T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an acquittal appeal preferred by the State Government against the respondent who was tried for having committed offence under sec. 135 (b) of the Customs Act 1962 (Act 52 of 1962) and sec. 85 (ii) of Gold Control Act 1968 (Act 45 of 1968 ). The respondentaccused was tried for the said offences by the court of J. M. F. C. at Bhavnagar in Criminal case No. 2432/70 and was convicted for the same. He was sentenced by the learned Magistrate to suffer R. I. of 6 months and to payment of fine of Rs. 100/for each of the two offences. The learned Magistrate further ordered the substantive sentences to run concurrently. Against this order of conviction and sentence the respondent preferred an appeal to the court of the Sessions Judge Bhavnagar where the said appeal was registered as Criminal Appeal No. 65/71. The learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the contraband articles which consist of five bars of gold were not proved beyond reasonable doubt to have been recovered from the possession of the present respondent. He further found that sec. 123 of the Customs Act which shifts the burden of proof in cases where articles are seized by an authorised officer in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods does not apply to the facts of the case. Under the circumstances the learned Sessions judge has further held that it was for the prosecution to prove that the golden bars which are said to have been seized from the possession of the respondent were smuggled goods and since there was no such proof offered by the prosecution the conviction of the respondent under sec. 135 (b) of the Customs Act could not have been made by the learned Magistrate. In view of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge was also of the opinion that the prosecution has failed in proving that the articles in question were found from the possession of the respondent he also set aside his conviction under sec. 85 (ii) of the Gold Control Act. He has thus acquitted the respondent-accused and being aggrieved by this decision the State Government has preferred this acquittal appeal. ( 2 ) BEFORE discussing the points which are involved in this appeal it would be necessary to state shortly some facts relevant to these points. 85 (ii) of the Gold Control Act. He has thus acquitted the respondent-accused and being aggrieved by this decision the State Government has preferred this acquittal appeal. ( 2 ) BEFORE discussing the points which are involved in this appeal it would be necessary to state shortly some facts relevant to these points. The prosecution witness Mahipatsing Balubha Zala whose deposition appears at ex. 10 in the record of the case received an information on or about 13 July 1968 that the respondent-accused was dealing in smuggling of gold and that be was to arrive at Bhavnagar with this gold. He therefore is said to have kept a watch at Bhavnagar railway station as well as State Transport Bus Station. The facts of the case reveal that on 12th July 1968 the respondent-accused left Bombay in the evening by train and arrived at Ahmedabad at about 6. 00 a. m. in the morning of the following day. He got down at Ahmedabad and got State Transport bus bound for Mahuva. He got down at Bhavnagar on that very day at about 11. 30 a. m. It is said that one sepoy belonging to the excise department named Anandsinh suspected the respondent-accused and therefore kept his track. The accused however took a tonga along with another passenger named Naradlal Labhashanker whose deposition appears at ex. 16 in the record of the case. So the tonga which was hired by the respondent-accused was occupied by accused himself and the prosecution witness Naradlal. When this tonga reached near the place which is known as Motibag the prosecution witness Mahipatsinh Zala who was at that time serving as Inspector Central Excise stopped the said tonga and inquired from the accused as well as his companion Naradlal whether they were in possession of any smuggled gold. As both of them refused to be in possession of smuggled gold he took the tonga to his office which is situated in Darbargadh. His sepoy Anandsinh occupied that tonga in the front seat near the driver. After they reached the office of Superintendent of Excise one Mr. Trivedi and two other panchas were called. Even Naradlal who was the companion of the respondent-accused in the tonga was taken as the third panch. In presence of these panchas the belongings of the accused were searched. After they reached the office of Superintendent of Excise one Mr. Trivedi and two other panchas were called. Even Naradlal who was the companion of the respondent-accused in the tonga was taken as the third panch. In presence of these panchas the belongings of the accused were searched. The case of the prosecution is that the accused was in possession of a portfolio made of raxine and on opening of that portfolio in presence of the panchas a raincoat was found. Searching the pockets of this raincoat the panchas laid their hands on a packet from one of these pockets. On the opening of this packet five bars of gold weighing 10 tolas with foreign marks thereon were found. Even other articles namely a diary two chits and a postcard which are said to be belonging to the accused were found from that portfolio. Thereafter with a view to verify whether the five bars of gold were manufactured in India or abroad two Goldsmiths from the town were called. According to the information which is said to have been given by these goldsmiths those bars contained 24 carats of gold and the total weight thereof was 583. 