja v. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC 1607; (16) Hari Prasad Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal & Ors., reported in AIR 1972 Cal 27 . 19. Mr. Sen has argued that the contention of the appellant that there has been violation of the rules or the principles of natural justice by refusing inspection of the documents to the appellant and by refusing the appellant to submit further written statement on the basis of the revised list of documents and witnesses is clearly without any foundation. Mr. Sen has taken us through the correspondence and has pointed out that an documents relied on at the enquiry had been inspected by the appellant and the appellant was informed that he would have the opportunity of making his further defence but the appellant by refusing to participate in the proceeding has really deprived himself of the opportunity. It is Mr. Sen's contention that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice and or any of the provisions of the law. Mr. It is Mr. Sen's contention that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice and or any of the provisions of the law. Mr. Sen has further submitted that the correspondence clearly go to indicate that the appellant had received copies of the depositions and he has argued that even if it could be held that the copies of the depositions were not supplied to the appellant who was present at the enquiry with Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee, there would still be no violation of the rules or the principles of natural justice. Mr. Sen argues that there is really no substance in the contention that the charges levelled against the appellant are bad as the said charges and the allegations made in support thereof indicate that the Disciplinary Authority had already made up its mind. It is the argument of Mr. Sen that the charges and the allegations in support there are, as they should be, very specific and definite and as the said charges had to be enquired into by the Enquiry Officer there could be no question of the Disciplinary Authority making up its mind. 20. Mr. Sen submits that In the instant case the decision of the learned trial Judge should be upheld, as there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice or of the Rules and sufficient opportunity had been given to the appellant to defend himself. It is the submission of Mr. Sen that the appellant by his own conduct has not availed himself of the opportunity given to him to defend himself in the enquiry Mr. Sen has commented that the principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Rules have been sufficiently complied with and the appellant who was not serious about the enquiry and had no intention of seriously participating in the same and was trying to delay and prolong the enquiry, cannot be heard to complain, and in any event, by his own conduct the appellant must be deemed to have waived compliance with Rule 14(16) and (17). In concluding Mr. In concluding Mr. Sen has finally submitted that in the event of this Court coming to the conclusion that the order in question violates the principles of natural justice or any provision of the Rules and cannot, therefore, be sustained, this Court should not direct reinstatement of the appellant, but should direct a fresh enquiry to be held. 21. I have to observe that a large number of decisions on the question of Court's jurisdiction and exercise thereof in a writ petition and also on the principles of natural justice and its various aspects had been cited from the Bar. I do not consider it necessary to refer to the said decisions, as the said decisions are not of any particular assistance in the facts and circumstances of this case and have no great bearing on the question involved in the present case. The said decisions enunciate various principles about which there is hardly any dispute. Whether there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice of any provision of the Rules must necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case. It is well-settled that if an order of dismissal of a Govt. servant is made in violation of the principles of natural justice or any violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred by proviso to Article 309 and clause (5) of Article 148 of the Constitution as a constitutional safeguard for the Government employees, for giving them a reasonable and effective opportunity the order must be held to be bad and must necessarily be quashed. 22. The impugned order, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot, in my opinion, be sustained and must be held to be bad, as it has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice and also in disregard of the mandatory provision of the Rules. In my opinion, no real and effective opportunity was given to the appellant to defend himself in the instant case. The refusal to permit Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist the appellant in the enquiry has, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, resulted, in my opinion, in a denial of reasonable and effective opportunity to the appellant to defend himself and has clearly amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice. The refusal to permit Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist the appellant in the enquiry has, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, resulted, in my opinion, in a denial of reasonable and effective opportunity to the appellant to defend himself and has clearly amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice. It may be true that in this kind of enquiry the engagement of a lawyer as a matter of right is not intended and power has, therefore, been conferred on the appropriate authority to grant or refuse permission to engage a lawyer. This power, however, cannot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily and must exercised judiciously in the large interests of justice. This power should be so exercised on a proper consideration of the facts and circumstances of a case as will ensure a just and fair trial to the parties. This power should not be exercised in a manner which will have the effect of unfairly prejudicing the case of the Government servant. It is now well-settled that refusal to permit a Government servant under the provisions of such Rule to take the assistance of lawyer, may, in appropriate cases, result in violation of the principles of natural justice and vitiate the enquiry and any order passed in consequence thereof. 23. Dealing with an identical provision contained in Rule 15(5) of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 the Supreme Court in the case of C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2178 observed at page 2182. "It is needless to say that Rule 15 is a mandatory Rule. The Rule regulates the guarantee given to Government servants under Article 311. Government servants by and large have no legal training. At any rate, it is nobody's case that the appellant had legal training. Moreover when a man is charged with a breach of a rule entailing serious consequences, he is not likely to be in a position to present his case at best as it should be. The accusation against the appellant threatened his very livelihood. Any adverse verdict against him was bound to be disastrous to him as it proved to be. In such a situation he cannot be expected to act calmly and with deliberation. The accusation against the appellant threatened his very livelihood. Any adverse verdict against him was bound to be disastrous to him as it proved to be. In such a situation he cannot be expected to act calmly and with deliberation. That is why Rule 15(5) has provided for representation of a Government servant charged with dereliction of duty or with contravention of the Rule by another Government servant or in appropriate cases by a legal practitioner." The Supreme Court held in the facts of the case that refusal to permit the Government servant to engage a legal practitioner vitiated the enquiry and amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity to the Government servant to defend himself. A Special Bench of this Court had occasion to consider whether refusal to permit a Government servant to be represented by a lawyer in the Departmental proceeding amounted to a denial of opportunity or not in the case of Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1961 Calcutta 1. Dealing with a similar provision contained in Rule 55 under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 then in force, the bench expressed the view that if on the particular facts and complexity of a case assistance of a lawyer was regarded as a part of reasonable opportunity, then denial of such opportunity is violation alike of the constitutional protection under Article 311 (2) and the principles of natural justice. 24. In the case of (17) Director General of Posts and Telegraphs and Ors. v. Nani Gopal Mazumdar and Anr., recently reported in 71 CWN 752, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider a similar question on the basis of an identical rule contained in Rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1957 and the Division Bench observed at page 755. "From a fair reading of the above Rule it seems clearly obligatory upon the Disciplinary Authority to firstly, allow the assistance of a legal practitioner to a Government servant if the person nominated by the Disciplinary Authority for presentation of its case is also a legal practitioner; even, if it is not so, then also it is equally obligatory upon the Disciplinary Authority to consider all other relevant circumstances of the case and then either to accord or refuse such permission. In other words, even where there is no legal practitioner nominated on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority, the Disciplinary Authority is bound to consider the facts and circumstances of the given case before it could refuse permission to engage a legal practitioner to assist the Government servant, it would therefore be a clear breach of duty on the part of the Disciplinary Authority if it would refuse to allow the petitioner to engage a legal practitioner only on the view that no legal practitioner was nominated by the Disciplinary Authority in presenting its own case. That being so, it is quite clear that the Disciplinary Authority in the present case refused to allow the petitioner to take the assistance of a legal practitioner simply because the case did not satisfy the first part of the Rule, namely, that there was no legal practitioner nominated by the authority for presentation of its own case. But at the same time the Disciplinary Authority failed to comply with the other part of the Rule in that it did not take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the instant case for refusing permission to the respondent to take help of a legal practitioner. Quite clearly, in taking such a decision refusing permission to the petitioner to take the help of a legal practitioner, there was violation of Rule 15(5) and, therefore, the petitioner must be deemed to have been denied reasonable opportunity afforded by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution consistent with the terms of Rule 15(5) and this contravened the rules and principles of natural justice." 25. In my opinion, it is the duty of the Disciplinary Authority to consider carefully the facts and circumstances of every case in the matter of granting of refusing permission to a Government servant to engage a legal practitioner to assist the Government servant, in the enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority should bear in mind that the rule bears upon the reasonable opportunity contemplated by Article 311 to the Government servant and the Rule is a mandatory one which regulates the guarantee given to Government servants under Article 311. The Disciplinary Authority must not refuse permission capriciously or arbitrarily. The Disciplinary Authority should bear in mind that the rule bears upon the reasonable opportunity contemplated by Article 311 to the Government servant and the Rule is a mandatory one which regulates the guarantee given to Government servants under Article 311. The Disciplinary Authority must not refuse permission capriciously or arbitrarily. In my view, if in the facts of any particular case the refusal of the permission by the Disciplinary Authority to the Government servant to take the assistance of a legal practitioner has the effect of denial of reasonable effective opportunity to the Government servant to defend himself in the enquiry and unfairly prejudices the Government servant in the enquiry, the refusal must be considered to be arbitrary and illegal and will have the effect of vitiating the enquiry which under such circumstances must be considered to have been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and also of the mandatory provision of the Rule. 26. In the instant case the appellant was employed as a Notice Server in the office of the Income Tax Officer. Far from having any legal training the appellant has indeed very poor education. Various charges, including charges of fraudulent removal of documents, tampering with and manipulation of documents, violation of office discipline and attempt to defraud the Government, entailing serious consequences, has been levelled against the appellant and the appellant was not likely to be in a position to present his case as best as it should be. The accusation against the appellant threatened his very livelihood. Any adverse verdict against him was bound to be disastrous to him, as it has proved to be. In such a situation he cannot be expected to act calmly and with deliveration. That is, as the Supreme Court points out in the case of C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin, AIR 1972 SC 2178 at page 2182, why the Rule has proved for representation of a Government servant by another Government servant or in appropriate cases by a legal practitioner. In the instant case it has to be borne in mind that the Presenting Officer was an Income Tax Officer and although the Presenting Officer was not a legal practitioner, he, because of his experience as Income-tax in hearing cases, may be considered to have fair training. The charges, which I have discussed earlier were sufficiently complicated and serious. In the instant case it has to be borne in mind that the Presenting Officer was an Income Tax Officer and although the Presenting Officer was not a legal practitioner, he, because of his experience as Income-tax in hearing cases, may be considered to have fair training. The charges, which I have discussed earlier were sufficiently complicated and serious. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in his order of dismissal has himself noted, "the charges are very serious and includes submission of fraudulent T.A. Claims, tampering with Government records with ulterior motives and fraudulent removal of Government papers etc." In the facts and circumstances of the present on the refusal of permission of the appellant of getting the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee on the ground that the said Madhusudhan Mukherjee, was a legal practitioner clearly unjustified and arbitrary. Apart this aspect which, in my opinion brings this case within the principles enunciated for the grant of permission to take legal assistance in the decision of the Supreme Court the decision of the Special Bench of this Court and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court which I have already noted, there is an additional particular fact of very great consequence and importance which, to my mind, clearly establishes that the refusal of permission to the appellant to have the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee, undoubtedly, had the effect of denial of reasonable and effective opportunity to the appellant in defending himself in the enquiry and had undoubtedly prejudiced the appellant seriously in the enquiry proceeding. It has to be borne in mind that Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee was assisting the appellant in the enquiry from the stage of the commencement of the proceeding. Madhusudhan Mukherjee had assisted him in the matter of inspection of documents and was also present act the enquiry when the witnesses on behalf of the Department were examined. During that period Madhusudhan Mukherjee, though he was a lawyer, was not a legal practitioner and was employed as a Government servant. As a Government servant the appellant was entitled to the assistance of Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee under the rule as of right without the question of any permission from the Disciplinary Authority. During that period Madhusudhan Mukherjee, though he was a lawyer, was not a legal practitioner and was employed as a Government servant. As a Government servant the appellant was entitled to the assistance of Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee under the rule as of right without the question of any permission from the Disciplinary Authority. Mudhusudhan Mukherjee resigned from Government service and became a legal practitioner during and in course of the pendency of the enquiry proceeding at the time when the witnesses on behalf of the Department had been examined and turn of the appellant to cross-examine the said witnesses arrived. At that stage Madhusudhan Mukherjee who had been assisting the appellant in his capacity as Government servant as of right became disqualified because of the change in his occupation from a Government servant to a legal practitioner from continuing to assist the appellant without necessary permission of the Disciplinary Authority. Madhushan Mukherjee, if he had been permitted by the Disciplinary Authority could have continued to assist the appellant in the enquiry and he could have cross-examined on behalf of the appellant, the witnesses of the Department examined in his presence. To deny permission to Madhusudhan Mukherjee in the midst of the enquiry to assist appellant on the gound that Madhusudhan Mukherjee was a legal practitioner, undoubtedly, prejudiced the appellant in the enquiry and had the effect denial of reasonable and effective opportunity to the appellant to defend himself. Apart from the aspect emphasised by the appellant that other Government servants were not available proper justice might not have been done to the case of the appellant by another Government servant, even if one was available and engaged in the midst of the enquiry as the Government servant so employed would not have the benefit of having participated in the earlier proceedings where witnesses to be cross-examined were examined. To my mind, if a party is deprived of the assistance of a particular person in whom he has confidence and who has been assisting him in a proceeding in the midst of the proceeding the party concerned is undoubtedly prejudiced in the trial and has a genuine and just grievance of denial of reasonable and effective opportunity and of justice to him. The Disciplinary Authority should have appreciated that in the facts and circumstances of the case denial of Madhusudhan Mukherjee’s assistance to the appellant in the midst of the enquiry proceeding by refusing to permit Madhusudhan Mukherjee who had been assisting him in the enquiry, had the effect of denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant and of stifling his defence. There does not appear to be any reasonable or probable ground for the refusal of the permission which became necessary only because of Madhusudhan Mukherjee's resigning from Government service. Madhusudhan Mukherjee, as the Disciplinary Authority very well-known had been assisting the appellant in the enquiry, and at that stage the appellant was entitled to his assistance as of right. Madhusudhan Mukherjee had assisted the appellant in the matter of inspection of documents from the stage of commencement of the proceeding and had attended on behalf of the appellant and with him all the proceedings of the enquiry when all the witnesses on behalf of the Department were being produced and examined. If Madhusudhan Mukherjee had not resigned from Government service he could have continued to assist the appellant and the appellant would have been entitled to his assistance as of right, permission became necessary only because Madhusudhan Mukherjee had resigned from Government service and had taken up legal practice. The person concerned remained the same. The case is not one where permission is asked for engagement of a lawyer as such in an enquiry at the very beginning. As I have earlier observed even if it was a case where engagement of a lawyer was sought for by the appellant to assist the appellant at the enquiry, permission should have been granted, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here, however, the Disciplinary Authority by its refusal in effect denied to the appellant the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee who had been assisting him and who was willing to assist the appellant. By withholding the permission which became necessary, because of Madhusudhan Mukherjee's resignation from Government service and becoming a practising lawyer, the refusal of the permission under such circumstances and in the facts and circumstances of the case, is clearly unjust and arbitrary and may even appear to be vindictive. By withholding the permission which became necessary, because of Madhusudhan Mukherjee's resignation from Government service and becoming a practising lawyer, the refusal of the permission under such circumstances and in the facts and circumstances of the case, is clearly unjust and arbitrary and may even appear to be vindictive. As, in my opinion the refusal of the permission to the appellant to take the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee, improper and illegal, I must hold that the appellant was denied reasonable and effective opportunity of defending himself in the enquiry and the enquiry must necessarily be held to be vitiated. The enquiry must he held to have been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and also of the mandatory provision of the Rule without giving to the appellant any reasonable and effective opportunity of defending himself. The order passed on the basis of such enquiry must necessarily be held to be illegal. The learned trial Judge does not appear to have considered and appreciated this aspect. 