Order.- This petition is directed against an Order made under section 144 Criminal Procedure Code, which reads thus: “Where as it has been made to appear to me that you and the villagers neighbouring the Yadapura village are scheduled to meet on 5th April, 1973 at 11 a.m. at Yadapura, in connection with the conducting of the jacra of Shri Jenukallusiddeshwaraswamy and such meeting/procession is likely to lead to riot. I do hereby prohibit the said meeting/ procession and strictly warn and enjoin you not to take part or conduct any such meeting procession at Yadapura village and surrounding area at a radius of three miles from the Yadapura village for a period of eight days commencing from 10 a.m. of 5th April, 1973.” Since the records were made available to the Court, a brief reference to the circumstances under which the said Order came to be made, would be necessary. At Yadapura in Arsikere Taluk an annual ‘jathra’ in the name of the local deity Jenukallusiddeshwaraswamy would be held by the local citizens, It would appear the petitioner is the Wahivatdar of the deity. In that connection a meeting of the citizens would be convened apparently with a view to constitute a committee for the conduct of such ‘jathra’ and any procession connected with it. On behalf of the petitioner such a meeting had been called to be he d on the 5th of April 1973 by a leaflet. A rival faction, headed by one Shankarappa, had also caused a similar leaflet to be published whereby such meeting had been put off to be held beyond the day of such ‘jathra’, i.e., 17th April, 1973. It was in this state of affairs that the said Shankarappa moved the Police for action to prevent any breach of the peace. The Police made a report on the eve of the impugned Order, and acting on such report the Taluk Magistrate issued it. A copy of the Order was served on the petitioner. Hence this petition. 2. On behalf of the petitioner, several criticisms were levelled against the Order by Sri R.U. Goulay, the learned Counsel. Briefly summarised, the argument is this: The Order on the face of it does not disclose in express terms that the Magistrate was satisfied with the material placed before him that such an Order was necessary for maintenance of public tranquility. On behalf of the petitioner, several criticisms were levelled against the Order by Sri R.U. Goulay, the learned Counsel. Briefly summarised, the argument is this: The Order on the face of it does not disclose in express terms that the Magistrate was satisfied with the material placed before him that such an Order was necessary for maintenance of public tranquility. It does not also disclose, however briefly, the material on which such an order is bated. Such a requirement would be necessary in that the provisions of sub sections (4) and (5) of section 144, Criminal Procedure Code provide for a remedy to thine who might be affected by the said Order. That the recording of such a satis “action, and the materials on which it has been based, is expressly enjoined by the provisions of the section itself, and on a comparison of section 144 (1) with the analogous provision in section 107, Criminal Procedure Code compliance with such requirement would be mandatory. In any event, the last part of the Order relating to an area of 3 mlies radius from Yadapur, is clearly illegal. 3. It seems to me unnecessary to consider the above contentions in any detail as in my view taking all the cirucmstances into consideration, it is not a fit case for interference in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, notwithstanding the fact that some of the above contentions, prima facie, deserve acceptance. 4. Before adverting to it further, the decisions relied on by Sri Goulay may be usefully referred to as affording some guidance to Magistrates while exercising the power vested in them under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code. 5. In Radhe Das v. Jairam Mahto and others1 Maspherson, J., in the context of section 141, Criminal Procedure Code, has observed thus: “..To give the Magitstrate jurisdiction under section 144 all that is required is that he shall be of opinion that there is sufficient ground to proceed under section 141 and that immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable and that the direction which he proposes to make is likely to prevent or tends to prevent a disturbance of the public tranquillity or a riot or an affray. In such circumstances private rights must give way whatever be the subject matter of the dispute; in particular it is immaterial that the dispute relates to land, as the great majority of dangerous disputes do in this province. Given the necessary condition an order cannot be impugned as without jurisdiction merely because it was arbitrary, for instance an order stopping music before a mosque. The condition introduced by the amendment of 1923, that the Magistrate must be of opinion that there is sufficient ground for utilising section 144 cannot be so interpreted. An arbitrary order may be and often perfectly valid. It is in fact the propriety of the Magistrate’s order that is here impugned. The correct stand point from which to view the propriety of order under section 144 is that of the Magistrate at the time when he passed it and in the light of the materials then before him. The Court will not be astute or keenly critical in respect of them. An order which was proper when made, may at a later date appear in the light of further events or further materials unnecessary and it will then of course be rescinded from the date at which it so appears.” 6. Since such an Order in certain circumstances, is revisable under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, (vide State of Bihar v. K.K. Mishra and others)2, it is open to a Court to examine the material on which an Order has been based. If there is no material, or if the material is so insufficient that a reasonable man might not act on it, the Court could interefere with it. The Patna case, cited earlier, would clearly support such a view. 7. The next case in Motilal Gangadhar Kabre v. Emperor3. This decision has relevance to the latter direction in the impugned Order prohibiting meetings and processions in an area of 3 miles radius. It is also to be seen that the impugned order is addressed to the pulic generally. The enunciation in Motilal’s case2 would render such an Order illegal. The relevant observations are: “The order in question prohibited the public generally and certain persons named therein from taking part in the procession within the whole of the municipal limits of Erandol and all public places within such limits. The enunciation in Motilal’s case2 would render such an Order illegal. The relevant observations are: “The order in question prohibited the public generally and certain persons named therein from taking part in the procession within the whole of the municipal limits of Erandol and all public places within such limits. In our opinion therefore the order does not conform to the requirements of section 141, sub-section (3), Criminal Procedure Code, and was beyond the powers of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Erandol, under that section." Again: "I think that having regard to the terms of the section, it is only when a Magistrate is of opinion that the public generally are likely to frequent or visit a particular place, i.e., a definite or specified place, and trouble is apprehended, that any order under subsection (3) can be made. As it stands, the effect of the order would be to prohibit all processions even of an innocent character, e.g., a marriage or a religious procession, being taken out at or in any public place in Erandol. The order is not directed to the public when frequenting or visiting a particular place, and in my opinion does not comply with the requirements of section 144 (3). The order therefore is illegal and beyond the powers conferred upon the Magistrate under the section." 7. I now turn to the reasons which impel me not to interfere with the order in question. It is clear from the order that it would expire after 8 days from 5th April, 1973. This period has come and gone and, therefore, the Order has spent itself. It is also not disputed that the ‘jathra’ in question is due to be held on 17th April, 1973. The leaflet which was the provocation for the Order had definitely fixed the date of the meeting as 5th April, 1973 and, therefore, to call for another meeting further steps would be necessary and by then the ‘jathra’ perhaps would have been over. Lastly, the provisions of section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, themselves provide for an adequate remedy for an aggrieved person, though, on the facts of this case, the adequacy of such a remedy is a debatable point. 8. For the above reasons, the petition has to fail and is accordingly dismissed, S.V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.