190 grams. Their value at the market price was assessed at Rs. 9 250 The goldsmiths gave an opinion that the bars were manufactured abroad. Thereafter these bars were seized by Inspector Mr. Zala and a panchnama evidencing all these facts was recorded. This panchnama is found at ex. 44 in the record of the case. ( 3 ) IT is further found that on the same day soon after the panchnama was over the Superintendent Central Excise one Mr. Mafatshanker Prabhashanker Trivedi whose deposition appears at ex. 20 recorded a detailed statement of the accused as found at ex. 5. During the course of this statement the accused admitted the ownership of the raxine portfolio from which the contraband articles were found. But he showed his unwillingness to reveal from which source he had purchased the bars of gold which were found from his possession. ( 4 ) AFTER all these formalities were over departmental proceedings against the respondent-accused were undertaken by the Collectorate Central Excise. At ex. 14 we find in the record of the case a copy of an order recorded by Assistant Collector of Customs Rajkot under sec. 111 of the Customs Act read with sec. ( 4 ) AFTER all these formalities were over departmental proceedings against the respondent-accused were undertaken by the Collectorate Central Excise. At ex. 14 we find in the record of the case a copy of an order recorded by Assistant Collector of Customs Rajkot under sec. 111 of the Customs Act read with sec. 23a of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 regarding the absolute confiscation of all the five gold bars which are said to have been found from the possession of the accused. By this order he also imposed a penalty of Rs. 500/under sec. 112 of the Customs Act. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER in the month of September 1970 the Additional Collector of Central Excise of the Collectorate Baroda accorded sanction for filing this complaint for offence under sec. 135 of the Customs Act. A similar sanction was also accorded by him for prosecuting the accused for offence under sec. 85 of the Gold Control Act. It was pursuant to these sanctions that the trial ultimately took place before the learned J. M. F. C. Bhavnagar. [ The Honourable Court after discussing the evidence held that the learned Sessions Judge had wrongly found that the prosecution has failed to prove that the 5 bars of gold were recovered from the possession of the accused. The Honourable Court was of the opinion that the finding of the learned Judge was liable to be set aside then Honourable Court further observed. ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) THEN the question which arises to be considered is whether the respondent-accused is found to have committed the offence contemplated by sec. 135 (b) of the Customs Act. This section provides that if any person acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying removing depositing harbouring keeping concealing selling or purchasing or in any other manner dealing with any goods which he knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under sec. 111 he shall be punishable with the punishment which is provided in clause (i) and (ii) of the section. Therefore in order to prove the offence contemplated by clause (b) of sec. 111 he shall be punishable with the punishment which is provided in clause (i) and (ii) of the section. Therefore in order to prove the offence contemplated by clause (b) of sec. 135 the prosecution has to prove that the respondent-accused was in possession of or was carrying the goods which he had reason to believe were liable to confiscation under sec. 111 of the Act. If a reference is made to sec. 111 of the Act it will be found that it provides for confiscation of the improperly imported goods. Therefore if the five bars of gold which the respondent-accused was found carrying with him held to be the goods which were improperly imported then they would be liable to confiscation and the accused would be liable to be punished under sec. 135 of the Customs Act. The question is whether these five gold bars can be held to be the goods which were improperly imported. While considering this question we have to bear in mind the rule of evidence which is specifically provided for under the Customs Act by sec. 123 which says that where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized. Therefore if the case can be brought within the ambit of sec. 123 of the Customs Act then the prosecution can successfully contend that there is a presumption that the goods in question are smuggled goods and that so long as this presumption is not rebutted by the defence it should be believed that they are the goods which are liable to confiscation under sec. 111 of the Act and that they are also the goods the possessor or the carrier of which would be liable to be punished under sec. 135 (b) of the Act. Therefore the whole controversy ranges round the question whether sec. 123 of the Customs Act has got any application to the facts of the present case. ( 7 ) BEFORE stating the points which are raised by Shri Mehta on behalf of the respondent-accused to show that sec. 135 (b) of the Act. Therefore the whole controversy ranges round the question whether sec. 123 of the Customs Act has got any application to the facts of the present case. ( 7 ) BEFORE stating the points which are raised by Shri Mehta on behalf of the respondent-accused to show that sec. 123 does not apply to the facts of this case it would be necessary to analyse the section itself and to consider under what circumstances the provisions of this section would come into play. In order to have clear idea of the implications of this section it would not be out of place to quote the same which is in the following terms:123 (1) Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized. (2)This section shall apply to gold diamonds manufactures of gold or diamonds watches and