27. In the facts of the instant case, I am further of the opinion tint the act of the Enquiry Officer in proceeding to make his report without fixing any date for hearing after refusal of the adjournment of the hearing fixed on the 9th of August, 1968, has the effect of depriving the appellant of the opportunity of defending himself. This act of making the report without fixing any date for hearing amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice and is contrary to the provisions contained in Rules 14(16) and (17) which I have earlier set cut. The appellant by his letter dated the 8th of August, 1968 to the Enquiry Officer had asked for an adjournment of the hearing fixed on the 9th of August, 1968 for one month on the ground of the further representations to the Disciplinary Authority made by him for getting the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee and also on the ground of his wife's illness. The Enquiry Officer by his letter dated the 16th of August, 1963 informed the appellant that his prayer for adjournment for yet another month could not he entertained. In the letter the Enquiry Officer did not state whether he was allowing any adjournment for a shorter period and he did not mention any date for the next hereing. The Enquiry Officer by his letter dated the 16th of August, 1963 informed the appellant that his prayer for adjournment for yet another month could not he entertained. In the letter the Enquiry Officer did not state whether he was allowing any adjournment for a shorter period and he did not mention any date for the next hereing. The Enquiry Officer also did not mention in his letter that as the appellant had not appeared on the 9th of August, 1968, the date fixed for the hearing, he had treated the enquiry as closed and he was proceeding to make his report, although the Enquiry Officer in his letter had stated that the appellant was not at all serious or interested in proceeding with his case. It might not have been proper for the appellant to absent himself on the date fixed for hearing on the ground that he had made an application for adjournment of the hearing. The absence of the appellant on the date fixed for hearing does not, however, justify the act of the Enquiry Officer in closing the enquiry altogether and in making his report, particularly in view of the provisions contained in Rules 14 (16) and (17). The explanation and reason offered by the Enquiry Officer that the appellant was not serious or interested in the enquiry, cannot, in the facts and circumstances of this case be accepted. It has to be borne in mind that the appellant's very livelihood was at stake and the appellant had been very actively participating in the proceeding to defend himself. The appellant had obtained the help of Madhusudhan Mukherjee who had been giving active assistance to the appellant in the enquiry and the appellant had been taking all possible steps to defend himself. With the refusal by the Disciplinary Authority, to permit Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist the appellant in the enquiry, the appellant, undoubtedly, felt very helpless in the matter of defending himself and the appellant made representations to the authority concerned for getting the necessary permission. With the refusal by the Disciplinary Authority, to permit Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist the appellant in the enquiry, the appellant, undoubtedly, felt very helpless in the matter of defending himself and the appellant made representations to the authority concerned for getting the necessary permission. Without the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee the appellant felt seriously handicapped in conducting his defence and to be able to defend himself properly and effectively, he was making representations to the Disciplinary Authority for the grant of the necessary permission to obtain the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee who had been assisting in defending him in the enquiry and he was asking the Enquiry Officer to adjourn the hearing. The adjournment was asked to enable the appellant to get the necessary permission for the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee to defend himself effectively and properly with the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee and not because the appellant was not serious a out the enquiry. It may also be noted that the delay in the enquiry proceeding was not due to the faults of the appellant only. The facts and circumstances on the other hand suggest that the Disciplinary Authorities were more responsible for the delay in the commencement and continuance of the enquiry proceeding. It appears that the appellant had in fact asked for adjournment of the hearing fixed only on two occasions once on 27.4.68. Before the dates fixed for the hearing the appellant had in fact submitted representations to the Disciplinary Authority for permission to get the assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee and the appellant had asked for the adjournment to enable the appellant to get the assistance of Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee in assisting the appellant in his defence in the enquiry proceeding even if there had been any justification for the view of the Enquiry Officer that the appellant would not participate in the further proceedings in the enquiry without the assistance of Sri Madhusudhan Mukherjee and the Disciplinary Authority had indicated that such permission would not be granted, the Enquiry Officer did not act properly by treating the entire enquiry proceeding as closed without fixing a firm date after refusal of the adjournment on notice to the appellant that if on the date fixed the appellant did not appear the enquiry would be proceeded ex parte against him. The Enquiry Officer should have appreciated that it was his duty to afford the appellant a reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the enquiry before him and the Rules which have been framed with the object of affording such reasonable opportunity to the Government servant against whom the enquiry is proceeding have to be properly complied with. It is always possible for any diligent Enquiry Officer within the limits of the rules prescribed to stop any unnecessary delay or the delaying tactics. It there be any, on the part of the Government servant. If an Enquiry Officer is satisfied in the facts of a particular case that any particular Government servant is trying unnecessarily to delay the enquiry proceeding by asking adjournments and by not attending the proceeding or otherwise, it is the duty of the Enquiry Officer to fix a firm date and inform the delinquent Government servant concerned that if the Government servant does not appear at the enquiry on the date fixed, the enquiry will be proceeded with in his absence. In my opinion, before an Enquiry Officer chooses to proceed ex parte in an enquiry of this kind, it is his duty to fix a firm date giving special notice to the party at fault that the enquiry will be proceeded on the date fixed in his absence unless the party concerned has made it absolutely clear to the Enquiry Officer that he would participate in the enquiry. In the instant case, in my opinion it was the duty of the Income Tax Officer to fix a firm date for the hearing after his refusal to grant the adjournment intimating to the appellant that if on the date fixed the appellant did not appear the enquiry will be proceeded with even in his absence. Even if it could be considered that the Enquiry Officer could proceed ex parte without any such notice on the 9th of August, 1968, the date fixed for enquiry, in the absence of the appellant, notwithstanding his prayer for adjournment, the Enquiry Officer could not have treated the entire enquiry as closed because of the provisions contained in Rules 14(16) and (17). At the most the Enquiry Officer, if he could have at all proceeded ex parte on that date, could have treated the case of the prosecution as closed and it was then incumbent upon the Enquiry Officer under the provisions contained in Rule 14(16) to require the appellant to state his defence. In view of the provisions contained in Rule 14(16) of the Rules, the Enquiry Officer could not have treated the entire enquiry as closed without giving an opportunity to the appellant to state his defence and could not have proceeded to make his report without complying with the requirement of the said rule such conduct on the part of the Enquiry Officer clearly violates the said Rule 14(16) and the principles of natural justice as by such conduct he deprives the appellant of the opportunity to state his case and defend himself. I may incidentally note that the appellant had by his letter dated the 23rd of August, 1968 forwarded a list of witnesses to the Enquiry Officer with their designations and postings with the object of examining the said witnesses. The appellant by his letter dated the 26th September, 1968 had also asked the respondent to supply the appellant with copies of depositions of prosecutions witnesses. These two letters, it may be noted were sent to the Enquiry Officer before he made his report on the 17th of October, 1968. I am therefore, or the opinion that there was a clear violation of the principle of natural justice and also of the rules in conduct of the enquiry. 28. It is unfortunate that some of the relevant and important documents have not been referred to in the petition or have not been annexed to the same. The existence of such documents, however, is not disputed and these documents have all now been included in the supplementary Paper Book which has been prepared. In my opinion, in a proceeding of this nature in which a Writ in the nature of Certiorari has been asked, it is permissible for the Court to look in appropriate case into such documents and to take note of the same in the larger interests of justice and for meeting the ends of justice. In my opinion, in a proceeding of this nature in which a Writ in the nature of Certiorari has been asked, it is permissible for the Court to look in appropriate case into such documents and to take note of the same in the larger interests of justice and for meeting the ends of justice. In the facts of the instant case and particularly bearing in mind that the appellant is a poor employee with very education and means, I am of the opinion that the documents included in the Supplementary Paper Book may be taken into consideration by this Court and the Supplementary Paper Book prepared by the appellant should be allowed to be filed and should be treated as a part of the records of the proceeding. Even if I had held that the documents in the Supplementary Paper Book cannot be taken into consideration, the position would not materially change and the findings would not be affected. 29. In view of my aforesaid findings, it does not really became necessary to decide the other contentions raised on behalf of the appellant. I may, however, observe that there appears to be force in the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the order of the Appellate Authority is not a good or the said order is not a speaking order and is not in conformity with the Rule 27(2) of the Rules. The decisions relied on by Mr. Chatterjee, which I have earlier noted in the judgment lend support to the view that the Appellate Authority should state its own reasons for the order it makes. The other contentions of Mr. Chatterjee, in the facts of the present case, do not impress me. Mr. Sen, in my opinion, has rightly contended that there is no real substance in the other points urged by Mr. Chatterjee. 30. In view of my aforesaid findings, I must hold that the impugned order is bad, unenforceable and illegal and the said order must be quashed. 31. In the result the appear must succeed and the judgment and order of the learned trial Judge must be set aside. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the learned trial Judge. I quash and set aside the order of dismissal and I direct and order that the rule in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition be made absolute. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the learned trial Judge. I quash and set aside the order of dismissal and I direct and order that the rule in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition be made absolute. The appellant will be entitled to the costs of the appeal and also the costs of the proceeding in the Court below. 32. I wish to make it clear that this order will not prejudice the right of the respondents, if any, to take such steps as they may be entitled in law and the respondents will be at liberty to hold a fresh enquiry the appellant if the respondents are otherwise so entitled under the law. Hazra, J, : The appellant Rabindra Nath Chatterjee (I shall refer him as "Shri Chatterjee") has filed this appeal against the judgment and order of Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (dated March 3, 1971) discharging the Rule obtained by him and dismissing his application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for recalling or quashing the orders passed by the appropriate authority removing him from his service. I had the benefit of reading and considering the judgment of my learned brother, A.N. Sen, J. but, I regret, I could not persuade myself to agree to an the views of my learned brother. I am delivering a separate judgment expressing my views. 34. What happened in this matter is as follows :- On September 13, 1955, Shri Chatterjee was employed as a peon in the office of the Income Tax Officer, District III (2) Calcutta. His scale of pay then was Rs. 30-35/- per month plus other allowances admissible to class IV Central Government servants. Thereafter, on May 23, 1959, Shri Chatterjee was directly appointed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Range II, Calcutta, as notice server and posted in the office of the Income Tax Officer, District III (2) in the grade Rs. 35-1-50/- plus other allowances. On September 25, 1963, he was transferred from the office of the Income-Tax Officers, District III (2), Calcutta to the office of the Income Tax Officer, District, 24-Parganas. Here he was given the job of a peon in the issue section of the said office. 35-1-50/- plus other allowances. On September 25, 1963, he was transferred from the office of the Income-Tax Officers, District III (2), Calcutta to the office of the Income Tax Officer, District, 24-Parganas. Here he was given the job of a peon in the issue section of the said office. He protested against allotment of such duties, because he said he was posted as notice server and he was not obliged to perform the duties as peon. His case is that he was threatened by the head-clerk of his office that he would be sacked unless he should perform the job allotted to him. His further case is that he was ill some time in March 1964 and was granted earned leave for 15 days but his Medical Bill was not paid. It is the case of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Range II that his legitimate expenses were duly paid. But Shri Chatterjee says that his T.A. bill for Rs. 100/- was not paid. It is stated by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner that there were serious irregularities in the T.A. bills submitted by him. Further allegation against him was that some papers relating to irregular T.A. bills submitted by him were lost from the table of the Supervisor and the allegation was that he removed same. Shri Chatterjee was asked by the Supervisor to sign a typewritten paper containing his statement about removal and it is alleged that he refused to sign the same. 35. It is not necessary to enumerate in detail the allegations made by Shri Chatterjee against the department; and the counter allegations made against Shri Chatterjee because, on August 17, 1964. Shri Chatterjee was suspended by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Range VI, Calcutta under Rule 12(I) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called the said Rules), on November 13, 1964 Shri Chatterjee was charge-sheeted on various grounds. He was informed that it was, proposed to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 15 of the said Rules. In the charge-sheet there were seven charges against Shri Chatterjee. He was informed that it was, proposed to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 15 of the said Rules. In the charge-sheet there were seven charges against Shri Chatterjee. The charges are as follows :- Charge No. I is that during the period from October, 1963 to August, 1964 Chatterjee has been found grossly negligent, utterly careless and thoroughly irregular in the discharge of his duties by not serving the notices given to him for service on the assessees as was required of him. Charge No. II is that during the period from October 1963 to August 1964 Chatterjee absented himself from duty without prior permission of the authority or authorities authorised to sanction leave to him. He applied for extension of leave even when the of exigencies official duties did not permit such extension and when he had no leave to his credit. He overstayed after the expiry of the leave granted to him thereby contravening office discipline. Charge No. III against Chatterjee is that he fraudulently removed or caused to disappear certain papers and documents from the table of the Supervisor of the Income Tax Office, District 24 Pagaranas on or about June 20, 1964 with ulterior motive of preventing further enquiry into the genuineness or otherwise of the T.A. Bills submitted by him in the months of October, November and December 1963. Charge No. IV is that Chatterjee contravened willfully office discipline and accepted legal procedure by refusing to sign a statement made by him before the Income Tax Officer, 24-Parganas during the course of an enquiry nude by the latter into the circumstances under which the papers mentioned in Charge No. III came to disappear. Charge No. V against Chatterjee is that he fraudulently got hold of the bills register maintained in the Income Tax Office, District 24 Parganas and tampered with the original entries made therein between 29th June 1964 and 4th August 1964 with ulterior motives of preventing the T.A. Bills submitted by him. Charge No. VI is that Chatterjee had preferred fraudulent T.A. claims in respect of journeys allegedly undertaken by him for effecting services of notice during the months of October, November and December, 1963, thereby attempting to defraud the State ex-chequer. Charge No. VI is that Chatterjee had preferred fraudulent T.A. claims in respect of journeys allegedly undertaken by him for effecting services of notice during the months of October, November and December, 1963, thereby attempting to defraud the State ex-chequer. Charge No. VIII is that Chatterjee became violent and had threatened dire consequences to the Supervisory Staff of District 24-Parganas for having brought the facts of the interpolation of the entries in the Bill Register to the notice of the Income Tax Officer, A, Ward, 24-Parganas, thereby seriously under-mining office discipline and preventing a full and impartial enquiry being made unto circumstances leading to the incident. 36. On September, 8, 1966 Chatterjee filed his written statement denying all the charges. 37. It is necessary to state what happened between the date of the charge-sheet on November 13, 1964 and the date of the filling of the written statement. 38. Chatterjee took inspection of some of the document between May 25, 1965 and June 7, 1965. His case is that some of the documents which he inspected were irrelevant for the purpose of submitting the written statement in defence. Chatterjee by a letter dated June 21, 1965 placed the said facts before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, On June 23, 1965 the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax stated that records and documents of which Chatterjee wanted to inspect were shown to him for inspection. On June 28, 1965 Chatterjee wrote a letter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner stating that Inspecting Assistant Commissioner refused to give him inspection of large number of records and documents. On July 2, 1965 Chatterjee wanted to take inspection of the first diary which was taken charge of by the Supervisor of Income Tax Office, District 24-Parganas on March 18, 1964 and which he alleged was not returned to him despite his specific request. On July 9, 1965 the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner stated that only such documents as are relevant for enquiry would be made available for inspection and an such documents and registers as were readily available and considered relevant were made available to Chatterjee for inspection. It was also stated that issue register another documents for the period subsequent to March 31, 1964 were not relevant for the enquiry. On July, 17 1965, Chatterjee replied to the letter disputing the contention. It was also stated that issue register another documents for the period subsequent to March 31, 1964 were not relevant for the enquiry. On July, 17 1965, Chatterjee replied to the letter disputing the contention. Between July 1965, and June, 1966 various correspondence passed between Chatterjee and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. On June 10, 1966, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner asked Chatterjee to submit his list of defence witnesses and list of documents. On July 14, 1966 Chatterjee furnished list of witnesses to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. On July 22, 1966 Inspecting Assistant Commissioner appointed Mr. M.M. Sarkar, Income Tax Officer "A" Ward Special Survey Circle VIII for the purpose of holding an enquiry into the charges against Chatterjee. Thereafter written Statement was filed. 