( 1 ) THE above case has been posted before us for determining the sufficiency or otherwise of the Court fee paid by the appellants on the memorandum of appeal. The appellants are defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the court below. Respondent 1 (plaintiff) instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,52,686-91 ps. along with further interest and costs on the foot of a mortgage against the appellants and respondent 2 (defendant 3 ). The appellants filed a written statement requesting the Court to dismiss the suit at the first instance. Thereafter, they filed a memo before the Court below stating that a decree for payment of the amount claimed by the plaintiff may be passed and the defendants may be given ten annual instalments to discharge the decretal amount. Thereafter, the trial Court proceeded to pass a decree. While doing so, it declined to permit the defendants to pay the decretal amount in instalments. Aggrieved by the decree of the Court below in so far as it declined to permit the defendants to pay the decretal amount in instalments, the appellants have filed this appeal. ( 2 ) ON the memorandum of appeal, the appellants have paid a sum of Rs. 10 as Court fee on the basis that the valuation of the appeal is governed by Art. 3 (iii) (1) (a) of Sch. II of the Mysore Court Fees and Suits valuation Act, 1958, which prescribes a Court fee of Rs. 10 as the Court fee pavable on the memorandum of appeal filed before the High Court if the order relates to a suit or proceeding the value of which exceeds rs. 1,000 and if there is no other provision governing it. ( 3 ) THE office having raised objection regarding the valuation given by the appellants in the memorandum of appeal, the above case has been placed before us for decision. ( 4 ) SRI D. S. Lingappa, the learned Counsel for the appellants, relied on an order passed by this Court in Kamala Devi v. The Mahaboob Shahi kulbatga Mitts, RFA. 3/70 and 75/69 dt. 5-1-1970, in which a similar question arose for consideration. The order passed by Narayana Pai, J. as he then was, reads as follows :"kamaladevi named above has obtained a decree for Rs. 3/70 and 75/69 dt. 5-1-1970, in which a similar question arose for consideration. The order passed by Narayana Pai, J. as he then was, reads as follows :"kamaladevi named above has obtained a decree for Rs. 2,10,675- 60p against the Mahaboob Shahi Kulbarga Mills Ltd. , the appellant in RFA. 75 of 1969. The trial Court granted two years time to the mills to pay the decree amount. "2. The judgment-debtor, the mills, has presented the appeal questioning the merits of the trial Court's findings. The appeal of kamaladevi, decree-holder, is limited to the direction for postponing the payment of the decree amount. 3. The question of Court fee involved in her appeal is whether she is right in paying the fixed Court fee of Rs. 10 under Art. 3 (iii), (1) (a) of the Second Schedule appended to the Mysore Court Fees and Suits Valuation, Act, 1958. 4. The appellant Kamaladevi does not question in her grounds of appeal, the correctness of any of the findings of the trial Court on the merits of the case. The only substantial ground is that the direction of the Court granting time to the defendant is one made without jurisdiction and not consistent with the other findings on the merits of the case. Under the Article mentioned above, a Court fee of Rs. 10 has to be paid when an appeal is presented to the High Court in cases among others for which no provision is made in the Court Fees Act. ( 5 ) THE Registrar in the Note of Return suggests that a Court fee of Rs. 200 is payable under Expln. 4 to S. 49 read with S. 47 of the court Fees Act. S. 49 deals with appeals. The principal rule laid down by it is that in normal circumstances Court fee for an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable, in the Court of first instance, and then adds certain Explanations to provide for cases where the entire decree is not questioned in appeal but the challenge is limited to certain parts thereof. Explanation 4 reads : 'where the relief prayed for in the appeal is different from the relief prayed for or refused in the Court of first instance, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the relief prayed for in the appeal'. ( 6 ) EXCEPT that the relief prayed for in the appeal is not the same as any of the reliefs prayed for in the trial Court, we find it difficult to see how this Explanation can be made applicable to this case. . The grievance of the appellant arises not in respect of any relief that was or could have been valued while presenting the plaint itself. Actually, so, far as the principal relief is concerned, the plaintiff is satisfied with the decree as made by the trial Court. ( 7 ) IN view of these peculiar circumstances, the proper view to take is that the appeal is one in respect of which there is no specific provision made in the Court Fees Act for computation of the Court fee. ( 8 ) THE reference to S. 47 in the Registrar's Note is wrong. The only apparent justification therefor being the time granted by the trial Court and objected to by the appellant may be regarded as controlling to some extent execution proceedings. We are however clear in our mind that no considerations relating to execution can be brought into the discussion of proper Court fee payable in this case. ( 9 ) IN, these circumstances, we accept the, valuation made by the appellant as correct and hold that the Court fee already paid is sufficient. " even though the appeal in the present case, is filed by the defendants against whom a decree has been passed, we are of the opinion- that" the order passed by this Court in RFA. 3 of 1970 connected with RFA. 75 of 1969 (1) which is extracted above, would govern the question of valuation of the appeal. The appellants have confined this appeal only to the question whether they should be permitted to pay the decretal amount in instalments or not. They are, however, not disputing the liability to pay the decretal amount. 3 of 1970 connected with RFA. 75 of 1969 (1) which is extracted above, would govern the question of valuation of the appeal. The appellants have confined this appeal only to the question whether they should be permitted to pay the decretal amount in instalments or not. They are, however, not disputing the liability to pay the decretal amount. In the circumstances, we hold that this is a case in respect of which there is no special provision providing for tile valuation of the appeal in the Mysore Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 and hence it falls under Art. 3 (iii) (1) (a) of Sch. II of the Act. The Court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal is held to be sufficient. --- *** --- .