any other class of goods which the Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette specify. This section obviously contemplates the seizure of the goods only under the provisions of Customs Act 1962 Therefore if the seizure is not made under the provisions of the Act this section would not come into play. So far as the facts of this case are concerned it cannot be gainsaid that the five disputed bars of gold have been seized under the provisions of the Customs Act. The section further provides that the seizure in question should be in the reasonable belief that they (goods) are smuggled goods. Therefore a mere seizure under the Act would not be sufficient for bringing the provisions of this section into play. The prosecution has further to prove that the seizure of the goods was made in the reasonable belief that the goods in question were smuggled goods. The expression reasonable belief postulates two things namely (1) the existence of a belief that the goods are smuggled goods and (2) the said belief should not be capricious or whimsical but should be reasonable. The expression reasonable belief postulates two things namely (1) the existence of a belief that the goods are smuggled goods and (2) the said belief should not be capricious or whimsical but should be reasonable. Therefore over and above proving that the goods are seized under the Act the persecution has to prove not only the existence of the belief that the goods were smuggled goods but also that such a belief was a reasonable one. ( 8 ) NOW the contention which is raised by Shri Mehta on behalf of the respondent-accused is that if we make a reference to the deposition of Inspector Zala who has seized the goods in question we find that there is no statement made by him throughout his deposition to show that he entertained a belief that the goods in question were smuggled goods. In this connection Shri Mehta further pointed out that the beliefs which is contemplated by this section is purely a subjective belief of the officer who seizes the goods in question and therefore unless that officer clearly and specifically states in his deposition that he had actually acted under a reasonable belief the existence of that belief cannot be inferred either from his conduct or from other circumstances of the case. According to Shri Mehta therefore it should be held by this court that one of the pre-requisites contemplated by sec. 123 of the Customs Act namely the existence of the belief that the goods in question were smuggled goods is wanting and if that is so no burden is cast on the accused to show that the goods which were found from his possession were not smuggled goods. ( 9 ) IT is undoubtedly true that the existence of the belief on the part of the officer who seizes the contraband goods that these goods were smuggled goods is one of the main pre-requisites contemplated by sec. 123 and so long as this pre-requisite is not satisfied the accused cannot be called upon to prove that the goods were not smuggled. It is therefore necessary to see whether the evidence which is recorded by the trial court possesses sufficient material from which the existence of the belief in question can be pointed out. 123 and so long as this pre-requisite is not satisfied the accused cannot be called upon to prove that the goods were not smuggled. It is therefore necessary to see whether the evidence which is recorded by the trial court possesses sufficient material from which the existence of the belief in question can be pointed out. But the contention of Shri Mehta that this can be pointed out only if the officer concerned specifically says so in his deposition requires a closer scrutiny. Before entering into that scrutiny it would first be necessary to state what Shri Zala who had seized these goods has stated in his deposition which is found at ex. 10. The relevant portion of this deposition on this point is as under:"on 13-7-68 I was serving at Bhavnagar. I was incharge of flying squad. I had received information that the accused is dealing in smuggling gold and on 13-7-68 we had kept a watch. I was going from Jilla Panchayat to Motibag. I came across one Tanga and I saw the person for whom the information was given. In near of me one inspector sepoy were coming behind the tonga and they gave me signal and I stopped that tonga and the accused and other person were sitting. I inquired about the smuggled gold but they refused and I took the tonga at our office. My office is in Darbargadh. We took both persons to our office upstairs the accused was in possession of one black packet and cloth beg. Supdt. Shri Trivedi was in our office and he was informed previously and I informed him about the incident. Then panchas were called and other man was asked to pose a pose as he was a passenger. He agreed to appear as a panch. His name Naradbhai U. Pandya. We called other two panchas and I started to search the black packet and out of it one Rakzin raincoat was recovered and from the packets of this coat one weighty packet was recovered and it was opened in the presence of panchas and accused and Supdt. Five ingots of gold were recovered each was weighing ten tolas. 4 Ingots bore the mark 999 credit susu; and one bore Shefial London. They were shown to the panchas. Five ingots of gold were recovered each was weighing ten tolas. 