39. After the written statement was filed what happened was as follows : 40. On November 9, 1966, the Enquiry Officer Shri M. Sarkar informed Chatterjee that prosecution witness will be examined on December 6, 1966 and he was directed to be present. On December 1, 1966, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner sent a revised list of documents and witnesses in substitution of previous list dated May 28, 1966. On December 3, 1966 Chatterjee received the said revised list of documents and witnesses. On December 6, 1966, Chatterjee by a letter informed the enquiry officer that he was being furnished with a revised list of documents and witnesses which are required to be considered thoroughly. On January 6, 1967 Chatterjee prayed for personal hearing and also that he should be allowed to assisted by Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee before the Enquiry Officer. On January 28, 1967, Chatterjee requested the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to cancel the revised list of documents and witnesses if he was not given opportunity to inspect the documents on the revised list. Shri Chatterjee states in paragraph 34 of the petition that the Enquiry Officer was biased and prejudicial. By a letter dated April 6, 1967 the Enquiry Officer informed him that since proceedings are continued under the said rules, the contention raised by him in the letter dated January 28, 1967 for allowing reasonable opportunity to inspect the documents before the disciplinary authority or cancellation or revoking the revised list cannot be looked into. By a letter dated April 6, 1967 the Enquiry Officer informed him that since proceedings are continued under the said rules, the contention raised by him in the letter dated January 28, 1967 for allowing reasonable opportunity to inspect the documents before the disciplinary authority or cancellation or revoking the revised list cannot be looked into. On April 25, 1967, Chatterjee by letter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner asked for an opportunity to submit a written statement on the basis of revised list it pursuance of Rule 14, Sub-rule (4) of the said Rules. On June 5, 1967 and June 14, 1967, two witnesses called by The Disciplinary Authority Shri S. Mukherjee and Paritosh Banerjee were examined before the Enquiry Officer. On September 11, 1967, another witness Shri S.C. Ghose called by the Disciplinary Authority was examined and the prosecution case for examining their witnesses was closed. On October 1, 1967, Chatterjee asked for an opportunity of being represented by Madhusudhan Mukherjee before Enquiry Officer in pursuance of Rule 14, sub-rule (8) of the said Rules. On November 25, 1967, the case was fixed for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. The case was again re-fixed for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and furnishing of names and addresses of defence witnesses on April 27, 1968. On May 23, 1968, the Disciplinary Authority refused to give permission to Shri Chatterjee for being assisted by Madhusudhan Mukherjee in the enquiry on the ground that he had ceased to be a Government servant. Between May 30, 1968 and August 5, 1968 Chatterjee again requested the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner for giving permission to be assisted by Madhusudan Mukherjee before the Enquiry Officer. On August 9, 1968 the date of hearing was fixed by the Enquiry Officer. It appears that on August 8, 1968 Shri Chatterjee informed the Enquiry Officer that his wife was ill and he asked for mother adjournment for one month. It is stated that with this letter a copy of the letter dated July 14, 1966 addressed to the inspecting Assistant Commissioner containing a list of the witnesses is annexed. However, this letter date August 8, 1968 is not referred to in the petition. The letter dated August 16, 1968 by the Enquiry Officer addressed to Shri Chatterjee was placed before us. However, this letter date August 8, 1968 is not referred to in the petition. The letter dated August 16, 1968 by the Enquiry Officer addressed to Shri Chatterjee was placed before us. In this letter the Enquiry Officer stated that Shri Chatterjee has been sending representation after representation to the Disciplinary Authority with the same request of permitting him to take the help of Shri Madhusudan Mukherjee who is no longer in Government service and every time he is fixing the case for examination and cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. The Disciplinary Authority did not grant the request of Shri Chatterjee. He though that Shri Chatterjee was not at all serious in proceeding with his case. He said that he was unable to entertain the petition dated August 8, 1968 for yet another adjournment for one month. The letter of the Enquiry Officer dated August 16, 1968 is also not referred to in the petition, thereafter by a letter dated August 23, 1968, Shri Chatterjee submitted a list of witnesses to the Enquiry Officer. On September 26, 1968, Shri Chatterjee asked the Enquiry officer to supply him with copies of deposition of prosecution witnesses. On October 17, 1968, Enquiry Officer made his report and found that Shri Chatterjee was guilty of all the charges except charge No. VII. 41. Thereafter on January 27, 1969 a second show-cause notice was given to Sri Chatterjee giving him opportunity of making representation within 15 days. 42. On consideration of the Enquiry report, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and provisionally came to the conclusion that Shri Chatterjee is not a fit person to be retained in service and so he proposed to impose on him the penalty of dismissal from service/removal from service. Shri Chatterjee was given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry. A copy of the enquiry report is annexed with this second show-cause notice. 43. Shri Chatterjee stated that he received the report of the Enquiry Officer dated October 17, 1968, on January 29, 1969. Shri Chatterjee, thereafter wrote to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range XXI, stating that he was ill and wanted extension of time and that he should be given opportunity of having access to the evidence. 43. Shri Chatterjee stated that he received the report of the Enquiry Officer dated October 17, 1968, on January 29, 1969. Shri Chatterjee, thereafter wrote to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range XXI, stating that he was ill and wanted extension of time and that he should be given opportunity of having access to the evidence. On February 11, 1969 Shri Chatterjee was asked by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to submit his representation by February 27, 1969. On March 7, 1969, Shri Chatterjee wrote to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner that unless he is given opportunity for having access to the records of evidence of the enquiry he was not in a position to reply and he asked for extension of time to file representation. On March 13, 1969, Shri Chatterjee asked for further extension of time. On March 14, 1969 the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner after considering all the facts passed an order that Shri Chatterjee be removed from service. 44. Thereafter, on April 28, 1969, Shri Chatterjee filed an appeal against the order of removal to the Commissioner of Income-tax the Appellate Authority. On October 16, 1969 the appeal was rejected by the appellate authority. Thereafter on February 2, 1970, a writ application was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and rule was issued. In January, 1971, the petitioner was heard and on March 3, 1971, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. delivered a judgment and passed an order dismissing the writ petition filed by Chatterjee. Thereafter, this appeal has been preferred. 45. After stating the facts of the case, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee with Mr. S.C. Ukil appearing for the appellant, Shri Chatterjee placed before us supplementary paper book containing several letters and correspondence which were not in the paper book filed in Court. 46. Mr. D.K. Sen with Mr. Hirak Mitter appearing for the respondents admitted that the correspondence included in the supplementary paper book passed between the parties, but he pointed out that only some of the letters in the supplementary paper book were referred to in the petition, but there several letters and correspondence included in the supplementary paper book which were neither referred to nor mentioned in the petition of Shri Chatterjee at all. However, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee and Mr. Ukil in course of their arguments referred to us the correspondence in the supplementary paper book. 47. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee took the following points :- 1. However, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee and Mr. Ukil in course of their arguments referred to us the correspondence in the supplementary paper book. 47. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee took the following points :- 1. Charge-Sheet given to the appellant Shri Chatterjee was bad and illegal. 2. There was violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as :- (a) Madhusudan Mukherjee, the representative of the appellant Shri Chatterjee was not allowed to appear at certain stage of the enquiry; (b) The Enquiry Officer did not fix any date of examination of the appellant's witnesses. He did not fix any date of hearing. (c) Depositions of prosecution witnesses were not supplied. (d) The Presenting Officer submitted the revised list of documents, but no opportunity was given to Shri Chatterjee to submit further written statement. 3. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee also took the point that no reason was given in the appellate order dated October 16, 1969 by the Commissioner of Income Tax and as such the appellate order was bad in law. The last point argued was that the Enquiry Officer was biased against the appellant. With regard to the first point, Mr. Somnath Chatterjee argued that at the time of framing of the charge no question of punishment arises. He said that there should be open mind till the charge is proved. He pointed out that the words "found grossly negligent" and the words "fraudulently removed" in the statement of charges show that issues were prejudged. He relied on the decision of (18) reported in (1968) 1 labour & Industrial Cases 735 (Gouri Pr. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal & Ors.). It was held by B.C. Mitra, J. in that case :- "At the stage of framing of the charge against a delinquent officer, no question of punishment can arise and the fact that the proposed punishment is mentioned in the charge-sheet would only show, that even before the charges are enquired into, and the finding arrived at on the basis of the enquiry, the officer has been prejudged. An open mind should be kept with regard to the charges made against a Government servant until the charges are proved. An open mind should be kept with regard to the charges made against a Government servant until the charges are proved. If such an open mind is not kept, but the enquiry is held on the assumption that the Government servant is guilty of the offence with which he is charged, and also that he is liable to a particular punishment, such an enquiry must be held to have been made in violation of the principles of natural justice." The principle of law on this point is well-settled, but I cannot accept the argument of Mr. Chatterjee on this point that the charge-sheet is bad. In the instant case, on November 13, 1964, the appellant Shri Chatterjee was informed by a memorandum that it is proposed to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 15 of the said Rules. The allegations on which the enquiry was proposed to be held were set out in the statement of charges. The charges framed against Shri Chatterjee were specified with full particulars in the statement of charges. In the memorandum it is, stated that if Shri Chatterjee so desired he could inspect and take extracts from the documents mentioned in the enclosed list. It is also stated that if Shri Chatterjee desires access to any other official records other than those specified in the list referred to, he should submit a list of all such additional documents. Access will be given only to such of the additional records as are considered relevant. He was informed that he may, if he so desires, take the assistance of another Government servant for inspecting the documents and assisting him in presenting his case before the Enquiring Authority in the event of an oral inquiry being held. He was requested to submit a written statement of his defence not later than December 7, 1964 and also :- (a) to state whether he desires to be heard in person ; (b) to furnish the names and addresses of the witnesses, if any, whom he wishes to call in support of his defence; and (c) to furnish a list of documents, if any, which he wishes to produce in support of his defence, 48. Reading the said memorandum and the statement of charges it is clear that the disciplinary authority did not make up his mind or prejudge any charge or came to a finding on the question of the guilt of the appellant or as to the question of punishment. 49. The next point which requires consideration is whether by reason of refusal to allow Shri Madhusudan Mukherjee to represent Shri Chatterjee before the enquiry after Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee resigned from Government service, there was violation of the principles, of natural justice. 50. As to whether the requirement of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in any given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the particular cases. In (19) Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, reported in (1948) 65 TLR 225 : (1949) 1 All ER 109 at page 118, Tucker, D. J said :- "There are in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of enquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth". More recently in (20) Byrne v. Cinematograph Renters Society Ltd., (1958) 2 All ER 579 Harman, J. observed :- "What then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind; First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly that he should be given an opportunity to state his case; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything more". 51. The aforesaid observations of the English Courts have been approved by the Supreme Court of India (See (21) Hira Nath Mishra & Ors. v. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, AIR 1973 SC 1260 at page 1263) (See also Khemchand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 -head note (d) and para 19, page 307.) The appellant, in the instant case, belonged to Class IV staff of the Central Government. The said rules were framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Relevant rule in this connection is Rule 14(8) of the said Rules which reads as follows :- "14(8). The said rules were framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Relevant rule in this connection is Rule 14(8) of the said Rules which reads as follows :- "14(8). The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case on his behalf but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority, is a legal practitioner, or the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits". This rule is relied on by the appellant, Shri, Chatterjee. 52. In the written statement filed by Shri Chatterjee, on September 8, 1966 he stated as follows :- "I desire and want to be head in person being duly assisted by a Government servant of my choice as permissible under Rule 14(8) of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) the Rules, 1965, such Government servant, being Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee, Inspector of Income Tax, presently attached as such to the Income Tax Office, Project Circle, Calcutta". 53. It appears that Shri Chatterjee also took the assistance of another Government servant Shri Somendra Kumar Gupta to inspect and take extracts from the documents, and it appears that Madhusudhan Mukherjee was present at the enquiry before the Enquiry Officer till his resignation from Government service. 54. Thereafter, Shri Chatterjee applied before the Disciplinary Authority to allow Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee to continue to assist him and stated that Madhusudhan Mukherjee was ready and willing to assist him. Shri Chatterjee stated his case on this point in paragraph 37 of the petition to the following effect. 55. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, by a letter dated May 23, 1968 in reply to the letter of Shri Chatterjee dated November 18, 1967 after more than 6 months, wrongfully and mala fide refused and prayer of Shri Chatterjee for being assisted by Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee at the time of proceeding before the Enquiry Officer alleging that the facts and circumstances of the case are not such as to justify the engagement of a legal practitioner by the petitioner. Shri Chatterjee stated that there are intricate points of law and facts in this case and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner should have allowed him to be assisted by Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. Shri Chatterjee stated that there are intricate points of law and facts in this case and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner should have allowed him to be assisted by Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. Thereafter, again on May 30, 1968 and on August 5, 1968 Shri Chatterjee requested the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax for permitting him to be assisted by Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee but his prayer was arbitrarily, capriciously and mala fide turned down by the letter of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner dated June 3, 1968 and letter dated August 9, 1968. 56. The memorandum dated June 3, 1968 by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax by which permission to continue the assistance of Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee was refused has been annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition by Biswambhar Nath, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax affirmed on September 7, 1970. It is necessary to set out the contents of the memorandum. The said memorandum reads as follows :- "Office of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Range VI, 3, Government Place, (West), Calcutta. Memorandum No. 81/IV-P/45 (Sub-File) dated, the 3rd June, 1968, Calcutta. Sub: Disciplinary proceedings against Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server (under suspension) 57. Sri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee had in the past made more than one requests for permission to continue to take the assistance of Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee, who has left Government service and is at present a legal practitioner. Those requests were rejected. In his petition dated 30.5.68, he has again requested to reconsider the matter in the light of three High Court decisions. 58. I have considered the petition of Shri Chatterjee, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of two of those cases, it was held that the denial of legal help was equivalent to denial of an opportunity to the delinquent officer to defend himself. In the third case, it was held that such denial did not amount to denial of adequate opportunity in defending the case of the delinquent officer. Having regard to the nature of the charges and other facts of the present case, I think denial of legal help to Shri Chatterjee will not amount to reasonable opportunity to defend the petitioner. 59. In the circumstances stated above, the petition of Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee dated 20.5.68 is rejected. He may take the help of another Government Servant. Having regard to the nature of the charges and other facts of the present case, I think denial of legal help to Shri Chatterjee will not amount to reasonable opportunity to defend the petitioner. 59. In the circumstances stated above, the petition of Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee dated 20.5.68 is rejected. He may take the help of another Government Servant. Sd/- N.K. Ganguli, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Range VI, Calcutta & Disciplinary Authority". Also another memorandum dated August 9, 1968 by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner is annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition. The same reads as follows :- "Office of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Range VI, 3, Government Place West Calcutta. Memorandum No. 156/IV-P/45 (Sub File) dated the 9th August, 1968. Calcutta:- Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee had in the past made several requests for permission to continue to take the assistance of Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee, who has left Government service and is at present a legal practitioner. Those requests were rejected. In his petition dated 5.8.68 received in this office on 7.8.68 he has again requested to reconsider the matter. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the Case. I do not find any reasons for reconsideration of the issue. The petition is, therefore, filed. Sd/- N.K. Ganguli, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Range VI, Calcutta, Disciplinary Authority. To Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice server attached to Income Tax. 24-Parganas (under suspension.) C/o. Shri Kartick Chandra Das (Tea Stall) Birati & Jessore Road Junction. Birati, Calcutta-51, 60. It appears from the said memorandum dated June 3, 1968 that the petitioner Shri Chatterjee not only filed a petition for allowing, him to continue the assistance of Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee but also cited several decisions of Court cases. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner considered the decisions cited before him and then after considering the matter he was of the view that having regard to the nature of the charges and other facts of the present case denial of legal help will not amount to denial of reasonable opportunity to defend in the instant case. 61. What happened before the Enquiry Officer has been stated by him in his report. 62. The examination of prosecution witnesses was concluded on September 11, 1967. Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee resigned from Government service on October 1, 1967. 61. What happened before the Enquiry Officer has been stated by him in his report. 62. The examination of prosecution witnesses was concluded on September 11, 1967. Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee resigned from Government service on October 1, 1967. After the resignation of Madhusudhan Mukherjee from Government service what happened before the Enquiry Officer will also appear from his report. The relevant portion of the report is stated hereunder:- ‘In the petition dated 30.10.67, Shri Chatterjee prayed that his case should not be fixed up till he was disposed of By my Memo No. SSC-VIII/319 dated 8.11.67 Shri Chatterjee was told that Shri Mukherjee resigned as for back as on 1.10.67 and hence he should have obtained necessary permission either for Shri Mukherjee or any other Government servant to assist him. The case therefore fixed on 25.11.67 for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses by the defence. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range, VI Calcutta in his Memo. No. 173/IV-P/45 (Sub-file) dated 16.11.67 turned down Sri Chatterjee request for permission to allow Sri Mukherjee to continue to assist him. No compliance was made by Sri Chatterjee on 25.11.67. Meanwhile I was transferred to Hundi Circle Calcutta and the case was re-fixed on 27.4.68 in my Memo No. NC/Con/G/1 dated 4.4.68 for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and furnishing the names and addresses of defence witnesses. On 18.11.67 Sri Chatterjee sent in another representation to I.A.C., Range VI, Calcutta with the same request which was earlier turned down by him Shri Chatterjee made yet another representation to I.A.C., Range VI, Calcutta in his petition, dated 25.4.68 on the same subject and requested me for adjournment of the case till disposal of his fresh representation. In his Memo No. 70/VI-P/45 (Sub-file) dated 23.4.68 I.A.C., Range VI, Calcutta, against refused permission to Sri M. Mukherjee to continue to assist Sri Chatterjee. A further representation was made by Sri Chatterjee on 30.5.68 to I.A.C., Range VI, Calcutta and a request made to me not to fix up the case till his petition is disposed of by I.A.C., Range VI Calcutta in his Memo No. 81/IV-P/45 (Sub file) to Sri Chatterjee expressed his inability to reconsider the matter. 