4 Ingots bore the mark 999 credit susu; and one bore Shefial London. They were shown to the panchas. We called two choksy from Nanavati bazar as a panch and it was confirmed that the ingots were foreign ingots of 24 carret gold. Mr. Trivedi asked the accused about any permit to possess any foreign gold to which he refused. On inquiry one diary was recovered from the black pocket and one diary two chits and one postcard were recovered and five gold ingots. Raincoat Diary chits and post-card all attached under a panchnama. The gold ingots were taken in a small tin pot. It was sealed after stitching it in a cloth and took the signatures of the panchas. It is clear from this deposition of the witness that he has not uttered the exact words that he seized the gold in question because he was under a belief that it was smuggled. However the deposition does disclose the facts which would prove the belief which prompted him to seize the goods. But since Shri Mehtas contention is that this belief being personal only to the officer concerned can be proved only through the uttered words and not through his conduct or other attendant circumstances of the case it will be necessary to consider how far this proposition is acceptable. ( 10 ) AS we have already pointed out what sec. 123 of the Act requires is the finding that the officer seizing the goods had a belief that they were smuggled goods. In other words if the prosecution wants to avail of the provisions of sec. 123 it should prove as a fact that such a belief was in existence at the time when the goods were seized. Sec. 123 does not provide for any particular mode of proof of the existence of that belief. According to law of evidence as contained in sec. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act a fact is said to be proved when after considering the matters before it the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the supposition that it exists. Therefore if one wants to prove that the belief contemplated by sec. Therefore if one wants to prove that the belief contemplated by sec. 123 of the Customs Act was in existence at a particular point of time he can request the court to consider all the matters before it and to draw proper inferences therefrom regarding the existence of the fact in question as would be done by a prudent man. It would not therefore be correct to say that the factual existence of a belief contemplated by sec. 123 of the Act can be proved only by a direct assertion of the same by the person having that belief. Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act provides the standard of proof in all cases and for all matters irrespective of the question whether the fact which is required to be found is subjective or objective in its character. It cannot be disputed that a belief which is contemplated by sec. 123 of the Act is subjective in its character. But as said above even subjective facts can be proved in the same manner in which all other facts are proved. Therefore it would not be a correct approach to say that such facts can be established only through spoken words and not through any other material found in the record of the case. ( 11 ) IN this connection it would not be out of place to consider what is exactly a belief which is entertained by a particular person. Belief is after all a condition of mind which can be expressed either through words or through a course of conduct. It cannot be gainsaid that words and conduct are merely two different forms of expression of the inner condition of mind. There is no reason therefore to prefer one form to the other. Sometimes both the forms are useful and sometimes any one of them is found useful. But to say that one form should be preferred to the other is to discard some fundamental principles of appreciation of evidence. Therefore in order to establish the existence of a particular belief one need not always search for the actual words through which the said belief is expressed because? for ought we know a liar may successfully conceal his real belief from the words which be chooses to utter. In such cases his course of conduct may speak more eloquently about the real nature of his belief. for ought we know a liar may successfully conceal his real belief from the words which be chooses to utter. In such cases his course of conduct may speak more eloquently about the real nature of his belief. Speech is not the only vehicle of expression of a belief and it cannot be gainsaid that action as revealed through a particular course of conduct is as good a vehicle of expression of belief as speech. Therefore even a subjective belief can be proved not only through oral assertion about his existence but also through a course of conduct adopted by the subject concerned. ( 12 ) IF this be so we have to consider whether in this case the prosecution has been able to prove even in absence of a specific oral assertion of the witness Zala in that behalf that he seized the gold under a belief that it was smuggled. In our opinion such a proof is available from the following facts and the course of conduct adopted by the witness just before the actual seizure of the disputed five bars of gold. ( 13 ) FROM the above narrated portion of the deposition of the witness it is clear that he had received an information that the accused was dealing in gold smuggling. It was pursuant to this information that he arranged for a watch at the bus station as well as at railway station. This watch was kept by sepoy Anandsinh and after the accused travelled a little in the tonga hired by him he was intercepted by witness Zala. Thereafter the witness made an inquiry as to whether the accused and his colleague were in possession of smuggled golds whereupon both of them denied being in possession of any smuggled gold. They were thereafter taken by the witness to his office. Then the raincoat which was in possession of the accused was searched in presence of the panchas and actually the five bars of gold containing foreign marks were found in the possession of the accused. Witness thereafter called two goldsmiths to ascertain whether these bars were manufactured in India or abroad. After obtaining the opinion of these goldsmiths he is found to have made