63. In the circumstances, when Sri Chatterjee's representation after representation was turned down by I.A.C., Range VI. Calcutta, he was given a final opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on 9.8.68. 63. In the circumstances, when Sri Chatterjee's representation after representation was turned down by I.A.C., Range VI. Calcutta, he was given a final opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on 9.8.68. But instead of availing himself of the same, he filed yet another representation to I.A.C., Range VI, Calcutta on 5.8.68 knowing its fate fully and sent me a petition on 8.8.68 praying for a month's adjournment. By his Memo No. 156/IV-P/45 (Sub file) dated 9.8.68, Sri Chatterjee was informed by I.A.C, Range VI, Calcutta that his petition was filed as he was unable to reconsider the case. In view of the above facts I have no other alternative than to refuse further adjournment of the case and Sri Chatterjee was informed accordingly in Memo No. HC/G/Con/291, dated 16.8.68." 64. Under the above facts appearing from the report and the circumstances of the case the question is whether there was violation of Rule 14(8). On this point before any decision is reached it is necessary to consider the nature of departmental enquiry. There is difference between the principles applicable to Courts of justice and those applicable to domestic Tribunal. A domestic Tribunal is not a Court of law nor a Court of lawyers. It is generally not a Tribunal composed of persons of legal training. 65. Article 311 of the Constitution does not permit dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of any person employed in civil capacity under the Union or the State without giving such person reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. If any rules are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, then what procedure to be followed and whether lawyer should be allowed to represent delinquent officer will depend upon the rules framed for such enquiry Rule 14(8) is such rule is the instant case. 66. Under Rule 14(8) Shri Chatterjee is entitled to take the assistance of another Government servant to present his case, but he had no right to engage a legal practitioner unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority is a legal practitioner. This is not the case here. Therefore, when Shri Mudhusudhan Mukherjee resigned from Government services he disqualified himself to represent the appellant Shri Chatterjee before the Enquiry Officer. This is not the case here. Therefore, when Shri Mudhusudhan Mukherjee resigned from Government services he disqualified himself to represent the appellant Shri Chatterjee before the Enquiry Officer. Thereafter he applied before the Disciplinary Authority and the Disciplinary Authority considered his case and even he considered the decisions which were placed before him and came to his own conclusion that in the instant case he will not permit Madhusudhan Mukherjee to represent Shri Chatterjee. This on plain reading of the rule and considering the facts and events this matter it cannot be said that the Disciplinary Authority has violated or disregarded Rule 14(8). He has considered the facts and circumstances of the case and has come to a conclusion as will appear from the memorandum mentioned above. 67. Under the said rule, the Disciplinary Authority has discretion to permit a legal practitioner to assist Shri Chatterjee having regard to the circumstances of the case. This is not a case for application by Sri Chatterjee for engaging a legal practitioner but for engaging Madhusudhan Mukherjee after his resignation from Government service and it so happened that Madhusudhan Mukherjee after his resignation started practice as an Income Tax practitioner (see para 36 of the petition). It seems to me that the Disciplinary Authority who is entrusted with a discretion applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of this case. He called his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider following the above rule. This is not a case where he did not exercise his discretion or in exercising his discretion he misconceived his powers and duties under the rule or that he took into consideration any irrelevant matter or omitted to consider any relevant matter. It is a case where he properly exercised his discretion in accordance with the said rule. 68. In the premises, there is no violation of principles of natural justice on this ground. 69. Now, I have to consider a few cases on the point. The first case relied on by Mr. Chatterjee is Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, AIR 1961 Cal 1 . The relevant rule which was for consideration in that case is not similar to the rule with which I am concerned in the instant case. In Nripendra Nath's case Rule 55 of the Civil Central Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 was considered. The relevant rule which was for consideration in that case is not similar to the rule with which I am concerned in the instant case. In Nripendra Nath's case Rule 55 of the Civil Central Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 was considered. This rule provides, inter alia, as follows :- "No order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of service............unless he has been informed in writing of the ground on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself." In Nripendra Nath's case, P.B. Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) said: "Once the courts are satisfied that the disciplinary Tribunals have acted within the Rules and have, complied with the principles of natural justice then the Courts of law no longer sit in appeal on the facts and merits of the findings of the disciplinary Tribunals and do not substitute their own opinion of the merits or facts even though they may differ from those of the Tribunal." 70. The Rule provided that the Government servant should be afforded adequate opportunity of defending himself. On the facts of Nripendra Nath's case which are entirely different from the facts of the instant case it was held that the Government servant should have been allowed legal assistance or in other words that the reasonable opportunity, under the facts of Nripendra Nath's case, demanded that he should be given assistance of a lawyer. 71. Bose, J. (as he then was) in Nripendra Nath's case also said :- "High Court acts in a supervisory capacity and does not substitute its own views for those of the Tribunal as a Court of Appeal" 72. The learned Judges in Nripendra Nath's case were considering a different rule and on the facts of that case agreed with the view that lawyer should have been allowed in that case. 73. Therefore, Nripendra Nath's case, in my view, is not authority for the submission that in the facts of the instant case Madhusudhan Mukherjee should have been allowed to represent Shri Chatterjee. 74. The next case cited at the bar is a recent decision of the Supreme Court in C.I. Subramaniam v. The Collector of Customs, Cochin, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2178 : (1972) 3 SCR 485 . This case has been very strongly relied on by Mr. Somnath Chatterjee. 74. The next case cited at the bar is a recent decision of the Supreme Court in C.I. Subramaniam v. The Collector of Customs, Cochin, reported in AIR 1972 SC 2178 : (1972) 3 SCR 485 . This case has been very strongly relied on by Mr. Somnath Chatterjee. What happened in this case is as follows :- The appellant Subramaniam was a Preventive Officer under the Customs Office, Cochin. He applied to the Assistant Collector of Customs seeking permission to allow his wife to run taxi service. He was informed that no permission was necessary for his wife to operate a taxi service but he should not canvass any business for his wife. Thereafter, it is said that the appellant acting on behalf of his wife purchased some cars which were used as taxis. It appears that there were several complaints against the appellant to the effect that he was canvassing business for his wife and that he had contravened certain provisions of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. He was charge-sheeted. Thereafter there was enquiry before the Enquiry Officer who came to the conclusion that the allegations made against him were established. He was removed from service. He challenged the validity of the order removing his, service on various grounds. His case was that a legally trained officer conducted the case for the prosecution. He also applied for engaging a lawyer. But this was not allowed. The grievance of Subramaniam before the Supreme Court was that he was pitted against a trained prosecutor and that is a good ground for allowing him to engage a legal practitioner to defend him lest the scales should be weighed against him. But the Disciplinary Authority completely ignored that circumstances. 75. In that case the concerned rule was Rule 15(5) which was similarly worded as the instant Rule 14(8). Subramaniam, in that case also supported his complaint of breach of Rule 15(5) on yet another ground. After his request for engaging a Counsel in that case was rejected, requested the Disciplinary Authority to let him have the assistance of a named Government servant. This request was made long before the enquiry. Request was also made to the Disciplinary Authority to move the superiors of the officer concerned to grant necessary permission to him to enable him to assist him (Subramaniam). This request was made long before the enquiry. Request was also made to the Disciplinary Authority to move the superiors of the officer concerned to grant necessary permission to him to enable him to assist him (Subramaniam). It appeared that the Disciplinary Authority wrote to the department for giving his permission, but the officer did not get the required permission to help him before the date fixed for enquiry. The Enquiry Officer did not give him sufficient time and opportunity to get the assistance of the other Government servant whom he wanted to represent. At page 2181 of the report, in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment, Hedge, J. said :- "It is needless to say that Rule 15 is a mandatory rule. That rule regulates the guarantee given to Government servant under Article 311, Government servants by and large have no legal training. At any rate, it is nobody's case that the appellant had legal training. Moreover when a man is charged with the breach of a rule entailing serious consequences, he is not likely to be in a position to present his case as best as it should be. The accusation against the appellant threatened his very livelihood, any adverse verdict against him was bound to be disastrous to him, as it has proved to be. In such a situation he cannot be expected to act calmly and with deliberation. That is why Rule 15(5) has provided for representation of a Government servant charged with dereliction of duty or with contravention of the rule by another Government servant or in appropriate cases by a legal practitioner". Hedge, J. then held in the last paragraph of the judgment :- "For the reasons mentioned above, we think that there had been a contravention of Rule 15(5). We are also of the opinion that the appellant had not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself." 76. Therefore in the said decision of the Supreme Court not only the presenting officer was represented by a trained prosecutor, but also the delinquent officer aid not get sufficient opportunity to be represented with the assistance of another Government servant. 77. On the grounds mentioned in the judgment, the appeal was allowed. The facts in that case are distinguishable because, in that case the presenting officer was represented by a trained prosecutor. In the instant case this is not so. 77. On the grounds mentioned in the judgment, the appeal was allowed. The facts in that case are distinguishable because, in that case the presenting officer was represented by a trained prosecutor. In the instant case this is not so. Further in the instant case the petitioner Chatterjee did not ask for assistance of lawyer but in the Supreme Court the delinquent officer was asking for assistant of lawyer from the beginning. Further in the Supreme Court case delinquent officer Subramaniam did not get the assistances of another Government servant because the Enquiry Office, did not give sufficient time and opportunity for the same. In the instant case the appellant Chatterjee was asked to take the help of another Government servant but he wanted assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee even after his resignation and he did not take assistance of any other Government servant. 78. It is to be noted that, in that case, the judgment of Lord Denning, M.R. (22) reported in (1968) 2 All. ER 545 (Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd.) was cited before the Supreme Court. In Pett's case Lord Denning, M.R. took a view different from Maugham, J. in 1929(1) Ch. D. 602 and held that when a Man’s reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not only has a right to speak by his own mouth. He has also a right to be defended by counsel or solicitor. 79. The Supreme Court did not accept the principles Laid down by Lord Denning, M.R. In that case Supreme Court said : "This decision, in our opinion, does not bear on the point under consideration. Herein we are dealing with a statutory rule which prohibits the appointment of a legal practitioner excepting under certain circumstances. Hence the agency theory has no relevance nor we required to consider the principles of natural justice as those principles are only relevant when the concerned procedure is not regulated by any statute at statutory rule". (See (1972) 3 SCR 485 at pages 492 as there seems to be certain printing mistake in AIR 1972 SC 2171 at pages 2180 paragraph 16). 80. Therefore the question is whether the statutory rules have been followed or not. I cannot hold that statutory rules have not been followed in the instant case. 81. (See (1972) 3 SCR 485 at pages 492 as there seems to be certain printing mistake in AIR 1972 SC 2171 at pages 2180 paragraph 16). 80. Therefore the question is whether the statutory rules have been followed or not. I cannot hold that statutory rules have not been followed in the instant case. 81. My attention was drawn to a very recent Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 77 CWN 752 (D.G. of Posts & Telegraph v. Nani Gopal Mazumdar and Anr.) where Rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1957 which is exactly similar to Rule 14(8) of the said Rules had been considered by this Court. In that case A.K. Sinha, J. (with whom Amar Nath Banerjee, J. Agreed) delivering the Judgment of the Court of Appeal upheld to order passed by P.K. Banerjee J. In Writ jurisdiction of this court quashing the order to dismissal. The appellant in that case who was an Assistant Engineer of Calcutta Telephone was charge-sheeted and in course of the enquiry proceedings, the appellant made several representations praying for assistance of a legal practitioner in the enquiry and also for inspection of certain reports of the special police establishment. Both the prayers of the appellant were refused. In the enquiry proceedings 25 witnesses were examined on behalf of the department Disciplinary Authority and two witnesses were examined by the appellant. Before the learned Judges, Subramaniam's case reported in AIR 1972 SC 2178 was cited. The learned Judges considered Rule 15(5) of the Central Civil services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 and observed as follows :- "From a fair reading of the above Rule it seems clearly obligatory upon the Disciplinary Authority to firstly, allow the assistance of a legal practitioner to a Government servant if the persons nominated by the Disciplinary Authority for presentation of its case is also a legal practitioner ; even if it is not so, then also it is equally obligatory upon the Disciplinary Authority to consider all other relevant circumstances of the case and then either to accord or refuse such permission. In other words even where there is no legal practitioner nominate on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. In other words even where there is no legal practitioner nominate on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority is bound to consider the facts and circumstances of the given case before it could refuse permission to engage a legal practitioner to assist the Government servant. It would therefore be a clear breach of duty on the part of the Disciplinary Authority if it would refuse to allow the petitioner to engage a legal practitioner only on the view that on legal practitioner was nominated by the Disciplinary Authority in presenting its own case. That being so, it is quite clear that the Disciplinary Authority in the present case refused to allow the petitioner to take the assistance of a legal practitioner simply because the case did not satisfy the first part of the Rule, namely, that there was no legal practitioner nominates by the authority for presentation of its own case. But at the same time the Disciplinary Authority failed to comply with the other part of the Rule in that it did not take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the instant case for refusing permission to the respondent to take help of a legal practitioner". In view of the above matter, the learned Judges held that there was violation of Rule 15(5) and, therefore, the petitioner must be deemed to have denied reasonable opportunity afforded under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution consistent with the terms of Rule 15(5) and this contravened the rules and principles of natural justice. In view of the above matter, the learned Judges held that there was violation of Rule 15(5) and, therefore, the petitioner must be deemed to have denied reasonable opportunity afforded under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution consistent with the terms of Rule 15(5) and this contravened the rules and principles of natural justice. The principles laid down in the above case cannot apply under the facts of this case, inasmuch as in the instant case, on the representations made by the appellant, Shri Chatterjee, the Disciplinary Authority did take into consideration, the facts and circumstances of the present case and the reported decisions mentioned by the appellant Shri Chatterjee; and in the memorandum dated June 6, 1968 it is recorded as follows :- "Having regard to the nature of the charges and other facts of the present case, I think denial of legal help to Shri Chatterjee will not amount to denial of reasonable opportunity to defend the petitioner." Therefore, in the instant case, the Disciplinary Authority did not reject the prayer for legal help simply on the ground that the case did not satisfy the first part of the Rule, namely, that there was no legal practitioner engaged by the Disciplinary Authority. 82. In the instant case, in my view Rule 14(8) has been followed by the Disciplinary Authority. 83. As to whether the charges are serious or not, is a matter of opinion. In any event, even if it is assumed that the charges were of serious nature which, in my view, it is not so, even then mere refusal to engage lawyer, is not per se violation of the principles of natural justice where the circumstances when lawyer could be engaged have been laid down in the said Rule. Observance of the rules in this case is observance of the principles of natural justice. 84. I will now deal with the next point argued on behalf of the appellant, namely that no date of hearing was fixed and that Enquiry Officer did not fix any date for examination of the appellant's witnesses in this connection it was argued that there was violation of Rule 14(16) of the said Rules. It is to be noted that in the petition it is not stated that the Enquiry officer did not fix a firm date or that no date for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses was fixed. It is to be noted that in the petition it is not stated that the Enquiry officer did not fix a firm date or that no date for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses was fixed. On the other hand in paragraph 40 (iii) of petition Sri Chatterjee complained :- "In course of cross-examination a large number of very important questions were disallowed and no record of such question was kept inspite of petitioner's request". 85. Therefore, according to the statement in the petition there was some cross-examination made on behalf of the petitioner Sri Chatterjee from the report of the Enquiry Officer it appears that case was fixed some cross-examination on 25th November, 1967. The care was re-fixed on 27th April, 1968 for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and for furnishing the names and addresses of the defence witnesses. It appears from the report that final opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses was given on 9th August, 1968. One day prior thereto, namely on August 9, 1968 the appellant Sri Chatterjee made a petition to the Enquiry Officer in which he asked for another adjournment for one month and in the said letter he enclosed a copy of his letter dated July 14, 1966 written by him before filing of the written statement to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax containing the list of his witnesses. This letter is not annexed to the petition and this point was not specifically taken in the petition but this letter is included in the supplementary paper book. Admittedly, on August 9, 1968 the appellant Shri Chatterjee did not appear before the Enquiry Officer. The hearing of the case in the circumstances was not adjourned by the Enquiry Officer to any further date. On August 16, 1968, the Enquiry Officer sent a memorandum addressed to Shri Chatterjee in reply to his petition dated August 8, 1968. In the memorandum the Enquiry Officer stated "Shri Chatterjee is not serious or interested in proceeding with the case and in the circumstances, he is unable to entertain the petition for yet another adjournment for a month". This memorandum is also not referred to in the petition. In the memorandum the Enquiry Officer stated "Shri Chatterjee is not serious or interested in proceeding with the case and in the circumstances, he is unable to entertain the petition for yet another adjournment for a month". This memorandum is also not referred to in the petition. However in his report, after stating in detail all the events relating to the several adjournments, the Enquiry Officer observed as follows :- "The entire sequence of events have been narrated in order to bring out the fact that the delinquent officer did not appear to be very serious, in defending his case specifically after the examination of the prosecution witnesses was concluded by the presenting officer on 11.9.67. It will be seen that from 11.9.67 to 9.8.68 the case was fixed by me for several times in order that Shri Chatterjee might cross-examine the prosecution witnesses already examined by the Presenting Officer but he failed to avail himself of the opportunity. Every time the case was fixed Sri Chatterjee was found making representation to Inspecting Assistance Commissioner Range VI Calcutta, with the same representation to Inspecting Assistance Commissioner Range VI Calcutta, with the same request of permitting Sri M. Mukherjee who left Government service on 1.10.67 to continue to assist him. Although his representation one after another was turned down by Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range VI, Calcutta, he pursued the same dilatory tactics without carring to seek permission for another Government servant to assist him. This being the position, I come to the conclusion that no useful purpose would be served by dragging on the case further and the last petition dated 8.8.68 of Sri Chatterjee rejected by me". 