inquiry from the accused whether he was holding any permit. The accused did not give any satisfactory answer. Witness thereafter called two goldsmiths to ascertain whether these bars were manufactured in India or abroad. After obtaining the opinion of these goldsmiths he is found to have made inquiry from the accused whether he was holding any permit. The accused did not give any satisfactory answer. It was thereafter that he actually seized the goods in question This is the course of conduct of an officer who having received an information that the accused was dealing in smuggling of gold goes through various proceedings takes various steps makes a specific inquiry whether the accused was in possession of smuggled gold and ultimately finds that he was in possession of five bars of gold with foreign markings which were certified by two goldsmiths as the gold manufactured abroad and finally seizes these articles. In our opinion all these facts taken together establish beyond doubt the course of conduct of a man who was under a belief that goods in question were smuggled goods. It is not a mere fact of seizure from which this inference is drawn. As already stated above the conduct exhibited by a person is sometimes more eloquent than his words. So far as this case is concerned we fail to understand what difference a mere oral assertion by this witness about the existence of the required belief would have made in view of the above referred consistent course of conduct. In absence of the proof of this conduct the said oral assertion of the witness would amount to only an utterance of empty words which would not carry any conviction while the oral assertion coupled with the proof of this conduct would be a mere surplusage. Finding of a fact from recorded evidence is not a matter of mere formality because it is the substance of evidence which matters. If this substance clearly bring about the existence of a fact-whether it is a subjective fact or an objective fact it does not matter if that fact is not directly derived from spoken words. Under these circumstances we are satisfied that when the witness Shri Zala seized the disputed gold he did so under the belief that the gold was smuggled. ( 14 ) BEFORE parting with this point we would like to refer to a decision given by a Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in Manka v. The State and another 1961 (2) Cri. ( 14 ) BEFORE parting with this point we would like to refer to a decision given by a Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in Manka v. The State and another 1961 (2) Cri. L. J. 406. We specifically refer to this decision because on persual of the facts of that case we find that they were to some extent similar to the facts of the present case and also because are argument similar to the one which is advanced by Shri Mehta on behalf of the respondent was also canvassed and found favour with the learned Judge of that High Court who has decided that case. ( 15 ) THE facts of that case reveal that two excise officers named Bhanwar Lal and Jindal were examined as prosecution witnesses and neither of them stated that he seized the goods in the reasonable belief that they were smuggled goods. It was contended that in absence of any direct evidence of the seizing officers that they did entertain such a belief it cannot be said that one of the important pre-requisites of sec. 123 was proved. The learned Judge who decided that case observed as under while accepting the contention advanced on behalf of the accused. " it will be seen that neither of the two officers stated that he seized the gold in the reasonable belief that it was smuggled. The evidence and circumstances appearing in the statements of these two officers are such that it was possible for them to have entertained a reasonable belief that the gold recovered from the posses sion of Manka was smuggled gold. But whether or not they did actually entertain such a belief or merely a suspicion they alone could have known. The court can only infer on the basis of the evidence and circumstances proved in the case whether there were reasonable grounds existing on the basis of which the officers could have entertained a reasonable belief. But the court cannot say whether or not they did entertain such a belief or merely a suspicion. Belief is a subjective matter. For a belief to exist there must be a believer and it is that believer who must believe that the gold is smuggled sold at the time he seizes them. Then alone the provisions of sec. 178a are attracted. Belief is a subjective matter. For a belief to exist there must be a believer and it is that believer who must believe that the gold is smuggled sold at the time he seizes them. Then alone the provisions of sec. 178a are attracted. "with great respect to the learned Judge we find ourselves unable to accept the proposition that the existence of a belief which is a matter of fact can be discovered only through spoken words of a witness. We have given our reasons why a course of conduct expressed by that very witness would some times be more eloquent and would be supplying a very dependable evidence about the fact in question. We do agree that the belief is purely a subjective matter and that it is for the believer himself to express that he entertained that belief. But the question is not who should express the belief in question. The question is whether that expression can be made only by spoken words or even by other methods. It is undoubtedly true that spoken words would furnish direct evidence on the point. But if the course of conduct is such which can successfully lead the court to a finding about the existence of the belief then we see no reason why that conduct cannot be taken into account. Whether a particular set of conduct is