86. In the letter dated August 5, 1968 written by Shri Chatterjee to the Disciplinary Authority which is referred to in paragraph 37 of the petition annexed to the supplementary Paper Book Shri Chatterjee stated that he wanted the assistance of Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. He stated that he had not found and her Government servant to assist him in presenting his defence and he was unable to defend himself. His case was not for appointment of a lawyer, but for engaging Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist him. He admits that he had not found any other Government servant to assist him. 87. He stated that he had not found and her Government servant to assist him in presenting his defence and he was unable to defend himself. His case was not for appointment of a lawyer, but for engaging Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist him. He admits that he had not found any other Government servant to assist him. 87. Whether permission will be given to him or not is a matter to be decided by the Disciplinary Authority and not by the Enquiry Officer. So the Enquiry Officer did what he could do. He gave several adjournments, and it appeared clear to him that such representations through Madhusudhan Mukherjee will not be allowed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Enquiry Officer also came to his own conclusion that every time the case is fixed, the appellant Shri Chatterjee was asking for adjournment on the same ground that he did not get permission to be represented by Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. Under the circumstances of the case after giving several adjournment the Enquiry Officer treated the matter closed on August 9, 1968. He said in his report in the circumstances, when Shri Chatterjee's representation after representation was turned down by Inspecting Assistant Commissioner Range VI, Calcutta, he was given a final opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on 9.8.68. But instead of availing himself of the same, he filed yet another representation to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range VI, Calcutta, on 5.8.68 knowing its fate fully. 88. So far as Rule 14(16) of the said Rules is concerned, it appears from the report of the Enquiry Officer that on May 2, 1967 Shri Chatterjee was informed that he would get an opportunity under Rule 14(16) of the said Rules to state his defence in the light of the revised list of documents and the witnesses and the case was fixed again on June 5, 1967. This letter is not annexed to the petition, but is annexed to the supplementary Paper Book. This letter reads as follows :- "M. Sorcar, Income Tax Officer, A-Ward Spl. Survey Circle VIII & Inquiry Officer, P-7, Chowringhee Square, Calcutta. Memorandum No. SSC/VIII/Con/A/51 dated 2nd May, 1967 with reference to his petition dated 24.4.67 addressed to me and his petition dated 25.4.67 addressed to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range VI, Calcutta, and Disciplinary Authority, copy endorsed to me, Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee Notice Server, Dist. Survey Circle VIII & Inquiry Officer, P-7, Chowringhee Square, Calcutta. Memorandum No. SSC/VIII/Con/A/51 dated 2nd May, 1967 with reference to his petition dated 24.4.67 addressed to me and his petition dated 25.4.67 addressed to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range VI, Calcutta, and Disciplinary Authority, copy endorsed to me, Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee Notice Server, Dist. 24-Parganas, (under suspension) is hereby informed that after the case for the Disciplinary Authority is dosed he will get an opportunity under the Rule 14(16) of the CCS(CC&A) Rules, 1965 to state his defence in the light of the Revised list of documents and witnesses supplied to him. The question providing an opportunity for submission of written statement of defence under the Rule 14(4) of the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965 does not, therefore, arise. Accordingly, he is informed that the date for examination of the prosecution witnesses has now been fixed 11 a.m. on 5.6.67 when he is directed to be present. Sd/- M. Sorcar, Income Tax Officer, A-Ward SSC/VIII & Inquiry Officer, Calcutta. To Sri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server, attached to Income Tax Office, Dist. 24 Parganas, (under suspension C/o. Sri Kartick Chandra Das (Tea Stall), Birati & Jessore Road Junction, Birati Calcutta-51." 89. What happened thereafter will appear from the report of the Enquiry Officer. On 5th June, 1967, prosecution witness, Sri S. Mukherjee was examined. The examination was held on June 14, 1967 when another prosecution witnesses was examined by the Presenting Officer. The case was then adjourned on August 11, 1967 for reexamination of prosecution witness. Shri Chatterjee was informed but he filed a petition praying for adjournment. The case was next adjourned till August 14, 1967 and then till September 8, 1967 and then to September 11, 1961. On September 11, 1967 the third prosecution witness was examined by the Presenting Officer and the case for the prosecution was concluded. Thereafter although several adjournments were given an opportunity was given to cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution yet Shri Chatterjee did not appear. Obviously on the ground that he could not appear unless he was assisted by Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. The Disciplinary Authority would not give him permission to take assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee. Therefore, the matter cannot be adjourned every time like this but has to be finalised. Obviously on the ground that he could not appear unless he was assisted by Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. The Disciplinary Authority would not give him permission to take assistance of Madhusudhan Mukherjee. Therefore, the matter cannot be adjourned every time like this but has to be finalised. In view of the facts of this case I cannot hold that the Enquiry Officer violated principles of natural justice by not fixing another firm date of hearing after August 9, 1968. 90. Rule 14(16) of the said Rules relied on by Mr. Ukil, the learned junior Counsel reads as follows :- "When the case for the Disciplinary Authority is closed, the Government servant shall be required to state this defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded and the Government servant shall be required to sign the record. In either case copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer, if any, attended." 91. In his enquiry report, the Enquiry Officer stated in detail what happened after the case of the prosecution witnesses was closed. The Enquiry Officer also gave his reasons why he did not adjourn the matter any further after 9th August, 1968. After the adjournment was refused and subsequent to the letter dated 16th August, 1968 by Enquiry Officer, Sri Chatterjee wrote on 23rd August, 1968 forwarding a list of witnesses. Thereafter on 26th September, 1968 Sri Chatterjee asked for copies of depositions. If the petitioner Chatterjee was serious to defend nobody prevented him from appearing before the Enquiry Officer on 9th August, 1968 or on the prior dated fixed for hearing, namely, on 27th April, 1968, and/or 25th November, 1967 to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution or to examine himself or his own witnesses. In the Order dated 10th March, 1969 the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner observed: "Sri Chatterjee is adopting the same dilatory tactics what he adopted before the Enquiry Officer". Under the circumstances I do not think I can go against the conclusions of fact arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. It seems to me that under the circumstances of the case Enquiry Officer was justified in proceeding to give his report upon the evidence tendered and the documents which were proved before him. 92. In The Union of India and Ors. It seems to me that under the circumstances of the case Enquiry Officer was justified in proceeding to give his report upon the evidence tendered and the documents which were proved before him. 92. In The Union of India and Ors. v. K. Rajappa Menon, AIR 1970 SC 748 at page 750, Supreme Court in considering Rule, 1913 of the Railway Servants Conduct and Disciplinary Rules, observed as follows :- "The Rule after all has to be read not in a pedantic manner but in a practical and reasonable way and so read it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the Chief Commercial Superintendent had substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules". 93. In the facts and circumstances of this case, in my view the Enquiry Officer had substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 14(16) of the said Rules. This point again has been raised for the first time in appeal. This is not purely a point of law but a mixed question of fact and law. Had this point been taken in the petition specifically, the Enquiry Officer who has been joined as respondent would have got an opportunity to meet charges against him that he has not fixed a firm date or has not complied with Rule 14(16). This has not been done and in any event, in my view, I cannot hold that there was violation of the principles of natural justice on these grounds. 94. With regard to the point taken on behalf of the appellant Shri Chatterjee that copies of depositions were not supplied, I am not very much satisfied because, it is stated on oath on behalf of the respondents that copies of depositions of prosecution witnesses Shri Mukherjee and Paritosh Banerjee were supplied by the Enquiry Officer to Madhusudhan Mukherjee who was then acting as agent of the petitioner on the respective examination dates, i.e., June 5 and 14, 1967. There is no doubt that prosecution witnesses were examined in the presence of both Shri Chatterjee and his representative Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. In any event disputed question of fact cannot be gone into in an application of this nature. 95. Mr. There is no doubt that prosecution witnesses were examined in the presence of both Shri Chatterjee and his representative Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee. In any event disputed question of fact cannot be gone into in an application of this nature. 95. Mr. D.K. Sen, in course of his argument has referred to us the records of the case which are included in the paper book to show that the petitioner Shri Chatterjee had opportunity to get inspection of all the documents which are referred to and relied on in the report of the Enquiry Officer. It is not necessary to enumerate the same in detail. I accept the submission of Mr. Sen on this point. 96. I do not think that there is any substance on the point raised on behalf of the appellant that the Enquiry Officer was based because he was an officer subordinate to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. In my view, the appointment of Enquiry Officer was duly and properly made under rules. 97. The only other point which requires to be considered is whether the order dated October 16, 1969 should be quashed on the ground that no reason was given in the said order. It is admitted by Mr. Somnath Chatterjee that this is a new point which is raised for the first time appeal. But Mr. Chatterjee submitted that this is a pure question of law and as such he should be allowed to take up this point. 98. Mr. Chatterjee relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Krishna Cinema & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1950 and M/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. The Union of India and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 862 and a decision of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court Testeels Ltd. v. N.M.D. Desai, Conciliation Officer and Anr., reported in AIR 1970 Gujarat page 1. 99. From the said decisions it appears that every Administrative Officer exercising quasi-judicial functions is bound to give reasons in support of the order he makes. 100. In State of Gujarat v. M/s. Krishna Cinema and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1950 the order complained of was made by the licencing authority under the Bombay Cinema (Regulation Act 11 of 1953) in this way: "application for constructing a permanent annexe hear the present Krishna Cinema and for obtaining the 'no objection' certificate is not admissible...". 100. In State of Gujarat v. M/s. Krishna Cinema and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1950 the order complained of was made by the licencing authority under the Bombay Cinema (Regulation Act 11 of 1953) in this way: "application for constructing a permanent annexe hear the present Krishna Cinema and for obtaining the 'no objection' certificate is not admissible...". With regard to such an order Supreme Court said at page 1953 of the report. "It is clear that the authority did not apply its mind to the application. It did not consider whether a building which was already in existence should be allowed to be converted into a cinematograph theatre" Supreme Court further held in that case: "The Order of the State Government which is a reaffirmation of its original decision communicated through the Licensing Authority gives no indication that the objections raised in the memorandum of appeal were considered. It sets out no reasons in support of the order. The authority which made the order on behalf of the State Government appears to have been oblivious of circumstances in which the building was constructed". 101. In Travancore Rayons Ltd. v. The Union of India and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 862 the order complained of reads as follows : "The Government of India have carefully considered the points made by the appointment (s), but see no justification for interfering with the order in appeal. The revision application is accordingly rejected." 102. Against this order of the Central Government appeal was prefer to the Supreme Court. In the facts of that case Supreme Court observed: "The question raised before the Collector of Customs was of a complicated nature and for its proper appreciation required familiarity with the chemical composition and physical properties of nitro-celluloss lacquers and of the substance produced by the appellant company". "When judicial power is exercised by any authority normally performing executive or administrative functions, the Supreme Court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two grounds one, that the party aggrieved in a proceeding before the High Court or the Supreme Court has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous; the other. That the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power". That the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power". In the Gujarat case Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai, Conciliation Officer and Another, the order said nothing more than that the officer did not approve of the action of the employer and so it was held that the order was liable to be quashed. 103. Mr. D.K. Sen placed before us the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1606 and submitted that this case is the leading case on the point. 104. What happened in Bhagat Raja's case is that the Government of Andhra Pradesh invited applications under Rule 58 of the rules framed under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. The appellant Bhagat Raja submitted two applications in prescribed form. The respondent No. 3 also made similar applications on the same date. As between the appellant and the respondent No. 3, the Government of Andhra Pradesh preferred the latter. Relevant portion of the order was as follows: "As between the other applicants Sri Bhagat Raja and M/s. Tiffin's Asbestos and Paints Ltd., the Government prefer M/s. Tiffin's Barytes,..... .as they are having adequate general experience and technical knowledge, and are old lessees in the district without any arrears of mineral dues to the Government. The Mining lease application of Sri Bhagat Raja for the areas covered by the mining lease application of M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos and Paints Ltd. is rejected". 105. Bhagat Raja filed application in revision under section 30 of the Act read with Rule 54 to the Union of India. Bhagat Raja asked for the grant of personal hearing, but this was not given. Ultimately, the application of Bhagat Raja was rejected. A complaint was made that in rejecting the applicant's revision applications the Union of India was bound to give reasons for its decisions as it was exercising quasi-judicial powers under section 30 of the Act read with Rule 54 and 55. Before the Supreme Court, the question arose that it was necessary for the Government of India to give reasons for the decision in view of the provisions of the Act and rules, because the decision was liable to be questioned in appeal to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, the question arose that it was necessary for the Government of India to give reasons for the decision in view of the provisions of the Act and rules, because the decision was liable to be questioned in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviewed the relevant provisions of the said Act and the rules made thereunder and observed as follows: "The decisions of Tribunals in India are subject to the supervisory powers of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and of appellate powers of this Court under Article 136. It goes without saying that both the High Court and this Court are placed under a great disadvantage if no reasons are given and the revision is if no reasons are given and the revision is dismissed courtly by the use of the single word "rejected" or "dismissed" 106. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions it is necessary to examine the order of the Appellate Authority in the instant case. The said order is as follows :- "Regd. with A/D Office of the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal P-7, Chowringhee Square, Calcutta 1. No. C/11524 Dated, the 16th October, 1969 ORDER Re: Appeal petition dt. 28.4.68 of Shri Rabindranath Chatterjee, Ex-Notice Server against the orders dated 10.3.69 under the C.C.S (CC & A) Rules 1965 of IAC, Range XXI, Calcutta. This is an appeal by Shri Rabindranath Chatterjee Ex-Notice Server under Rule 23 of the Central Civil services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 against the order No. R-XXI/66/1W-45 (sub)/File dated 10.3.69 under the said Rule, passed by the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income-tax, Range XXI. 2. I have gone through the relevant records of the case. According to the Enquiry Officer (who was appointed to enquiry into the charges framed against Shri Chatterjee) the charges Nos. 1 to 6 against him (Shri Chatterjee) have been proved. The inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income-tax has passed the order dated 10.3.69 after taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the order passed by the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income-tax R-XXI Calcutta is quite justified and in accordance with the Rules. I decline to interfere with this order of the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income-tax. 3. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the order passed by the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income-tax R-XXI Calcutta is quite justified and in accordance with the Rules. I decline to interfere with this order of the Inspecting Asstt. Commissioner of Income-tax. 4. In the result, the appeal is rejected. Sd. R.R. Chopra, Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal-1 Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Chatterjee lodge, M.B. Road, Near Jessore Road, Birati, Calcutta-51" 107. In this connection it is be noted that the instant case Rule 27 of the said Rule 27 of the said Rules enumerates consideration of appeal. Rule 27 provided as follows : "27. Consideration of appeal - (1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the Appellate Authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 10 and having regard to the circumstance of the case, the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly, (2) in the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule the Appellate Authority shall consider (a) Whether the procedure laid down in these rules has complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are warranted by the evidence on the record; and (c) whether the penalty of the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe; and pass orders- (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing, or setting aside the penalty ; or (ii) remitting the case of the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case.........". 