sufficient for proving the existence of belief depends purely on facts of each case and looking to the facts of the present case we do find that the five bars of gold which were recovered from the possession of the respondent-accused were seized by the Inspector Shri Zala only under a belief that they were smuggled goods. In our opinion therefore this requisite of sec. 123 is proved. ( 16 ) BUT this does not solve our problem because the question which still remains to be decided is whether this belief was reasonable. This is the second requirement of sec. 123. The Legislature is found to have directed that a mere belief of an officer that the goods in question are smuggled would not do as that belief should be based on some reason. In other words the belief contemplated by sec. 123 is not the belief of a man who just acts at whatever information he gets. 123. The Legislature is found to have directed that a mere belief of an officer that the goods in question are smuggled would not do as that belief should be based on some reason. In other words the belief contemplated by sec. 123 is not the belief of a man who just acts at whatever information he gets. The said belief must rest on some information which is not only relevant but which is found to be more than a mere gossip or speculation. In other words the formation of the belief should not be based on a mere caprice speculation or whim. The use of the adjective reasonable with reference to the belief that the goods are smuggled is indicative of the limitation of an otherwise arbitrary power. The legislature has therefore put an effective check on an arbitrary use of this power which results in shifting of burden of proof even in criminal cases. Therefore the reasonableness of the belief that the goods are smuggled is a matter of judicial scrutiny. In Barium Chemicals Ltd. and another v. Company Law Board and others A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 295 Shelat J. has explained that the words reason to believe or in the opinion of do not always lead to the construction that the process of entertaining belief or opinion was not formed on relevant facts. It therefore cannot be disputed that it is not for the officer who entertains a particular belief to be the sole judge about its reasonableness. But the scrutiny of the court which is contemplated is not the scrutiny of an appellate authority because the expression reasonable belief is surcharged with the subjective approach of the officer who entertains the belief. Therefore what the court should scrutinise is only to see whether the belief on which the concerned officer has acted was a belief which could have been entertained by a reasonable and a prudent man. It is from this aspect of the matter that we now proceed to consider whether the belief entertained by Inspector Shri Zala was a reasonable one. ( 17 ) TO determine this question we have again to recapitulate the facts of the case. Shri Zala the Inspector was supplied with a definite information that the accused was smuggling in gold. It was for him to decide whether he should act upon this information or not. ( 17 ) TO determine this question we have again to recapitulate the facts of the case. Shri Zala the Inspector was supplied with a definite information that the accused was smuggling in gold. It was for him to decide whether he should act upon this information or not. If he has decided to act upon the information received by him it would not be for this court to tell him whether he should not have so acted for the simple reason that the belief which was entertained by him was purely a subjective matter. But the formation of the final belief of the officer was not based merely on the information which he received. In order to verify the information which he received he arranged a watch both at the railway station and at the bus station. As a result of this watch he found the accused going in a tonga. After receiving a signal from his sepoy Anandsinh he intercepted this tonga and then made an inquiry whether any of the occupants of the tonga was in possession of smuggled gold. The accused and his companion refused to have been in possession of any smuggled gold. He thereafter took them to his office and searched the belongings of the accused and actually found the accused in possession of five bars of gold bearing foreign marks on them. Even at this stage he has not taken the final step of seizing the articles. In order to verify his belief that the articles (gold bars) were smuggled he called two goldsmiths. He obtained their opinion and then inquired from the accused whether he was in possession of a permit. It was after collecting this data that he finally formed a belief that the goods were smuggled goods and should therefore be seized. From these facts can it be said that the officer concerned had no reason to entertain a belief that the gold found in possession of the accused was smuggled ? In our opinion the answer to this question should be in the negative. We are therefore of the opinion that the belief which was entertained by the Inspector Shri Zala was reasonable. ( 18 ) IN view of this it must follow that sec. In our opinion the answer to this question should be in the negative. We are therefore of the opinion that the belief which was entertained by the Inspector Shri Zala was reasonable. ( 18 ) IN view of this it must follow that sec. 123 of the Customs Act applies fully to the facts of the case and if that be so the burden of proving that the seized bars of gold were not smuggled would be on the respondent-accused He has obviously not discharged this burden and therefore his conviction under sec. 135 (b) of the Act should follow. Acquittal set aside: Sentences to three months imprisonment: Leave to appeal refused. .