108. Now, the question is whether the order passed by the Appellate Authority, namely, the Commissioner of Income Tax contains reasons for rejecting the appeal and whether the Commissioner of Income Tax observed Rule 27 of the said Rule. 109. The Commissioner of Income Tax, in the instant case, did not reject the appeal simply by stating "the appeal is rejected", but gave some reasons. He stated that he had gone through the relevant records of the case. 109. The Commissioner of Income Tax, in the instant case, did not reject the appeal simply by stating "the appeal is rejected", but gave some reasons. He stated that he had gone through the relevant records of the case. He considered the report of the Enquiry Officer and the order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on careful consideration on the facts and circumstances of the case he was satisfied, "the order passed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner is quite justified and according to the rules." It follows from his order that according to him (a) the order of Assistant Commissioner was quite justified and (b) the order was in accordance with the rules. Thereafter, he said in the order that he declined to interfere with this order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. This means that the penalty imposed was adequate according to him. In the result he rejected the appeal and that means he confirmed the order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner it is true that in the order he did not elaborately state his reasons. But from the order it appears that he accepted the reasons given in the order passed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax dated March 10, 1969 and also he considered the report of the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, it is necessary to read the order appealed against to see whether it contains sufficient reasons. 110. In the order dated March 10, 1969 the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Range III, has considered in detail the charges against the appellant, Shri Chatterjee. He also considered in detail reasons given by the Enquiry Officer in the enquiry report for coming to the conclusions that the appellant, Shri Chatterjee was guilty of Charges 1 to 6. He also found that the Enquiry Officer gave reasonable opportunity to Shri Chatterjee to defend himself against the charges framed and has followed the procedure laid down in the rules. He went through the enquiry report and after careful consideration of the enquiry report, he agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. He also issued a show-cause notice to Shri Chatterjee. It was observed by him that Shri Chatterjee was adopting the said dilatory tactics which he adopted before the Enquiry Officer. He allowed Shri Chatterjee more than one month's time for filing representations, if any. He also issued a show-cause notice to Shri Chatterjee. It was observed by him that Shri Chatterjee was adopting the said dilatory tactics which he adopted before the Enquiry Officer. He allowed Shri Chatterjee more than one month's time for filing representations, if any. He recorded that Shri Chatterjee has not filed any representation, but he was making efforts to gain more time on every occasion on some plea of the other. He recorded that the disciplinary proceedings have been pending for several years and he did not consider it fit to wait any longer. After considering all the facts he passed the order against Shri Chatterjee for his removal from service. In my view, this order gives full reasons and the appellate order of Commissioner shows that the Commissioner is satisfied that the order passed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax was justified. 111. Further the enquiry report of the Enquiry Officer is full of reasons. Therefore, the appellate order of the Commissioner of Income Tax read with the order which is appealed against dated March 10, 1969 and the report of the Enquiry Officer would show that there are elaborate reasons for the orders which were passed. In the order dated March 10, 1969 the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner also found that the Enquiry Officer has followed the procedure laid down under the rules. The Commissioner also found that the order passed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was in accordance with the rules. In my view, requirements of Rule 27(2) of the said Rules have been substantially complied with. 112. In view of the above matter, I agree with the conclusions reached by the learned Judge of the Court of first instance. 113. In the premises, on my part I would dismiss the appeal. There will be no order as to costs. Masud, J.: This appeal has been preferred against the judgment of Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. who discharged the Rule on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thereafter this appeal was heard by A.N. Sen, J. and Hazra, J. and the judgment was delivered on September 11 and 12, 1973. Sen J. allowed the said appeal and Hazra, J. dismissed it. Thereafter, the appeal has been referred to me by the learned Chief Justice under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent, 1865. 115. Thereafter this appeal was heard by A.N. Sen, J. and Hazra, J. and the judgment was delivered on September 11 and 12, 1973. Sen J. allowed the said appeal and Hazra, J. dismissed it. Thereafter, the appeal has been referred to me by the learned Chief Justice under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent, 1865. 115. The short point to be decided in this appeal is whether the order of termination of service of the appellant, passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax on October 16, 1969 an employee of the Government of India under the Income Tax Department, confirming the order of termination of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner being the Disciplinary Authority dated March 10, 1969 is illegal and void inasmuch as the said orders have been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and also Rules 14(8), (16) and (17) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The Counsel for both parties have cited large number of Supreme Court and High Court decisions in support of their respective contentions. The said employee was suspended on August 17, 1964 and the said Disciplinary Authority on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer terminated his services on March 10, 1969. Thereafter the appeal against the said order was made before the Commissioner of Income Tax who rejected the same by the impugned order dated October 16, 1969. I have repeatedly suggested to the Counsel and Solicitor for the respondents to settle the dispute on reasonable terms. I have even indicated that the petitioner who happens to be only a Peon/Notice Server should be reinstated with extraordinary leave without pay from the date of suspension in 1964 till today. At the request of the Solicitor for the respondents I adjourned the matter for more than two months but I have been told by the Counsel for the respondents that there are insuperable procedural difficulties to settle the said matter. According to him, the only term his clients could suggest is that the petitioner is to send a memorandum to the President of India. The Counsel for the appellant naturally could not agree to the disposal of this appeal on such terms. Be that as it may, the points of law argued in this appeal do not appear to me to be a matter which would necessitate arguments for days together. 116. The Counsel for the appellant naturally could not agree to the disposal of this appeal on such terms. Be that as it may, the points of law argued in this appeal do not appear to me to be a matter which would necessitate arguments for days together. 116. Both the learned Judges have accepted the well-established principle that requirements of natural justice must depend on facts and circumstances of each case. In the absence of any statutory rule incorporating the said doctrine of natural justice the principles underlying the said doctrine are generally limited to two simple guidelines (A). A judge should not be a prosecutor; (B) a person must not be condemned or penalised unheard. Decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Court have however introduced some other subsidiary rules which are necessary corollaries or ancillary to these two fundamental principles. With respect to the first guideline very often an employee charged with an offence is often asked to face an enquiry before an Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer invariably happens to be an officer equal or subordinate to the rank of the Disciplinary Authority. It is not unnatural for a delinquent employee to apprehend that the report of the Enquiry Officer would not be favourable to him for the simple reason that the Enquiry Officer is a wing or arm of the Disciplinary Authority. In this sense the Enquiry Officer may be said to be a judge and a prosecutor. It is not suggested that all the Enquiry Officers do not decide an enquiry proceeding on merits objectively or independently. It may also be added that such enquiry proceeding cannot be said to be an unreasonable procedure on the ground that an investigation by an Enquiry Officer on the basis of a charge-sheet cannot but be made by an officer of the employer from a practical point of view. The integrity of an independent Enquiry Officer who is not in the employment of the employer may be questioned. In any event the report of the Enquiry Officer is not final. The Disciplinary Authority who happens to be a responsible officer is supposed to apply his mind on the evidence, oral and documentary, adduced before the Enquiry Officer and arrive at a final conclusion on the allegations against such delinquent employee. In any event the report of the Enquiry Officer is not final. The Disciplinary Authority who happens to be a responsible officer is supposed to apply his mind on the evidence, oral and documentary, adduced before the Enquiry Officer and arrive at a final conclusion on the allegations against such delinquent employee. Another safeguard against injustice done to such an employee is the consideration of the order of the Disciplinary Authority by an appellate office. Thus, the procedure of investigation by an Enquiry Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority from amongst its own officers can be said to be reasonable compromise for upholding the said first guideline. 117. With respect to the second guideline it is now well-settled that the accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to know the allegations against him and also an opportunity should be given to him to disprove such allegations in a reasonable manner. To avoid any ambiguity, the second guideline is often incorporated in the statutory rules. Apart from the statutory rules the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution must have to be followed. For all these reasons the Court should be vigilant in examining the reasonableness of the procedure adopted for the purpose of complying with the principles of natural justice, but in addition to this general principle of natural justice there are often specific statutory provisions where a reasonable opportunity is provided to defend a person against whom a charge-sheet has been framed for allegations such as misconduct, fraud, dishonesty etc. It is the Court's duty to see that such specific provisions are followed meticulously. 118. It appears to me that there is not much difference of opinion as to the legal principles to be followed in this particular case. The two learned Judges have only differed on the application of this principle to the facts of the present case. It is now necessary for me to analyse the Judgments of the two learned Judges and express my views. The records of the case as placed before the Appeal Court have been constructed differently by the said two learned Judges and naturally they came to different conclusions. 119. Large number of Supreme Court decisions have been cited by Mr. It is now necessary for me to analyse the Judgments of the two learned Judges and express my views. The records of the case as placed before the Appeal Court have been constructed differently by the said two learned Judges and naturally they came to different conclusions. 119. Large number of Supreme Court decisions have been cited by Mr. D.K. Sen with H. Mitter, Counsel for the respondents in support of the Judgment of Hazra J. who has held that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice and the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee with Mr. Ukil, Counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied upon the judgment of Justice Sen who has held that in the facts and circumstances of this case there is a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and the said statutory rules. The important point to be decided in this case is whether the service of the appellant has been terminated by the respondents in accordance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution read with Rule 14(4), (8), (16) and (17). Unfortunately many new points have been argued before the Appeal Court which were not raised before or dealt with by the Trial Judge. Relying upon the case (23) Amanullah v. State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 1370 , paragraph 7, Mr. Chatterjee has justified those new points on the ground that they were pure question of law which go into the root of the dispute between the parties. 120. Article 311 (2) provides that a reasonable opportunity shall have to be given to the delinquent Government Servant before his service is terminated. This requirement of reasonable opportunity is one of the pillars of the doctrine of natural justice. Large number of judgments have been delivered by the Supreme Court and the High Courts on the meaning of the words "reasonable opportunity." Unlike the terms and conditions of private employment or Service Rules or standing orders agreed upon by other employers the service conditions of a Government Servant are incorporated in the said Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965. Part VI of the said Rules set out the procedure for imposing penalty. Relevant Rules have been framed under this chapter for purpose of providing a machinery which is to be followed before a penalty such as termination of service is determined. Part VI of the said Rules set out the procedure for imposing penalty. Relevant Rules have been framed under this chapter for purpose of providing a machinery which is to be followed before a penalty such as termination of service is determined. On a proper construction of these Rules in the said part, the detailed provisions of reasonable opportunity have been set out to ensure that the employer does not violate the principles of natural justice. The broad question that arises in this connection is whether the statutory duty of a Government as an employer is confined to observance with the said rules in part VI. We are not concerned with the other parts of the said statutory rules some of which have no relevance to the doctrine of natural justice. The Constitution enjoins the Government to give a reasonable opportunity to a Government employee before his service is terminated. Rules in Part VI have set out the procedure on the basis of which such a reasonable opportunity could provided. The statutory rules cannot over-side the provision of a reasonable opportunity in the Constitution. It can, therefore, be legitimately argued that although the rules have been followed by the Government in connection with the disciplinary proceeding of a delinquent Government employee the facts may not justify the conclusion that reasonable opportunity has been given. The statutory rules cannot contemplate all possible contingencies that might arise in connection with such proceeding. There is no doubt that the rules do reflect the principles of natural justice but at the same time it is quite possible to imagine cases where rules have been followed and yet reasonable opportunity cannot be said to have been given on the ground that such opportunity amounts to a mockery of justice. To illustrate, an Enquiry Officer may allow the witnesses on behalf of the Government to be cross-examined but the deposition adverse to the Government may not have been recorded by the Enquiry Officer who, as stated earlier, is a Subordinate Officer of the Disciplinary Authority. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that reasonable opportunity under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution should be construed not only on the basis of the compliance with the Statutory Rules but also with the principles of natural justice all of which cannot be incorporated in the Rules. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that reasonable opportunity under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution should be construed not only on the basis of the compliance with the Statutory Rules but also with the principles of natural justice all of which cannot be incorporated in the Rules. The Rules might have been rigidly followed but the opportunity provided in Article 311 (2) must be in consonance with the reasonableness, fair play and justice. I am conscious of the fact that the observations I am making, may in most cases be academical, but a classification is necessary to emphasise that even if there is no breach of Statutory Rules, reasonable opportunity to the delinquent Government Servant must have to be given. 121. There is another aspect of the meaning of the word "reasonable opportunity" in Article 311 (2). It is often argued that once the statutory rules have been followed and the enquiry office has not acted mala fide the High Court in its writ jurisdiction has no power to set aside or modify the decision of the Disciplinary Authority. It has been argued by Mr. Sen that the Court's power under Article 226 are not co-extensive with the power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court often as the highest Court of appeal can undo a wrong under the said Article but the High Court in its writ jurisdiction should not strictly follow the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court which has a very wide power. It is true that the Writ Court has to discharge its duties under certain limitations but it is difficult to accept the proposition that the jurisdiction to do justice on pure question of law is compartmental. The Legislature makes the law, the Supreme Court puts the correct interpretation of the provisions of an enactment. Often interpreting the provisions of an enactment the Supreme Court can be said to have made laws by way of legal fiction but such laws cannot be independent of the existing provisions of an enactment. There is no doubt that the Supreme Court has a very wide power to decide the matter on the basis of facts which may not be taken into consideration in a Writ Court. There is no doubt that the Supreme Court has a very wide power to decide the matter on the basis of facts which may not be taken into consideration in a Writ Court. But the principles of law if declared by the Supreme Court in an unqualified manner would be a law of the land and the Writ Court must follow the same. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the view that the Supreme Court might have interfered with the decision of the Disciplinary Authority under its wide power under Article 136 but the Writ Court cannot apply those declarations of law in its jurisdiction under Article 226. Further to submit that the Supreme Court might have declared some principles of law under its wide power in the special facts and circumstances of a particular case but those declaration would not be binding on the Writ Court is to make Article 141 of the Constitution infructuous. 122. Another factor has to be emphasised. It is not indispensable that the High Court must have to accept the decision of the Disciplinary Authority if the latter has followed the statutory rules bona fide. The word "bona fide" sometimes creates another confusion. The Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer might be ignorant of law but that does not mean that he has acted mala fide. Again an officer might have acted in good faith by following the procedure under the statutory rules and yet "reasonable opportunity" within the meaning of Article 311 (2) might not have been given. Even if the Government servant has acted mala fide in misusing the statutory provision, the Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer must have to follow the statutory rules. It cannot be said that because the delinquent employee acted mala fide in not taking advantage of the opportunity given to him, the Disciplinary Authority also can ignore the statutory provisions of Article 311 (2) read with the statutory rules. 123. The statutory rules again may provide mandatory provisions and also discretionary provisions. If the Disciplinary Authority has not followed the mandatory provisions it must be held that the Disciplinary Authority has acted illegally. The question that often arises is to what extent a High Court in its writ jurisdiction can interfere with the exercise of discretionary provisions by the Disciplinary Authority. 124. If the Disciplinary Authority has not followed the mandatory provisions it must be held that the Disciplinary Authority has acted illegally. The question that often arises is to what extent a High Court in its writ jurisdiction can interfere with the exercise of discretionary provisions by the Disciplinary Authority. 124. In the instant case one of the Rules which requires primary consideration is Rule 14(8) which reads as follows :- "(8) The Government Servant may take the assistance of any other Government Servant to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority, is a legal practitioner or the Disciplinary Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits." 125. Although Rule 14, sub-clauses (4), (16) and (17) provide mandatory provisions which the Disciplinary Authority and the Government Servant shall have to follow, the said Rule 14(8) however, involves an element of discretion which has become the controversial issue in this case. According to the learned Counsel for the respondents the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority, have exercised their discretion bona fide and lawfully and as such the said Rule 14(8) has been lawfully complied with. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. and Hazra, J. have held in their respective judgments that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the exercise of discretion under Rule 14(8) has been made properly but the Counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of this case the said Rule has not been complied with and, as such, the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioner is in breach of the principles of natural justice and also the statutory rules. Mr. Sen, as stated earlier, has strongly contended that as a pure question of law the High Court in its Writ jurisdiction should not interfere with the exercise of discretion in the said rule unless it holds that in the facts and circumstances of this case the Disciplinary Authority has acted mala fide or exercise of such discretion is perverse. In may view, Mr. In may view, Mr. Sen is partially correct, Ordinarily if on the evidence before the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority two possible reasonable findings of facts can be taken the Court should not interfere with such findings of fact inasmuch as the Writ Court does not act as a Court of Appeal. But the exercise of discretion under a statutory rule, even if it is not mala fide, can be interfered by the Writ Court if such exercise of discretion on the part of the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority is arbitrary, unreasonable and baseless. The Disciplinary Authority may act in good faith in ignorance of their knowledge of statutory provisions. Further, although his act may not be called mala fide, the statutory procedure may have been followed by such authority in a formal stereotyped and rigid manner. The compliance with the statutory rules in connection with the disciplinary proceeding is not an empty formal ritual. The interpretation of a statutory rule which provides exercise of discretion by the disciplinary authority although strictly complied with may not be inconsonance with the provision of "reasonable opportunity" to the Government employee as required under Article 311(2). In my view the exercise of discretion by a Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate authorities is justiciable in a Writ Petition on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice if the power of such authority or authorities is exercised arbitrarily and capriciously. In the light of these observations I hold that the decision arrived at by Sen, J. is correct and this appeal should be allowed. The reasons why I have come to the said conclusions are as follows:- A. Rule 14(8) has been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. Article 311(2) provides that a reasonable opportunity shall have to be given to a Government employee before punishment, such as, termination of service, is given. Reasonable opportunity being an adjunct of the doctrine of natural justice Rule 14(8), (16) and (17) have to be construed in the light of such doctrine. Rule 14 (8) comprise three contingencies: (i) In a disciplinary proceeding the delinquent Government Servant may be allowed to take the assistance of any other Government Servant to present the case before the Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer. Rule 14 (8) comprise three contingencies: (i) In a disciplinary proceeding the delinquent Government Servant may be allowed to take the assistance of any other Government Servant to present the case before the Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer. (ii) He may not be allowed to engage a legal practitioner for the purpose of presenting his case unless the Disciplinary Authority appoints a legal practitioner for presenting the charges against such Government Servant. (iii) The Disciplinary Authority has the power to allow a legal practitioner to defend the case on behalf of the Government Servant before the Disciplinary Authority in the facts and circumstances of a case even if the Presenting Officer is not a legal practitioner. (B) Apart from the fact that these three elements have a binding effect being the statutory rule under the Constitution the latter procedure has been provided in consonance with the doctrine of natural justice. It is agreed both by Sen, J. and Hazra, J. that the compliance or the non-compliance with the principles underlying the doctrine of natural justice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case the records show that the appellant was appointed as a Peon and thereafter as a Notice Server. In paragraph 49 Ground GG of the petition it is stated that the petitioner was not even a Matriculate and was not able to defend himself on his own. At the initial stage of the Enquiry Proceeding it appears from that record that one Somendra Kumar Gupta, a Government Servant was assisting the petitioner. It is however, alleged that the said gentleman was suspended by the authorities for reasons not known to this Court. This statement of Mr. Ukil on behalf of the appellant has not been denied by Mr. Sen nor the statement from the Bar has been contradicted by any records from the Income Tax Department. It is however, alleged that the said gentleman was suspended by the authorities for reasons not known to this Court. This statement of Mr. Ukil on behalf of the appellant has not been denied by Mr. Sen nor the statement from the Bar has been contradicted by any records from the Income Tax Department. As there is no Supplementary Affidavit on behalf of the said Somendra Gupta & the factum or reasons of such suspension not having been disclosed before this Court, it is not proper for me to give any importance to such suspension, but, be that as it may, admittedly one Madhusudhan Mukherjee, another Government Servant, was not only present at the time of inspection of the documents filed on behalf of the respondents but also was even present when the prosecution witnesses were examined when the examination-in-chief of the three witnesses on behalf of the department before the Enquiry Officer took place on 5.6.67, 14.6.67 and 11.9.67. On October 1, 1967 Madhusudhan resigned and ceased to be a Government Servant. On November 18, 1967 the appellant prayed to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, being the Disciplinary Authority, for allowing Madhusudhan to continue to assist him before the Enquiry Officer. A second reminder was given to the said Disciplinary Authority on April 25, 1968 for allowing Madhusudhan to assist him. On May 23, 1968 this prayer was refused by the Disciplinary Authority on the ground that Madhusudhan had ceased to be a Government Servant. On May 30, 1968 another representation was made by the appellant for allowing assistance of Madhusudhan but on June 3, 1968 which was again rejected by the Disciplinary Authority. By letter dated August 5, 1968 the appellant made his last representation to the Disciplinary Authority praying for his assistance on large number of grounds vide page 21 of the Supplementary Paper Book. It has also been referred to in paragraph 37 of the petition. This letter has set out the following grounds for which the petitioner prayed for assistance of Madhusudhan. "(i) No. of articles of charge issued-7 (ii) No. of witnesses-35. (iii) No. of documents-about 50. (iv) Volume of depositions-naturally voluminious. (v) Nature of charge-serious and complicated. (vi) My education qualification-Not even Matriculate. (vii) Any other attainments-Nill. This letter has set out the following grounds for which the petitioner prayed for assistance of Madhusudhan. "(i) No. of articles of charge issued-7 (ii) No. of witnesses-35. (iii) No. of documents-about 50. (iv) Volume of depositions-naturally voluminious. (v) Nature of charge-serious and complicated. (vi) My education qualification-Not even Matriculate. (vii) Any other attainments-Nill. (viii) Shri Madhusudhan Mukherjee whose assistance I have been seeking is not a new hand altogether but the very same person who was rendering me assistance until he left Government Employment after taking up legal profession. The mere fact that late Shri Mukherjee has left Service and taken up legal profession should not deprive me of his continued assistance. (ix) I have not so far found another Government Servant to assist me in presenting my defence. (x) I am unable to present my defence myself." 126. These grounds have been communicated to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on August 5, 1968. Admittedly Madhusudhan Mookherjee as a Government Servant was assisting the petitioner on September 11, 1967 when the prosecution witnesses were examined. The Enquiry Officer happened to be Mr. Sorcar, who was Income Tax Officer, "G" Ward, Hundi Circle, Calcutta. Although on August 17, 1964 the appellant was finally suspended and on November 13, 1964 a charge-sheet was served on the appellant, the appellant was intimated as late as August 4, 1966 that the said Enquiry Officer was appointed to investigate the genuineness of the allegations against the appellant. The Enquiry Officer who happened to be the Income Tax Officer subordinate to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner fixed date of hearing for examination of prosecution witnesses on December 6, 1966, but on December 1, 1966 a revised list of documents and witnesses in substitution of the previous list forwarded to the appellant on 20.5.66 was submitted by the Disciplinary Authority, who is hereinafter described as "IAC". On the date of hearing, that is, on 6.12.66 the appellant prayed for an adjournment on the ground that Shri Madhusudhan Mookerjee who was assisting him prior to the Enquiry Proceeding was refused permission to do so and the new list of documents and witnesses supplied by the IAC should have to be examined by him. His prayer was granted and the Enquiry Officer fixed 7-1-66 as the next date of hearing. Similar prayer for adjournment was made by Shri Chatterjee on 6.1.67 for a further adjournment on the same grounds. His prayer was granted and the Enquiry Officer fixed 7-1-66 as the next date of hearing. Similar prayer for adjournment was made by Shri Chatterjee on 6.1.67 for a further adjournment on the same grounds. The Enquiry Officer granted his prayer and re-fixed the case on 7.2.67 On 7.2.67 Shri Chatterjee did dot appear nor any petition for adjournment was filed. Although Shri Chatterjee's conduct cannot be justified it appears from the report of the Enquiry Officer that Shri Chatterjee in his letter dated 28.1.67 to IAC objected to the new list of document and witnesses submitted on behalf of the department. Shri Chatterjee was further informed by the Enquiry Officer that his contention in his said letter dated 28.1.67 to IAC cannot be accepted. The Enquiry Officer, however fixed the next date of hearing on 24.4.67. Shri Chatterjee on the said date appeared under protest and submitted a letter dated 24.4.67 by which the appointment of the Enquiry Officer and also the appointment of the Presenting Officer was challenged. It may be added here that Shri Chatterjee by his letter dated 8.9.66 earlier also objected to the appointment of the Enquiry Officer. On 25.4.67 Shri Chatterjee filed a petition to IAC praying for an opportunity to submit an additional written statement of defence in connection with the revised list of documents and of witnesses filed on behalf of the department on 1.12.66. The Enquiry Officer by his letter dated 2.5.67 informed Shri Chatterjee that he would get the opportunity under Rule 14(16) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 to state his defence in the light of the said new list of documents and witnesses and fixed the date of hearing on 5.6.67. On June 5, 1967 before the Enquiry Officer prosecution witnesses Shri S. Mukherjee was examined by Shri C.L. Dutta, the Presenting Officer who happened to be also an Income Tax Officer. The said witness was examined in presence of Shri Chatterjee and M. Mookherji. The case, was, thereafter, adjourned to 14.6.67 when another prosecution witness Shri Paritosh Banerjee was examined by the Presenting Officer. The case was postponed till 11.8.67. On 11.8.67 Shri Chatterjee filed the petition praying for a fortnight's adjournment. The Presenting Officer had also filed a petition on 8.8.67 praying for an adjournment. The case, was, thereafter, adjourned to 14.6.67 when another prosecution witness Shri Paritosh Banerjee was examined by the Presenting Officer. The case was postponed till 11.8.67. On 11.8.67 Shri Chatterjee filed the petition praying for a fortnight's adjournment. The Presenting Officer had also filed a petition on 8.8.67 praying for an adjournment. In the petition of the Presenting Officer on 8.8.67 the Presenting Officer also prayed for an exemption to produce Shri S.M. Faridad Supervisor, 24-Parganas as witness. The case was, thereafter, adjourned to 14.8.67, 8.9.67 and 11.9.67 with an intimation to Shri Chatterjee by the Presenting Officer. On 11.9.67 Shri S.C. Ghosh was examined by the Presenting Officer in presence of Shri Chatterjee and M. Mookherjee. The examination-in-chief of the prosecution witnesses was concluded on 11.9.67. M. Mukherjee who had been assisting Shri Chatterjee resigned from Government Service on 1.10.67 and started practising as an Income Tax Lawyer. As stated earlier, Shri Chatterjee made several representations to the IAC for allowing Shri Mukherjee to continue to assist him in the enquiry proceeding. The Enquiry Officer fixed the next date of hearing on 25.11.67 for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses by the defence. The IAC by his letter dated 16.11.67 rejected Shri Chatterjee requests for permission to allow Shri Mukherjee to assist him. As Mr. Chatterjee did not appear on 25.11.67 the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses could not be started. In the meantime, the Enquiry Officer himself was transferred to another Circle and he informed Shri Chatterjee that the next date of hearing would be 27.4.68 but before the said date on 18.11.67 Shri Chatterjee sent another representation to IAC for his permission to allow Madhusudhan Mukherjee to assist him in the disciplinary proceeding. Similar representation was again made to the IAC on 25.4.68. The IAC by his letter dated 23.4.68 again refused permission to Shri Mukherjee to allow the latter assist Shri Chatterjee. During the hearing before me I have asked the respondents to produce a letter dated 25.7.68 written by the Enquiry Officer to Shri Chatterjee. The material portions of the said read as follows:- M. Sorcar, Income Tax Officer, G-Ward Hundi Circle, Calcutta & Inquiry Officer. 25.7.68 Memorandum No. H. C/C/Con Sub: Disciplinary Proceedings against Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server (under suspension). 127. The material portions of the said read as follows:- M. Sorcar, Income Tax Officer, G-Ward Hundi Circle, Calcutta & Inquiry Officer. 25.7.68 Memorandum No. H. C/C/Con Sub: Disciplinary Proceedings against Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee, Notice Server (under suspension). 127. It appears that the petition dated 30.5.68 of Shri Rabindra Nath Chatterjee for permission to continue to take the assistance of Shri Madhusudhan Mookherjee was again rejected by Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, R-VI, Calcutta and Disciplinary Authority in the Memorandum No. 81/IV-P/45 (sub-file) dated 3.6.68 addressed to Shri Chatterjee. He has been asked to take the help of another Government Servant if required. 128. In the circumstances, the case is finally fixed up at 11 A.M. on the 9th August, 1968 when Shri Chatterjee is directed to attend. The list of defence witnesses should be submitted meanwhile. He will note that the case will not be further adjourned under any circumstances. Sd/- M. Sorcar 25.7.68 (M. Sorcar) Income Tax Officer, G-Ward Hundi Circle, Calcutta & Inquiry Officer. To Shri Rabindranath Chatterjee, attached to Income Tax Office, 24-Parganas, (under suspension) C/o Shri Kartick Chandra Das (Tea Stall) Birati & Jessore Road Junction. Birati, Calcutta-51. 129. This letter clearly show that the Enquiry Officer finally fixed 9th August, 1969 as the date of hearing when Shri Chatterjee was directed to attend. He has also been asked to submit a list of defence witnesses in the meantime. The Enquiry Officer made it very clear that the case would not be further adjourned under any circumstances. It appears from the record that on 8.8.68 the petitioner prayed for a month's adjournment. The Enquiry Officer thereafter did not fix any other date of hearing and Shri Chatterjee was accordingly informed by his letter dated 16.8.68. It may be stated here that the said letter dated 25.7.68 did not mention the fact that the enquiry proceeding was concluded or that the Enquiry Officer would proceed ex parte. On August 23, 1968 Shri Chatterjee in continuation of his letter dated August 8, 1968 submitted the posting and designation of some of the witnesses whom he wanted to call as defence witnesses. On September 26, 1968 Mr. Chatterjee asked the Enquiry Officer to supply him with the copies of the deposition of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as the prosecution witnesses were examined on 5.6.67, 14.6.67 and 11.9.67. On September 26, 1968 Mr. Chatterjee asked the Enquiry Officer to supply him with the copies of the deposition of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as the prosecution witnesses were examined on 5.6.67, 14.6.67 and 11.9.67. Thereafter Shri Chatterjee received a letter from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner asking him to show cause within fifteen days as to why he should not be dismissed from service. Thus admittedly on hearing took place between 9.8.68 and 17.10.68 when the Enquiry Officer filed his report. 130. On these facts it is clear that the petitioner did not get the legal assistant of Shri Mukherjee on account of refusal on the part of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner although repeated requests in writing were made by Shri Chatterjee. The said letter dated 25.7.68 as set out above only showed that Mr. Chatterjee, was asked to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and submit a list of defence witnesses before 9.8.68. The decision of Shri Chatterjee not to appear on 9.8.68 was not correct. He at least could have appear before the Enquiry Officer and explained the practical difficulties of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses particularly in view of the fact that the said letter dated 25.7.68 clearly stated that the case would not be further adjourned under any circumstances. But even then the said letter did not give any indication that the hearing would be concluded on 9.8.68 which was fixed only for the purpose of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. Shri Chatterjee came to know of the report of the Enquiry Officer on 17.10.68 and naturally Shri Chatterjee though that at least another day would be fixed for cross-examination of defence witnesses. In fact on 23.8.68 Shri Chatterjee informed the Enquiry Officer about the detailed particulars of the defence witnesses. On 26.9.68 the petitioner asked for deposition of the prosecution witnesses as the prosecution witnesses were examined as early as 5.6.67, 14.6.67 and 11.9.67. The question thus arises whether the reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner as set out in Rule 14 Sub-clauses 8, 16 and 17. Rule 14(8) provides for a discretionary power to the Disciplinary Authority. Under this Rule the Government Servant may be allowed to take the assistant of another Government Servant for presenting the case on behalf of the defence. Rule 14(8) provides for a discretionary power to the Disciplinary Authority. Under this Rule the Government Servant may be allowed to take the assistant of another Government Servant for presenting the case on behalf of the defence. In the present case Madhusudhan was allowed to assist Shri Chatterjee not only before the enquiry proceeding when it began but also till examination of prosecution witnesses were finished. But on 1.10.67 M. Mookherji resigned and ceased to be a Government Servant. Several representations were made to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to allow Shri Mukherjee to defend his case. Shri Chatterjee even appealed to the Disciplinary Authority to allow Shri Mukherji on the various grounds mentioned in the letter dated 5.8.68. Even prior to August, 1968 representations were made by Shri Chatterjee on 18.11.67, 25.4.68 and 30.5.68. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner by his order dated 10.3.69 had himself agreed with Shri Chatterjee's one of the grievances. The relevant Statement in the said letter reads as follows :- "The charges are very serious and include submission of fraudulent T.A. claims, tampering with Government records with ulterior motive and fraudulent removal of Government papers". 131. Strictly speaking the IAC had reasons to disallow Shri Mukherji to cross-examine prosecution witnesses after he ceased to be Government Servant on 1.10.67. But the said rule also empowers the IAC to allow a legal practitioner to assess the delinquent Government Servant when the Presenting Officer on behalf of the prosecution is a legal practitioner. I agree with the contention of Mr. Sen that the Presenting Officer, admittedly, not being a legal practitioner, there is no mandatory duty on his part to allow Shri Mukherji who is a practising lawyer after 1.10.67. As discussed earlier, the rules may provide mandatory provision and also provision which empowers the Disciplinary Authority to exercise discretion in an appropriate case. The rules cannot contemplate all possible contingencies. If there is a breach of mandatory provision without any justification the Writ Court may invoke its jurisdiction to intervene. But with respect to the powers of the Disciplinary Authority to exercise its discretion it must be held that discretion is to be exercised judicially. Rule 14(8) does not give absolute right to the delinquent Government Servant to get the assistance of a legal practitioner but the disciplinary Authority also has not been given absolute power to exercise the discretion arbitrarily. Rule 14(8) does not give absolute right to the delinquent Government Servant to get the assistance of a legal practitioner but the disciplinary Authority also has not been given absolute power to exercise the discretion arbitrarily. The discretionary power that has been given to the IAC, in my view, has been exercised arbitrarily and without any reason whatsoever. Reliance may be placed upon the decision of (24) A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Drs., AIR 1970 SC 150 where the Supreme Court has held that even an Administrative Officer cannot be allowed to exercise arbitrarily in an appropriate case. The failure of Shri Chatterji to appear before the Enquiry Officer was caused by the refusal of permission to allow Shri Mukherji to assist Shri Chatterji for the purpose of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and for presenting the defence case. The Disciplinary Authority, that is, IAC, has not give any reason why Shri Chatterjee was not allowed to take the assistance of Shri Mukherjee. Shri Mukherjee was a Government Servant prior to 1.10.67. He assisted Shri Chatterji from the very beginning. He was even allowed to be present when Prosecution witnesses were examined. But simply because he resigned and ceased to be a Government Servant he might not have been allowed to assist Shri Chatterji as Government but there is no reason why a lawyer's assistance should be denied to Shri Chatterji. Mr. Sen's contention is that the Presenting Officer being an Income Tax Officer, he cannot be said to be a legal practitioner and as such the IAC was right in refusing permission. It is also urged by him that Shri Chatterji never asked for assistance of a lawyer as it was done in case of Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal AIR 1961 Cal-l, C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin, AIR 1972 SC 2178 and also D.G. of Post and Telegraph v. Nani Gopal Majumdar 77 CWN 752 on which the Counsel for the appellant relied before the Appeal Court and also this Court. It appears from the Judgment of Hegde J. in the above Supreme Court case that even if the Presenting Officer is not a legal practitioner but a legally trained man the de1inquent employee should be allowed the assistance of a lawyer to enable him to get a reasonable opportunity under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and also on the basis of the principles of natural justice. Further the said Rule 14(8) also contemplated an alternative situation even when the Presenting Officer is not a legal practitioner the rule states that the Disciplinary Authority may allow the Government Servant to engage a legal practitioner if the "Disciplinary Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits." Admittedly in this case the Presenting Officer is an Income Tax Officer before whom the Income Tax lawyers appear to argue Income Tax cases. Thus the Presenting Officer cannot be said to be legal practitioner but is certainty a legally trained man, and there is absolutely no reason why Shri Chatterji was not allowed to engage Madhusudan after Madhusudan had ceased to be a Government Servant. The last limb of Rule 14(8) gives ample scope to the Disciplinary Authority to allow the assistance of a lawyer to Shri Chatterji. Further it is also admitted fact that the petitioner was appointed as a peon and thereafter as a Notice Server and was not even a Matriculate. 132. The officers who were giving evidence on behalf of the prosecution were educated people. The charge against the petitioner is not simply removal of certain papers from the Income Tax Office. The charges are seven in number alleging gross-negligence, irregularity in the discharge of duties, absence from duty without permission, fraudulent removal of Government Papers, fraudulent T.A. claims and tampering without original entries in the appeal register. But the most significant thing is that no reason was given by the IAC in his final order dated 10.3.69 to explain why he exercised his discretion in refusing legal assistance to Shri Chatterjee. The IAC even overlooked the fact that on account of his refusal, the Enquiry Officer could not get the evidence of the prosecution witnesses cross-examined. The Disciplinary Authority also ignored the fact that the Enquiry Officer concluded his enquiry without giving the accused the last change to present defence witnesses or to state his defence in normal course. The IAC even overlooked the fact that on account of his refusal, the Enquiry Officer could not get the evidence of the prosecution witnesses cross-examined. The Disciplinary Authority also ignored the fact that the Enquiry Officer concluded his enquiry without giving the accused the last change to present defence witnesses or to state his defence in normal course. At least one letter should have been written to Shri Chatterjee to give him the last warning that the hearing would be concluded and the defence case would not be considered if Shri Chatterjee refused to appear on a definite date. The final notice that was given on 25.7.68 only stated that no further adjournment would be allowed under any circumstance and admittedly 9th August, 1968 was fixed for cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. The Disciplinary Authority and the Enquiry Officer knew that the lists of defence witnesses were duly given to them. The prosecution witnesses were examined in 1967. As a result of the refusal of the Disciplinary Authority to allow Shri Mukherjee to appear before the Enquiry Officer, the cross-examination after one year was not possible. The evidence would naturally be forgotten. Shri Chatterjee accordingly asked for copies of deposition which were also refused. Shri Mukherjee had the knowledge of Shri Chatterjee's case from the very beginning. As a Government Servant he was allowed to assist Shri Chatterjee in the enquiry proceeding. Shri Chatterjee had the privilege of inspection notes of some of the documents which the Government allowed inspection at earlier stage. An allegation was made that a vital document like Shri Chatterjee's general tour diary which would substantiate the genuineness of the T.A. Bill was not allowed for inspection of the ground that it was missing. There was no legal bar for the Disciplinary Authority to allow Shri Mukherjee to assist Shri Chatterjee. The Order of suspension of Shri Chatterjee was passed in August 1964 and it appears from the report of the Enquiry Officer that by Memo No. 267 dated 4.8.67 Shri Chatterjee was informed of the appointment of an Enquiry Officer. As early as July 14, 1966 Shri Chatterjee furnished the list of defence witnesses to IAC. It cannot be said that Shri Chatterjee was not serious to defend his case. He asked inspection of the documents on which the Presenting Officer relied. He took inspection of documents. As early as July 14, 1966 Shri Chatterjee furnished the list of defence witnesses to IAC. It cannot be said that Shri Chatterjee was not serious to defend his case. He asked inspection of the documents on which the Presenting Officer relied. He took inspection of documents. He regularly appeared on three days when the prosecution witnesses were examined. It is true that the petitioner asked for several adjournments on the ground that he was unable to defend his case without the assistance of Shri Mukherjee but it appears from the record that Shri Chatterjee has really asked for two adjournments once on 27.4.68 and again on 9.8.68. For the other adjournments he was not responsible. Even after 9.8.68 Shri Chatterjee wanted to have the defence witnesses examined and before the Enquiry Officer submitted his report he continued to give particulars about the defence witnesses and also asked for copies of depositions. Thus the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer that Shri Chatterjee was not serious of defending his case was not correct. All these facts were completely ignored by the Disciplinary Authority and the Disciplinary Authority only examined the evidence on three prosecution witnesses who could not be cross-examined and ignored all other facts. No reasoning have given by the Disciplinary Authority by the Commissioner of Income Tax in their orders about these commissions and omissions. For all these reasons I agree with the conclusion arrived at by Sen, J. In my view not only there has been arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Disciplinary Authority but also no real or effective opportunity was given to Shri Chatterjee to defend the charges against him and such there is a violation of the principles of natural justice. In my view Hazra, J. was not correct in holding the view in his judgment the material portions of which read as follows :- "Thus on plain reading of the rule and considering facts and events in the matter it cannot be said that the Disciplinary Authority has followed or disregarded Rule 14(8)...... Under the said rule Disciplinary Authority has discretion to permit a legal practitioner to assist Shri Chatterjee having regard to the circumstance of the case. Under the said rule Disciplinary Authority has discretion to permit a legal practitioner to assist Shri Chatterjee having regard to the circumstance of the case. This is not a case for application by Shri Chatterjee for engaging a legal practitioner but for engaging Madhusudhan Mukherjee after his resignation from Government service and it so happened that Madhusudhan Mukherjee after his resignation started practice as an Income Tax practitioner (see paragraph 36 of the petition) ............This is not a case whether he did not exercise his discretion or in exercising his discretion he misconceived his powers and duties under the Rule or that he took into consideration any irrelevant matter or agreed to consider relevant matter. It is a case where he properly exercised his discretion in accordance with the said Rule". 133. Mr. Sen has argued that the Disciplinary Authority hag exercised his discretion after consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case. His decision not to allow Shri Mukharji to assist Shri Chatterjee is a finding of fact and this Writ Court should not interfere with that decision. In my view the principle of law argued by him is not disputed but it has no application to the facts of this case. The Disciplinary Authority did not give any reason for such refusal in the impugned order. Although he discussed the charge-sheet in detail he did not even mention the reason why refusal of lawyer's assistance was made by him. There is no allegation against Shri Mukherjee nor there is even a discussion as to why he exercised his statutory discretion against the petitioner's prayer for assistance of Shri Mukherjee. Even the Commissioner of Income Tax had not applied his mind to this failure to exercise the discretion on the part of the Disciplinary Authority in his order dated 15.10.69. He only stated that he had gone through the relevant records of the case and, therefore, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was justified and according to the rules. He did not even consider that as result of the refusal to grant assistance of a lawyer to Shri Chatterjee the IAC compelled the Enquiry Officer to submit his report without cross-examination of prosecution witness and without knowing the defence case at all. Hazra, J. has stated: "It is true that in the order he did not elaborately state his reasons. Hazra, J. has stated: "It is true that in the order he did not elaborately state his reasons. But from the order it appears that he accepted the reasons given in the order passed by the IAC of Income Tax dated March 10, 1969 and also he considered the report of the Enquiry Officer". The report of the Enquiry Officer could not contain the reasons why the Disciplinary Authority refused assistance of Shri Mukherjee to Shri Chatterjee. The IAC also did not give reasons for such refusal. Thus there is nothing to show that the Disciplinary Authority or the Commissioner of Income Tax applied his mind and considered all the facts of the case and took a reasonable view on the matter. Further if Mr. Sen's contention is accepted then a delinquent employee would never get any relief in a Court of law if the Disciplinary Authority and his subordinates become vindictive. Reliance may be placed upon C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin (supra); Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal (supra) and D.G. of Posts and Telegraphs v. Nanigopal (supra) where the Supreme Court and Bench decisions of this Court have interfered with the decisions of Disciplinary Authority on the ground of refusal on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to give legal assistance to the delinquent Government servant. 134. The next point to be decided is whether Rule 14, sub-Clauses 16 and 17 have been complied with by the Enquiry Officer. Unlike Rule 14(8) these rules are mandatory. Under Rule 16 when the case for the Disciplinary Authority is closed the Government servant shall be required to state his defence. A copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the Presenting Officer. The evidence of the Government servant shall be produced. The witnesses produced by the Government Servant shall be examined and shall be liable to cross-examination, reexamination and examination by the Enquiry Officer according to the provisions applicable to the witnesses for the Disciplinary Authority. The words "shall" has been used in the said sub-clauses 16 and 17. From the records of the case it appears that the Enquiry Officer could not comply with this mandatory provision on account of repeated adjournments asked for by Shri Chatterjee and also on the ground that he could not defend himself without the legal assistance of Shri Mukherjee. The words "shall" has been used in the said sub-clauses 16 and 17. From the records of the case it appears that the Enquiry Officer could not comply with this mandatory provision on account of repeated adjournments asked for by Shri Chatterjee and also on the ground that he could not defend himself without the legal assistance of Shri Mukherjee. It is true that Shri Chatterjee's conduct in absenting himself on 9.8.68 could not be justified but at the same time the Enquiry Officer should have given information to Shri Chatterjee that if he would not appear on 9.8.68 the Court would proceed ex parte and close the case. If Shri Chatterjee has acted unreasonable it does not follow that the Enquiry Officer should also act without complying with the mandatory rules. The Enquiry Officer should have fixed a date after the department's case is closed and intimate Shri Chatterjee that Shri Chatterjee would not be allowed to complain that the statutory provisions to produce the defence witnesses or to state defence case was refused. In this connection the statements in paragraph 47 of the petition may be mentioned :- "47. Your petitioner states before making or publishing the purported report the respondent No. 3 did not inform your petitioner that unless your petitioner appears the said respondent No. 3 will proceed ex parte." 135. Even the notice dated 25.7.68 was not annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition where the Enquiry Officer stated that no further adjournment under any circumstances will be granted. It true that the notice provides that the case was finally fixed on 9.8.68. The said date was finally for the purpose of cross-examination of prosecution witness and the Enquiry Officer made it clear in the said notice that no further adjournment would be granted under any circumstances for the purpose of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. The Enquiry Officer should have formally given another notice fixing a final date for presenting defence case. Admittedly without fixing any other date the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. I, therefore, do not agree with the reasonings of Hazra, J. that there has been no violation of Rules 14(16) and (17). Reliance be placed upon the case of (24) Union of India & Ors. Admittedly without fixing any other date the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. I, therefore, do not agree with the reasonings of Hazra, J. that there has been no violation of Rules 14(16) and (17). Reliance be placed upon the case of (24) Union of India & Ors. v. K. Rajappa Menon, AIR 1670 SC 748 where Supreme Court in considering Rule 1713 of the Railway Servant's Conduct and Disciplinary Rules made the following observations: "The rule after all has to be read not in a pedantic manner but in a practical and reasonable way and so read it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the Chief Commercial Superintendent has substantially complied with the requirements of these rules." Hazra, J. has been upon these observations but I respectfully differ with the application of the said Rule to the facts of the present case. 136. The last point that has beer allowed to be argued by the appeal Court is whether the Commissioner of Income Tax in his order dated 16.10.69 acted in accordance with Rule 23 of the said Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. I would have agreed with the conclusion of Hazra, J. if Rules 14(8) (16) and (17) read with Article 311 (2) and the principles of natural justice would have been followed by the Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority but unfortunately in the present case as discussed above I have held there was not only breach of the statutory rules but also no substantial effective reasonable opportunity was given to Shri Chatterjee in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It appears to me that the Commissioner of Income Tax did not apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of this case. I am not suggesting that the Commissioner of Income Tax should give a detailed reason in connection with an appeal under the said Rule 23. Assuming Hazra, J. is correct in holding that the Commissioner of Income Tax applied his mind after consideration of all the facts and circumstances including the enquiry report and the order of disciplinary proceeding the Commissioner of Income Tax, decided only on the basis of laches and alleged dilatory tactics of Shri Chatterjee. He has not given any importance to the order of the Disciplinary Authority in refusing permission of Shri Mukherjee to Shri Chatterjee. He has not given any importance to the order of the Disciplinary Authority in refusing permission of Shri Mukherjee to Shri Chatterjee. He has also ignored the fact that the Enquiry Officer did not fix any date for dosing the case and for allowing Shri Chatterjee to state his defence. There was no difficulty on the part of the Commissioner of Income Tax to remand the case to the Disciplinary Authority or the Enquiry Officer for giving Shri Chatterjee a last opportunity to produce defence witnesses or to state his defence. In my view apart from the aforesaid reasons a public officer such as the Commissioner of Income Tax, acted also arbitrarily in rejecting Shri Chatterjee's appeal specially in view of the fact that, before the Enquiry Officer communicated his report to Shri Chatterjee on 17.10.68 Shri Chatterjee informed the Enquiry Officer about the designation and posting of defence witnesses on 28.8.68 and also prayed for deposition of prosecution witness on 16.9.68. 137. For all the reasons stated above I agree with the conclusion arrived at by Sen. J. and disagree with the finding of Hazra, J. In the result, in my view, the appeal is allowed and the Judgment and Order of the learned Trial Judge is set aside. The impugned order of dismissal is therefore quashed. The Rule in terms of prayer A & B of the petition be made absolute. The appellant will be entitled to costs in this appeal and also the costs of the proceeding in the Court below. I also agree with the observations of Sen, J. which read as follows :- "This order will not prejudice the right of the respondents if any, to take such steps as they may be entitled in law and the respondents will be at liberty to hold a fresh enquiry against the appellant is the respondents are otherwise so entitled under the law". Sen, J. : This was an appeal from the Judgment and Order passed by Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. discharging the rule obtained by the petitioner Rabindra Nath Chatterjee in his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the said petition Rabindra Nath Chatterjee challenged the validity of the order of his dismissal and prayed for the issue of appropriate writs for quashing the said order. 138. The appeal was specially assigned to this Bench. In the said petition Rabindra Nath Chatterjee challenged the validity of the order of his dismissal and prayed for the issue of appropriate writs for quashing the said order. 138. The appeal was specially assigned to this Bench. There was a difference of opinion in the appeal between myself and my learned brother Hazra, J. for reasons recorded in may judgment. I allowed the appeal and made the rule absolute. I had passed the following order :- "In the result the appeal must succeed and the Judgment and Order of the learned Trial Judge must be set aside. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the learned Trial Judge, I quash and set aside the order of dismissal and I direct and order that the rule in terms of prayers (A) and (B) of the petition be made absolute. The appellant will be entitled to the costs of the appeal and also the costs of the proceeding in the Court below. I wish to make it clear that this order will not prejudice the right of the respondents, if any, to take such steps as they may be entitled in law and the respondents will be at liberty to hold a fresh enquiry against the appellant if the respondents are otherwise so entitled under the law." My learned brother for reasons recorded in his judgment dismissed the said appeal and upheld the order of the learned Trial Judge. My learned brother in his judgment passed the following order :- "In view of the above matter, I agree with the conclusions reached by the learned Judge of the Court of first instance. In the premises, on my part I would dismiss the appeal. There will be no order as to costs." 139. In view of the difference between the two members of the Bench the matter was reported under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent to the Chief Justice and the learned Chief Justice was pleased to assign the matter to Masud, J. for his opinion. There will be no order as to costs." 139. In view of the difference between the two members of the Bench the matter was reported under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent to the Chief Justice and the learned Chief Justice was pleased to assign the matter to Masud, J. for his opinion. The matter was thereafter heard by Masud, J. The learned Judge for reasons recorded in his order has held :- "For all the reasons stated above I agree with the conclusion arrived at by Sen, J. and disagree with the finding of Hazra, J. In the result, in my view, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the learned Trial Judge is set aside. The impugned order of dismissal is therefore quashed. The Rule in terms of prayers A & B of the petition be made absolute. The appellant will be entitled to costs in this appeal and also the costs of the proceeding in the Court below. I also agree with the observations of Sen, J. which read as follows: "This order will not prejudice the right of the respondents, if any, to take such steps as they may be entitled in law and the respondents will be at liberty to hold a fresh enquiry against the appellant if the respondents are otherwise so entitled under the law". 140. After the decision of Masud, J. the matter has now come back to this Court for final disposal. In accordance with the majority view the appeal must, therefore, be allowed and we, therefore, pass the following order. 141. The appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the learned Trial Judge are set aside. The order of dismissal is quashed and set aside and the rule in terms of prayers (A) and (B) of the petition is made absolute. The appellant will be entitled to costs in this appeal and also the costs of the proceeding in the Court below. 142. This order will not prejudice the right of the respondents, if any, to take such steps as they may be entitled in law and the respondents will be at liberty to hold a fresh enquiry against the appellant if the respondents are otherwise so entitled under the law. The appeal is finally disposed of accordingly. There will be stay of operation of this order for a period of three weeks. The appeal is finally disposed of accordingly. There will be stay of operation of this order for a period of three weeks. Hazra, J. : I agree.